

# I. F. Stone's Weekly

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15 CENTS

## Congress Says "Da" on Nuclear Arms for Germany

Even the Supreme Soviet in Moscow could hardly rubber-stamp party line with more alacrity than did the Congress of the United States in approving the Pentagon's party line on the wisdom of spreading nuclear arms to our allies, particularly to the Germans. Never was a more momentous decision taken with less discussion. In the House a handful of rebels led by Meyer of Vermont had put in resolutions to block the nuclear sharing agreements but the House Rules Committee refused to report them out and Speaker Rayburn refused to recognize Congressman Meyer for a unanimous consent request. Meyer and Byron Johnson (*D. Col.*) were allowed a few remarks in protest on July 16 covering little more than a single page of the Congressional Record. Though 40 members of the House had signed a letter asking for discussion of the agreements, the leadership steam-roller applied gag rule.

### Senate Worse Than The House

The Senate next day provided a worse spectacle. Not a single Senator dared introduce a resolution to block any of the agreements. Senator Humphrey had gone so far as to raise some questions (which we reprinted in last week's issue). He took the floor on July 17 to stultify himself by answering the questions to his own satisfaction and throwing in the sponge. Morse spoke up and said he had so many reservations about the agreements he wasn't sure he would vote for them. Apparently he was unaware that the law is so rigged that no vote to confirm these treaties-disguised-as-executive-agreements is required and that no concurrent resolution to block them within the 60-day deadline was before the Senate. Church of Idaho expressed some misgivings and exchanged flowery compliments with Humphrey; the latter even compared Church with Borah, thus laying it on with an over-size shovel. The other liberals in the Senate, apprised in advance that Humphrey would speak on the nuclear agreements, were discreetly silent or absent.

An anthology of fatuity could be compiled from Humphrey's speech answering his own questions. While he recognized at one point that the nuclear sharing agreements are part of a series of steps which may take the world "just a little closer to the day of ultimate war," he soon hastened to say that on the other hand these agreements "could actually help chances for a test ban" by stepping up pressure on the Russians. This theory of pressure for peace by speeding up the arms race has long been the favorite rationalization of bipartisan foreign policy. If Humphrey believes it, why has he been leading the fight for disarmament? If he is for disarmament, why does he year after year give in so easily on the greatest obstacle to it—the various steps to rearm the Germans with nuclear weapons? Humphrey's final question to himself was

### Reformed Radical

John Strachey, author of the pre-war *Coming Struggle for Power*, whom the State Department tried to bar in the 30's as a dangerous radical, is here again but this time on a tour arranged and financed by the State Department. Now a right-wing British Laborite, and a prospective War Minister, Strachey lobbied privately in Washington liberal circles in favor of the nuclear arms sharing agreements. Strachey explained that the Labor Party's proposal for a non-nuclear club of nations (other than the U.S. and U.S.S.R.) calls only for renouncing the production, not the use, of nuclear weapons, and assumes the U.S. would supply these arms to its allies. There is a growing demand in the rank-and-file of British Labor for unilateral renunciation of thermonuclear weapons. The *London Economist* (June 27) cynically and approvingly described adoption by the leadership of the non-nuclear club idea as "a ruse for baffling the unilateral disarmers."

whether the people of Western Europe wanted nuclear weapons. He assured himself that the State Department had told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in executive session that "the people welcome them." This will be news in England, where the British Labor Party is deeply split over the issue; in Germany, where the Social Democrats and the labor movement are opposed to nuclear weapons; in Greece, where the opposition parties have so far blocked acceptance of nuclear missile bases.

The extent to which our military bureaucracy takes control of Congress for granted was revealed July 23 when the House Appropriations Committee made public its hearings on Mutual Security. These showed that an Assistant Secretary of Defense in executive session on June 3 and Gen. Lauris Norstad on June 8 explained that by the end of this calendar year they would have nuclear missiles and other "advanced weapons" in the hands of ten NATO powers—Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France, Britain, Germany, Italy, Greece and Turkey. No such agreements had yet been approved. The British, French, German, Dutch, Turkish and Greek pacts were still before Congress. The Norwegian, Danish, Belgian and Italian agreements have not yet been submitted to it. Yet all of them, and their approval, were taken for granted. Krushchev could not be more sure of his Supreme Soviet than our Generals are of Congress.

The next step will come next year. Congress will be asked to amend the Atomic Energy Act to hand over the nuclear warheads to our allies. Friends of peace had better start getting ready early to fight that one.

## Majority Leader McCormack Chimes In On Approving First Strike Strategy

### Holifield Joins Nelson Rockefeller in Build-Up for Preventive War

Congressman Chet Holifield (*D. Cal.*) this year has joined Nelson Rockefeller, the AEC and certain elements of the Pentagon in spreading the idea that nuclear war can be kept neatly limited, and that we may therefore threaten nuclear war if necessary.

Holifield made a major speech on this theme before the House July 15. He began by reading the introductory section of the report to Governor Rockefeller on a fallout shelter program with its complacent assurance that "if a test of military strength" become necessary "our people and our democratic society can be successfully defended" and its hint that a shelter program would increase "the sense of purpose of our negotiators at the international conference tables." Holifield differs from Rockefeller only in arguing that the shelter program should be financed by the Federal government.

#### Fears We May Deter Ourselves

Holifield said he was not espousing preventive or pre-emptive war but his reasoning leads straight in that direction. After mentioning the Quemoy and Lebanon crises of last year, he said, "our deterrent striking force is also designed to prevent small-scale aggression or even extremely provocative behavior on the part of the Soviet Union" but "if the launching of our attacking forces will mean inevitable destruction of our Nation by a counter blow from the Soviet Union, we ourselves will be deterred from using such an extreme measure." This means he envisages the use of nuclear striking power, not as a last-resort of defense, but as a means of enforcing our will politically. In the Lebanese-Iraqi crisis, which dissolved without war, this route would have culminated in a disastrous nuclear exchange between U.S. and U.S.S.R.

The point Holifield was making became clearer when Majority Leader McCormack of Massachusetts interjected, "While we should not adopt a policy of a surprise attack, certainly it seems to me we should get away from the policy of non attack under any circumstances." Mr. Holifield agreed that "a policy of massive retaliation after attack is a completely fallacious doctrine." Holifield made his real position plain when he said, "In other words, unless we are clearly willing to use, in extreme necessity, our deterrent striking force, that force is not really a deterrent." This is the philosophy of preventive nuclear war.

Holifield's optimistic adventurism is based on the loaded

#### To Make It Easier to Gamble With Our Lives

"This study was initiated in the belief that non-military defense measures . . . might make two significant contributions to the national defense. First, they might alleviate the catastrophe of a nuclear attack. . . . Second, they might increase U. S. freedom of action . . . willingness to make foreign policy decisions carrying a risk of war may be important to meet major Soviet challenges. . . . Deterrence of extremely provocative enemy behavior other than a direct attack on the United States might thus be maintained as a credible national policy . . . we cannot rule out the possibility that the United States, faced with a major Soviet challenge, might sometime be forced to resist militarily, even at the risk of devastation. . . . Control of the military situation could be more quickly seized . . . if the United States were compelled to launch an attack. . . .

"Warning measured in terms of days is possible if nuclear attack occurs as an extension of a local war, or after a period of severe international tension, or as a last-resort decision by the United States. . . . Strategic evacuation would then be possible. . . . A dramatic and unequivocal signal, such as exploding a small atomic weapon at a very high altitude over the city, would help in getting people to move quickly."

—*The Rand Corp. (Herman Kahn) Report on A Study of Non-Military Defense, pps. 1-9.*

assumptions and the unreliable figures of his recent nuclear war hearings. He admitted in passing that in arriving at his figures, "We chose a limited attack". But he is not willing to discuss what would happen if the nuclear first strike he proposes unleashed a total war. He quotes the less revealing portions of the Rand report (but not those in the box above). He has failed to explain why his figures assume only 50,000,000 dead from an attack of 1,446 megatons on the United States while the Rand study estimated 90,000,000 from a 1500-megaton attack. Nor has he ever discussed the other, more realistic Rand estimate of a 20,000 megaton attack, with 160 million deaths.

The idea that nuclear war can be limited is folly. The notion that it might ever be wise to initiate it is criminal. The belief that fallout shelters could save the life we know and the country we love is a delusion. There is now no sane alternative to peace, but the search for it is hard and to challenge the military cave-man mind takes courage.

### City Plan Experts Says Fallout Shelters Would Be Tombs in A Real Atom War

"It is incredible that Governor Rockefeller and his Special Task Force on Protection from Radioactive Fallout have come to the conclusion that the people of the State of New York should build thick-walled protective shelters. This is either an astonishing display of ignorance, an attempt to stiffen our resolve in the cold war, or perhaps to give us a sense of security.

"The concept of fall-out shelters has validity only in an 'exercise war'—a war which produces fewer casualties in the entire state than would be sustained from a single 20-megaton hydrogen bomb exploded over New York City. The probable cause of a real war will be far different. . . . If our

cities are attacked, our enemy will send dozens of big bombs against a city like New York. . . .

"The fall-out shelter program would only be useful against radiation fallout. Such shelters do not protect from heat and blast effects. They serve only as tombs . . . if our cities are attacked, there are very few people who will survive the blasts and heat effects.

"It cannot be an exercise war—it will either be annihilative or it will not start. Once started, it cannot stop—there will be . . . no house doctor to call a technical knock-out. The few unlucky ones remaining alive would not have long to live."

—*Walter Thabit, formerly of the Baltimore City Planning Dept., Letter to the New York Times, July 20.*