

BOOKS

U.S. Dominican policy: "out of touch with reality"

THE DOMINICAN CRISIS: The 1965 Constitutionalist Revolt and American Intervention

By Peiro Gleijeses, translated by
Lawrence Lipson
The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1978, 450 pp.

By Henry Berger

Natural disaster has visited the Dominican Republic in the past but never with quite the fury with which Hurricane David swept the small Caribbean island nation in the autumn of 1979. As one reads Peiro Gleijeses' extraordinary study of politics in the Dominican Republic, there is an overpowering temptation to conclude likewise that political crisis has often dominated the history of this unlucky country but never with such tragic results as occurred during the tortuous spring of 1965.

The military junta which, in September, has deposed the elected constitutional administration of Juan Bosch was itself overthrown on April 25, 1965, by those determined to restore the moderate, democratic reformist government they had elected over two years earlier. Their effort was aborted and crushed exactly three days later, on April 28, by a U.S. military intervention allegedly undertaken, in President Johnson's words, "to give protection to hundreds of Americans in the Dominican Republic."

It was, of course, not the first time an American president had used such a pretext to disguise and justify the intrusion of the marines into the Dominican Republic in order to take charge of affairs on behalf of the interests of American corporations. Indeed, such had been the case four times before in this century and Professor Gleijeses affirms that "the lie was as flagrant in 1965 as it had been on previous occasions."

Nor does Gleijeses accept the subsequent claim by the American embassy in Santo Domingo and the Johnson administration that the intervention was necessary to forestall a Communist takeover of what initially had been "a popular democratic revolution." No, he declares. "The Dominican far-left—Washington's nightmare—was strong only in the minds of its enemies." In Gleijeses' judgment, the Dominican revolt "came close to success" precisely because it was committed to "political and social democracy.... It afforded a unique opportunity for the Dominican people to break the chains of oppression. It could have shown a new, non-Cuban road toward social change in Latin America. Instead the Pax Ameri-

cana prevailed."

These appraisals are not new. Critics at the time and subsequently journalists and scholars effectively destroyed the web of half truths and falsehoods surrounding Johnson's proclaimed Dominican policy. But Gleijeses' book (an expanded revision of his Ph.D. dissertation) substantially advances knowledge of Dominican affairs and the meaning of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America.

His is the most detailed, documented, and clearly presented analysis of internal Dominican political developments during the 1960s within our reach. Gleijeses makes it clear, for example, in his sophisticated review of Dominican history, that from its hesitant beginnings as an independent republic in the nineteenth century to the termination of the seemingly endless Trujillo dictatorship in 1962, and then beyond, the military was the cutting edge of what passed for politics in the Dominican Republic.

It was the military officers who, on behalf of the propertied, "traditional" elements of Dominican society (the *gente de primera*), were prepared to "step in and defend 'Dios, Patria, Libertad.'" It was "their God, their country and their kind of liberty," Gleijeses notes, but so long as the system supplied the military their share of wealth and power, they defended it, even at the expense of most other Dominicans. As Rafael Bonnelly, one of the longest survivors of the Trujillo regime he helped to build, told his good friend, American ambassador John Bartlow Martin, "Interests are interests, and they are powerful."

Bosch's presidency.

Juan Bosch challenged the interests and he lost. Gleijeses does not portray Bosch's brief stay in power (February to September 1963) as faultless or without weaknesses. Bosch's presidency "did not realize the 'sweeping social reforms' the Dominican people expected," and his base of support eroded as a result. Juan Bosch was also "arrogant and vain.... He was an excellent novelist, but not a political theorist, nor, indeed, a towering figure of Latin American politics."

But, Gleijeses insists, "Bosch was not overthrown because he was arrogant and vain. Nor was he overthrown because of mistakes made during his short administration." He was "doomed from the start" because he sought to build a political and social democracy, an honest government opposed to but tolerant of communists and other political opponents. Even Ambassador Martin, who contributed to Bosch's downfall and be-

trayed the effort to restore him to power, acknowledged that his "brief administration may well have been the most honest in Dominican history, if not in Latin America." Bosch's attempts were destroyed by forces that, "in typical Latin American fashion, accepted political democracy only when it was divorced from social democracy."

Gleijeses holds the American government responsible in large measure for the triumph of forces opposed to Bosch's rule and his attempted return to office. In so doing, the author penetrates to the essence of the American liberal relationship with the Latin American "democratic left."

Gleijeses stresses the continuity of Latin American policies in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, policies that Gleijeses says were "coherent and logical" but the assumptions of which "were completely out of touch with reality." This fact, he says, explains the apparent confusion, lack of sophisticated judgment, and hesitancy that characterized American actions during the first hours of the revolt in April 1965. Marshalling impressive, persuasive and direct evidence, Gleijeses makes it clear that the U.S. opposed Bosch's return and decided that the revolt must be defeated from the start. The former Dominican leader was not sufficiently anti-Castro or anti-communist. He was too strong a nationalist and too much of a democrat. He believed in "real, rather than formal Dominican independence." The only acceptable members of the Latin American democratic left, so far as the members of the New Frontier and Johnson administrations were concerned, were the "safe" ones who put Washington's interests ahead of Latin American interests and social democracy. Failing that alternative, the U.S. relied on the Latin American military to protect its interests and defeat the perceived internal threat of Castro communism.

This was Kennedy's policy. It was Johnson's policy. It was the basis of American policies and actions in the Dominican Republic in April 1965. It was why Juan Bosch had to be rejected and defeated. Gleijeses concludes that "without the American intervention, Juan Bosch would have returned to complete his term as president of the Dominican Republic, and the great aim of the constitutionalist movement, already within reach on April 25, would have finally been achieved."


The U.S. secured a safe, strong, anti-communist government in the Dominican Republic. The country was "stabil-

ized" under Joaquin Balaguer, a former puppet of Trujillo, who ruled for the next 12 years. In May 1978 Balaguer was defeated in elections by Antonio Guzman, Bosch's successor as head of the *Partido Revolucionario Dominicano* (PRD). Despite efforts by Balaguer and his supporters to abort the election results, Guzman was permitted to take office in August. But he is "safe." As the *Latin American Political Report* (May 12, 1978) noted, "The PRD is no longer the nationalist and semi-revolutionary party that it was in 1965" and this explains why the new American ambassador, Robert Yorst, could assure every-one on his arrival in Santo Domingo, just before the elections took place, that "his government would continue to maintain close and friendly relations with the Dominican Republic, whoever wins."

Which perhaps also helps to explain why the Guzman regime has been afflicted with political unrest since taking office, including violent riots during the summer of 1979. And now the devastation of tropical storms. As one villager lamented, "We are totally destroyed. There is nothing left."

Henry W. Berger is associate professor of history at Washington University in St. Louis.

Texaco up 211% ...
Sohio up 191% ...
Mobil up 131% ...
Gulf up 97% ...
and Exxon earns \$1.15 billion in profits in just three months while we wait in gas lines and worry about heating our homes. Had enough?



THE BROTHERHOOD OF OIL
Energy Policy and the Public Interest
Robert Engler. (1977) \$12.50 (\$2.50, paper).

"Engler makes clear how the oil companies manipulate prices... take advantage of real shortages to raise prices... extract the profits and slough off the loss anticipated with the energy crisis... control the pace of technological development... control demand." *Washington Post*

Also available:

THE POLITICS OF OIL Private Power and Democratic Directions
Robert Engler. (1961, 1967, 1976) \$5.95.

ENERGY-EFFICIENT COMMUNITY PLANNING: A Guide to Saving Energy and Producing Power at the Local Level
James Ridgeway. (1979) \$9.95.

NEW ENERGY Understanding the Crisis and A Guide to an Alternative Energy System
James Ridgeway and Betinna Conner. (1975) \$7.95.

Please add 75¢ per item for postage and handling.

Please send me the following:

☐ Payment enclosed ☐ Charge to my:
☐ Visa ☐ Master Charge ☐ American Express
Minimum charge: \$10.00.

Account Number

Bank Number

Expiration Date

Signature required for charge

Name

Address

City, State, Zip

Mail to:

Institute for Policy Studies

1901 Que St., N.W., Dept. AA
Washington, D.C. 20009

A-019

Missiles

Continued from page 4.

ly in place before 1989. If vulnerability is a serious problem, what are we to do in the meantime? Also, it is one thing to match the number of Soviet warheads to the number of American ICBMs, quite another to assume that a highly complex, never-before-attempted, coordinated surprise first strike would be overwhelmingly effective. Even if Soviet planners thought it could succeed, there is absolutely no reason for them to doubt that the U.S. would respond with its remaining nuclear forces against Soviet cities and industrial regions. Such enormous destruction of Soviet society is a lot to risk on what Brown once termed "a single cosmic throw of the dice."

Whose first strike?

Contrary to what the vulnerability argument implies, MX critics say, the missile is not defensive but offensive, a first-strike counterforce weapon. While there are not enough MX warheads to threaten all Soviet land-based missiles—a fact

that, according to the Air Force, proves that the missile is necessarily a second-strike weapon—they are adequate to destroy those that carry silo-busting warheads. And when put in the context of total U.S. weapons development (including the Trident submarine-launched missiles) MX will contribute to the creation of a comprehensive, pre-emptive first-strike capability for the U.S. by the early 1990s.

The end-point of this highly technical debate is that the real justification for MX is to be found not in the hard-numbers realm of warheads and "throw-weights" but in the murky world of superpower perceptions. According to Lou Montulli, the real issue is "the Soviets' perception of our intent." It's not enough to "convince some rational individual at a cocktail party that, yes, we can destroy them. I can't depend that there will always be rational leadership over there." Thus, the necessity of "massive retaliatory capacity" to deliver a clear politico-military message to the Soviets and the rest of the world about U.S. resolution and will.

But the perceptions game is highly ambiguous and how the Soviets will read this particular message impossible to predict. MX will block for good the already stalled momentum of arms con-

trol. If U.S. planners worry about the vulnerability of less than half our nuclear arsenal, how will their Soviet counterparts interpret a weapons system that threatens 75 percent of their nuclear forces based on land? What if the Soviets expand their warheads and missiles beyond the limits defined in SALT II in order to target the entire complex of MX launching sites many times over? And what if they build a mobile system of their own that is not verifiable by U.S. satellites?

Lou Montulli has answers for all these questions. If the Soviets build more warheads, the Air Force will build more shelters—up to 9,200, if necessary. If they "play a 1930, Nazi Germany game, creating a war machine" then we can confront the option of abrogating our one arms control treaty with the Soviets—the ABM Treaty—so as to install a "low altitude defense system." And if the Soviets introduce an ABM of their own? It is a never-ending game of measure and counter-measure that threatens to dangerously destabilize the fragile structure on which nuclear deterrence has rested for nearly 20 years.

Next week Robert Howard will report on political opposition to the MX system.



Klimt's women challenged traditional bourgeois values.

ART «» ENTERTAINMENT

BOOKS

Visions of the future
in Freud's Vienna

FIN-DE-SIECLE VIENNA:

Politics and Culture

By Carl E. Schorske

Alfred A. Knopf, \$15.95

By Ulf Zimmermann

In 1900 Sigmund Freud published his *Interpretation of Dreams*. In publicly exposing these irrational, wishful sexual-psychological forces that the former century had kept under the mantle of rationalism, the book, like the year, distinguishes between 19th-century rational and 20th-century psychological man. In an otherwise eclectic collection of essays on some of the men and movements that acted the midwife to our 20th century, Carl Schorske makes this one of the cutting distinctions throughout.

The chronological and cultural centrality of this distinction might be one reason that he has made his chapter on "Politics and Patricide in Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams*" the central one of his seven separate essays into Viennese "Politics and Culture." It is also the shortest one and makes its point, as the title suggests, most

directly.

Because of the personal and professional frustrations Freud and many of his Viennese fellows suffered as liberalism slumped into impotence, their public and political ambitions became repressed and translated

The public exposure of irrational man produced first cultural conflict, then a new politics.

into psychological patricide. Rendered impotent themselves to become actors in the political arena, displacing and standing in for their parents' generation, they acted out their ambitions in the private pits of their psyches. The resulting ahistorical theory

of man and society facilitated anew the inward escape that 20th-century intellectuals (and others) have repeatedly taken—most notably for the U.S., as Schorske points out in his introduction, during the '50s.

Klimt's images of women were as palpably sensual as they were infinitely suggestive. They challenged, moreover, the rational values of bourgeois liberals, as demonstrated in their rejection of Klimt's representation of philosophy for the university as "nebulous" and "fantastic." This was, after all, a time when philosophy "sought truth in the exact sciences."

Public exposure of psychological man did then produce political conflict. But in cases like the portrayal of Philosophy, the conflict was still confined to the city's cultural and political elite. To foment serious and widespread conflict through such artistic conjurations of the psychological required an altogether different sort of medium and artist. This was provided in the "politics in a sharper key" of the "Austrian trio." These "virtuosi" were Georg von Schoen-

Continued on page 15.

FILM

On Company Business lets CIA indict itself

By Michael Gallantz

A film documents the worldwide crimes of the CIA over three decades, identifies six American presidents as behind-the-scenes culprits, and implicates the news media, liberal politicians, and labor bureaucracy as accessories. The film gets standing ovations from packed houses and must-see reviews from the major papers.

No, it's not happening in Cuba but right here. And it's on television.

On Company Business, a three hour documentary directed by Allan Francovich, co-produced by Francovich and Howard Dratch and edited by Veronica Selver, has received audience and media acclaim at press and festival screenings in Berlin, Los Angeles, New York, and the Bay Area. Francovich expects four million people to see it in three one-hour segments on the Non-Fiction TV series (IN THESE TIMES, Apr. 23) that began May 9 and continues May 16 and 23.

On Company Business brings together a vast amount of information buried until now in already forgotten magazine articles or scattered among the myriad CIA diaries. But it's the way this film brings the material together that gives it its unique impact. Through a montage of interviews, newsreels and stock footage, the CIA gets hoisted on its own petard.

Ex-CIA director William Col-

by allows that, yes, CIA did try to kill Castro, but no evidence exists of any other assassination attempts—cut to a newsreel showing Congolese nationalist leader Lumumba a captive of a laughing General Mobutu—cut to John Stockwell, ex-CIA Angola operative, telling of a CIA colleague driving around with Lumumba's body in his trunk and of the CIA's problem: "We couldn't just poison him [Lumumba] at an embassy party; that would be too obvious."

On Company Business runs for three hours without a word of narration. The film makes its points with contrasts, and one contrast is between its avoidance of all narration and the style of the newsreel footage that peppers the film. The newsreels talk at us, and in the end lie; this film makes us see.

The filmmakers allow William Colby to state the film's point most explicitly: the CIA was no "rogue elephant" but a faithful executor of the bipartisan foreign policy of six administrations.

Francovich spoke to IN THESE TIMES about the film's background and artistic and political implications.

What was the most difficult part of your work?

Fund raising. Ultimately the film cost \$350,000, and we had to focus on filmmaking and fund-raising at the same time. We got money in \$500 and \$1000 chunks. Until the very end we

got no money from foundations or PBS, just the hard way.

But the TV Laboratory people at WNET in New York did help in the end.

Yes, they have a sense of adventure. The money they gave us made it possible to finish earlier.

How did you get the interviews?

Colby and these other people are doing many interviews. Colby wrote a book and appeared on talk shows. Part of his job was PR, and he's used to appearing

in the media and in getting his way with it. But we had pieces of the jig-saw puzzle that they didn't know we had. Usually the people they give interviews to haven't done this meticulous research.

Did you decide that narration was inappropriate for this film, or do you have a broader case against it?

I don't like objective narrations. It's a manipulative technique, and there's no need for it in doc-

umentaries if you know what you're doing. Also, it has a credibility problem. No matter how objective it sounds, it's a point of view superimposed through a voice.

Will people be able to perceive some of the more subtle themes of the film?

Not necessarily. But most of the audience gets the principal points. Others will get more; the

Continued on page 15.



Jesse Leaf, a CIA analyst on Iran (left) and David Bufkin, a mercenary from Angola (right) were interviewed for the film.

