Progress of the Struggle

by NORMAN ANGELL

AFTER

SAN FRANCISCO

THE proclamation of the official end of the war in Europe came almost as an anticlimax to the stupendous events which immediately preceded it—a round dozen of events, any one of which, each presenting its own particular problem, would in ordinary times furnish sufficient material for discussion by the public

for a decade. To have to swallow this amount of history all at once is likely to produce severe intellectual indigestion, emotional sickness.

The events emphasize

two things: the incredible rapidity with which the whole world situation may change; and the fact that what comes out of San Francisco will be the real test of whether or not the war has been fought in vain.

In three years the social and political composition of the world has been transformed. It is not a matter of maps, but of vital alteration in the balance of forces which will determine the kind of life that is to be led for generations and the kind of men that are to lead it. Three or four years ago it looked as though civilization were to pass into a new, and what seems to us of the West, a terrifying social form, the form of actual slavery, in which men would have little to say as to their own fate; their whole lives subject to powers they would be unable to influence.

Such slave societies have sometimes proved extremely stable and endured a long time. The society which produced the pyramids and reached a sophistication of which the Egyptian tombs give evidence, lasted in one form or another not only the one thousand years of Hitler's promised Reich, but three to four thousand years. The freer forms of society have been very ephemeral in comparison; they were in mortal peril three years ago. The Europe from which the civilization of the world

for the last three or four hundred years has mainly radiated proved too divided, too weakened by the elements of disintegration within it to defend itself against a criminal minority, something in the nature of a mere criminal gang. Even France had shown grave divisive and disintegrating tendencies.

If Britain also had lacked sufficient unity to form a government which could rally the nation as a whole, and had fallen, the Hitlerite power would almost cer-

tainly have conquered not merely the whole of Europe, but North Africa and the Mediterranean. There would have been a linking up of the nazi forces with Japan, the conquest of India to at least the degree China has been conquered, and a very probable defeat of Russia. The world situation today would have been very different.

Power has passed from totalitarian Germany and is passing from totalitarian Japan. But we do not yet know whether those who now hold preponderant power can remain united sufficiently to build a society upon freedom as opposed to totalitarianism and dictatorship. Part of the power which destroyed Hitler is itself wielded by dictatorship—for it serves no purpose of truth or of peace to pretend that either Russia or China is democratic in the sense in which Jefferson and Lincoln and Mill and Gladstone used that word.

Ensuring that those to whom power has been transferred shall use it for the purposes of freedom and democracy is now the main problem which we face. We run the risk of sacrificing freedom in order to maintain unity or of sacrificing unity in order to retain, or to appear to retain, such freedom as we have. Yet freedom so retained could never be secure. For years we shall be confronted by an unreal antithesis—

freedom and independence on the one side and dominant power denying those things on the other. Our task will be to find the synthesis: what minor freedoms and independencies shall be sacrificed to preserve the major freedoms. Which is which?

MUCH of this we do not clearly see at present. The events which we have had to record within a single month have been so stupendous, so quickly following one on the other, that we risk getting lost in a jungle of new problems, or of being carried along on a tide so swift—that we lose the sense of direction.

Ever since the establishment of FREE World, some four years ago, this column has emphasized a few major themes. The risk of repetition has been taken because the only hope of not getting lost in this maze, or of being carried helplessly on the current, is to hold fast to a few central governing truths which may enable us to retain control of events instead of being controlled by them. Thus, in the case of the San Francisco Conference, this column has consistently urged that the first thing-which does not mean the only thing, or even the most important thing -is security: security against war and aggression, security for the right of each nation to live under the particular social, political or economic system it prefers. Peace at this stage of the world's development is more important than complete and absolute justice, for if we don't get peace there will be extremely little justice.

To insist that, before the policeman is brought on to the scene, the law he enforces must be chemically pure, means, not that we shall get completely just law but that we shall get no policeman. If we get our police we can alter the law in the direction of justice; if we get no policeman there will be simply violence and terror. In other words, security is one of the tools which we must use as the means for the constant alteration of law in the direction of justice; a justice never completely attained because men will never completely agree as to what it is.

THE debates in San Francisco have em-

phasized also another truth often expressed in these columns. No constitution, however carefully its clauses may be drawn and the commas placed, can ever of itself save mankind. A democratic constitution implies as its fundamental assumption that final decision in political, social and economic problems shall be by the people. But if political, economic and social decisions by the people are to be on the basis of the facts, the people must have access to the facts, be free to discuss them. If the people do not know the facts, obviously they cannot decide what to do about them. In the absence of such knowledge all talk about "the will of the people," "government by the people," is a perilous and evil sham. Obviously, therefore, this "access to the facts" is in the category of first things, for all democracy rests on it.

Yet access to the facts is of little avail unless men acquire the moral and intellectual disciplines by which alone the facts can be rightly judged, the right conclusions drawn. When, after the first victory over Germany, the public of the United States decided, contrary to the counsel of Wilson, that the road to peace was isolationism, that public had free access to the facts if they had been concerned to get them. But the mood and temper of the time obscured judgment.

IT is strange how little we draw the most needed lesson from the dreadful revelations of what the Germans have done. That lesson has a bearing on the work of San Francisco and the constitution which may come therefrom. Here were a people not in any way biologically different from ourselves, closely allied to the British and American peoples in race (if there be such a thing as race) and in much of their cultural background; the heirs to a great civilization, having made enormous contributions to science, philosophy, religion, art, music; highly educated, orderly, disciplined, efficient. Yet the outcome of it all was the acceptance of political philosophies which every sane man outside Germany knew to be arrant nonsense, the acceptance of the autocratic rule of an ignorant guttersnipe who could only be regarded as psychopathic, sadistic, criminal.

If this episode proves, as it does, that a whole people can go utterly wrong, it must prove also that other peoples can go wrong to some similar degree; that the voice of the people is not always the Voice of God; that we too may become subject to dreadful error unless we keep alive our awareness of liability to error, our need to know, and to judge with responsibility and discipline what we know. It illustrates the futility of the perfect constitution as the instrument of human welfare if those who are to work the constitution have not the necessary human quality. The Weimar Constitution was one of the best ever devised by men. Its outcome, again, was Hitler. It was a constitution for the government of that highly "educated," "civilized" people whose governance and reform have now become one of the prime problems of the Allies.

Why did a people, heirs to a great Western civilization, learned, bookish, encyclopedic, thorough, efficient, and all the rest of it, living under the best constitution that the professors of political science knew how to devise, nevertheless go so disastrously wrong? We don't know, and that is one of the tragic elements of the postwar situation. Our main demand is now for sheer retaliation upon the German people. The leading article of a New York liberal paper urges that, as a beginning, we kill a hundred thousand Germans.

Another commentator insists that if we begin to make any distinctions between good Germans and bad we shall fail; that the whole German people are equally guilty—a statement which incidentally synchronized with one from Stalin in which he declared, as he has declared more than once, that Russia has no enmity to the German people and desires to see them prosper. As a group of Free Germans have been organized in Moscow under the aegis of the Russian government, a group that might become the nucleus of a German government of the future, Stalin's view obviously is that even if there are no good Germans there are some less evil than others.

I HE trouble is that we forget experience. Immediately after our previous victory we had no soft mood. For a time we were just as anti-German as at present. We maintained the blockade despite starvation in cities like Vienna. The cause of our failure in dealing with Germany was not that we were insufficiently angry with Germany but that the Allies were too angry with each other. No policy that we might have devised, however "hard," could have been carried out, because the British began to quarrel with the French, the Americans with the British and all with the Russians. All sought scapegoats.

Today so many seem to believe that if only we hate fascism enough and insist on lynching all collaborators we shall give the world peace. In 1919 fascism had not yet been invented and there were no collaborators, but neither was there peace. The absence could hardly have resulted from our tenderness toward those non-existent creeds. The enemies that destroyed us were not fascism or collaborationism, but nationalism and isolationism; our refusal to accept the obligations and duties of international organization.

That danger today takes only a slightly new form as in the difficulty of continued effective cooperation (particularly in the future government of Germany) between the western democracies and the Russian autocracy. The avoidance of World War III will depend, mainly, upon the ability of democracy and autocracy to work together for the common ends of security and peace. The condition of effective cooperation will be the frank recognition of these two facts: first that, as between the Russian power on the one side and the democracies on the other, there are deep differences of values and outlook; second, that on no account must those differences be allowed to lead to conflict. Future peace demands that we shall recognize the differences and manage to live and work together despite them. Cooperation will be dammed at the beginning if we proceed on the assumption that the Russians must forthwith adopt our views or we theirs; that we must surrender our political freedoms and adopt a dictatorship because under a dictatorship like the Russian, true democracy is achieved-as so many Soviet advocates so frequently insist.

At present, discussion of the problem presented by these differences seems to

be between two main groups, one of which apparently assumes that Russia can do nothing right and the other that Russia can do nothing wrong. From such a di cussion nothing but heat and mischief can emerge. Certainly, we in the West should have the wisdom to recognize the circumstances of the great Russian State, composite of many primitive peoples, the great mass of whom were yesterday in a condition of serfdom. We should understand that in those conditions government by discussion, by the give and take of a number of political parties, by open criticism and organized political opposition-things which in the West we understand as democracy -simply could not be applied to Russia so long as revolutionary conditions prevailed.

Whether that system can, without danger, be extended to populations brought by the might and valor of Russian arms under Russian governance, but which have a very different tradition and cultural background, is quite another question. If we are to judge how far the security of the West can accept Russian domination, not merely in the recently absorbed republics of Latvia, Lithuania, Esthonia, but also in what remains of Poland, in Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and even Austria, we must have access to the facts. Russia must give to observers, newspaper men, visitors from the west in Russian controlled territory the same facilities Russians are accorded in the west by the Allies.

Perhaps our first task in establishing really dependable relations with Russia will be to persuade her to remove her present blackout of knowledge in this respect. An additional reason for putting this first is that it runs counter to no real Russian interest. Russia's real interest indeed is all the other way. The restrictions she has imposed in the past have not prevented adverse criticism, deep differences of opinion about things Russian. It is quite unlikely that the criticisms or the differences would be any greater under free reporting; the probability is that they would become much less.

We must somehow manage to make it clear to her that this secrecy and prohibition of free reporting stands as an insuperable obstacle to understanding and confidence. For us in the west to pretend that this is not so is to do no service to Russia, to the Russian people, to future peace, to the success of the efforts of San Francisco, to the purposes for which we fought this war. Until we know day by day fully what the facts are, and have been permitted to judge those facts for ourselves, we simply don't know what we are talking about.

Without full access to the facts, it is tragically certain that we shall fail all along the line—fail to maintain unity, fail to control Germany, to make peace.

AT SAN FRANCISCO

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Pacific War ---

Closing In For the Kill

BY

HERBERT COREY

JAPAN is walking the last mile. No doubt about that. Circumstances have prevented us giving her the full strength up to this time but they have been cleared away. No nation on earth can stand up against our terrible concentration of power. Only—

Let us not buy the bunting just yet. That may be a long mile.

We have been inclined to be rather hoity-toity in our attitude toward Japan. We talk of her treacherous attack on Pearl Harbor. But we had known all the time that she would strike that way if she struck at all. Her men are yellow, bandylegged, and have buck teeth. But they are excellent soldiers. They know all there is to be known about cave fighting and jungle warfare. They can live on a handful of rice a day, they travel light and fast, and they are well armed. Their rifles are not so good as ours but their bullets kill. Some of their artillery is more practical than ours. They are not as good in hand-to-hand fighting as our men but they are pretty good. They seem to have no reluctance about dying. Any general will tell you that a soldier who can shoot fairly straight, who keeps his gun clean, who is well disciplined and who will not run away is a good

The reputed death rate is eleven dead Japs to one dead American. But if the Japs can keep on feeding more live men in each year than she loses in dead men that last mile may be a long one. And the best advices are that she can do just that.

Here is an appraisal of where we stand and where the Japs stand, and of our strategy and of how long it may take us to push them that "last mile" to unconditional surrender.

Our power is increasing. A Japanese spokesman said that Japan can afford to lose forty men to the American one, to win the war. Japan may lose the forty and not win.

We went into this war with an amateur army and a navy that was largely greenstick. Now that Germany is out of the way—unless, of course, we boyscout the Nazis into high morale again—we can without trouble assemble an army of 5,000,000 in the fight against Japan. It will be the perfect army, too. Enough wary, angry veterans to give weight and edge to it, enough fresh young blood to keep it fast and venturesome, enough men experienced in Jap-killing to furnish that specialized instruction, and new and better weapons to replace the weapons which have been shown to be just not quite good enough.

We were not up to the German par in hand guns. It is debatable whether the German rifle was not better than our rifle. German tanks were very tough nuts to crack. Some of the German guns had us out-ranged and carried a heavier wallop.

Our weapons have always been better than the Japs have in stock, bar their knee mortar. That is a highly murderous device, but we now have pulled up even with it. The Jap has one fine light machine gun. His rifle is good enough to snipe with and that is pretty good.

But our weapons have been bettered as a result of tests. And there will be more of them. The Jap will have more manpower than we can possibly assemble