

# IN THE WORLD

## U.S./ZIMBABWE

# Smith's settlement gives whites veto

By Robert A. Manning

**T**HERE HAS BEEN, WE ARE TIRELESSLY told, an agreement signed between Ian Smith and three "moderate" African leaders that will create a black majority government in Zimbabwe by the end of the year.

The U.S. and Britain, who have been fruitlessly trying to obtain an Anglo-American plan for Rhodesia's transition to Zimbabwe, gave Smith's version of "majority rule" a cautious welcome. But the ink was barely dry as Africa responded with a resounding "No." The guerilla forces of the Patriotic Front (PF) composed of Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU and Robert Mugabe's ZANU denounced the accord as a "sellout," as did the five frontline African states (Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, Zambia, and Tanzania) reflecting the dominant views of the Organization of African Unity.

The initial reaction of UN Ambassador Andy Young (who has been on the losing end of a battle with Zbigniew Brzezinski over Africa policy) touched on the heart of the matter: "An internal settlement is no settlement. It does not address the issues that have some 40,000 people fighting." Yet, in the same breath (though conveniently omitted for sensationalist impact by the press) Young qualified his apparent rejection explaining, "I would hope that this would not stop the Anglo-American plan, but that it may be one step in the direction...toward bringing all the parties together in a free election."

Even a casual glance at the agreement reveals its sheer inadequacy. The first thing that must be said about it is that it was, as few would dispute, the strain of a guerilla war costing \$1 million a day, taking up one-third of white manpower and resulting in white emigration of 1,000 a month that led the wily Smith to any agreement at all.

### White veto power.

The agreement signed by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole and tribal Chief Jeremiah Chirau provides white veto power, reserving 28 of 100 seats in parliament for whites (who comprise 4 percent of the population). The *New York Times*, hardly a supporter of guerilla war, editorialized, "The deal is little more than a device for keeping real power in the hands of Rhodesia's small white minority." The accord, the *Times* pointed out, "would let the white settler community block any measures that threaten its economic privileges for at least ten years." The judiciary, police, army and civil service would all remain white-dominated.

Moreover, during the transition period (until Dec. 31) all of Rhodesia's emergency laws remain—laws permitting such things as shooting on sight anyone who ventures outside tribal trust lands after curfew, and would keep more than 500,000 Africans in "protected villages" (read: strategic hamlets) where the white government has herded them to separate them from guerilla influence.

The accord provides for white property guarantees and pensions payable overseas. It prevents any fundamental social, political or economic changes in the structure of society or the state aside from making the three black leaders accomplices. Joshua Nkomo summed up the situation, saying, "The problem has been simplified... Muzorewa and Sithole are now part of the Smith regime. We face one enemy now."

The media have tried to portray the "moderate" Africans as popular figures with broad support acting as a "voice of



Prime Minister Ian Smith is about to sign agreement in Salisbury, Rhodesia, March 3 with (left to right) Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Tribal Chief Jeremiah Chirau, and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole.

reason," thus laying the ideological groundwork for U.S. backing for an internal settlement. William Randolph Hearst went so far as to propose Ian Smith for the Nobel peace prize.

Of the three leaders, the only one with any popular support is Bishop Muzorewa. Chirau is widely known as "Smith's man," and Sithole, who was one of the founders of ZANU, since deposed, an opportunist who recently moved into a plush high-walled house in Salisbury's white suburbs, has no real base. But most of Muzorewa's support is as a clergyman. Muzorewa is the first American-educated Methodist bishop in Rhodesia. He is not known for his political astuteness. He only began to dabble in politics in 1971 at the urging of ZAPU and ZANU (whose leaders were in prison) when he led a campaign against a British referendum seeking to legitimize Smith.

Although much of the media has echoed Smith's claim that the guerillas have no real support and the "moderates" are the real voice of the people, there have been no opinion polls, and the fact that tens of thousands of Africans have fled the country to join the guerillas certainly expresses an opinion.

The accord is a much watered-down version of the Anglo-American plan, which didn't provide white veto power and called for an internationally supervised transition period under British guidance (Britain is the legal colonial power).

### Guerilla war intensifies.

British Foreign Secretary David Owen, who is under strong pressure from British Conservatives to back Smith's plan, called the deal "a significant step towards majority rule." Although the Carter administration has feigned agreement with Britain, the U.S. leans more towards getting the PF involved in the political process, while Owen has favored the internal settlement. Owen summed up the dilemma facing Britain and the U.S.: Without PF participation, "it will be difficult to win international approval, difficult to hold fair and free elections and difficult to get economic sanctions lifted." Owen and U.S. Asst. Sec. of State for Africa recently met in London with Sithole and claimed "qualified support from Britain and the U.S."

Smith has hoped to trigger a split in

the PF and lure Nkomo into the internal settlement. This has also been the hope of the British who view Nkomo as the most adept of politicians. But with the cards stacked against him, Nkomo has held firm and the PF has drawn closer together. In lieu of a split, the Anglo-American partners still hope to bring the PF into the present settlement, which would give it international credibility. But under the present circumstances it appears unlikely that the PF would participate.

The debate underway in the UN Security Council is the first major challenge to the internal settlement and to Anglo-American maneuvers. Unless Britain and the U.S. are prepared to cast vetoes, the Security Council is expected to retain economic sanctions against Rhodesia and reject the internal settlement.

Both Nkomo and Mugabe have vowed to intensify the war effort. ZANU has more than 5,000 guerillas in the field operating from bases in Mozambique and throughout the eastern part of Zimbabwe. ZAPU has been less effective, and has barely 1,000 of more than 8,000 trained guerillas actually fighting, operating from bases in Zambia. If Nkomo mobilizes the forces at his disposal, the war in the western part of the country could heat up and make it very difficult to hold elections.

### Rightwing pressure on Carter.

The Carter administration is beginning to feel rightwing pressure—part of a general conservative backlash to many of Carter's foreign policy initiatives—against support to include the PF. Since the first days, there has been a struggle between "global strategists" such as Brzezinski and the "Africanists" such as Young who have urged removing Africa policy from the global Cold War chessboard and dealing with Africa in African terms.

As initiatives in southern Africa stagnated and Soviet and Cuban involvement has grown in the Horn of Africa, Young's influence has been waning as Carter has taken a "get tough" stand with the Russians trying to muster backing in Congress for the Panama Canal Treaty and also a SALT arms accord with the USSR. The direction the U.S. takes on Zimbabwe is a key indicator of which way American

policy is going.

Young has warned that a "black-on-black" civil war may ensue if the internal settlement goes ahead alongside a deepening war. "We have evidence," Young has said, "that there would be a massive commitment of Soviet weapons as there was in Angola." Already, usually moderate Zambia has warned that it might have to seek aid from the Eastern countries and possibly Cuban troops may be invited in. American officials feel that large-scale Soviet involvement—at least in terms of military hardware—is a virtual certainty if the war intensifies in tandem with the internal settlement.

The worst-case scenario envisioned by the State Department is a situation where such a war would develop and South Africa would be the only outside power willing to commit forces. The U.S. and its NATO allies, who have been working overtime for a credible "moderate" solution in southern Africa to prevent the formation of a radical bloc of African states from Angola across to Mozambique, might be forced to back Pretoria at least tacitly given the present Cold War atmosphere.

Such a scenario would totally shatter the "enlightened" pro-African nationalist Africa policy that the administration has tried to project and completely erode Western credibility—always suspect—in Africa.

But, as South Africa has given Smith's plan its blessings, such a scenario is not far-fetched.

Whether or not the Anglo-American bluff is called, the Zimbabwe situation underscores a crucial point: the conflicts in southern Africa, contrary to media image-mongering, have never been simply "race wars." African liberation forces have not been fighting in the bush simply to create a black middle class to fill the shoes of the present colonial mentors, but rather to transform from bottom to top the white-dominated societies. There is a fundamental conflict of interests between white privilege and the Western economic interest bolstering it and the cause of African liberation. In Zimbabwe, where 6.7 million Africans outnumber the white settler community 25 to one, this is becoming imminently clear.

Robert A. Manning covers American foreign policy in Africa for *IN THESE TIMES*.



## FRANCE

## Marseilles' left secure, but split

By Jim Cohen

MARSEILLES

**M**ARSEILLES, FRANCE'S second largest city with nearly a million inhabitants, has been a prominent port and commercial center since ancient times. It has been governed for the past 24 years by Gaston Defferre, a Socialist party leader of national stature and a former government minister.

With one of the heaviest concentrations of working class population in all of Europe, Marseilles and the Rhone delta region are solidly to the left. It will remain so after this week's legislative elections. Of the region's 11 deputies in the National Assembly, six are Communist and four are Socialist. A lone district, located in the commercial center of Marseilles—demographically the smallest and the most aged in the city—is held by a Gaullist.

Since World War II, the parties of the right have had enormous problems generating local leadership and gaining footholds in places of municipal and regional power. The involvement of conservative politicians in financial scandals and secret paramilitary activities hasn't helped. Even many businessmen shun the right, preferring to negotiate directly with the real seat of power: Gaston Defferre's city hall. The mayor's influence over municipal purse-strings, building permits, and public opinion make it difficult to avoid dealing with him.

But while the left is well entrenched, the market economy continues to have as tight a grip as ever. The rate of unemployment, hovering near 10 percent, is more than double the national average. Manufacture, construction and naval repair are all deeply depressed. The huge steel and petrochemical complex created ten years ago in nearby Fos-sur-Mer employs thousands of workers; but there are highly capital-intensive industries that, at present, are working nowhere near full capacity. Layoffs and hard-fought defensive strikes to resist them—are common occurrences at Fos these days. Only the maritime trade in Marseilles' vast port seems to have resisted major decline.

Salaries here are below the average national level. About 70 percent of all salaried workers in the region earn less than 2,400 francs monthly—the wage level advanced by both the Communists and the Socialists as a necessary minimum.

## A divided left.

The elected officials of the left are vigorously proposing the Common Program of the left as an overall national solution, but Socialist and Communist party leaders have clashed sharply for the past several months over how to revise the Program. The likely prospect of a left victory is poisoned by disunity and disarray.

Here in Marseilles, the situation is, if anything, worse than elsewhere. Defferre is an old warhorse who has been part of the Socialist "family" since long before the post-1968 upsurge of popular struggle. When first elected mayor in 1953, he replaced a Communist, Jean Cristofol. Those were the Cold War days, and Defferre's brand of socialism was strongly anti-Communist. Throughout the '50s and '60s, and even after the signing of the Common Program in 1972, Defferre's local alliances were with the right, against the Communists.

As mayor, Defferre is in charge of over 11,000 municipal employees. He has steadfastly refused to negotiate with the CGT and CFDT, the two left-oriented labor confederations that represent the majority of organized workers in France. The only union Defferre recognizes in municipal ranks is Force Ouvriere, a union

The French left is supposed to win when Marseilles goes to the polls. But the Socialist-Communist quarrel may make the victory an empty one.

created during the Cold War with the benevolent aid of the CIA. Force Ouvriere has always refused to support the political left in the name of "independent unionism."

Two years ago, a long and bitter garbageman's strike for higher wages—and against city hall's harassment of CGT and CFDT organizers—prompted Defferre to call in the army to break the strike. One of the by-products of this confrontation was a partial radicalization of municipal workers, many of whom see their mayor as a socialist impostor.

This image is not helped by Defferre's being a wealthy owner of two newspapers. One of these is *Le Provençal*, local organ of the Socialist party, which Defferre acquired thanks to a law, which he helped to pass, authorizing the expropriation of newspaper owners who collaborated with the Nazis. In 1965 Defferre wheeled and dealed to gain control of a second paper, *Le Meridional*, the tribune of the local right, noted for its "law and order" and anti-immigrant stances.

Active throughout World War II in the anti-German Resistance, Defferre is recognized by all as an extremely adept politician. His firm hold on city hall is based not only on classic "voter appeal" but also on a highly ramified system of neighborhood committees for satisfaction of local demands, patronage in city hiring, and organized recreational activities.

## Defferre flushes right.

Last year, Defferre was elected mayor for the fifth time. And for the first time, he "flushed" his allies on the right—in grand style—and sought the cooperation of the Communists in city management. From the start, however, the relationship

CRS/Pierro



Gaston Defferre (right), the Socialist mayor of Marseilles, shakes hands with Maurice Genoyer, a local businessman who bought out a failing crane company in 1976 and put it back on its feet.

was stormy, with constant disagreement over the sharing of administrative posts and money. Pedestrian zones, tax rates, aid to flood victims, credits for the brand-new subway: everything became the pretext for quarrels reflecting the national conflicts of the left.

The election is expected to make few changes in the representation of the region, but a few new faces have appeared to spice the action. In the fourth district, the working class bastion of the recently deceased Communist elder statesman Francois Billoux, it is virtually certain that the new deputy will be Guy Hermier, a rising star in the CP apparatus. Hermier, a university professor with no real links to his district (a very common phenomenon in French politics), is a member of his party's Central Committee.

The third district belongs to Defferre. In the event of a left victory, it is almost a sure thing that he will become a government minister—probably Minister of the

Interior—leaving his running mate Jeanne Mazel to occupy his seat. Mazel is a former nurse who was appointed by Defferre to preside over a women's information center run by the city. Her electoral campaign has been an energetic effort not only to gather votes, but to raise the consciousness of men and women alike about sexual inequalities.

One of Defferre's right-hand men, Charles-Emile Loo, is almost certain to retain his seat. Loo, National Treasurer of the Socialist party, is a former print worker who later opened up his own shop. He is head of the 15,000-member Federation des Bouches-du-Rhone, one of the most powerful regional branches of the Socialist party.

The national electoral scandal has also affected Marseilles. Defferre has initiated court action against the government for attempting to stuff the ballot box with absentee ballots from Austria, Gabon, and

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## SPAIN

## Communists winning factory vote

By Barbara Mann Franck

BARCELONA

**I**N THE MIDST OF A SUDDEN increase in labor conflicts, *Comisiones Obreras* (CCOO, the Workers Commissions)—the trade union, dominated by the Spanish Communist party (PCE)—is winning a solid victory in current factory elections. Premier Adolfo Suarez, whose cabinet is undergoing a shake-up, has maintained absolute silence on the subject of the Communists' impressive display of strength among the Spanish working class.

With less than half of the vote in, CCOO candidates have won 37.9 percent of the 80,415 factory representative posts. The Spanish Socialist party's (PSOE) *Union General de Trabajadores* (UGT) is in second place with 31 percent of the representatives. Press analysts expect the trend in favor of the CCOO to continue.

While elections continued beyond the original mid-February deadline set by the unions themselves, thousands of workers have taken to the streets in recent weeks in strike actions to support demands un-

der negotiation in the hundreds of collective contracts now up for renewal around the country and to protest problems left unsolved by the *Pacto de la Moncloa*—rising unemployment, company closings and inflation.

CCOO leader Marcelino Camacho warned that "there will be more mobilizations as long as the government fails to meet its obligations."

In early February in Navarra 40,000 workers staged a one-day strike. In the unitary action to protest recent firings in the northwestern Basque province and to highlight salary demands related to various contracts, police used rubber bullets and smoke bombs against demonstrating workers. In late February 10,000 workers from SEAT, led by socialist Catalan senators to the Cortes (Spanish parliament), marched through Barcelona in a militant reaction to a central government-approved plan for reducing production by shortening the work week—and thus lowering wages—at all of the company's plants.

The economic crisis, lately affecting Basque ship builders and steel foundries, has provoked in-fighting among Spanish

capitalists and a re-shuffling in the cabinet. The sector of the government that promotes tight money policies, state intervention and nationalization of crucial industries and a long-term program for strengthening business is apparently losing out to those favoring fast, short-term credit and *laissez faire*. The former group was behind the economic *Pacto*, signed last fall by political leaders including Socialists and Communists. The latter faction is more responsive to pressures for immediate financial aid that are coming with increasing insistence from Spain's big business.

The division in the cabinet is undoubtedly responsible for the government's failure to live up to its end of the economic pact.

Suarez, as always, finds himself threatened from all sides—by far-right Spanish capitalists, by a restless Communist working class, by nationalist sentiments in the two regions of greatest economic importance and by an endless chain of economic problems.

The PSOE is predicting Suarez won't last into 1979.

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