

... Linked to K's Offer to Accept Any Control in A Disarmed World

tions and those of Western Europe, the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and Japan, the world of organization should establish its own development authority administered by an economic and social council.

(e) Its own revenue system. . . .

"This plan is admittedly bold; some will say radical; but so was the Constitution of the United States. This plan calls for a yielding of a limited amount of sovereignty by the nations of the world in order to prevent that annihilation of humanity which a third world war would bring. . . .

"This plan will find little favor with those wedded to the status quo . . . [it] is far in advance of public opinion in this country today. . . . And yet if it were patiently and fully presented by the Chief Executive and the overriding needs for such a plan to reverse the arms race were explained I am confident that the American people would support the President. . . .

Would the Russians Agree?

"It will be said that the Russians will never agree. But let us look at the record—a record which unfortunately has not been made clear to the American people.

"On June 4, 1961, Premier Khrushchov at Vienna handed an aide memoire to President Kennedy in which he said:

"The Soviet government, as is well known, has already more than once emphasized that the Soviet government, on its part, is willing unconditionally to accept any Western control proposals if the Western powers accept the proposal for general and complete disarmament. . . . When all states disarm . . . each country will have proper guarantees of its security. . . . In these conditions we are ready to accept any control proposed by the Western powers.' . . .

"I suggest that the least we can do is put Mr. Khrushchov to the test. If he means what he says on disarmament controls and we can get him to recognize a strong international peace-keeping authority in a disarmed world, would we not have found the road to permanent peace? . . . If he does not mean what he says let us at least call his bluff and make our own position abundantly clear to the world. . . .

"There remains the problem—and perhaps insoluble problem—of China. All agree that disarmament without Chinese Communist participation can never be effective. President Eisenhower at his press conference Feb. 11, 1960 [said] . . . 'Well, it's perfectly clear that in such a big territory, such a great population could not be ignored when you are talking about general disarmament. . . .'

Cyrus Eaton Honored

Pugwash, Nova Scotia—Presentation of a citation to Cyrus Eaton for his "devotion and dedication" to the improvement of international understanding marked the conclusion of the Tenth Pugwash Intellectual Life Conference of American University Presidents here July 16. The group, which has been in session here since July 7 under the sponsorship of the Association of American Colleges, includes Presidents of colleges affiliated with the major Protestant denominations as well as the Catholic faith. The college presidents unanimously declared "one of our prime tasks is to work for international understanding, which is among the most urgent goals of American society." In paying tribute to the Cleveland industrialist, the educators stated, "We join in appreciation of the devotion and dedication with which you have contributed to this desirable end."

"That these views are shared by President Kennedy and his principal advisers, I have no doubt. . . .

"It is entirely possible that world-wide efforts for disarmament would break down on the rock of Chinese Communist opposition. Yet how do we know until we try? . . . Is it not possible that if we could come to an agreement with the Russians . . . behind plans for total and permanent disarmament, the dangerously explosive Chinese situation could be brought under control? . . .

"A Senator from Massachusetts, speaking on December 11, 1959 about the expectations raised around the world by the Russian proposal for far-reaching disarmament and the considerable disappointment at the limitations of this proposal, said:

"It is for us now to meet these expectations with far-reaching new plans of our own, and not to disappoint the world by treating this problem merely as a matter of psychological warfare. We must design and propose a program that combines disarmament with the strengthening of the United Nations and with world development. . . . So far we have lacked the vision to present a comprehensive program for the development of a world community under law."

"Those words are as true today as when the President of the United States—then the Senator from Massachusetts—first spoke them. Time is running short. The East-West disarmament conference is imminent. A comprehensive American plan for disarmament under enforceable world law is the present imperative for peace."

A Correction and More Light on Dodd's Work As Foreign Agent for Guatemala

In our issue of July 3 we called attention to a table in the Congressional Record of June 21 (page 10,227) which inadvertently disclosed that Senator Thomas J. Dodd (D. Conn.) was registered as a foreign agent for Guatemala in 1957-58. We were wrong in saying that he was a member of Congress in those years. Mr. Dodd was in the House from 1952 to 1956, but not in 1957-58. The tabulation showed that Mr. Dodd was paid \$24,999.96 by the Guatemalan government in 1957 and \$41,666.62 in 1958, the year he campaigned successfully for election to the U.S. Senate.

We are in a position to add a few more details to our earlier report. In 1956 Mr. Dodd's last year in the House, when he was a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee,

he was able to raise the defense support allocation to the Guatemalan government from the \$5,000,000 originally asked by the Eisenhower Administration to \$15,000,000. The allocation was first raised in committee to \$10,000,000. On June 6, 1956, Mr. Dodd made a speech asking for more funds to make Guatemala (where the CIA had helped overthrow the Arbenz regime two years before) into "a showpiece for its neighbors." On June 7 he moved an amendment adding another \$5,000,000 for this purpose to the Mutual Security bill and on June 11, after the bill had passed with his amendment, Mr. Dodd made a statement on the floor "to make perfectly plain the legislative intent" that the extra money was for Guatemala.

Adenauer Would Rather Risk Nuclear War Than Give Up Atomic Arms

(Continued from Page One)

West to negotiate with the Ulbricht government for free access to West Berlin." Is this so catastrophic?

The New Drang Nach Osten

Adenauer and Strauss have sold their followers on the belief that nuclear rearmament in alliance with the West can regain for the Reich not only "central Germany" (Mitteldeutschland), as their propagandists call East Germany, but the lands east of the Oder-Neisse at the expense of Poland. That way lies war, and in this is the danger of the West German propaganda emphasis on "self-determination." It is quite true that the Russians do not allow self-determination in their own zone, particularly in East Germany. Indeed everybody likes self-determination best in the other fellow's back-yard; examples: our attitude toward Cuba and Nehru's attitude toward Kashmir. But in Eastern Europe, self-determination for the Germans will be an unpopular slogan even among those who would like self-determination from the Russians. It is only a few years since the Germans applied their own form of self-determination to Eastern Europe which remains fearful, especially when the Germans have begun to arm again, this time with nuclear weapons.

Indeed the principal reason for Strauss's sudden trip here was to emphasize Germany's right to nuclear weapons and to counteract whispers that the Kennedy Administration might be prepared to concede a denuclearized Germany in bargaining with the Russians. Strauss told his press conference at the Pentagon that the decision to introduce tactical nuclear weapons into all NATO forces was made in February, 1957. "We must break nuclear weapons into two categories—means of delivery and warheads," Strauss went on. "The means of delivery weapons must remain part of all allied forces. That means, for West German forces, our air offensive missiles, our air defense missiles and our ground missiles. The problem of nuclear warheads was never raised by the West German government. If Germany is involved in a war it will be a NATO war. If there is a NATO war, nuclear warheads would be released for use of the allied forces. We cannot give up atomic weapons because they are a part of NATO

How the Satellite Peoples See It

"In a recent article Senor de Madariaga wrote: 'The satellites are as restive as ever, and therefore forbode more trouble than help (for Russia) if it came to a European crisis.' With all respect, I must differ directly with him. Apart from East Germany, the poorest and least successful, the satellites are solidly behind Mr. Khrushchov in his present attitude towards Germany.

"Not to put too fine a point upon it, the Poles, the Czechs, and the Hungarians fear and hate the Germans to an extent which we cannot even begin to comprehend in this country. And the Russians, who suffered less but only relatively, at the hands of the Germans, are not far behind.

"I am referring not to members of the Communist Party, nor to Ministers, but to the people. They are horrified by the prospect of Western Germany getting atomic weapons; and they have no desire to see Germany reunited. This gives to the Soviet Union a massive psychological support throughout Central and Eastern Europe, which we shall underestimate at our peril.

"The reason is understandable when you see and hear of it at first hand. Warsaw and Budapest were destroyed by Hitler's orders. . . . In all four of the countries we visited the Germans killed and killed and killed for five interminable years. The killing was not confined to the Jews; and it is not forgotten."

—Lord Boothby (Ind. C) reporting on a trip through Eastern Europe in the London Sunday Times July 16.

planning for Germany." This emphasis in public seems designed to head off any compromise involving a denuclearized Reich. The Adenauer regime would rather risk a nuclear holocaust than give up nuclear weapons. This is why Adenauer so quickly attacked Willy Brandt's proposals at a press conference in Berlin July 7. The latter suggested that a peace conference could be called to determine the "foreign policy status" (neutral?) of a reunited Reich and that it might consider inclusion of a reunited Germany in an atom free zone. This, to Adenauer and Strauss, would be a loss of Germany's freedom to determine its own destiny. For them, that destiny must be nuclear. These Germans are making trouble again.

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