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Better at Hiding Information Than At Hiding Tests

To move back from Geneva to Washington is to plunge into an altogether different atmosphere. Here the decision to resume testing can be seen ever more clearly as a political and domestic matter. It is painful to notice that as the date for resumption of testing draws near, only one member of Congress has suggested postponement. A few others—not many—may feel the same way, but they are silent. Frank Kowalski, Connecticut's Democratic Congressman-at-Large, the one professional Army officer in the House, a West Pointer and a Colonel, released a letter to the President April 12 suggesting—as India did in Geneva that same day—that we postpone resumption while negotiations are going on. "It would seem inconsistent," he wrote Mr. Kennedy, "to threaten the life of these negotiations by committing the very acts we are trying to outlaw at Geneva. . . . Your decision not to talk would assure the free people of the world that before God we are doing all that is humanly possible to promote peace and avoid spilling nuclear refuse upon all mankind and generations to come."

A More Daring Leadership Required

Kowalski's lone voice merely emphasized the silence. It would take a President more daring and emotionally committed than John F. Kennedy has shown himself to be to step into this political void, and appeal to the better conscience of the country against the storm of protest and suspicion which a sudden order to stop would bring from the Republicans, the Southern oligarchy and the military-industrial complex. The best one hears from the unhappy liberals in the Kennedy entourage is that *after* a new test series, and only then, can the Administration afford to be more flexible about controls. The Russian refusal to permit *any* inspection even by the neutrals, does not make the Administration's task easier, and strengthens the suspicion that they, too, are not ready to talk seriously until after another round of their own.

What Geneva is discussing seems all the more irrelevant when seen from the perspective of Washington. Unfortunately a combination of diplomatic tact and inadequate information keeps the neutrals from breaking through into the realities. The whole question of underground testing has been exaggerated out of all proportion. At his press conference on March 29, Mr. Kennedy was asked about emphasis on inspection of underground tests since he himself had said at Palm Beach last winter that they did not particularly advance the art of weaponry. Mr. Kennedy replied lamely that he thought "underground tests potentially could be more rewarding than they have been in the past." It now appears that only a few days earlier a key Defense Department official, when questioned by the House Appropriations Committee, admitted that underground tests were of limited value and that one could never

Social Notes

Since our last report Mr. Kennedy managed to attend two State dinners for and by the Shah of Iran and his Queen but found no time to see a delegation from the Women Strike for Peace which held a 24-hour vigil for a week outside the White House trying to talk with him nor to spare a moment for Miss Miyoko Matsubara and Mr. Hiromasa Hanafusa who came from Hiroshima on their way to Geneva.

The resplendent Shah brought the not unexpected news that he needed dollars quickly if he were to continue to support himself in the style to which U.S. aid and rich oil revenues, all somehow dissipated, had accustomed him. Miss Matsubara and Mr. Hanafusa brought messages of a different character, an appeal from 460,000 citizens of Hiroshima against resumption of testing.

All these visitors, humble and regal, had their scars to show. On the face of Miss Matsubara, who teaches at a school for the blind, are visible the skin grafts which are a relic of that day the mushroom cloud appeared over Hiroshima. The Queen of Iran, too, has suffered. The emerald and diamond crown she wore to the White House dinner is so heavy her head had to be protected with a padding of velvet and cotton. Mr. Hanafusa, whose parents were victims of the Hiroshima bombing when he was two, owes his survival to his grandmother, but at the age of four he began to help her by collecting old iron and copper in the streets, earning sometimes as much as 30 cents a day. The Shah also had a sad story; he told the National Press Club "this king business" had given him "nothing but headaches." No doubt the U.S. Treasury will keep the aspirin coming.

be sure of the results without a full-scale test, "and that takes the atmosphere." *

Unfortunately this expert testimony, released a week after the President's remark, was generally overlooked or ignored in the U.S. press and the neutrals at Geneva are unlikely to hear of it. We reprint important parts of it (see boxes on page three) because it contained this and two other admissions important in the current controversy over test detection. The witness was Dr. J. P. Ruina, who is in charge of the Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency; his jurisdiction includes Project VELA, through which the U.S. is

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* Three years ago we called attention (the Weekly, June 8, 1959) to similar testimony by Dr. Shelton of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project who objected that testing underground or in outer space provided "very little information on the main purpose of the weapon, that is, how to use it, and whether to use it, and what it will do." Then, as now, little attention was paid this testimony.

studying improved methods of detecting and identifying underground tests. Dr. Ruina's two other admissions were that atmospheric tests could be monitored "without actually putting stations within the other country" and that British studies showed, as he grudgingly put it, "some possibility that one can improve detection capabilities rather significantly." It is a pity so few people here or abroad will know of this testimony.

"Information Men" At Work

A less candid picture was drawn for the Washington press corps last Thursday, April 12, when the State Department was thrown into a near panic by the proposal from Geneva for a temporary moratorium on testing while negotiations were underway. This originated with India, drew a Soviet agreement and was supported by many of the neutrals; Canada joined them in deploring resumption while talks were going on. But in the Department, as in most of U.S. press coverage, this was presented solely as a Soviet proposal, and steps were taken by "information officers" to counter the news from Geneva. These steps are so typical they deserve fuller description.

First of all the press was allowed to report "the thinking of U.S. officials"—this was the dictated phrase. How, where and just when this "thinking" was obtained, whether by telepathy, osmosis, divination, palmistry or necromancy cannot be divulged; this is the old not-for-attribution but please-use-it device. Suffice it is to say that the "thinking" was so discouraging about the possibilities of detection that it was even suggested one could not be sure of detecting atmospheric tests without an international network! Fortunately the process of transmitting this thinking provoked so many embarrassing questions and disclosed so many contradictions that little if any trace of these disembodied cogitations could be found in the next day's newspapers.

The second step taken was the release of a report on "The Detection and Identification of Underground Nuclear Explosions" by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

While We Talk Disarmament

"In this bill, peacetime appropriations for Defense have again reached a new high as a result of new or enlarged programs to increase our military strength. . . . The Dept. of Defense reports that longer range programs proposed in this area [strategic retaliatory forces] will provide by 1967 a force of over 700 B-58 and B-52 bombers equipped with HOUND DOG and SKYBOLT missiles, well over 1,000 land-based ICBM's, and 41 submarines with more than 650 POLARIS missiles abroad. It is also reported that the alert portion of this force alone will have three times the destructive capability of the alert force we had in June 1961. . . . The Air Force will keep one-half of its strategic bomber force on 15-minute ground alert during fiscal 1963. . . . One area, chemical and biological warfare weapons, has been allocated an approximate increase of four times the amount provided in the current fiscal year."

—From the Appropriations Committee report to the House on the 1963 Defense Dept. budget, April 13.

This marked another of the occasions on which this Agency, which is supposed to be working militantly for disarmament, has been used by the State Department to make propaganda discouraging disarmament negotiations. This on-the-record report fell as flat as the off-the-record "thinking" but I hope that independent scientists, particularly seismologists, will write the agency for a copy so they can analyze it for themselves. It could hardly have been more pessimistic if written by Dr. Teller himself. On page 4, for example, it agrees with Dr. Teller that even at the best the location of a suspicious seismic event could only be made within "about 10 kilometers" or six and a quarter miles. Coast and Geodetic found, to the contrary, in a still undisclosed study of Project Gnome that travel time curves could be drawn to locate the explosion within several tenths of a mile. The report says on page eight that there is no technique "which would permit the identifica-

Senator Clark Warns Senate Badly Needs Preparation for Disarmament Treaty

"Two of the great powers have recognized that the key to practical disarmament cannot await the solution of political problems. 'Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total (disarmament) program has been achieved,' read the US-USSR Joint Statement of Sept. 1961. But their deeds do not match their words. . . .

"In Congress and throughout the country we have failed to readjust our thinking about disarmament to make it compatible with the basic new fact of international life: Two great powers have the present capability of destroying civilization. And either of them might do it through accident as easily as by design. . . .

"The Senate, even today is badly informed on the President's disarmament policy. An incident during last week's debate on the UN bond issue illustrates the point. A press story indicated that our delegation in Geneva would submit a plan that called 'for the elimination of national armies within nine years.' The statement differed little from those of the President I have quoted. Yet a Senator drew attention to this article in obvious surprise and alarm. Another Senator, a noted supporter of the President, said that he 'had never heard anybody on the floor of the Senate, or, for that matter, in this country, make a declaration going that far, which would seek to abandon our own national forces.' Regrettably—as a reading of the Congressional Record of April 5 will show—this unfamiliarity is not the sole property of these two men.

"There are a number of reasons for this. First disarmament matters are extremely complex and are diffused among a number of overburdened committees. The Senate Committees on Foreign Relations, Appropriations, Aeronautical and Space Sciences, and Armed Services all have jurisdiction as does the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Disarmament to each of these is a different, and sometimes secondary, problem. Committees occupied with determining how large our arsenal should be—whose daily currency is testimony from members of the industrial-military complex of which President Eisenhower warned—are not apt to regard highly their function as disarmament policy advisers. . . .

"May we not be heading for another Versailles? Is the Congress being prepared to 'advise and consent' to a meaningful disarmament treaty? I fear not, and, more important perhaps, does the country understand what the Administration is up to? Again I fear the answer must be negative. Is not the conclusion that if disarmament should become diplomatically possible, it would nonetheless fail for want of Congressional approval? As of today, I fear the answer is yes. . . .

"In the end, much depends on the American people themselves. The incentive . . . must come from the grass roots of public opinion."

—Senator Clark (D.Pa.) to the American Academy of Political Science in Philadelphia, April 13.