

DANGERS

OF A

FALSE PEACE

By Frank Kingdon

PEACE, if this be any comfort to her, has this much in common with God, that many speak her name and few take her demands seriously. Many a man has won a reputation for piety by being thoroughly negative, and thus never doing anything, which includes never doing anything which can be laid to him as blame. He could be accused of no sin because he could be accused of no action. He never fought a thief, or accused an exploiter of the public's trust, or raised his voice or hand against any living man, therefore he proved that he loved everybody, and was reputed to be godly indeed. "I never heard him say a harsh word against anybody" is an encomium I have often heard, but it always leaves me wondering why the man of whom it is said has never met some of the people I have known, to describe whom commendation would be about as adequate as a lead pencil to depict a sunset. I have a persistent conviction that doing the will of God sometimes involves taking a positive stand, and even occasionally taking thought, and that one's godliness is not necessarily directly in ratio to one's inaction.

The reason for this homily is that I am being continually confronted by public men who demand of me to answer why I am opposed to them when all they have sought during the past few years has been peace. They love peace. They want the United States to live in peace. Peace is their evensong and their matin. Therefore, during the last two or three years they have spoken and voted against any action on the part of the United States that would involve it in anything going on anywhere else in the world. They have served peace, they claim, by a vigorous advocacy of doing nothing. Their logic seems to be: peace is the absence of war; we cannot make war if we are unprepared for

it; therefore let us stay unprepared for war and, *ipso facto*, we are at peace. They have refused to vote for the extension of the Selective Service Act, thus preventing us from having a trained army; therefore they are the men of peace, for obviously if we do not have an army we cannot have war. They have safeguarded every American home against losing its loved ones, they argue, because they have insisted that the United States should call no man from civilian life into the armed services. But they ignored every voice that cried of our danger from those who kill and enslave civilians as well as soldiers.

These patriots who now stand on platforms and beat their breasts with virtuous thumps, acclaiming that their muddle-headedness was no more than a sincere attempt to save us from the agony of war, were mistaken in only one point: we do not live in this round world alone. Old Daniel Webster could stand on the floor of the Senate, thrust his fingers in his waistcoat, and thank God that we are not as other men, especially those involved in the bitter feuds of ancient Europe, but that we have the two oceans to separate us forever from the battles that sow the other continents with blood. But his phrases are as outworn as his smallclothes. No modern Senator can echo him with any sense; not even the Honorable Hiram from California, nor the "Gentleman" from Montana, nor the senior Senator from Ohio. We simply do not live in Daniel Webster's world. We are a part of the ache and tragedy of all humanity. The bombs that detonated on Madrid shook our own floors, and the guns firing on Shanghai rattled our own windows.

We do not make peace in our time by confronting with an umbrella the man with a sword. We make peace only by disarming him.

Once the spark is fanned to flame in our day, every man's house is threatened, and the fire will not die until all households are united to put out the blaze and to subdue the arsonist. The trouble with all those who thought that we could stay at peace while the rest of the world warred was that they did not understand the kind of world in which we are living. They were nineteenth century men unable to cope with a twentieth century world. Even while they professed to love peace they betrayed her.

Now we must win the war for which they kept us unprepared. No falser peace could be contemplated than one leaving the issue undecided at this juncture between the men of freedom and the tyrants. Whatever we may or may not say about our enemy, he is in earnest. He may be fanatic, or even psychopathic, but this is beside the point, for he is all out to get what he wants and to make this the kind of world in which he will be sure to get what he wants. We charge him with ruthlessness and cruelty. They sound to us like criminal accusations. But they are the by-products of determination, of a will that brooks no hindrance, and so what to us looks like criminality seems to him to be virtue. We cannot persuade him. We must beat him. He will not let us live or do business our way unless we do. This is why no man is fit to lead us in the making of the peace who does not enter with all his heart into the winning of the war. The peace of the appeaser is not peace at all. It is the interlude between wars. The more clearly a man sees the nature of the war the more lucidly will he comprehend the necessary nature of the peace. A bad peace will generate new and more terrible wars.

There are those, for example, who see this as no more than a struggle for power between nations. They will look upon any peace as good if it assures in their eyes the supremacy of their own nations in the post-war period. They see Germany, the nation, as the devil in the situation, and will be satisfied with any peace that reduces Germany to a broken or a satellite state. Vansittart in Britain is the prime example of their ilk. He maintains that we shall solve our problems if only we break Germany up into little ineffective states after the war. Let us cut this monster into small pieces, he says, and never again shall it be able to threaten the peace of the nations. To those who are moved by vengeance this sounds like a reasonable end for the people that they hate. Actu-

ally, however, it can project but two outcomes. First is the end that they think, consciously or subconsciously, it will serve, namely the continuance of their nations in their present positions of superiority. Men find it sweet to belong to peoples that are powerful among the nations, and such men look upon the rise of another state as a kind of impertinence that must be punished, or as a threat that at all costs must be destroyed. When they talk about preserving civilization they mean keeping the *status quo*, and when they appeal to morality they intend to praise a system that keeps them in the place of dominance. They are nationalists of the old order with all the obstinacy and shortsightedness of members of a specially privileged group. The outcome they hope for, therefore, is one in which they will be able to enforce their will upon a world at their feet. Temporarily they may have such a world. What they, in common with all Bourbons cannot grasp, is that such a world cannot last. To dismember Germany is to deny history. She is what she is, and what she is she will be. The triumphs of Bismarck and his successors are too deeply grooved into the flesh and blood of the whole German people for any dismemberment of Germany to produce anything but a restless and festering discontent. They will rebel at any partition in exactly the same way as any other people would rebel at it. So the second outcome of a policy aimed at perpetuating the old divisions of power would be the creation of an area of permanent discontent in the very heart of Europe.

To affirm this is not to assert that nationalism as we have known it must be continued in the post-war world, but it is to recognize that nationhood as a fact in human experience cannot be ignored. The paradox of the peace in a certain sense is that it both has to recognize nationalism and to disarm it. I try to make the distinction in my own thinking by saying that nationality must survive but that nationalism must not. What I mean is that the social experiences through which men identify themselves with specific groups are not only historically real but culturally dynamic. Occasionally an individual comes along who is able to identify himself with all humanity and to find the full satisfaction of his personality in this wide frame of reference, but such people are rare even among men of genius. Most inspired men find their spark in a local habitation and a home, and in speaking for the particular place they know, express something which belongs to uni-

versal experience. Shakespeare was an Englishman, Goethe a German, and Burns a Scotsman. They were men of localities. What in them rose to the level of genius, in most men is the highest inspiration they know. Nationality is one expression of the diversity that gives both character and color to human living. In this sense nationality should be preserved. Outrage is done to actual motivations of the spirit when national bonds are denied. Such dismemberment works violence upon people to such a degree that they will be continuously in revolt against it. Instead, therefore, of a program for the dismemberment of Germany being one that gives promise of peace it is actually only an assurance of continuous war.

II

THE trouble with Vansittart is that he has seen the evil of our times, but he has called it by its wrong name. It is not Germany that has to be dismembered, but nationalism as contrasted with nationality that has to be disarmed. By nationalism I mean the distortion of pride in nationality into a desire to dominate all other nations in the struggle for power. It is nationality turned into a weapon of selfishness, of group advantage over all other groups. As such, nationalism has been the root of many fallacies that have brought our society to its present chaos. National sovereignty, the unlimited right of any people to do what it thinks best for its own advantage, even to the starting of wars, is one. Economic nationalism, that has prevented the free flow of trade through all quarters of the world, is another. Colonization, with its twin evils of ignorance and special privilege, is a third. The whole mischievous theory of strategic boundary lines is a fourth. Just to mention these is to make clear that Germany has followed the evil logic of nationalism with a blinder faith than other nations, but we shall not cure the evil by cutting up its chief exponent. That we can do only by modifying the thing itself.

Evidence for this assertion may be found in the fact that those who fight Germany for nationalistic reasons themselves fall into the snare of the fallacies of nazism. Vansittart is basically accepting the nazi philosophy when he advocates dismembering his fallen foe and reducing his victims to the level of chattel slaves. This is exactly what Germany has done to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and France. He is false

to his own repugnance of the methods of the Nazis when he adopts them for his own in dealing with the Nazis, yet he is logical if he proceeds on the same premise of nationalism on which they proceed. We are agreed that we cannot build a good peace in a nazi world. We must recognize that we cannot do any better in any chauvinistically nationalist world, for it amounts to the same thing.

The same tendency of those who think nationalistically to go over to the nazi philosophy is evident among the group who talk about the Germans being endemically brutal. Brutality is no monopoly of the Germans. To contrast them to their disadvantage with the so-called heirs of the Mediterranean tradition is to overlook the patent fact that fascism got its start in Italy under a gangster whose record is less bloody than Hitler's only to the extent that his resources were poorer. Hitler went to school to Mussolini, and both found their textbook in Machiavelli. To divide humanity into Germans and non-Germans, with all the virtues on our side, and with evil in the blood-stream of the Germans, is exactly the same kind of mental process that leads the Nazis to divide the world into Jews and non-Jews. A racial theory of that unscientific kind gains no validity because the terms are changed. It is dangerous and stupid prejudice on both sides. The German people are people. They have not been isolated in history. Their blood flows in the veins of every nation in Europe, therefore, to treat them as a "race" apart is false to history, to anthropology, and to good sense. A peace that is founded upon any such nonsense will be as unjust and unproductive as would be a peace based on the inferiority of any other "race."

Nobody could even think in these unrealistic terms unless he had first fallen victim to the virus of nationalism. The question of a good peace comes down to what we can do about this basic poison. How can we preserve the values of nationality yet save ourselves from the evils of nationalism? This looks like a stupendous question. As a matter of fact, it is not as difficult as it seems. This is not the first time that men have had to find a way of reconciling these alternatives. Seven hundred years ago, Switzerland confronted it and brought into being the Confederation that has lasted ever since. We ourselves had to find an answer to the same problem and we produced the United States. Great Britain has had to deal with the demands of her colonies to be recog-

nized as equal partners in the Empire and has evolved the British Commonwealth of Nations. Each of these unions differs from the others, which shows that not only can the dilemma be solved but that there is more than one way of doing it.

To say that these are not adequate examples because of the homogeneity of the peoples involved, or because of the limitations of territory taken in, is to convict oneself of lack of historical imagination. Switzerland has even overcome the difficulty of diverse languages, for its people speak three different tongues in three different sections. Our own histories have a way of obscuring the bitterness of the events leading up to the Union in their depiction of its glorious attainment. It would do us all good to go back at this stage and remind ourselves of the intense rivalry of the colonies, of their economic warfare, of their threats against each other, and of the trepidation of the smaller ones in the presence of their larger neighbors. Perhaps we have forgotten that Vermont refused at first to come into the Union at all. The Constitutional Convention only just succeeded as it was, and even so strong a Union man as Jefferson would not consent to its conclusions until they were modified by the Bill of Rights. One fact pointed up by the British Commonwealth is that recent warfare does not prevent federal co-operation, for South Africa took her place among the Dominions within a decade of the Boer War.

As for the objection that these instances refer to peoples within relatively restricted areas, we can certainly affirm that modern communications have brought all the nations into closer proximity than that among the thirteen colonies when the Union was formed. They came together because they had the will to do so, a will steeled by the realization expressed in Franklin's familiar phrase that if they did not hang together they would hang separately. Surely it takes no profound philosopher to see that if the nations do not stand together now they will fall together in a civil war of civilization. The federal principle, however it may be implemented, is the proved foundation for an international structure that conserves national values and curbs nationalistic ambitions.

The central decision which has to be made for such a federation of nations is where sovereignty shall lie. No nation, least of all the most powerful nations, is going to give any promise of accepting a restriction upon its own

sovereignty unless it knows exactly where sovereignty will rest and what its own safeguard within that sovereignty shall be. There are three decisive controls that count in this connection. They are the making and administration of the law, the courts of justice, and the army. Who shall legislate international law? Who shall sit on international courts? Who shall command international armies?

III

WHEN the war ends with the victory of the United Nations, the actual power will be in the hands of the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and China. If the war continues for a protracted period, the United States is likely to emerge as the dominant one of this group. In the immediate post-war period passions will burn with intense desire for revenge, and the young men who return from the army are likely to be the most inflamed of us all. Is it going to be possible in such a time for us to plan calmly for an international order? I doubt it. I venture to say that a peace quickly made will be one ineptly planned. And a peace ineptly planned, as we have all learned to our dismay, is no peace at all, but an outrider of future wars. Therefore, knowing ourselves as well as we do, we should already rid ourselves of the picture of the kind of peace conference that remains in our minds from the last war. Our first job will be to feed and rehabilitate a broken Europe, and to calm down in the process to the point where we can be as wise in our generation as the framers of the Constitution were in theirs. We have to define the answers to a world society's demand for proper laws, fair justice and adequate policing.

On the legislative side, we shall undoubtedly keep our present national legislatures to continue their work within the national scenes. Each country should be left free as far as possible to formulate its own statutes and organization. There will, however, have to be an international congress to begin the development of a body of accepted international law. Such a congress will get its representation partly on the basis of the populations of nations and partly on that of the recognition of the parity of states as states. The formula to reconcile these cannot be a simple one. We found one by giving the House of Representatives a population basis and allowing every state equal representation in the Senate. Should the interna-

tional congress be bicameral this arrangement might be copied. In a unicameral arrangement a formula might be found that provided for a Cabinet in which certain nations would be always represented and others by rotation.

The tradition of an international court already exists and its plan could be taken over with few modifications. Our own experience has shown that such a court wins its own prestige by the character and justice of its decisions.

The form of an international army may very well be already in our world by the end of the war, for we shall probably see the emergence of a unified command of some sort among the United Nations. I doubt whether any blueprint could produce as adequate a plan as war itself will force us to adopt. Moreover, the exigencies of war will move us to accept an international command in military affairs.

Events have their own way of educating us. In 1919, we shrank from any form of international commitment lest it involve a loss of sovereignty. Now we know that no commitment in peace means later involvement in war, and that unlimited sovereignty carries the threat of unlimited aggression on the one hand and total danger on the other. In so far as this has sunk in, we are already prepared for some sort of cooperation among the nations. When it has penetrated deeply enough, we shall seek an actual confederation. When that time comes, the concept of national sovereignty will exercise much less power over our minds. It will mark the hour at which the door of history will begin to swing on its hinges, for then we shall pass out of the shadows of a past which would dictate a bad peace into the real present in the light of which a good peace can be found.

THE forces of democracy have need for men like Guglielmo Ferrero who are able to take thought in the midst of conflict and chaos. Thus, the loss that democracy has suffered in the death of this thinker, whose mental vigor and great-hearted courage were unimpaired by danger, exile, and age, is now greater than ever. Ferrero was one of Europe's finest. He belonged to that category of men who, since Dante, have refused to permit the difficulties of exile to interrupt their self-assigned task of enlightening the world. His works, particularly "The Reconstruction of Europe" and "The Gamble," published during the war, are indispensable to an understanding of the forces which have plunged mankind into its present tragedy.

But it is not only in his books that Ferrero stood as an uncompromising foe to fascism and aggression. He took time from the work of a scholar to throw himself with the ardor of a young man into the fight against appeasement. He saw early and clearly the significance to the world of the aggressions against Manchuria and Abyssinia, and he recognized the mistaken policy of concession in the non-intervention in Spain and the abandonment of Czechoslovakia. Those who were in Geneva at the time of the Munich pact still remember the eloquence with which he condemned the stupidity of that appeasement policy.

We of the FREE WORLD, who knew that he agreed with every principle for which we stand and who recognized the greatness of the aid which Ferrero would have rendered in the creation of a "people's peace," refrained from including him in the list of our honorary members in order not to jeopardize his position in Geneva where the increasing influence of vengeful fascism threatened his life. Now, Ferrero's memory and work will guide us in our plans for a free world.

ANGLO—SOVIET

relations

THE Treaty recently concluded between the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R.

has given the greatest satisfaction and encouragement to those who have long deplored the continued misunderstanding between the two Governments whose peoples, from their natures and characteristics, could so readily make friends. I have no special knowledge of the squabbles and the differences which produced this unfortunate result: like most squabbles they are probably best forgotten for the present and left to the historians of the future. Just as in the lives of individuals, the best way for nations to end a quarrel or a misunderstanding is not to try to apportion blame or failure, or to argue out how the misunderstanding arose; it is to settle down to do an honest job of work together, preferably work involving muscles as well as brains, on which both sides are keen.

When I heard a year ago of the German attack on Russia, my first reflection was: This will bring Russia back into the community of nations; this, if we live that long, will allow me to see my Russian friends again. One had almost given up hope of a reconciliation, at least in our time.

May I refer to personal experience? Up to 1932, Russian physiologists had come to work with me in England, with fellowships from the Rockefeller Foundation or from their own Government. From 1932, the visits were shut down. In 1935, the XVth International Congress of Physiologists was held in Russia, a highly successful meeting in which the visitors saw much to admire, particularly the hundreds of keen young people who stood around us to see and listen. One hoped then that intercourse and exchange would start again; they did not. And when the XVIth Congress occurred at Zurich in 1938, not a single Russian was permitted to come. This state of affairs was not due in any way to lack of mutual ap-

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preciation or understanding on the part of scientific people, and certainly our Russian colleagues did not desire it; many of them would have sold their souls to go and study for a time abroad. It was ordained from above. Much as one deplored it then and since, it may very well be that this policy of isolation, applied consistently to all except those few who were regarded as completely safe politically, was necessary. In the days when industrial and military development were more important than butter, it was essential to maintain that intense conviction of the superiority of their political and economic system, which—added to their traditional love of country—has helped to make the morale of the Russian people so formidable a weapon, so fundamental a contribution to the ultimate defeat of Germany.

Since Britain and Russia became allies in June, 1941, the same difficulty has persisted. No doubt the stickiness has not been all on one side, and some of it has certainly been due to different ideas of secrecy; but even in matters where secrecy was unnecessary it has been impossible to make contact. This has not been due to suspicion on our part of Russian political ideas. In fact, every communist organization in Great Britain has been exploiting Russia to such an extent as to make people utterly tired of propaganda and to impede the development of natural normal relations between allies.

Guns, tanks, and aircraft are now very much more important than butter, and our great collaborator in the enterprise of defeating Hitler may well have been right in fearing the effect on morale of a sudden change in his policy of isolation before a definite agreement had been reached. We have had to say to ourselves that patience was necessary; that the suspicions of a quarter of a century could not be removed in a few months; that the price of failure was so heavy and the value of success so great that we must go on working away to