

Chicago after Daley

Post mortems: the least of a bad deal

What was distinctive about Mayor Richard Daley in comparison with other big city mayors? What was his greatest accomplishment? His greatest failure? What lessons can be learned from his years in office by people concerned about problems of the cities?

In *These Times* asked those questions of several urban experts, drawn from different points on the political spectrum. Here are excerpts from their comments:

Edward Banfield, professor of government at Harvard University, author of *The Unheavenly City* and prominent conservative theorist.

"American cities are run by a variety of independent operations interested in checking each other. In order to get much done it is necessary to find an informal way of centralizing. That's what political machines do, in Chicago with a high degree of success. At the ward level, people can reach the committeeman, but he doesn't have power to check city-wide projects. Daley was one of the few who was able to maintain that arrangement, because he was a man of great administrative ability and he was honest.

"Daley gave businessmen the sense that the city was intelligently run. They didn't think they would be harassed by some mousetrap gimmick. If political leaders of New York had paid more attention to businessmen there, the poor would be better off.

"There are costs along with the benefits. Americans seem to have preferred informal centralization to formal centralization. If they were perfectly reasonable beings, they'd conduct political affairs by rational discussion, but they aren't. So I think it's better they organize themselves through patronage and ethnic loyalties rather than some other means, such as force. Given the composition of cities and the people you've got to govern, the Chicago political system is a very good model indeed."

Pierre DeVise, assistant professor of urban sciences, University of Illinois, Chicago Circle, a frequent critic of Daley policies.

"Daley controlled the last of the city machines. He started out as a new-style boss, an efficient city manager, not an old-style boss, but he was an efficient manager of a machine.

"Probably his greatest accomplishment was to become a kingmaker and the biggest disappointment was the comedown in 1968. He brought Chicago tremendous influence and got federal funds in the Kennedy-Johnson years. After 1968 came the failures. Chicago had avoided racial confrontation and that caught up with it, as well as peace demonstrations and the convention week. From that year on the mayor was a failure.

"The main lesson would be to prevent another leader from combining chairman and mayor and try to prevent another representative of the Irish Mafia from holding the office. I think political action at the local level is gone. Daley was unique as a local, state and national leader."

Stanley Hallet, faculty of Center for Urban Affairs, Northwestern University, graduate school of management.

"Daley paid attention to the fundamentals. He kept his Roman Catholic Irish identity as a glue in the ethnic mosaic of the city and focused on the basic questions of physical infrastructure, negotiating the deals and managing the finances necessary to rebuild that infrastructure from highways to sewer plants.

"The first lesson for liberals and the left would be to pay attention to ethnicity and religion. The second would be to get a better grip on the fundamentals, economy and infrastructure, as a basis for building more democratic political life and better civic institutions."

Richard Hatcher, Mayor of Gary, Ind., national black political leader.

"I think the most distinctive thing was his ability to put together a workable coalition of private business interests, political interests and organized labor interests in such a way as to be able to transcend the limitations of the Mayor's office itself.

"His greatest accomplishment was that he was able to build the city physically, the lakefront, skyscrapers, highways. I know he's regarded as a 'man of the people,' but his greatest failure was that the people, or certain people, were not given the kind of attention they deserve. When you look at the South Side and the West Side of Chicago, these are areas of abject failure. To some degree white working class neighborhoods did not fare all that much better than blacks and Latinos. Daley's support of some of the more base attitudes of the people contributed greatly to racial segregation that still prevails in Chicago.

Ira Katznelson, associate professor of political science, University of Chicago, co-author of *Politics of Power*.

"In some ways Daley was a genuinely working class politician, who was able to treat working class politics as intensely personal, local and distributive. Yet he was able to keep invisible from the neighborhoods his relationship with representatives of capital and the State, outside of the city. He was the master of that and gave the fullest and most classic expression to a traditional American grammar of working class politics. That orientation to localities gave him immense freedom to bargain and broker with other powers.

"His most positive accomplishment, even though it had enormous costs, was that without challenging any of the features or routine operation of the American economy, he was able to maximize resources for Chicago, getting for the city the least bad deal. His biggest failure was not challenging the basic forces that were producing a declining Chicago.

"At some point the left has got to challenge the enormous gap between the language and politics of the community and the real impact of the political economy on the neighborhood. Also, challenges to machine, working-class politics can't be effective with liberal reform campaigns. Daley at a minimum was of the working class, but the liberal reformers are often profoundly anti-working class."

Len O'Connor, author of *Clout*, a biography of Daley, and political commentator on WGN-TV.

"He depended on nobody but himself. He had no partners.

"His greatest accomplishment was that he survived as long as he survived.

"You'd have to look at the lessons from the standpoint of practical politics—'Give ground grudgingly—maintain the status quo as long as possible until you face revolt'. He preserved white ethnic cohesiveness. He didn't want open occupancy. He wanted to keep blacks where he could vote them. For Daley everything was politics.

"The big lesson to be learned from Daley is 'inherit a powerful machine and a solvent city'. That's the moral."

Daley the builder: Chicago still crumbles

By David Moberg
Staff Writer

"What trees do they plant?" Mayor Daley asked in attacking demonstrators at the 1968 Chicago Democratic party convention.

Although not famous for his trees, Daley did plant expressways, universities, convention centers, an international airport, and many public buildings. He encouraged private investors to build skyscraper offices (Sears, Standard Oil and John Hancock most recently), shopping centers and high-rise apartments.

Like Robert Moses in New York, Daley swung a heavy hammer, knocking down an old city to make way for profitable construction of a new one appealing to big business and middle-class whites.

Any growth was better than no growth for Daley the Builder. He succeeded with the strategy better than most mayors who have tried. In the process he often destroyed much as well, and left behind a lopsided city.

► Boss, housekeeper and builder.

Daley succeeded because he was three mayors in one—boss, housekeeper, and builder.

As political boss he had centralized control of the whole city government. That meant bankers and businessmen "could reach an agreement with one person and he could deliver," Ron Grzowski, chairman of South Shore National Bank, says.

Daley the boss could stimulate private development with deals the businessmen found hard to refuse. For example, he could use the right of eminent domain and urban renewal powers to clear out large chunks of land, then assemble them into blocks for developers to build middle and upper income housing. He could guarantee enormous tax breaks through control of the assessor's office. When the University of Chicago wanted the black neighborhood to its south declared a slum and cleared, Daley could do so without delay.

Daley the boss also delivered the votes for state and national elections. During the Kennedy and Johnson years he called in those debts, bringing Chicago a disproportionate share of federal money—half a billion dollars for expressways feeding traffic into the Loop, one billion dollars for urban renewal projects, half a billion more for public housing.

Daley as housekeeper attracted private investment by concentrating the city's own resources on the classic tasks of keeping the streets clean, maintaining a tough police force and providing adequate fire protection. If funds for social welfare programs didn't come from Washington or Springfield, they got short shrift—but property taxes were held down.

Daley the builder used public money for construction that provided political monuments and helped to bind together his political coalition of banks and bondholders, real estate speculators, construction firms and the construction trade unions.

► Maintain the tax base.

"There's one thing Daley never forgot," Daley ally Julian Levi, University of Chicago law professor and chairman of the Chicago Plan Commission, says. "The ability of Chicago to survive and progress was completely dependent on it retaining its tax base. His basic strategy from the beginning was to maintain and enhance the solvency of the city."

Tax structure and land values thus

dominated city politics the way profit rules in a corporation. As a result, Daley used public construction to boost the value and quantity of downtown private building. One study showed that the city spent 88 times as much per square mile on the central business district as on the rest of the city.

"Daley was most concerned with the health and vitality of the central business district," Grzowski says. "He was mostly interested in structures, less in human development, such as schools or neighborhoods."

Take for example Daley's relationship with Sears, Roebuck and Co. The city promptly and cheaply provided Sears a block of city street and relocated water and sewer lines so that it could build its 110-story headquarters in the Loop. Yet when Sears decided to abandon a retail store that was the heart of a shopping center in the black Englewood neighborhood, none of Daley's famed clout stopped the exodus.

► Much of city sliding off a cliff.

Daley prevented Chicago's downtown from following the path of Detroit or Cleveland, but the rest of the city suffered. Ironically, that neglect is undercutting the effects of the development efforts.

Urban renewal and public housing money was often spent in black neighborhoods, but it was used to "urban remove" blacks or else to maintain segregation, more pronounced in Chicago than in any other major U.S. city. Neighborhood shopping, housing and recreation declined as a result of government neglect and redlining by financial institutions. As a result, "a significant portion of the city is simply sliding over the cliff as a result of years of inattention," Northwestern University urban studies researcher Stan Hallet says. Many businesses have fled the decaying neighborhoods, hurting the city by taking away jobs. Also, more blacks now have turned to the Loop for shopping and entertainment, to the horror of the downtown businessmen.

Daley's centralized power meant few neighborhoods had local institutions that could make the continual minor adjustments necessary for neighborhood vitality, safety and the "secondary jobs" of a thriving local economy. The exceptions were university and middle-class lakefront neighborhoods.

► Chicago still crumbled.

Daley furiously built, but Chicago still crumbled. From 1967 to 1972, 140,000 jobs were lost. In 1976, the city had a net loss of 56 homes or apartments a day. The real estate tax base declines each year despite new construction.

Corporate and government policies shaped the national trends creating problems for Chicago and other cities. Daley couldn't stop those trends or escape business cycles; he tried simply to "manage the consequences of his inability to solve problems such as poverty," in the words of Ira Katznelson, author of *Black Men, White Cities*.

Daley tried to save the city from ruin by working with and serving private capital and by attempting to attract white middle class residents. Benefits of these policies for the rest of the city "trickled down," often in a thin and uneven stream. Other mayors tried to do what he did, but few were as successful. Yet the success of Dick the Builder as a Mayor of things ultimately exaggerated his failures as a Mayor of people.

LIFE IN THE U.S.

Job-related cancer on the rise

By Bonne Nesbitt
Staff Writer

The U.S. Department of Labor estimates that in 1974, one out of every 10 workers (nearly 6 million people) suffered from a job-related disease or injury. And according to the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, 100,000 people die of these diseases and injuries each year. If the figures are to be believed, occupational hazards are a leading cause of death in this country and working can be dangerous to your health.

One of the most serious of the job-related diseases is cancer. Second only to heart disease in the number of people it kills, the National Cancer Institute says 365,000 people a year—or roughly 1,000 people a day—die of cancer.

Many of the known carcinogenic (cancer producing) substances commonly used in industry have been around for a number of years and are only now being taken seriously.

Vinyl chloride (VC) is a good example. VC, a petrochemical used in the manufacture of polyvinyl chloride plastic (PVC) has been used in the U.S. for about 40 years. VC gas is one of several produced when petroleum is refined. To get PVC plastic the VC is "cooked" under pressure and the result is PVC resin. The resin is sent to fabricating plants where it is either pressed into plastic sheets or molded into whatever shape is desired. A very versatile product, PVC is widely used in the health, construction and many other areas.

►4.5 million live near plants.

There are currently 58 companies manufacturing VC, PVC and its close relative, ethylene dichloride (EDC). This means several hundred thousand workers are being exposed to its dangers. According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), more than 4.5 million people live within a 5-mile radius of the 58 companies producing the three substances. Air concentrations of PVC and EDC in those communities have been measured at levels ranging from one part per million to three parts per million.

VC was not tested to determine whether it was capable of causing cancer until 1970, when it was found to cause angiosarcoma of the liver in mice. Even then, very little was done to protect workers from exposure until B.F. Goodrich Co. reported the deaths of three workers from liver cancer in 1974.

In October 1976, the EPA ordered companies to cut VC and EDC air emission levels by 80 percent within 90 days. But the order was a follow-up on a standard it first proposed in the fall of 1975. According to the new standard, emission levels must not exceed a range of 0.1 to 0.3 parts per million.

Animal test results compiled by NIOSH show that VC workers had a rate of liver cancer 16 times higher than normal, were five times more likely to contract brain cancer and had twice the normal risk of cancer of the lymphatic system.

►In use since 1935, but not reported till 1955.

The chemical 4-aminobiphenyl was an ingredient of synthetic rubber. Animal test results released in 1952 and 1954 showed it caused cancer of the bladder. Unfortunately, it had already been in use in the U.S. since 1935 and the first cancer reports began to surface in 1955, when its use was finally discontinued.

Phenyl beta nathalamine (PBNA), a chemical used in the production of rubber products and an essential component of solid rocket fuel, has recently been found to have carcinogenic properties as a result of some European testing. B.F. Goodrich, the only American company producing PBNA, has stopped making it because of the cancer risk. But it may al-



This machinist's right lung was removed because of job-related cancer. The company he worked for mined diatomaceous earth and made various products from it. Because of the workman's compensation case this worker filed (and lost) the company was exposed for having used asbestos in its products for over 20 years. Photo by Fred Lonidier from a large artwork, "The Health and Safety Game."

ready be too late for untold numbers among the 15,000 workers who have been exposed to the substance.

Asbestos, a widely used insulating material, is another carcinogen. It has been estimated that within the next 45 years 400,000 of the country's one million past and present workers who have come in frequent contact with the material may die from cancer unless it is caught and treated in the early stages.

►Nuclear workers endangered.

A new study, released by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission a few months ago, shows that workers employed in atomic plants where radiation exposure levels were well below the present government safety standards, nevertheless have a cancer death rate 6 percent above the average.

The new results contradict years of previous study results and were obtained by checking the death certificates of nearly 4,000 atomic workers who died between 1944 and 1972.

At least 700 new chemicals come into the industrial market each year and few of them have been tested for possible carcinogenicity.

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), an agency within the Department of Labor, was not created until 1971—a result of the Occupational Health Law passed by Congress in 1970. And the Toxic Substances Control Act was passed by Congress only within the past four months.

The Toxic Substances Act requires the

EPA to use animal testing on all chemicals suspected of being carcinogens, when such substances have significant human exposure or are released into the environment.

►Animal testing alone is not practical.

But animal testing alone may not be a practical solution. Dr. Henry Falk of the Center for Disease Control, "the problem with that is you would very quickly run out of animals and facilities to test them."

There is also the problem of manpower and animal testing takes time. Like vinyl chloride—you just can't feed it to the animals. You have to put them in an enclosed chamber, pump the gas in, measure the levels within the enclosed space....

"And then it should be tested on more than one animal," Dr. Falk went on. "Thalidomide was a classic example. It didn't cause problems in mice and rats, but it did in monkeys and dogs." (Thalidomide was the tranquilizer that produced thousands of babies born without arms and legs when it was taken by unsuspecting pregnant women in the early '60s.) "Animal testing is a good solution, but not really feasible for 700 drugs a year," Falk believes.

►New testing methods.

The situation is not completely hopeless, however. Falk says the CDC and other researchers are closely watching new testing procedures such as the "Ames" method. The test, developed by Dr. Bruce Ames,

a California researcher, can rapidly detect a potential carcinogen with what appears to be a fairly high degree of accuracy.

"They expose bacteria to the suspected (carcinogenic) chemical and then look for mutational changes in the bacteria. Those chemicals capable of causing mutations in bacteria are likely to cause cancer," he explained. "Unfortunately, the test is not foolproof, but it's a good starting point in the weeding out process. Chemicals that give a positive mutation reaction can then be submitted to the more accurate and time-consuming animal testing." The Ames test produces a result within a couple of days, and its rate of accuracy is believed to be in the range of 80 percent.

►Cancer doesn't appear for 10-30 years.

Industrial cancer has become a serious problem and continues to be a threat to the lives of workers for a number of reasons. Some of them are:

- The nature of the disease itself. Cancer has a long latency period and may take 10 to 30 years to develop—and no one knows what triggers the disease in the first place. As Dr. William Blot, a biostatistician with the National Cancer Institute, put it, "There may not be just a single cause of cancer, although we believe it is triggered by environmental factors."

- "Maybe there's something about each of us, a genetic predisposition that causes cancer when triggered by an environmental stimulus—but we don't know what the mechanism is or how it works. Some people smoke cigarettes for years and never get cancer, while others do."

Not knowing the cause of the disease also makes it hard to predict safe levels of exposure to substances capable of producing cancer in industry or elsewhere.

- The results of animal testing were often ignored in the past because of a refusal to accept cancerous results as applicable to human beings. But now that we are developing the same cancers 20 and 30 years later, even outspoken critics of animal testing are losing this particular conceit.

►OSHA not funded enough.

- OSHA has never received the kind of funding needed to do the extensive jobs of inspection, testing and research that occupationally linked diseases require.

OSHA and its research arm, NIOSH, are theoretically responsible for the health and safety of an estimated 62 million workers employed throughout 5 million facilities. Yet OSHA's budget only allows it a work force of 1,500 inspectors and only 400 of them have the scientific training needed to test chemical and other substances capable of causing cancer and numerous other work-related ailments.

Despite this, OSHA made more than 151,000 inspections and issued 117,000 citations during 1975 and the first 9 months of 1976. Unfortunately, because of the lack of technically trained inspectors, many of the citations were for mechanical hazards—such as lack of guard rails, protective clothing, etc. Also, serious violations usually merited fines of only \$600.

►OSHA has to be pushed.

Granting that many of OSHA's problems are not exclusively the fault of the agency, it has not aggressively fought for what it needs or sought stringent controls over industry. Most standards handed down by OSHA have been the result of suits filed and pressures applied by various labor unions.

- But the most basic aspect of occupational cancer is the attitude in both government and industry, which assumes a substance is innocuous until proven otherwise—that is until people are maimed or start dropping dead. It is, after all, more profitable to do the testing on the workers themselves.