

## JFK In Boosting the Defense Budget Calls Military Spending A Form of Insurance

## Does the Arms Race Insure Anything But A Growing Mutual Insecurity?

All through the President's special message on the defense budget last week ran the theme that money spent on arms was like money spent on insurance. This is a deceptive metaphor.

A man buys insurance in order to protect his wife and children, knowing that he will some day die. The arms race is not insurance against death, but against a neighbor one does not trust. You assume that if you let him know you carry a revolver, he will not dare to attack you. This is the theory of deterrence in its simplest form.

The trouble with arms race insurance is that both sides take it out against each other. Each neighbor regards the other as untrustworthy and himself, of course, as a sterling fellow. To deter him you have to have more firepower than he does. If he has a revolver, you buy a shotgun. If he sees you have a shotgun, he puts metal guards around his windows. To meet this obstacle to swift and sure deterrence, you put in a stock of hand grenades. He may counter this with a small second hand cannon aimed at your bedroom window.

## Second Strike Capacity

To meet the threat of that cannon aimed at your bedroom window, you decide to put in some second strike capacity. You aim an automatic machine gun into his nursery, and wire it to go off when and if he lets fly into your bedroom. He will then know that though he may kill you and your wife in your sleep, his children will die with you.

Put in these terms, it is easy to see that the one kind of insurance this provides is insurance that neither side will sleep easily at nights.

This problem is soluble only when looked at not from the viewpoint of any one household but of all of them. We meet the problem in community living by forbidding private armament and allowing firepower only to the police.

So long as we fail to apply this same approach to the world community, the arms race only supplies an increasing insecurity. Thus Mr. Kennedy, in stepping up the Polaris program, calls for 29 nuclear submarines "each with a full complement of missiles." He says, "The sooner they are on station, the safer we will be."

Each Polaris submarine has 16 nuclear missiles. If our arithmetic is correct, 29 submarines will carry a total of 524 missiles. When the Russians know we have 524 nuclear missiles cocked at their cities and bases from secret places under the sea, will we really be safer?

## The Origin of Those Missile And Bomber Gap Scares

"There is no doubt that the services have sometimes utilized inflated estimates of enemy strengths to strengthen their budget requests to Congress. There have been marked differences of opinion between the services based on differing intelligence estimates—about Soviet missile strength, and, some years ago, about Soviet bomber strength. Each service has a natural tendency to stress those elements of Soviet strength with which it is most concerned."

—Hanson W. Baldwin, *New York Times*, March 27

The Russians certainly won't feel safer. Their answer will be to build nuclear submarines of their own and ring *our* shores with them. When both sides are ringed by secret submarines armed with enough missiles to wipe out every city and small town in both, will we feel safer? Or will we be looking around for some new super-monster to pile on top of all the existing monsters we call instruments of deterrence? Can either side really be made safer by rendering the other side more insecure?

Mr. Kennedy says, and we are sure he is sincere, that "the primary purpose of our arms is peace, not war." But this is what men have always said. "If you want peace, prepare for war" is one of the oldest fallacies of mankind. The President is objective enough to note that "in the public position of both sides in recent years, the determination to be strong has been coupled with announced willingness to negotiate. For our part," Mr. Kennedy added, "we know there can be dialectical truth in such a position, and we shall do all we can to prove it in action." The trouble is that both sides want to deal from a situation of strength, and neither is yet willing to put the job of policing the world in the hands of a world community. There is no other way out.

To step up the arms race, as Mr. Kennedy is doing with this new message, merely adds to the tempo of madness. We began by ringing the Soviet Union with bases to contain it. The Soviets replied by developing an intercontinental ballistic missile which can hurl death on our cities in 30 minutes. We counter by putting nuclear armed submarines in secret position around the Soviet shores. The USSR may reply next by putting nuclear weapons in orbit on space ships whirling around the earth, ready on signal to hurl death down upon it. The notion of deterrence on which both sides operate is a delusion. It leads to a dead end for mankind.

## Only Solution We Can See Is To Plan for War Against Other Planets

"Los Angeles, Mar. 27—(AP)—By 1965 the United States expects to have: 708 Atlas, Titan and Minuteman ICBM's, most of them stored in bomb-proof pits; 236 Polaris missiles in nuclear submarines and 150 additional Minutemen on trains roving 100,000 miles of railroad tracks, hard to spot and harder to hit.

"Total: 1,094 ready-to-launch nuclear warheads, any one of which could wipe out a city. This is probably two or three times the fire-power needed to blast any likely combination of enemies off the face of the globe. Even if Russia by 1965 has a reasonably good anti-missile missile, with this overkill of 200 to 300 percent the United States

should be able to get enough missiles through to make any future war a literal hell.

"So in 1965 will we need more missiles? If we don't, what happens to America's vast missile industry? The industry last year grossed \$6 billion and gave jobs to 300,000 people. By 1965, if future growth matches past performance, it could begin to rival the \$12 billion, 700,000-worker automobile industry.

"Any serious dislocation of this industry would have a depressing economic effect. . . . A survey of missile executives indicates full awareness of the problem."

—*New York Herald-Tribune*, March 28

## It Was Not Lack of Military Means Which Caused Our Failure in Laos

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country to repeat all the agonies of the French in the bloody years before 1954. In addition, and here the maps shown by Mr. Kennedy at his White House press conference gave a false picture, it is not true that the Pathet Lao and Captain Kong Le merely hold three northern provinces; if that were true, the situation could be contained by a military line or by partition. The true situation may be seen in the map published by *Le Monde* in Paris (March 25) which shows that except for the Mekong River valley lowlands which adjoin Thailand, all the rest of the country from north to south is now "infected" with guerrillas. They hold the mountain uplands. According to a series of three articles by that paper's Far Eastern expert, Robert Guillain, by far the best on-the-spot report I have seen (March 24, 25 & 26-27), all the east-west routes are controlled by the Pathet Lao; they are in position to cut the country in half at Thakek. There is no longer a line which can be held.

### The Same Old Errors

The Laos crisis deepens one's disappointment with the President's special message adding some \$2 billions to our defense budget, boosting both the monsters of massive retaliation (see p. 3) and also means for limited war. Though Mr. Kennedy's requests are much less than the arms lobby had been led to expect from the Democrats, they illustrate that the line of least resistance in our society when faced with a crisis is to step up our military appropriations. But our policies in Laos did not collapse for any caution in military spending. Their failure grew out of our inability to understand social and economic factors. In the six years since the Geneva accords we have created viable regimes neither in Laos nor South Vietnam; only neutralist Cambodia is stable. We have built up huge armies in Thailand, Formosa, the Philippines and these two Indochinese satellites which either lack the will to fight or are geared in any case to large scale modern war against Communist China. They have neither the equipment, the training nor the political program to do battle in the countryside. In both Laos and South Vietnam, in addition, mistreatment of the large racial minorities in the mountains by the dominant lowlander Lao and Viets have given the Communist guerrillas friendly ter-

### Some British Views of Laos

"There have been many defects in past American policy, including the support of unrepresentative right-wing figures."

—*London Times*, from Bangkok, March 27

"British official opinion does not share the view commonly reported from Washington that in Laos Mr. Khrushchov is simply engaged in a reckless piece of brinkmanship to test the nerve of the new American President and of the West as a whole. It is too well aware of the fact that the Laotian civil war is partly the result of rash American diplomacy under the Eisenhower Administration, a result about which Britain and France gave repeated warnings."

—*Diplomatic Corresp.*, *London Observer*, Mar. 26

"He [Prince Souvanna Phouma "the most considerable of the Laotian politicians"] was defeated in 1958 [in his effort to build a neutral Laos] not by the Communists but by the Laotian right wing, with army support and American encouragement. A right wing government took over, and the international control commission was got rid of as being too neutral. The integration of the Pathet Lao troops and of the northern provinces failed. An American military mission arrived, and American aid poured in."

—*Scrutator in London Sunday Times*, March 26

rain in which to operate.

To win the people by fair treatment—is this so difficult a principle to understand in a country constantly striving at home by democratic means to improve economic security and minority rights? Unfortunately the military and diplomatic bureaucracies by tradition and training have little taste or sympathy for democratic policies, and these make or distort policy in the act of carrying it out. So inextinguishable a military windbag as Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, made another of his speeches in the midst of the Laotian crisis and declared "U.S. military power must be prepared to safeguard our principles whenever, wherever they may be threatened." (*N.Y. Herald-Tribune*, March 26.) But what moral right do we have to impose "our principles" by blood and fire on a distant peaceful people anyway? And just what did American principles have to do with the conniving grafters we tried to impose on Laos?

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