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## Adenauer's Old Game and Some Lessons of the Past

Two historic parallels may provide useful guidelines on the way to new Berlin negotiations. The first is the course of events under the Eisenhower Administration, between November 1958 when Khrushchev demanded a new status for West Berlin and May, 1960, when Eisenhower's assumption of personal responsibility for the U-2 blew up the summit conference. The second is the way the seizure of power by Hitler ended the long and tangled disarmament talks between World Wars I and II.

The main lesson of the first is to be wary of taking signs of "thaw" between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as assurance of a peaceful settlement on Berlin so long as Adenauer and de Gaulle have a virtual veto power over negotiating terms and are allowed to delay talks interminably. Friendly exchanges between Washington and Moscow like the publication in *Izvestia* of the President's refreshing interview with its editor help to break the ice but they are falsely reassuring if not accompanied by resistance to German pressure and fuller education of the U.S. public to the basic issues. The course of events under Eisenhower was in some ways similar to the course of events under Kennedy. In both cases, on the plane of public relations there were gestures and exchanges which gave hope of a settlement while on the plane of diplomatic preparations Adenauer was successful in so limiting the area of negotiations as to make a settlement unlikely.

### Even Dulles Not Rigid Enough For Adenauer

It is useful to recall that even John Foster Dulles was not rigid enough for Konrad Adenauer. When Dulles suggested in November, 1958, as a compromise that maybe East German instead of Russian officials might be allowed to stamp travel passes as "agents" of the Soviet Union, Adenauer (and Willy Brandt, too) were furious. There were similar convulsions in Bonn when in January, 1959, Dulles said that there might be other ways of unifying Germany than by free elections, the first public hint of proposals that West Germany should seek closer relations with East Germany as a means slowly of reuniting the country. Adenauer lives, as André Fontaine said in *Le Monde* (Nov. 22), in terror of being abandoned. He has constantly to be reassured by private letter from the White House when he sees the forbidden word "disengagement" in the press or hears that Secretary Rusk in talking with Foreign Minister Gromyko had mentioned that subversive phrase, "European security." Any formula which promises a framework in which diverse security needs might be reconciled—and thus the way really cleared for eventual German unity—sends Adenauer up in alarm. He is like the neurotic woman who rules her house-

### Not Exactly Truthful

**Q.** Minister, this is a question which has been kicking around here. I am sure you can put an end to it right at this moment. Please explain your reported Nazi background.

**A.** My only reply to this question is as follows, and this is a statement which I have already made in the past before the Bundestag, the German Parliament: I have never in my life been what is called here a Nazi, not even for one second. I have neither been a Nazi prior to 1933, nor have I been a Nazi after 1933, nor do I have any intention of being turned into a Nazi at this time through misrepresentation.

—German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder before the National Press Club, Nov. 22.

The statement issued by the German government on his past (as printed in *Die Zeit* of Hamburg Nov. 24) presents the facts differently. It denies that he was ever a Storm Trooper, but admits that he was a Nazi. The official biography says he applied for membership in the Storm Troopers in the winter of 1933-34 but his application lapsed when he moved from Bonn to Berlin. He did however join the Nazi party in 1933 and remained in it until 1941 when he married the daughter of a "non-Aryan" banker. (The ratio of money to actual Jewish blood had to be very wide for survival in such cases.) The biography claims that he showed his negative attitude toward Nazism by joining the Confessional Church in 1938. Nevertheless he remained in the Nazi party for three more years.

hold by hysterics, threatening several times a month to commit suicide—as Adenauer regularly hints that, if thwarted, Catholic capitalist West Germany may join up with Moscow.

When Mr. Kennedy, trying hard to develop a more mature public opinion, spoke at Seattle recently of those who see "only two choices: appeasement or war, suicide or surrender, humiliation or holocaust", he was, even if unintentionally, describing our frenetic West German ally. During the recent German election campaign, both Adenauer's Christian Democrats and Brandt's Social Democrats were passionately in agreement that negotiations must not be limited to Berlin, that Berlin's interests could be safeguarded only in the context of wider negotiations. Now they have come whirling about full circle to the view that negotiations must be confined to Berlin alone. Adenauer feared that wider talks on European security might create another obstacle to German possession of nuclear warheads, that provisions against surprise attack might put Russian inspectors on West Berlin soil. In short, he feared a wider settlement might put a stop to West Germany's steady expansion in military power. It

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## Way Suggested for Neutrals to Take Nuclear Initiative from Deadlocked Big Powers

### Sweden and Six Pro-West Neutrals Propose Universal Rapacki Plan

"The Rapacki Plan envisages the creation of one particular atom-free zone, that is, in Central Europe. In our proposal we should like to apply the principles underlying the Rapacki Plan on a universal basis. Why should not Africa or a part of the African continent become an atom-free zone if the African States so wish? . . . It could be raised with regard to other areas of the world than Africa. We realize that there might be different degrees as to which one area or the other could be sealed off from nuclear weapons.

"It may well be desirable, therefore, to lay down different rules for atom-free zones in different parts of the world. A rule that might be appropriate for conditions in Africa would, perhaps, not be equally fit or applicable in Central Europe. It is obvious that an over-all ban on nuclear weapons tests, as well as the establishment of atom-free zones, would call for certain controls. The problem of controls in connection with disarmament is very complicated and important. In our view it cannot be solved by one single formula; the solution must, instead, be adapted to the object of the controls in each particular instance. . . .

#### Need for Test Control Exaggerated

"Let me again express my feeling that the demand for controls, as a condition for a treaty prohibiting nuclear tests, has been given excessive importance in the face of the possibilities existing today of detecting nuclear explosions by means of technical devices. On the other hand, a certain amount of controls is needed, no doubt. I might add that this was acknowledged also by the author of the Rapacki Plan, which provides for a control system. . . .

"In a statement to this Committee on 26 October I suggested that in view of the failure of the three great Powers to reach an agreement to ban nuclear weapons tests, another approach might be tried. I then put the question whether the initiative could not be taken by the non-nuclear countries themselves. If the report which the Disarmament Commis-

#### New Non-Nuclear Club Proposal

The other nuclear resolutions passed by the United Nations at this session—against testing and against the use of atomic weapons—are little more than the expression of pious hopes the big Powers can ignore. But as we went to press a vote was nearing on a different kind of resolution which the smaller powers can implement among themselves. This was offered by Sweden, with the support of six other pro-Western neutrals: Austria, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Libya, Sudan and Tunisia. This combines two ideas, one put forward by the Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki for an atom free zone in Central Europe, the other by Lord Russell many months ago for a "non-nuclear club" of smaller Powers. The resolution would instruct the Secretary General to ask the non-nuclear powers if they would be willing to "enter into undertakings to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such weapons and to refuse to receive in the future nuclear weapons on their territories on behalf of any other country" and submit the results to the Disarmament Commission not later than next April 1. Because so little attention has been paid this proposal in the press we reprint here part of a Swedish speech at the UN explaining it.

sion is to receive on 14 December indicates no hope that the Geneva negotiations will be resumed under present circumstances, we could instead take steps to find out if those many countries which have not participated in the Geneva Conference and are in favor of prohibiting nuclear weapons tests might be ready to assume a more active part in order to reach a solution; they might form a 'non-atom club,' . . . under which they might undertake not to manufacture, not to import or not to store nuclear weapons on their own territories on behalf of their own or any other country. . . . We are attempting to open new roads for further negotiations."

—Mr. Unden, Sweden, in the UN First Committee, Nov. 17.

### Ceylon Sees The Danger of World Rule By A Russo-American Condominium

"What we have is not the classic armaments race of the 20th Century, when the fate of one nation or an alliance of nations was at stake, when armaments may even have nurtured the economies of nations. In the nuclear race it is the human race that is at stake, and while a few nations may still benefit economically from the production of armaments, such armaments are a deterrent to the development of the economies of the new-born states. . . . The nuclear arsenals . . . are a deterrent not to war but to peace and to peaceful development.

"There have emerged far out in front in the armaments race only two Powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—and if this race continues unabated, we shall soon find that these two Powers will enjoy the military domination of the world. . . .

"Nor is it too far fetched to envisage an evolution from this rivalry to one of partnership—that is to say when these two Powers join in a cartel, when they discover some bright early morning that they have more in common than their differences. Such things have happened in history

before, even in such recent history as the Second World War when the enemies of yesterday have become the allies of today. . . .

"I do not say that is what Moscow and Washington want. I do not for one moment suggest that this is what they would even approve. But nations achieve objectives not only in policy but also in drift, in the logic of evolution, in the sudden and unforeseen turn of events. . . .

"Theories that human beings can survive a nuclear war are being assiduously cultivated and are creating the illusion that survival is a distinct possibility. Mankind is thus being hypnotized into a state of complacency, and there is no need to stress here how dangerous such an illusion can be. . . .

"We want a peace race, no different from any other race in which the participants are in a hurry to get somewhere—in this case, into a world without arms. . . . The people of Ceylon want to see a world without weapons, a world without war, a world under the growing power of the United Nations."

—Mr. Malalasekera of Ceylon in the UN's First Committee debate on disarmament, Nov. 22.