

We Thought The State Dept. Considered The Principle of Non-Intervention Obsolete

"The U.S. is taking a hard look at a Chilean proposal for the protection of human rights in the hemisphere because some officials believe it might lead to a situation

where the O.A.S. would be in a position to investigate racial problems in the U.S."

—Washington Star from the Rio Conference, Nov. 19

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Delusions That Failed in Korea Won't Work in Vietnam

The most important battle of the war has begun. It is the battle to convince the American people that they can win the Vietnamese war quickly if only the Air Force is given carte blanche to "clobber" the North. The Nixon interview on *Face The Nation* last Sunday (Nov. 21) and General Curtis Le May's interview with the Associated Press the same day (the fullest version may be found in the *Baltimore Sun*, Nov. 22) seek to exploit both the widespread anxiety about greater involvement and the widespread delusion of victory by air-power. How powerful an election issue this can become may be seen from Stewart Alsop's sensitive and revealing opinion survey in the *Saturday Evening Post* (Oct. 23) which found almost three out of five persons polled thought "we should go even further in Vietnam, even if it means bombing Hanoi and Red China."

Bombing Has Already Failed

The bombings of the North which began last February were sold first as a means of forcing North Vietnam to throw in the sponge at the negotiating table and then as a means of shutting off the supply of men and aid to the South. It has failed in both respects. Gen. Thomas S. Power, the retired Commander in Chief of the Strategic Air Command, in his book last year "Design for Survival" said that by aerial ultimatum and selected bombing of military depots we could force the North to surrender "within a few days and with minimum force" (pps. 224-225). Now, ten months after the Powers' formula was adopted, the North has shown itself less disposed than ever to end the war. When it became clear months ago that blackmail by bombing would not work, the bombing was defended as a means of destroying sources of supply and interdicting supply lines. But the only result is that the North is now infiltrating whole regiments into the South where before there was only a trickle of men and supplies. The fighting has shifted, as the pro-war and pro-bombing *U.S. News & World Report* admits (Nov. 29), "from hide-and-seek jungle warfare to savage, open battles involving well-trained North Vietnamese and Americans." The tempo of the war has risen despite intense bombing of both North and South.

The pressure on Johnson to expand the Vietnamese war recalls the pressure on Truman to expand the Korean war. Le May is out to play the role of MacArthur. The advice Le May gives now is the advice Le May gave then. "I happen to believe," he told the Associated Press pompously in his latest interview, "we can get the message across better by the

Henry A. Wallace

Henry Wallace was an exasperating cross between a saint and a village innocent. He never gave to his work as political leader or editor the kind of hard grappling with fact that he applied to corn breeding. In the 1948 campaign, he often read second-rate scripts prepared by third-rate Communist party liners. He could be a most woolly-minded man, and some of his offhand remarks (like that on the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia) could make the hair even of devoted followers stand on end. But of all the political leaders of the New Deal generation none has proved a truer visionary. All the major ideas he espoused, and for which he was savagely ridiculed, have since become accepted parts of governmental thinking and policy: the ideas of the "ever-normal granary", of food for peace (derided as a proposal to give a quart of milk to every Hottentot), and of full employment were Wallace's. So was the idea that the postwar world, in the decline of imperialism, would be "the century of the common man." The most hostile storm of all was stirred by his anti-cold war campaign for the Presidency in 1948. But two decades, and many billions of armament dollars later, we and the Russians have come around to accepting the idea he espoused of peaceful co-existence, as some day we will with the Chinese. He applied to world politics the best strain of his native evangelical Middle Western idealism. We followed him with love in what we knew would be a lost battle in 1948. But what he stood for no longer looks lost today.

use of airpower than by the use of ground forces." The "message," of course, is that the North Vietnamese had better surrender or we will burn up their country. In his newly published autobiography, "Mission With LeMay," he relates that when the Korean war broke out "my immediate suggestion" was "that we go up North and burn the principal cities, as we had done in World War II in Japan. I believed that this would stop the war very quickly, with minimal casualties." (p. 458). This is also his recipe for winning in Vietnam.

Le May writes that for three years in the Joint Chiefs of Staff he had been arguing for an attack on the North (p. 564). He was for an ultimatum warning Hanoi "to draw in their horns and stop their aggression, or we're going to bomb them back into the Stone Age. And we would shove them back into the Stone Age with Air power or Naval power—not with ground forces." (p. 565). This reference to the Stone Age is psychologically revealing, for Le May is a man of brutal

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U.S. Gives Up Its Stockpile Weapon In Return for Aluminum Price Rollback

How Peking Saved the U.S. From Defeat at the United Nations

China's bid for UN membership seems to have been defeated by China itself. Were it not for Peking's insistence on a hard line resolution, there would certainly have been a majority instead of a 47-47 tie. It is also possible that a more tactful resolution might have changed the four votes necessary to defeat the U.S. motion declaring China's membership an "important question" requiring a two-thirds majority. It passed 56 to 49. Cambodia led a bloc of China supporters who wanted a simple resolution seating Peking but not specifically calling for the ouster of Formosa. Actually, since there is only one China seat in the UN, the effect would be to oust Formosa. The super-Leftist Albanians won Peking support at the last moment for the version demanding Formosa's expulsion. In the voting, for the first time, the U.S. failed to carry the Latin American bloc. Chile defied Uncle Sam and abstained on the membership resolution instead of voting "No."

Why Africans Are Bitter Over Rhodesia

When Cuba contracted to buy one-third of its oil needs from Russia, the world oil cartel imposed an embargo overnight. No country except the Soviet Union could supply a drop. Cuba is an island. Rhodesia is landlocked and therefore much more easily shut off but the oil companies are doing their best to discourage an embargo and the new UN resolution is vague on the subject. It seems from Cuba's experience that defying the oil trust is a crime but racism is a minor misdemeanor—at least as long as it's white racism. When black racism raised its head in the Congo, real, exaggerated or alleged, the CIA provided U.S. planes and anti-Castro Cuban mercenary pilots to hunt down the rebels, missionaries were flown out and order restored. . . .

The U.S. rolled back aluminum prices but to appease the companies is agreeing to dispose of its remaining stockpile at market prices through the Big Three: Alcoa, Reynolds and Kaiser. This means it gives up its leverage in a future price rise. It will no longer be able to threaten to put aluminum on the open market. This is what the big producers have been bargaining for. . . . The effort to make Chile rescind its 2-cent increase in the price of copper is bound to stir ill feeling there.

Our Half-Hearted Policy on Rhodesia

"If our government was determined to apply economic pressures to the extent we are able, we would have stopped trade in minerals and equipment, the major items exchanged between the U.S. and Rhodesia. American imports from Rhodesia totalled about \$11 million last year; more than half, chrome and asbestos. About 38% of our chrome comes from Rhodesia but we have an adequate supply stockpiled. Exports to Rhodesia, on which the government has apparently placed no embargo, amounted to \$24 million, about half agricultural and road machinery."

—George M. Houser, of the American Committee on Africa, Nov. 19 calling on the U.S. to bar all trade with Rhodesia, to institute economic measures against Portugal and South Africa equivalent to any aid they give Rhodesia, to withdraw recognition from both countries if they recognize the rebels and to warn that force will be used if economic measures fail.

The Chilean government has a strike on its hands because it is trying to enforce its own guidelines on miners' wages. In a stringent world market, Chile wants a higher price to help finance its plans to become a refiner and fabricator of the metal instead of merely a producer of the ore. . . . We applaud Robert Kennedy's action in turning down Castelo Branco's invitation to address the cowed and purged Brazilian Congress and for pointedly telling a Sao Paulo audience on arrival in that country, "I believe in free institutions, free elections, freedom of protest." That's subversive in Brazil today. . . .

Iranians studying abroad have been working desperately to save the lives of two students sentenced to die for supposed complicity in a plot to kill the Shah after a trial foreign observers thought a travesty. For 13 years Iran has been living under a "state of emergency" in which (as one exile described it) "a man can suddenly disappear, to be heard of some ten years afterward, just because he has made a mildly critical comment on the prevalent corruption, poverty and illiteracy." Readers can perform a good deed for Christmas by writing a letter of protest to the Iranian Embassy, 3005 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, asking commutation of sentence.

Vietcong Envisage Free Elections in South Vietnam After U.S. Withdrawal

"... a Vietcong agent stressed American recognition of the National Liberation Front as a prerequisite to any discussions. Following that gesture, he said, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam could be negotiated. Only after U.S. troops had left the country, he went on, could elections be held to determine the composition of a coalition government for South Vietnam. The Vietcong official stated that the Liberation Front, itself composed of various factions, could collaborate with non-Communist Saigon politicians. But he declined to specify which Cabinet posts the Front would claim in such a coalition.

"Other sources indicated, however, that the Vietcong has until now hesitated to label itself a government lest it discourage possible deals with Saigon politicians in the future. Vietcong leaders reportedly believe that another coup d'etat in the capital may uncover elements sympathetic to their cause.

"We realize that the prestige of the U.S. is at stake, and thus we must have an acceptable solution," the Viet-

cong official continued. "But the U.S. must also realize that the people in our liberated zones will not tolerate the presence of American troops before a solution is reached. We cannot accept a cease-fire, as Senator Mansfield has suggested, because we could not defend ourselves. If peace is established without a guarantee, it is valueless and we may as well continue the struggle. What is the guarantee? The withdrawal of foreign troops."

"What about North Vietnamese troops in the South? The answer was oblique and evasive: 'We cannot have foreign interference in our country, not even by Hanoi, which we consider a foreign government. It is true that all Vietnamese recognize only one President, Ho Chi Minh. But to be politically realistic, we must solve South Vietnam's problem in the South itself. Reunification is for the future—perhaps in 15 or 20 years.'"

—Stanley Karnow from Hong Kong (Washington Post, Nov. 19) reporting conversations in European and African capitals with North Vietnamese and Vietcong spokesmen.