

These Nightmare Glimpses of the Military Mind in Action Explain Why . . .

The selections on these two pages from the just published testimony on the 1964 Defense Dept. budget (Pt. 2) before the House Appropriations Committee may help us understand better why the Pope spoke so urgently in his peace message:

Mr. [Geo. H.] MAHON (D. Tex.): General, what is your thinking in regard to the development of a 100-megaton bomb? We apparently are not interested in developing this weapon. The Soviet Union has boasted of having the large bombs and the Soviet Union has actually tested a much larger weapon than we have. . . .

Gen. [David M.] SHOUP (Commandant, US Marines): I think it is just as important that we have one if they have it. . . .

Mr. MAHON: What would you say to the argument that if we have say 100 megatons in 10 separate missiles that it would be more effective in devastation and deterrent than just say one 100-megaton bomb.

Gen. SHOUP: When you get into this kind of bomb, shooting from 100 to 200 miles high—and to date no one knows how to stop one of them. Some of these days, hopefully, the U.S. will find out how to shoot down those other things that have come down through the atmosphere, but the bomb I am talking about doesn't have to come down through the atmosphere. It will burn the place up without it. (pp. 339-40)

Just A Couple Over New York and New England

Mr. MAHON: Would a 100-megaton weapon in our possession and operational be a deterrent, in your judgment General?

Gen. Curtis E. LEMAY (USAF Chief of Staff): I think it would. * * *

Secretary [Eugene M.] ZUCKERT (of the Air Force): The deterrence is a matter of trying to judge the other fellow's state of mind. If a 100-megaton weapon—the Soviets have it—make them feel better but on the other hand they are still going to be concerned about what kind of damage they are going to receive. I do not think the kind of damage they are going to receive is determined by whether or not we have a 100-MT bomb or a few 100-MT bombs.

Mr. MAHON: A couple of 100-megaton bombs detonated in a high burst where they could not be very well intercepted might immobilize the New England area, New York and New England. (p. 446)

Faith in Counter-Force Evaporates

Mr. MAHON: I would like to ask Admiral Anderson about his interpretation of counterforce strategy.

Admiral Geo W. ANDERSON (Chief of Naval Operations): Off the record. (Discussion off the record).

We Never Burn 'Em Up Unless—

Gen. LeMAY (USAF Chief of Staff): If you have to go in there and there is cover around where weapons could be concealed that could fire on the choppers (helicopters), you should beat it up with your fixed wing fighters before they go in, at the same time covering them until they get on the ground. You can do this with fixed wing airplanes that have the capability for accurate fire and delivery of heavy munitions. YOU CAN CARRY QUITE A LOAD (our emphasis—IFS). If you try to do this with the chopper, it is not a good firing platform. You cannot hit anything with it. They cannot carry much of a load of weapons. So, this is not the way to do it.

Mr. [Dan'l J.] FLOOD (D. Pa.): Now you have this problem. We are going in to Point A. I have guerrillas and these Reds all around the area. My intelligence reports where they are. They are practically and traditionally tied in to local villages and local people. Now you are back to the question which has been appearing in the newspaper all week. I have to go in there. I have to go in tonight. Are you going to go in, as in these pictures you showed me here the other day, and clobber everything and everybody with napalm and rockets and .50-caliber machine guns, kill everybody and burn everything, so the choppers put down and all they do is have a nice hot mess because everybody is dead?

Gen. Le MAY: No; it is not advocated to bomb indiscriminately. It is only those targets that have been clearly identified as enemy targets.

—1964 Defense Budget Hse hearings, pps. 483-4.

Mr. Wm. E. MINSHALL (R. Ohio): What happens to the hardened bases?

Admiral ANDERSON: Off the record. (Discussion off record).

Mr. MINSHALL: Pardon me, Mr. Chairman, for interrupting, but this hardened target concept has been explained to us by Mr. McNamara and other experts, and you are an expert, and not one of them has come here, Mr. McNamara included, and said that we could knock them all out. They have still said that we would suffer untold damage.

Admiral ANDERSON: That is right.

Mr. MINSHALL: What makes you think the Soviet Union is just going to target on our military targets?

Admiral ANDERSON: Off the record.

Mr. MINSHALL: That is a wild concept, in my book.

Mr. MAHON: Of course if there are Soviet submarines at sea that can launch medium-range ballistic missiles you cer-

Gen. Taylor Says India, Not China, Started Last Autumn's Border Fighting

Mr. [Robert L. F.] SIKES (D. Fla.): Let me talk about Red China and the Indian operation. Did the Indians actually start this military operation?

Gen. [Maxwell D.] TAYLOR (Chr'm, Joint Chiefs of Staff): They were edging forward in the disputed area; yes, sir.

(Discussion off the record).

Mr. SIKES: Is the area of the neutral zone on territory that was formerly claimed by India or claimed by China?

Gen. TAYLOR: In most cases claimed by both.

Mr. SIKES: Where is it with relation to the generally accepted international boundary?

Gen. TAYLOR: That is hard to say because there is no generally accepted international boundary. I am sorry to be vague about this, but I can assure you that I spent several hours trying to find out where the McMahon line is. Actually, you find the maps differ on this. The terrain is so terribly rugged, there has been no accurate mapping

and no accurate boundary lines or markers placed.

Mr. SIKES: Is the proposed neutral zone generally within territory which was occupied prior to all of this activity by Indian or Chinese forces?

Gen. TAYLOR: Most of it was unoccupied by anybody. General Hall, are you an expert on this subject?

Gen. HALL: Yes, sir. I would say in general it was occupied by neither force, but that the NEFA [North East Frontier Agency] was occupied predominantly by Indian forces. One thing I think it is very important to point out is that the Chinese Nationalists, when they were in control of China, did not recognize this line either. So it is not a question of the fact it is a Chinese Communist line vis-a-vis an Indian line. It is an Indian line that has never been recognized by either the Chinese Communists or the Nationalists.

—Dept. of Defense 1964 appropri. hearings before House Approp Com, Pt. 2, released April 19, pps. 9-10.

... The Pope Spoke So Urgently of the Need for Peace and Disarmament

tainly wouldn't expect to take all of them out?

Admiral ANDERSON: No sir.

Mr. MAHON: What does counterforce strategy mean to you?

Admiral ANDERSON: Off the record. (pps. 340-41)

Pushing Hard to Create New Monsters

Mr. [Gerald R.] FORD (R. Mich.): I detect a tendency on the part of some people to accept the philosophy that mutual deterrence or nuclear stalemate is inevitable regardless of what we do dollarwise, programwise, or otherwise. Do you accept the philosophy that mutual deterrence or nuclear stalemate is inevitable?

Gen. LEMAY: No, I do not accept that philosophy at all. . . . In other words, if we stop trying, we certainly are not going to succeed in defending ourselves. . . .

Secretary ZUCKERT: I do not think anybody in the Pentagon in a position of responsibility believes we are going to get some kind of balanced situation that is going to perpetuate itself. That is why all of us—Navy, Army, Air Force—are pushing at these technological frontiers all the time to find out what may be the key to the next weapon system or the next development that will upset any balance. (pps. 580-81).

Chemical and Biological War

Mr. [Robert L. F.] SIKES (D. Fla.): In the present world situation, where there seems to be an effort to find a way to win wars without resorting to nuclear strikes . . . there is a possibility that chemical and biological materials will play a much more important part than they have played heretofore. That would particularly be true if the Russians were to demonstrate a very pronounced capability in that field. Does that possibility concern the Department of the Army?

Secretary [Cyrus R.] VANCE (of the Army): Yes, it does concern the Department of the Army and to that end sir, we are procuring additional munitions during the coming years which would increase rather substantially our capability to deliver chemical and bacteriological materials on target. In addition, we are increasing the funds for chemical and biological research and development so as to press forward in new types of weapons which may be able to be used in such a situation. . . .

Mr. SIKES: Does intelligence tell us what the Russians are really doing in this field.

Secretary VANCE: Our intelligence indicates that they are devoting considerable attention to it. . . .

Mr. SIKES: How far are we going in the way of warning system and in providing a gas mask and similar defensive measures?

On Cuba As Soviet Base

Mr. [Jamie L.] WHITTEN (D. Miss.): With Cuba being a Communist stronghold in the Western Hemisphere doesn't it make an ideal base for further steps forward into South and Central America. . . ?

Gen. Maxwell D. TAYLOR (Chr'm, Jt. Chiefs of Staff): I would say that Cuba is an island surrounded by seas which we control absolutely: that any movement of men, material and things of that sort from Cuba would be known by us.

—1964 Defense Budget, Hse App. hearings, pps. 14-15

Gen. [Earle G.] WHEELER (US Army Chief of Staff): They are in the hands of the troops, but we need better types.

Mr. SIKES: I would assume the civilian population was almost completely unprotected in these fields?

Secretary VANCE: That is right. (pps. 188-90).

Not A Few Russians in Cuba

Gen. SHOUP: I am not much of an expounder, but we seem to have so many words today about some Russian forces that are about 90 miles away. I think we ought to think about what we are going to do when they are 3½ miles away in submarines with Polaris-type armament. And it is going to come to pass. What are we going to do when they put tremendous-sized nuclear weapons in satellites or even in bombers? When you might have to get but three or four of them over this continent to burn the whole darn thing up.

These are the serious problems that are confronting this nation, more than a few Russians down in Cuba. (p. 339)

End of the White Race

Gen. SHOUP: Now, about the casualty business. I have said for the last 2 years that when the nuclear exchange of the magnitude that is possible occurs—and there will be even greater capability later—that we will have not millions but 700 to 800 million dead. Although I did not give him the figures, that is exactly the figures Khrushchev used in the past month. I have no communication with him nor he with me, but that is exactly the same figure.

We are then looking at a situation where we have the white race or the Caucasian race—and I don't know whether it would be good to eliminate the white race from the face of the earth or not but I am convinced that a nuclear exchange will do it. Within a matter of years afterward the white race is finished. There will be a little bit of New Zealand and Australia left but you have plenty of yellows and browns to take that over in a matter of a few years. (p. 337)

Admiral Anderson Dismisses Submarine Fears in That New Cuban Fishing Base

Mr. [Geo. H.] MAHON (D. Tex.): Now I would like to talk about a matter involving the Cuban fishing fleet and the use of ports, the possible use of ports in Cuba by the Soviet fishing fleet and by the Soviet submarine fleet. Will you give us the picture on that?

Admiral [Geo. W.] ANDERSON (Chief of Naval Operations): Yes, sir; I will. On the 25th of September, just before the outbreak of the Cuban crisis, the Cubans and the Soviets signed an agreement for the construction of a fishing port in Havana for Cuban and Soviet use.

On Jan. 17, 1963, the Cubans announced that the planning was complete and the construction for the fishing port would start in February 1963, with completion scheduled for December 1963. The announcement reiterated Cuban sovereignty over this facility.

In July 1962, Soviet fishing boats arrived in Havana and have since operated in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. They have been joined by others, bringing the total

involved to ——. [Number cut by censor—IFS].

In addition, three fish factory ships have called at Cuban ports, probably bringing in fish from the Soviet Union. The Cubans have bought five fishing boats from Japan, three of which already have been delivered to Cuba.

Cuba has a significant shortage of protein in their diet, dating from the slaughter in 1961 of breeding stocks to replace imports from the U.S. The establishment of the fishing fleet in Cuba is an efficient means of supplementing the source of the protein in the diet. The Soviet Union is helping to support the Cuban economy. However, there are no additional gains to the Soviet Union.

(Discussion off the record).

Admiral ANDERSON: To date, we have seen no evidence that Soviet submarines have operated from Cuban ports. We also believe that if they went into Cuban ports we would find out about it very quickly.

—Pt. 2 1964 Defense Approp House hearings, p. 349