

A Mao Tse-tung Republican: How Goldwater Won in The Past and Hopes to Win Again

"Mao Tse-tung, the Communist revolutionary general, has written a valuable book on the tactics of infiltration. In it, he says: 'Give me just two or three men in a village and I will take the village!' In the Goldwater campaigns of 1952 and 1958 and in all other campaigns where I have served as a consultant I have followed the advice of Mao Tse-tung. . . . The individuals we enlisted became a secret weapon possessing strength, mobility and real impact. They were able to infiltrate centers of opposition support, keep

us informed of opposition tactics. . . . In 1958 we had Cell Group members working for most of the radio and television outlets in Arizona. We were informed immediately when the opposition tripled its request for time. . . . The security surrounding campaign headquarters can be penetrated. Knowing in advance what the opposition proposes is very useful information indeed. . . ."

—*"How to Win An Election"*, a newly published book by Stephen C. Shadegg, one of Goldwater's political aides.

I. F. Stone's Weekly

VOL. XII, NO. 27

AUGUST 10, 1964



WASHINGTON, D. C.

15 CENTS

The Ferment and the Fury in New York's Negro Ghettoes

I spent several days in New York last week trying to learn more about the racial situation there, on which so much may depend. To see the great city again after the Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant riots is to see it with eyes freshly opened. Driving in from Long Island, over the Tri-Borough bridge, into 125th Street, I saw the Negro ghetto looking as dingy as ever, but relaxed and somnolent, as if its fury spent. Downtown, walking on opulent Fifth avenue, amid all the new steel and glass skyscrapers, one noticed with a new sharpness the almost complete absence of black or brown faces. Except for an occasional poorly dressed messenger boy, one saw only whites, and one felt that this wonder city, with its towering and majestic beauty, rested like ancient Athens on a slave class, kept out of sight in a menial quarter of its own. I went to the theatre and saw three plays on the race question, two by Negroes: James Baldwin's *Blues for Mister Charlie*, Le Roi Jones's *Dutchman* and Martin Duberman's *In White America*. The message of the first is hate; the second, loathing; the third, the only one by a white man, compassion. Even at these performances, though the audiences were responsive, it was as if the stories told were of another world, far removed from these well-dressed and educated white and Negro intellectuals, some of them mixed couples, but otherwise moving about racially separate to talk and smoke during intermission.

Moratorium Opposed

I began my exploration of this other world at the downtown headquarters of the Congress for Racial Equality in a rundown loft building on Park Row just across the little park that fronts on City Hall. It was a hectic morning. The papers that day carried the text of the statement by the leaders of major Negro organizations calling for a temporary suspension of mass demonstrations until after election day because the defeat of Goldwater was more important "than any local or state condition." My talk with the white press officer was constantly interrupted by angry phone calls from branches of CORE as far away as California protesting any such moratorium. James Farmer of CORE and John Lewis of SNCC did not sign the statement with Roy Wilkins of NAACP;

War Behind Our Backs

The White House tried to play down the shooting off North Vietnam, but most of the press could not resist the temptation to sell papers and spread the news across page one in flaring headlines. Chairman Russell of the Senate Armed Services Committee tried to deflate the crisis atmosphere after Secretaries Rusk and McNamara gave his committee and Senate Foreign Relations a briefing. "There have been naval operations in the Gulf of Tonkin by the South Vietnamese," he told the press, "and this could have confused the North Vietnamese."

It now appears that South Vietnam has been carrying the war to the north with U.S. support. A Washington report in New York Times Aug. 4 said, "that the [U.S.] destroyers on patrol have sometimes collaborated with South Vietnamese hit-and-run raids on North Vietnamese port cities, though the destroyers themselves stay in international waters." A dispatch from Saigon in that same day's paper said, "There was speculation that Hanoi's call for vigilance by the armed forces and the resulting tension may have been a factor in the still unexplained attacks by three torpedo boats on the U.S. destroyer Maddox." In an editorial the same day the New York Times threw further light into these shadows when it said, "South Vietnam's small naval forces have staged a number of raids on the North Vietnam coast. One theory in Washington is that the American destroyer, as seen on North Vietnamese radar, may have been taken for a similar South Vietnamese ship."

The day before the attack the North Vietnamese radio charged that on Friday U.S. and South Vietnamese warships had shelled "the Hon Me and Non Ngu islands" in North Vietnam. The attack on the Maddox, according to the Washington Post Aug. 3, took place "less than 20 miles from the Island of Hon Me." Washington says it has "no knowledge" of an attack on these islands. But U.S. participation in raids on North Vietnamese ports has not been denied. This is carrying on war behind our backs.

Aug. 4.

Martin Luther King of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference; Whitney M. Young, Jr., of the National Urban League, and A. Philip Randolph, chairman of the Negro American Labor Council. But Wilkins told the press both

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Farmer and Lewis agreed with suspension of mass demonstrations and withheld their signatures until meetings of their steering committees. The press officer vehemently denied over and over again that Farmer had made any such statement; he said Farmer agreed with the estimate of the Goldwater danger, but not with the call to suspend mass demonstrations. It was soon clear from the tone of these phone conversations that the black backlash against any suggestion for halting militancy was as strong as the white backlash on the other side.

A Frantic Call from the South

During the phone calls I had a chance to look around the loft, jammed with battered desks and old typewriters on which a whole corps of volunteers were working. I ran into old-timers like Jim Peck, the pacifist-anarchist, who has been beaten up on more picket lines for more good causes since the 1930s than any other man in the country; here he was back on the firing line, after a bout with tuberculosis, as diffident and devoted as ever. While I was looking around a more dramatic telephone call came in from the Sheriff's office in Jonesboro, La., where a CORE volunteer, Danny Mitchell, a young Ph.D. from Syracuse, had been arrested on the usual charge of "contributing to the delinquency of a minor" presumably for recruiting some local Negro into the voter registration drive. Carl Rachlin, another old-timer, of the Workers Defense League, now general counsel for CORE, got on the other extension. "We won't forget you," he assured the caller. "We'll get right on it." The words suddenly evoked the terrifying scene 2,000 miles away in the Deep South. The phone was no sooner hung up than another call reached lawyer volunteers in the area and sent them speeding to the Sheriff's office. Rachlin told me of a similar frightening night call a few weeks earlier when another volunteer worker, Ronny Moore of Southern University, was shot at while crossing the Mississippi at St. Francisville. He took refuge in a Negro home at Jonesboro only to have it surrounded by a mob of whites threatening to burn the house down. A frantic phone call to the Justice Department in Washington for help elicited no response. In desperation a call was put through to FBI headquarters in New Orleans. It had stayed open all night. The alert FBI man who took the call phoned the local police in Jonesboro. On his urgent demand, the local police dispersed the mob and prevented a tragedy.

Just Admission Price for the CIA

"When are we, in the Foreign Relations Committee and in the Senate, going to delve into the military aid program? Year after year the Committee accepts in almost dead silence whatever the Defense Dept. tells it about military aid. We shove the critical reports of the Comptroller General under the table when the Secretary and Assistant Secretaries of Defense testify because we don't want to embarrass them. . . .

"The real justification for 'forward defense' aid is not that the recipient can use it against Communism, because a non-industrial country that cannot support a peace-time army cannot sustain a war effort against Russia or China. What 'forward defense' aid does buy is entree for American military and intelligence agencies close to Communist borders. For these privileges, we have paid since World War II a dozen times more than we need to have paid."

—Sen. Morse, in the Senate foreign aid debate, Aug. 3

With a telephoned introduction from the downtown office I went next to the CORE office in Harlem at 307 W. 125th St. This turned out to be on the second floor of a decayed business property. The office had one old desk and typewriter. The walls were decorated with tattered signs and photos. One said, "Please report all injuries caused by stick happy police to CORE." George Johnson, the CORE official in charge, is a Negro from a small town near Cincinnati, with a master's degree in education from the University of Michigan. He taught special children's classes in the Cincinnati schools before going full time into the civil rights movement. He himself lives in the Bronx and said he found Harlem "very depressing."

The Only Ones Who Stay

"The only people who stay in Harlem," Johnson told me, "are those who have no alternative. As in the South, all who can get away, do so. We perform all kinds of social and civic services. People come to us in desperation because they have nothing to eat or no place to sleep and we try to do what we can. We try to awaken people to their responsibilities, to teach them why civil rights are important and why, being black, they should be in the movement. We tell them they have two main weapons—the ballot and selective buying. Registration is low. During the riot we operated a first aid station and won 20 new recruits. People could see we were doing

More Nuclear Information to Our Allies As Bait For Joining the MLF

The new Atomic Information Agreement between the U.S. and NATO confirms our worst fears about the proliferation of national nuclear weapons via a multilateral force. As an inducement to participate in that force, the U.S. is offering individual NATO states access to information about delivery systems for nuclear weapons.

The new Agreement and the 1955 Agreement it will supersede are parallel except for a few key omissions and additions. Omitted from the new Agreement is the requirement that information transferred by the U.S. to NATO be used "exclusively for . . . NATO defense plans." Whereas the 1955 Agreement requires that information transferred by the U.S. to NATO "not be transferred by NATO . . . beyond the jurisdiction of that organization," the new Agreement contains this same requirement with one exception: "Unless otherwise specified by the U.S., atomic information provided to NATO may be communicated by NATO to its member states. . . ." This may occur only

where the information is "necessary to carry out functions related to NATO missions. . . ." Thus access to information is made contingent upon participation in NATO's MLF.

Finally, the new Agreement allows the U.S. for the first time to share with "NATO and its member states" information related to "the development of delivery systems" for atomic weapons. The '55 Agreement speaks only of information related to "defense plans," "the training of personnel," and "the evaluation" of enemy capabilities. In the past, the great cost of research and development for delivery systems has been the major barrier to proliferation of national nuclear forces.

Unless Congress vetoes it, the new Agreement will become effective approximately 60 legislative days from June 30. This means late September or, if Congress adjourns before then, next January. In either case, a dangerous agreement is likely to slip past an unsuspecting public.

—The Agreements are in the Cong. Rec., Jl. 27, p. 16131 ff