

I. F. Stone's Weekly

VOL. III, NUMBER 8

MARCH 14, 1955



WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Hatred, Not Hydrogen, Is The Fatal Explosive

In all the widening international debate on the H-bomb, a central issue seems to be avoided. It is not hydrogen, but hatred, which threatens the future of mankind. We cannot go on building up hateful attitudes without making a fatal explosion unavoidable. Sir Winston Churchill's finest rhetoric cannot mask the specious character of the hope he expressed to the House of Commons—that by a “sublime irony” it may develop that “safety will be the sturdy child of terror and survival the twin brother of annihilation.” This is only a newer restatement of an old fallacy—that to preserve peace, prepare for war. The accumulation of armament, the steady stepping up of tension, the increase in fear have often made war inescapable over some slight incident which might have been passed over safely, in other circumstances, particularly if the great Powers were not so well prepared.*

Nuclear fission and fusion have changed nothing whatsoever in the nature of man. When tension builds up to a certain point, the long-expected war comes almost as a physical and organic relief. Civilizations have destroyed themselves before; the risk of death and annihilation is a commonplace to the soldier; that larger annihilation, perhaps of all mankind, is only an abstraction to the individual. The same men who would go bravely into death in battle cringe like the worst cowards before the more onerous duty of serving their country by speaking unpopular truths.

If we go on developing in the United States the mental climate of the cold war, building up a picture of the Soviet bloc as a monstrous society, permitting military men and priests (in the immemorial fashion of their kind) to create the notion that the alternative to war is “slavery,” that *this* conflict (like virtually every other war mankind has known) is a holy

crusade, then war will become inescapable.

It is a fallacy to believe that there can be peaceful co-existence in a world split between heavily armed Powers glowering with jealousy, suspicion and hatred across the line between them. Peace is only possible with charity, and charity in this context means a readiness to understand how these new revolutionary societies developed, to see the good as well as the evil in them, in short to take a pragmatic, adult, humane and compassionate view of our fellow travellers on this tiny and perhaps already fated planet—and above all to recognize the quite fantastically swollen mote in our own eye when we talk glibly of ourselves as the “free world.”

Our scientists, months later, have begun to echo Nehru's plan for a standstill agreement on further atomic tests. The more tests the more we frighten ourselves and others toward war; the more “total” the weapons become, the more insinuating the whisper that maybe we had better drop one first before the enemy does. But basically we need most a standstill agreement on the propagation of hatred.

The Russians were hooted down when they proposed a ban on war propaganda at the UN some years ago; admittedly such a ban could not be reconciled with a free press. But to say that is to stop at half-truths. The fact is that our government gives the line to public opinion, and that the same people who recoiled from banning war propaganda have been doing their best to ban peace propaganda. The witch hunt has made talk of peace dangerous and shrivelled up the peace movement. Yet what is said here for a comparative handful ought to be a major topic of debate on press and radio. Our own hatred, skilfully and perpetually fostered in all we read and hear, may yet be our destruction; this is the fatal explosive.

A Frightened Giant Who Ties Himself Up in Knots

We have worked ourselves up into such a state of awe about our own terror weapons that we are hampering our own efforts to protect ourselves; security regulations designed to keep secrets from the enemy encumber our own defense plans. The whole American atomic security craze is passing the point of diminishing returns. An example the press ignored was brought to light by Senator Symington of Missouri last Tuesday in interrogating William F. Tompkins, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Department of Justice's Internal Security division, about the Administration's security program.

Symington said Civil Defense Administrator Val Peterson, testifying four days earlier before a Senate Armed Services subcommittee, said security regulations “made it extremely

difficult for us to work in the area of preparation to take effective steps to meet the threat of fall-out.” Peterson declared “we simply could not reveal that data to the Bureau of Public Roads. It is classified . . . and even in my own organization . . . we could not discuss the fall-out problem or fall-out data even with the people in our own organization who were cleared to accept secrets (sic) because they did not have Q clearance.”

In other words, employees already cleared for security in civil defense were unable to take part in planning against fall-out because they did not have Q clearance. (Washington will soon have as many types of clearance as H. J. Heinz has pickles.) With all the talk about fall-out and security, no newspaper seems to have reported either the Peterson testimony or Symington's reference to it. Yet here we have a real security problem arising from an excess of “security.”

* It is disturbing to find in the Fact Sheet sent out by the Democratic National Committee last week that the Eisenhower defense cuts are opposed on the ground that “Army cut-backs thwarted Administration desire for troop intervention to save Indo-China.”

ROUND OUR GIDDY CAPITAL

Far East Crisis: A month ago State Department officials were talking in private briefings of "swopping" Quemoy and Matsu for a cease-fire in the Formosa straits, but last week in his appearance behind the closed doors of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Dulles took a stiffer position, denied that any such bargain would be considered. Peking seems to have upped its terms, too, and there are indications that not only the coastal islands but a UN seat are its price for a cease-fire . . . The prevalent opinion in the press corps is that the Eisenhower Administration would like some graceful way to get off the hook at Quemoy and Matsu, but nobody is sure just what dominant policy is. The same lines of divergence are visible, with Defense Secretary Wilson and Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey for disengagement while Dulles plays to the Knowland-Radford team . . . A sharp crisis is in sight over the Finnish oil tanker, the Aruba, with State Department hinting last Wednesday that despite angry "dares" from Feking the vessel would be stopped . . .

Keeping Ourselves Confused: So great is the confusion created by the deliberate obscurity in foreign affairs that press men are about equally divided between the theory that Eden's speech and Dulles's reflect a sharp difference in Anglo-American policy, and those who believe them the product of private agreement, with Dulles "firm" while Eden negotiates . . . The latter point to the passage in the Dulles speech where he expresses the hope that the present military activities of the Chinese Communists are not "the first stage of an attack against Formosa"—if not, this seems to imply, we would not defend the coastal islands. "We know that friendly nations, on their own responsibility," Dulles went on, "are seeking to find substance for these hopes . . ."

Brownell on the Defensive: The opening of hearings on the government security program before the Humphrey subcommittee showed the effect of informer turnabouts and the Ladejinsky case. Assistant Attorney General William F. Tompkins of the Internal Security Division turned up with a 63-page statement but didn't get very far with it before he was put on the defensive and subjected to sharp questioning by Senators Humphrey, Symington and Norris Cotton (R., N.H.). Last August Humphrey was ready to throw the Bill of Rights overboard to prove himself no Red. Now he was rebutting the Justice Department's attempt to picture the attack on informers as a Red plot. Symington, too, has shifted with the political wind.

How Do You Tell? The questioning was naive and ill-informed. The Senators seemed to think that determining whether a man was a "subversive" was on a par with determining whether he had blue eyes or was over six feet tall; they spoke as if objective standards were possible and as if, by applying these standards, differences of opinion between

Conscience Becomes Suspect

Next Thursday, March 17, the New York Board of Education votes on whether teachers must become informers to keep their jobs. Said one McCarthyite witness in favor of such a requirement, Thomas F. Flynn, for the Kings County (Brooklyn) American Legion, "I have heard a lot this afternoon about individual conscience. It seems to be the new Communist line."

Clark Foreman, who appeared against the proposed new rule on behalf of the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, testified in rejoinder, "You have a spokesman for the American Legion say that the right of the individual conscience seems to be the new Communist line . . . Martin Luther is not regarded by the majority of Americans as either a heretic or a subversive."

(By strict definition, of course, Luther was both.)

Departments (as in the Ladejinsky case) could be prevented. But we have reached the stage where there are few liberals, much less radicals or actual Communists, left in the government. The danger, Tompkins said, is from those "who have been successful in keeping their Communist connections a secret from their friends and associates." Such persons would give only faint and distant indication of any liberal views. The inference is that everybody must now be watched and spied upon, and that one can never tell where a "subversive" may be lurking. When the public begins to wake up to the fact that this means everybody is suspect and no one to be trusted, we shall really see some political fireworks.

FBI Still a Sacred Cow: Senatorial questions also showed that the FBI, whose political illiteracy and sloppy methods are responsible for informer abuses, is still a sacred cow. Brownell is criticized for his meaningless new "reforms" which make no change whatsoever in existing security procedures, and for his brief in the *Peters* case. But both, in their defense of the informer as the cornerstone of thought control, only reflect the FBI's long and intense campaign to encourage gossip, snooping and spying as a means of political thought control . . . Solicitor General Sobeloff's failure to sign the *Peters* brief will be no surprise to readers of the *Weekly*; we reported last year that he differed sharply with Brownell on the Lattimore case and Rover's attack on Youngdahl . . .

The Natvig Case: This is an effort by indictment to frighten reformers who recant. Justice never bothered to investigate whether she lied about Ted Lamb, and already had a "recantation of her recantation" when the indictment was obtained.

A Documentary Not to Be Found Elsewhere in the U.S. Press . . .

The Text of the Exchange Which May Split the Labor Party

MR. ANEURIN BEVAN (Ebbw Vale, Lab) . . . The assumptions on which the [defense] programme was based were as inaccurate as the assumptions underlying the Prime Minister's speech yesterday. In 1950-51 they said we had three years. It had turned out to be more. Yesterday the Prime Minister said we had three or four years, but it might be wrong. They were merely wild guesses. The difficulty of the Prime Minister in making a speech in the House arose out of his virtues, out of his extraordinary capacity for presentation. The mediocrity of his thinking was concealed by the majesty of his language. (Opposition laughter.)

The Prime Minister yesterday spent the time of the House telling the nation and the world that the hydrogen bomb and the atom bomb between them had produced circumstances in which negotiation might be more fruitful. What they wanted to know was when the negotiations did start? (Loud opposition cheers.) . . .

If it be true and I think it is, what the Prime Minister said yesterday, will he tell the House why he does not insist upon meetings with the Russian leaders? It may be that they are not sincere in what they say, but there is only one way of finding out, and that is to meet them. It may be that the Prime Minister would like to do it but that the United States won't permit him. That is a sombre thing to say, it is a wicked

thing to believe, but we have now reached a situation in Great Britain where we can, in a few short years, run the risk of the extinction of British civilization and we cannot reach the potential enemy in time to arrive at an accommodation because we are now at the mercy of the U. S.

SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL (Woodford, C.) It is absolutely wrong to suggest that the course which we have followed has been at the dictation of the United States. It is quite true that I would have liked to have seen a top-level conference of the three Powers. I would have liked to have seen it shortly after Mr. Malenkov took power, to see, as I said: 'Is there a new look?' I wanted to do that and my colleagues agreed . . . I prepared to go over and see the President and hoped to arrange with him to invite a three-Power conference. However I was struck down by a very sudden illness which paralyzed me completely physically. I had to put it off, and it was not found possible to persuade President Eisenhower to join in that process. [Emphasis added] . . .

MR. BEVAN said the House was grateful for the Prime Minister's intervention—(cheers)—but his statement was complete confirmation of what he (Mr. Bevan) had said. The Prime Minister had wanted to visit President Eisenhower in the hope of converting him to the project, but failed to do so . . .

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