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Has Dulles Been Overruled by "Us" on Summit Talks?

The Greeks had a mythical creature, the centaur, half man, half horse. We seem to be governed in Washington by a similar composite, half President, half press agent. It has often been impossible for those who cover the White House to determine just where Mr. Eisenhower ended and Mr. Hagerty began. That widely reported remark of Mr. Hagerty to the reporter in Chicago who thought the President had a nose-bleed, "Oh, you thought it was *us*," was revealing. Mr. Eisenhower and his press representative have become an "us"—except perhaps for Sherman Adams there is probably no one closer to the President.

Against this background, Mr. Hagerty's slip in his CBS interview last Sunday has injected a new note of hope into the prospects of a summit meeting. The Eisenhower letter to Bulganin pictured a summit meeting like a gathering of constitutional monarchs to fix their royal seals on agreements arrived at by their Ministers. "It would be essential that prior to such a meeting," the letter said, "these complex matters should be worked on in advance through diplomatic channels and by our Foreign Ministers so that the issues can be presented in form suitable for our decisions. . . ."

Not How It's Understood by "Us"

The drafting of the letter was in the hands of the State Department. The procedure indicated would leave the decisions in the hands of Mr. Dulles and the rubber stamp in those of Mr. Eisenhower. But apparently this is not how it is understood by "us." For when Mr. Hagerty was asked about the preconditions for a summit meeting, he replied "we would merely like to know what we would like to discuss." His attempt later to explain away the discrepancy made it sharper. He said the President was ready to meet with Krushchev and Allied leaders "if they do one thing and fairly simple; if we have starts of diplomatic negotiations and then have a foreign ministers' meeting to do one very simple thing, to agree on what we can discuss." This would leave only the agenda in the hands of Mr. Dulles.

A recent press conference revealed that the President was not familiar with the final draft of the letter he signed to Bulganin. Apparently Mr. Hagerty didn't take time to read it too closely, either. The difference between the two views is considerable because it is the widely accepted view here and abroad that if the reins are left in the hands of Mr. Dulles, there will be no agreements, but that if they are in the hands of Mr. Eisenhower, some start toward a relaxation of tension is possible.

The widespread notion that it would be foolish to hold a summit meeting unless sure of success in advance encloses several fallacies. How can one ever be sure in a real bar-

gaining session that there will be agreement? It is only at a conference summoned to accept the unconditional surrender of a defeated foe—as at Versailles—that one may be "sure of an agreement" in advance. What Mr. Dulles really wants is assurance in advance that the Russians will accept his terms.

A Get-Together Need Not Be Formal

Nor need an inconclusive summit meeting be a disaster. Few are foolish enough to think the complex issues between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. can be settled so quickly. It is possible to limit a session to the easier issues. It is possible to announce in advance that the purpose is for the leaders of the great nations—Eisenhower, Krushchev, Nehru, and Macmillan—to get to know each other better, as a token of good will, an informal exploration of possibilities for negotiation, a symbol of relaxed tension. It is only those who fear any relaxation of tension who fight against such a meeting. If there is to be a meeting, they prefer one so loaded with difficult questions as to make failure inescapable. They would then have demonstrated "good faith" and could step up the arms race.

Ready for Controls in That Atom Free Zone

In his speech at Minsk, Mr. Krushchev noted that the French reply to the Bulganin note, unlike the U. S., made a summit meeting contingent on a foreign ministers' meeting "to define the program of a possible summit conference, making the reservation that the foreign ministers would not be competent to discuss the question in substance." If questions of substance are left to Mr. Dulles, there will be no agreement. This is a view as widely held in allied nations as among those on the other side. The Minsk speech has not been printed here, though radio transcripts are available. These show it more hopeful than the press reports would indicate. An important point is that Mr. Krushchev in discussing the Rapacki proposal for an atom free zone said the Soviet Union "is ready to examine this proposal and to accept the establishment of the necessary controls."

"It goes without saying," Mr. Krushchev said of the Eisenhower outer space proposal, "that we cannot deny the importance of the question of control over the use of cosmic space. But this question must be examined as part of the general disarmament problem, including the question of a ban on atom and hydrogen arms." He asked a halt on testing and the elimination of bases threatening the U. S. S. R. Can one honestly deny that if the roles were reversed, we would say the same? Would there not be value in a face-to-face meeting at which the heads of the great powers and the great neutrals could discuss such questions informally?

Is This The Kind of "Disengagement" the Administration Is Planning to Offer?

Little Noticed "Maverick" Speech on Foreign Policy May Be Clue to Ike's Plans

A group of Democratic mavericks in the House led by Henry Reuss of Wisconsin last Monday staged a small scale uprising against bi-partisan rigidity in foreign policy. We provide two glimpses of the debate and the heart of Congressman Reuss's little noticed speech because this was the first voice in Congress for any kind of disengagement, because it is well to notice how weakly inconsistent this "rebellion" is, and because he believes that the Eisenhower administration, too, has a similar kind of "disengagement" in mind. The Russians may regard the idea of "swopping" a free East Europe for a reunited Germany in NATO subject only to some arms restrictions as a gold brick, but here it is:

"At the NATO conference last December, the Administration offered our European allies a much expanded shopping list of American secrets, missiles and even nuclear weapons . . . Adequate ground strength is necessary in order to constitute a real deterrent to Russian aggression.

"Necessary though it may be to share our atomic secrets and weapons with our allies, without adequate precautions such a move will have two fateful consequences. Still another step away from conventional weapons increases the chances that any war at all in Europe will be a nuclear war. The yawning chasm that divides Europe will therefore become deeper. The goal of relaxing the tensions between East and West will be pushed even further out of reach. Secondly, placing the atomic weapon in the hands of more countries increases the number of those who can eventually trigger the atomic war we seek to avoid.

Arm and Negotiate

"Because the proposal to share atomic secrets and weapons marks a great divide, it must be considered not in isolation but in the context of the whole of our foreign and military policy. As we rush onward with the arms race, we must try equally to relax the tensions in Europe which make the arms race necessary. . . .

"I believe that such an alternative possibility lies in the disengagement of Soviet and NATO troops which now confront each other from opposite sides of the Iron Curtain through the heart of Europe. . . . If accepted by the Russians, an offer to withdraw troops and create a demilitarized zone between the Rhine and Russia would greatly increase the

Prediction

"I say that ten years from now, if we continue at our present rate of spending for arms, we can look back, see what we have spent in the last ten years, yet we will have less defense, security, and more threat of war than we have now."

—Mr. Blatnik (D. Minn.), in the House, Jan. 27.

chances of peace by widening the area where a mistake could be made without the catastrophe of an all-out nuclear war. . . . making some such disengagement proposal, even though the Russians reject it, is, I believe, necessary if the NATO alliance is to go forward toward rearmament with any kind of unity. . . .

"Such a disengagement differs, for example, from the stimulating proposals recently made by Mr. George F. Kennan. He talks of the withdrawal of British and U. S. armed forces from the continent of Europe, and the separation of Germany from NATO, in consideration of a Russian troop withdrawal.

"I believe, on the contrary, that our forces are needed on the continent, particularly in France and the low countries, to thicken the western European defense on the ground, and as a pledge of our solidarity with our NATO allies. I also believe there is nothing inconsistent in a reunited Germany, with a self-imposed limitation on its armed forces, remaining a member of NATO. . . .

"In his letter this month to Premier Bulganin, President Eisenhower has apparently overruled Mr. Dulles and has offered in essence the above proposal. After stressing the need for reunification of Germany by free elections, and for self-government for the countries of Eastern Europe, the President said:

"The United States is prepared, along with others, to negotiate specific arrangements regarding force levels and deployments and broad treaty undertakings, not merely against aggression but assuring positive reaction should aggression occur in Europe.' . . .

"If these words mean anything, and I hope that they do, they mean that the United States will urge its NATO allies, including West Germany, to prepare with us a Western position regarding the demilitarization of Middle Europe as a means to reunify Germany and to bring freedom to the enslaved nations."

How Baghdad Pact Aid Unleashes An Arms Race in the Impoverished Middle East

Mr. McGOVERN (D., S. Dak.). Has it not been true that in some cases the military assistance we have sent to the northern tier of states, to members of the Baghdad Pact, has actually caused some other potential friends in the world to take funds away from economic and technical development and allocate them to military weapons . . . in order to counter some of the military aid given to their neighbors?

Mr. ROOSEVELT (D., Cal.). I thank the gentleman and agree with him. I can cite one specific instance, that of Israel where she feels because of military aid given to her neighbors . . . that she has to use an unwarranted proportion of her resources to build up her military strength. . . .

Mr. McGOVERN. Chester Bowles, former Ambassador

to India, has reported that American military aid sent to Pakistan in 1956 prompted the Government of India to withdraw \$100 million from its second 5-year plan and allocate it to military orders with the French and the British. . . .

Mr. ROOSEVELT. I come back to what I said earlier, imposition of a real arms embargo in the Middle East would enable those countries that have so much to do for the basic welfare of their people, to spend their time, their money and their efforts working for the improvement of the people in the area. Rather too often unfortunately this military buildup, in effect, only serves to keep a particular ruling party in power and to suppress the great majority of the people.

—House of Representatives, Jan. 27.