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and of small-town America for "normalcy", for an end to emergency and experiment, for a Canute that will somehow hold back the tides of change. Like Coolidge and Harding, he is inescapably insipid, the type that vice presidents of banks regard as solid fellows. That kind of leadership ruined the Republican party before and will do so again.

The Welfare System For The Rich

There is no cheap way out. The first choice is between urban-racial requirements and the upper class welfare system which is the military-industrial complex and aerospace. This is the gravy train of the suburbs, the technicians and the new millionaires of Texas and California whose gilt-edged old age pensions depend on militarism and the space race. These are the richest and easiest sources of the contributions a Presidential campaign requires; Kennedy tapped them in 1960 with the "missile gap" nonsense; Nixon has done so again with a "security gap", a "research gap" and a "submarine gap," all equally nonsensical. Nixon knows it, as Kennedy knew it, but that won't keep Nixon from stepping up the arms race just as Kennedy did. The key point to watch is what he does about the anti-ballistic missile; only a program of this size can support the complex and aerospace in the style to which they have become accustomed. It is hard to see Nixon breaking loose from his constituency on that one. So the course is set for a lot of nonsense about letting free enterprise solve the problems of the ghetto. He will try to win over a thin upper strata of Negro leadership, but without alienating his base. It is the unexpected outbreak which is to be feared; then we are likely to see resort to force and a revival of witch-hunting old-Nixon style. Both will intensify racial antagonism and crisis.

This is the danger on which a new opposition should focus. Humphrey's flabby joint post-election appeal with Nixon against "divisiveness" shows that he is as incapable of leading it now as he was before the election. If there is no "divisiveness" there is no two-party system and there is no real choice again. To deny choice is to provoke and extend the really dangerous divisiveness of alienation among the youth and the

The Case For Coalition

"The most hopeful way of achieving a peaceful solution would seem to be for the Americans to exert pressure on President Thieu to permit some established middle-of-the-road politicians, such as Dr. Dan and Mr. Dzu, to make contact with the leaders of the NLF in a sympathetic but neutral capital in South-East Asia. Dr. Dan was dropped from the present Cabinet for having suggested the possibility of a coalition during a visit to the United States and Mr. Dzu, Thieu's former rival in the Presidential election, is in prison for advocating a policy which is now generally accepted as the only way to break the political stalemate.

"The formation of a Coalition Government in Saigon could serve as an important rallying point for the moderate non-committed people of South Vietnam, who are tired of coups and war lords. Many of them already see the establishment of a Coalition Government as the only hope of preserving their bourgeois way of life. These small capitalists would strengthen the hands of those non-Communist lawyers, businessmen and doctors who have slipped away during the past few years to join the NLF, which, of course, is led by Communists. . . .

"If such a coalition could obtain support of the middle rank officers in ARVN—who, after all, are the sons of the urban middle classes—they could render the organisation of a successful coup extremely difficult, if not impossible. The South Vietnamese officer, although fighting on his native soil, is just an anxious to return to civilian life as the American draftee, and he can count on the support of the Vietnamese towns-woman, for whom war means loneliness and misery."

—Clare Hollingworth, just back from Saigon, writing on *The Next Phase in Vietnam in the Conservative London Daily Telegraph*, Nov. 2.

blacks. A real opposition is necessary if orderly change is to be possible. But Humphrey in the campaign showed himself constitutionally incapable of leading such opposition. To follow him will only ensure another defeat. Only McCarthy began to open up the real issues. If he could develop a rapport with black aspiration, he could lead an effective opposition, inside or outside the party, but preferably within it. There is no substitute for that coalition the Democratic

From A Portrait Meant To Be Friendly of That Man in Saigon Who Blocks The Peace Talks

"Saigon—For a political figure who must depend on the popular vote, Nguyen Van Thieu [South Vietnam's military President] has a few shortcomings when it comes to stirring the masses. Even his ardent fans admit that in public he is quiet, dignified, cautious, withdrawn and uninspiring—in a word dull. . . .

"When one Cabinet minister complained that he was losing key personnel to private industry and asked permission to raise the salaries of five aides, the President turned him down on grounds that this was against regulations. . . . Mr. Thieu suggested the minister simply add five fictitious names to the payroll and give the newly created salaries to the deserving aides. . . .

"Not everything Mr. Thieu has done has been received with enthusiasm by U.S. officials here. The arrest earlier this year of Truong Dinh Dzu, runner-up in the 1967 presidential election, for advocating negotiations with the Vietcong sparked charges that Mr. Thieu was using his power improperly to purge political rivals [and Dzu, as this story fails to mention is still in jail—IFS]. Also, Mr. Thieu has done little to win the support of the rural population. . . . Though Mr. Thieu has talked about agrarian

reform and about relieving the disparity between the war-caused privations of the countryside and the 'luxury' of the cities, he hasn't made any changes. . . .

"Mr. Thieu betrays an extreme sensitivity about his position. On a flight to Honolulu last summer, accompanied by cabinet ministers, aides and bodyguards. . . . Mr. Thieu—quartered in a private cabin—was asked if he wanted dinner, but he declined. The others were served and later Mr. Thieu decided to eat, too. His meal arrived and an aide remarked that it was the same steak dinner menu served to the others.

"Mr. Thieu became highly upset, according to sources who witnessed the incident, and berated the airline staff for serving him a meal similar to the others. Then he devoted his attention for the rest of the trip to planning his menus. He demanded special meals on special chinaware and went so far as to insist he be served breakfast rolls while other members of the party be served ordinary bread."

—Peter Kannin Wall St. Journal Oct. 31, "President Thieu Pleases U.S. By Quiet Efforts to Increase Stability."

party represents. To capture, broaden and educate it seems to me essential if the country's problems are to be solved peacefully.

McCarthy is right when he says the narrow returns show that Humphrey might have beaten Nixon if the bombing halt had come earlier. But there is reason to doubt that Johnson wanted a Humphrey victory. A Humphrey defeat may have suited his vanity and calculations. Johnson worked well with Eisenhower in the 50s, and may hope to work as closely with Nixon. The extraordinary pact reached between them at their first White House conference after the election must encourage the ambitions Johnson may nurture to be an elder statesman of the bipartisan Establishment. The Nixon-Johnson agreement may seem at the moment to safeguard the Paris talks from upset by Thieu. But when two such tricky operators agree, the pro-peace forces had best be on guard.

A Most Intricate Con Game

There has rarely been such an opaque con game as the Paris talks, and it is not surprising that all sides are suspicious. Hanoi paid an unexpected price. It did what it said it would never do, submit to conditions for a bombing halt. It agreed to sit down at the peace table with the Saigon government. "It is absolutely out of the question," Wilfred Burchett told Tokyo *Shimbun* in a Phnom Penh interview Oct. 30 on his return from Hanoi, "that North Vietnam and the NLF would talk at conferences with representatives of the present Saigon regimes." To agree to sit down with the "puppets" as Hanoi has done, and to scale down the fighting, must seem to the NLF a repetition of 1954 when Hanoi bought its independence at the expense of the South.

The lull around the DMZ has made it possible for the U.S. First Cavalry to be moved southward into the Mekong Delta for "pacification" operations. "We are not taking any inhibitions on our own military operations in South Vietnam," Walt Rostow said on ABC *Issues and Answers* Nov. 10, specifying that we had not agreed to a cease-fire and that U.S. and ARVN forces were "moving out into the country-

Add Delusions of Saigon

"High South Vietnamese officials say privately the bombing halt came too soon. They argued again today that the enemy was approaching military defeat."

—Washington Post from Saigon Nov. 9

"Despite the official figure of 166,000 enemy soldiers killed this year, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units still represent 220,000 men. The allied camps are fortified bastions, surrounded by barbed wire, watch towers and searchlights, defended by tanks, artillery and machine guns. Few Americans venture unescorted any distance from major cities.

"The South Vietnamese army is being described as 'tremendously improved' in recent months. It has 'gained confidence in itself' and now even engages in independent operations. According to more skeptical appraisals, most of its members are mainly on guard duty. Of the 10 organized divisions, only one, in the north, is really aggressively active. The fact that the Mekong River delta, where there are few American troops, is the least 'pacified' area tells its own story."

—Andrew Borowiec, Washington Star, Nov. 3.

"The Government in Hanoi and the political arm of the Vietcong—the National Liberation Front—today administer over 1,800 of the 2,500 villages and over 8,000 of the 11,650 hamlets inside South Vietnam. Indeed, Saigon administers less than eight million of the total population of 17 million and of this eight million some four-and-a-half million are soldiers and civil servants paid by the state."

—Clare Hollingworth, London Telegraph Nov. 2.

side; pacification is accelerating." While U.S. bombing of the countryside is stepped up, the NLF is expected to give up the bombardment of the provincial towns and outposts from which the "pacification" forces operate.

It is enough to make one wonder whether those "certain outstanding matters" between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to which Nixon referred after his White House visit might possibly include an agreement to let the Russians finally "pacify" the

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Some Figures On The Total Cost Of Our Air War Against North Vietnam

Now that the bombing of North Vietnam has ended, at least temporarily, we phoned the Pentagon press office for some figures on what it all cost. The Pentagon tries to hide this by lumping aerial figures for both Vietnams. The figure which startled us most was for the total bomb tonnages dropped on Vietnam, North and South, up until the end of October. This was given as 2,948,057 tons. When we asked for comparative figures, we were told that the total tonnage dropped in World War II was 2,057,244, the grand total for both the European and Asian theatres. So we dropped almost 50 percent more bombs on Vietnam than on all Eurasia and the Pacific. The total dropped on Korea, North, and South, in the Korean War was 635,000. We have dropped five times as much on Vietnam. We asked the Pentagon how to figure the cost and were told about 50 cents a pound. This means the bombs alone cost about \$3 billion.

When we asked whether most of this was dropped on North Vietnam, we were told only about a fifth was dropped on the North. So that would run to \$600,000,000.

As of Oct. 29, we had lost 914 fixed wing planes and 10 helicopters over the North.* An attack or fighter plane averages about \$2 million, a helicopter about \$250,000. So you can add another \$2 billion for planes and helicopters

lost in combat over the North. That brings the total to \$2,600,000,000 for the bombing of the North.

But that is not the whole story of plane losses. There is another category of air losses not due to ground-to-air or air-to-air fire. This includes planes hit by mortar fire, damaged in accidents, or lost in Vietnam through other causes. The grand total of these for both Vietnams is 1,198 fixed wing and 1,214 helicopters. These may be worth roughly another \$2 billion for the fixed wing and another \$300 million for the helicopters. If half of this is allocated to the air war against the North, it would bring the total cost of the attacks on the North to \$3,750,000,000.

To this must be added the cost of pilots lost. The Pentagon has given out a figure of "more than" 450 pilots killed or missing in the air war over the North. The mean cost of training a modern combat pilot is \$450,000. That would add another \$202 million to the cost, bringing the total up to almost \$4 billion. Never was more money blown away in a more wicked cause.

* The combat losses in the South during the same period was 315 fixed wing planes and 906 helicopters.