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poured down on them. They came straight from the cradle to science, they came by a circuitous route that resembled a bohemian writer's jacket copy.

What is true for all of them is a shared temperament of mind and spirit that defies analysis of origin but is invariably made substantive in the same way: each of them had wanted to know how the physical world worked, and each of them had found that discovering how things worked through the exercise of her own mental powers gave her an intensity of pleasure and purpose, a sense of reality, nothing else could match. When she put it all together she knew she was a scientist. In each life a different set of circumstances and a different psychological time span was required to put it together. That's all that can be said of who the scientists are, and where they come from.

■ More artist than victim.

What did I think I'd find, and what did I actually find? To state the case quickly: I think I simply set out to document discrimination against women in science. In a profession justly characterized as powerful, authoritarian and pre-eminently male, I expected to find their numbers insignificant, their positions uniformly subordinate, their personalities subdued, their minds safely conservative. I ended by doing a 180 degree turn on that expectation.

I've been deeply moved by the resourcefulness of women in science rather than by their victimization, and amazed by the variety of their personalities, their experience, and their activity. I discovered how passionate an enterprise science is—how like artists scientists are—and that hundreds of women who possessed the driving spirit, the pressing hunger, occupied peripheral, often humiliating positions for 20 and 30 years in order to do science. You could not keep them out of the human enterprise, and because you couldn't keep them out they created a history, left a legacy, had consequences. Together with the contemporary women's movement, they have formed a wedge, making the opening for women in science larger than it ever was before so that today, while the profession, like all professions, is still without anything that resembles parity, nevertheless innumerable women in science are where they belong—in possession of grants, professorships, laboratories—and thousands of young women not only think it perfectly natural that they should become scientists, they consider science a leading contender for their right to a sexy working life.

I thought I'd find most women scientists anti-feminist, as one generally does find the women in a profession whose hierarchy often tyrannizes in the name of "rigor of mind," threatening to hurl into the purgatory of professional contempt those fellow workers who hold unorthodox views or entertain perspectives of thought as yet unendorsed by the intellectual heads of state. Instead, I found very few anti-feminists among the scientists, a surprisingly large number of open feminists, an even larger number of fellow-travellers and not a single scientist in her 30s or 40s who did not acknowledge the influence of the women's movement in her own working life, and on the life of professional science.

■ The pleasures of thinking.

Generally, when a scientist spoke of the difference the women's movement has made in science she was speaking in what we might call "gross" terms—that is, of the increase in grant, tenure and promotions for women, the alterations in hiring practices, awarding of prizes, inclusions in honor societies. What struck me forcibly, though, in the year I spent with the scientist was the subtler way in which feminism and science had begun to flow into each other in these past years.

The women's movement has urged to the surface a latency of mental ability in thousands of women. What was once dormant now seems active: the erratic impulse has become a steady influence. In science I found several women in their 50s who had lived much of their lives as women for whom being a woman is a profession, and then in their maturity had discovered they had scientific talent

and had become scientists. These women embodied a new imperative. One of them expressed it most memorably when she said, "All my life, when I've been asked my opinion, I've said 'I feel...' And so has every other woman I've ever known. And that's all right. We haven't done so badly with 'I feel.' But I went into science because I wanted to be able to say 'I think.'" When I came to know this scientist better I discovered "I wanted to be able to say I think" was a euphemism for "I need to think."

Another scientist, a woman of 54, working class, from the midwest, married at 17, raised six children, went back to school at 40, became a biologist and is now the principal investigator of a laboratory in a hospital attached to a famous medical school in the east. Her husband had been proud and sustaining all the way through, agreeable to their meeting one weekend a month in either her city or his. Then he was transferred to the West Coast, and suddenly their relationship was thrown into question. "I think Dave was surprised when I didn't follow him to California," the scientist said. "And God, I wanted to. I miss him terribly." She fell silent, looked down into her lap, looked up, then very softly she said, "But I can't stop thinking now."

It was through such women that I came to perceive the additive quality of scientific thinking, to see that it feeds something incomparable: a clarity of inner being that once experienced cannot be done without. These women, these older scientists who'd lived whole other lifetimes as the professional lovers of men and children, they knew the value of intimacy in the dalliance of life, they knew the meaning of doing without love, they did not speak idly or in ignorance. But each of them indicated that now, if pushed to the wall, if forced to choose, they'd have to choose science. Science had become their deepest selves. Love, necessary love, was somewhat at a remove. These women had become devoted to experiencing a self characterized by work rather than love, and had begun to construct lives around that devotion.


Nearly 50 percent of graduate students in science today are women. Of these 50 percent a very large number are being shaped by the assumption that the training they receive is to be taken seriously, that the life before them is to grow organically around the fact of their being scientists—that this is the norm—unlike the scientists now in their 40s who got Ph.D.s, then let their professional lives shape up around marriage and are the lost generation of women scientists; or the women in their 70s who did what the women in their 20s are now doing but were freaks when they did it, people who occupied a society of one.

For me, contemporary feminism is a piece of consciousness—diffused in its power and influence, unpredictable in its capacity for progress—that cannot be turned back. It is a force of thought and perception—a way of seeing things anew—that lurches unsteadily about, very much like Plato's man emerging from the cave, blinded by the light. It raises its voice in confused belligerence (where the hell am I?), whirls round in frightened anger (you miserable...), lies down in exhaustion (this is too much for me), suddenly gets reasonable, wants a little civilized conversation, again it's in a rage (fuck you, I thought you were my friend, you're just a pig like all the rest of them). But all the while it is accumulating an inner sense of where it is in the world. Slowly, it gains a stronger feel for the surround, figures out which direction to move in, where the light is strongest, the path clearest, learns which plants are poisonous which animals benign, feels itself a creature on the landscape, walking upright, at home in the territory. Who or what can make it turn back, retreat to the cave, lie down in the darkness again? The Republican administration? Ronald Reagan's cutbacks? I ask you. ■ Vivian Gornick, a New York-based writer, was a staff writer for the *Village Voice* for nearly 10 years and has written widely on the Middle East, American radicalism and the contemporary women's movement. She is currently at work on a book about women and science to be published by Simon & Schuster.

one foreign parent, spent their first six years in bed with rheumatic fever or were raised either in the upper class or in the ghetto), I was astonished by the range of backgrounds and personal histories I encountered.

I found scientists who came from Park Avenue, Main Street and Tobacco Road;

from the intellectual elite and the petit bourgeoisie; from parents who were evangelists, actors, lawyers, scientists, tailors, ministers and coal miners; from families where they were neglected, abused and ignored, as well as loved, prized and nourished. Every kind of bleakness and every kind of brilliant light had



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Linda Dydo, member of AFSCME Local 101, and Librarian for the city of San Jose, burns her termination notice during a strike rally.




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PERSPECTIVES



Herb Petr and Irving Wexler/Political Art Calendar 1982

How Reagan is speeding the American empire's decline

By John Judis

THERE IS LITTLE DISAGREEMENT among Americans that the American economy has declined, both with respect to its past performance and with respect to other capitalist nations, and that this decline has contributed to a general deterioration of the U.S.' position in the world. There are sharp disagreements over what, if anything, to do about this decline, but Ronald Reagan now seems to have a program for revitalizing the U.S.

In the 1980 election, Reagan made the Democrats' responsibility for our decline a central campaign issue. In his acceptance speech at the Republican convention in July, Reagan blamed the country's "disintegrating economy" and "weakened defense" on the Democrats. "They say the United States has had its day in the sun," Reagan said. "I utterly reject that view." And his sweeping victory reflected many Americans' conviction that Reagan, with his promise to restore the free market and sharply increase defense spending, was better qualified than Jimmy Carter to restore the American "place in the sun."

But an examination of the causes of the United States' decline reveals that the measures Reagan proposes are at the root of the problem. His programs are more likely to accelerate the country's decline than to arrest or reverse it.

Why, then, have Americans, includ-

ing the nation's corporate elite, acquiesced in—or even applauded—these programs? Is the country bent on self-destruction? Does a certain madness stalk the halls of Congress, the boardrooms of our corporations, the classrooms of our universities and the shop floors of our factories?

Falling behind.

From the end of World War II until the early '70s, the U.S. was the unchallenged leader of world capitalism. The value of each nation's currency was pegged to the dollar, whose value was fixed at \$35 an ounce of gold. The American standard of living was the world's highest. Its basic manufacturing industry was far more advanced than that of any competitors. And its armed forces, with nuclear weapons, had no peer.

But after 1960, the American position in the world steadily eroded. The U.S. share of world trade dropped 16 percent in the '60s and 23 percent during the '70s. In 1971, the U.S. abandoned the dollar-based Bretton Woods monetary system, and since then, the dollar has declined in value 50 percent against the German mark and 44 percent against the Japanese yen. As of 1979, the U.S. lagged behind Switzerland, Denmark, West Germany, Sweden, Luxembourg, Norway, Belgium, Iceland and France in *per capita* income.

American decline as a world power has been no less dramatic. The Soviet Union overcame the U.S. lead in nuclear weaponry. The American defeat in Vietnam encouraged other less developed countries, including those in OPEC, to defy the U.S. And European allies, bristling under the weight of inflated Eurodollars and poised between militarily equal superpowers, increasingly adopted

His attempt to regain a lost glory through military superiority follows the fatal path of other has-beens.

an independent posture—as seen in the creation of the European Monetary System in 1978 and the Western European refusal to go along with the 1980 American trade boycott of the Soviet Union. American diplomatic decline was epitomized when the virulently anti-American movement that overthrew the Shah of Iran seized American diplomats for hostages and taunted the Carter administration for more than a year.

The economic and diplomatic declines are deeply interrelated, but have independent causes. There are three main reasons why the American economy began to decline: first, American companies became complacent about the need to modernize their domestic production facilities; second, the American government reflected this complacency by acceding to business' immediate needs and neglecting longer-term priorities; and third, American foreign policy goals created a heavy burden on industry.

Industrial complacency.

In contrast with its rivals, the U.S. did not have its industrial base destroyed during World War II. But the Western European countries and Japan rebuilt their industries during the late '40s and the '50s with new post-war technology. Meanwhile, American companies chose not to use their immense profits to renovate their factories. This pattern has

continued through the present.

The *Chicago Tribune* found last year that about 61 percent of the machine tools used in Japan are less than 10 years old, compared to only 31 percent of those in the U.S. The steel industry is one of the worst offenders. As late as 1975, American steelmakers were still relying on open-hearth furnaces built before World War II (or even World War I), while their Japanese and German counterparts were employing the latest oxygen furnaces.

The older technology is less productive. From 1967 to 1973, manufacturing productivity in the U.S. grew annually by 2.9 percent; Japan's productivity grew 10.4 percent, Germany's 5 percent; from 1974 to 1980, with a world slump in effect, U.S. manufacturing productivity grew only 1.6 percent annually, while Japan's increased 4.1 percent and Germany's 5 percent.

Instead of being plowed back into increasing industrial productivity at home, American firms used their profits to invest overseas or to diversify into other sectors, most notably services. The reason was greater short-term profitability.

From 1960 to 1970, domestic investment by American firms increased by 119 percent, while foreign investment increased by 247 percent. British economist Stuart Holland estimates that as

Continued on the following page

The graphic above is reprinted from the Political Art Calendar 1982. Copies are available for \$5.60 from Alliance for Social Change, 519 SW 3, Suite 810, Portland, Ore. 97204, or from Citizens Party, 3525 NE 13 Ave., Portland, Ore. 97212.

Continued from the previous page. of the mid-'70s, the U.S. was producing overseas four times as much as it exported, while Japan and West Germany were both producing overseas only about 40 percent of what they exported. During the '70s, American banks, their vaults swelling with petrodollars from the OPEC countries, invested or loaned their funds overseas. In 1970, foreign loans comprised 17.5 percent of the business of the 10 largest U.S. banks; by 1979, foreign loans comprised 42.6 percent of their business.

When firms used their capital in the U.S., it was most often directed toward the rapidly-growing service sector. From 1969 to 1978, annual investment in machinery, measured in constant dollars, did not increase, while investment in office and accounting equipment increased 120 percent.

The short-sighted state.

The federal government was not simply a passive spectator in that process. It encouraged the foreign use of capital. The Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department, except during the 1968-72 balance of payments crisis, encouraged the export of capital by maintaining the dollar's value high in relation to other currencies. An overvalued dollar made American exports more expensive and Japanese and German imports cheaper, but it also made American purchases of European firms cheaper. Even the small points of the tax code favored multinational expansion. One provision has allowed corporations to pay no taxes on overseas profit that they reinvest overseas.



The state also bowed to the short-sighted pressures of businessmen and corporate economists in their choice of federal spending targets. In the '50s, the U.S. embarked on an ambitious highway program that delighted the auto industry and the suburban developers, while railroad roadbeds were allowed to deteriorate. When oil prices skyrocketed during the '70s, the U.S., dependent largely on trucks and automobiles, and with its cities organized according to the priorities of Standard Oil and General Motors, was much less able than Western Europe or Japan to absorb higher energy costs.

During the late '60s and the '70s, when business and the public began to growl about higher taxes and deficits, the state again acceded to short-sighted advice and began to reduce expenditures on the industrial infrastructure. According to a study by Pat Choate and Susan Walters, public works expenditures declined from \$198 per capita in 1965 to \$140 per capita in 1977. As a percentage of GNP, they declined from 4.1 percent in 1965 to 2.3 percent in 1977. According to Choate and Walters, one out of every five bridges in the U.S. must now be either replaced or renovated, harbor facilities are "unable to service efficiently world shipping coming into American docks," 46 percent of American cities surveyed will have to expand their water-treatment facilities to accommodate new industry, and about a fifth of the nation's dams and a fourth of its highways need major repair.

A deteriorating infrastructure raises the costs of production. An energy-inefficient transportation creates higher prices for goods, which must be shipped from producer to consumer. And it re-

duces workers' standards of living and creates upward pressure on wages. Declining city services discourage plants from expanding and encourage them to locate elsewhere.

There are no comparative figures on how, for instance, Europe's and Japan's more energy-efficient transportation system has kept down their industrial costs, but an estimate of energy saved by Japan's high-speed train that runs from Tokyo to Osaka is indicative. According to Frank Browning, the 100-mile-an-hour *Shinkansen* train carried 124 million passengers in 1977. If these passengers had travelled in automobiles—as they might have in the U.S.—Japan would have consumed an extra 40 million barrels of oil, worth about \$1.2 billion.

Guns and factories.

The most important reason for the precipitous American decline in industrial growth and innovation is the effect of the high rate of defense spending. From 1960 to 1978, the U.S. spent about 7.5 percent of its GNP annually on defense, Japan spent 1 percent, and Germany spent 4 percent. Only slow-growth Britain spent a comparable proportion of its GNP on defense.

Defense spending diverts human and material resources away from civilian production; it requires either deflationary higher taxes or inflationary budget deficits; it creates an unwelcome choice between defense spending and spending on infrastructure and social welfare.

In a recent study, Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wisc.) noted that the U.S., Germany and Japan spend about the same percentage of their GNP on research and development. But in the U.S. the military takes five times the share it takes in Germany, and 14 times the share it takes in Japan. The U.S. continues to have more scientists and engineers per worker than either Germany or Japan, but an estimated 30 to 40 percent of U.S. scientists and engineers, compared to less than 5 percent of their Japanese counterparts, are engaged in defense-related work.

There have been some important "feedbacks" from military to civilian production—communication satellites, for instance. But the absence of feedback has grown increasingly striking. Aspin notes how the U.S. military developed miniaturized video cassette recorders in the late '50s to target guided missiles, but it was the Japanese who saw the civilian potential and cornered the commercial market of the '80s.

The Vietnam war was the central event in American economic decline. Inflation, caused by growing deficits and bottlenecks, grew from 1 percent in 1961 to 5.9 percent in 1970. And the overheated American economy provided the impetus for Japan and Germany's swift rise. From 1967 to 1970, Japan increased its share of world trade by one-third, "in large part," according to Joyce Kolko, because of the preoccupations and diversionary military orders that were distracting the American corporations from meeting consumer demand or competing in world markets.

During the Vietnam war decade, the steep American decline began. From 1960 to 1970, American automobile companies' share of the domestic market fell from 95.9 to 82.8 percent; steel dropped from 95.8 to 85.7 percent; textiles from 93.4 to 67.1 percent; and calculating and adding machines from 95 to 63.8 percent. In 1971, the U.S. registered its first balance of trade deficit of the 20th century.

Alliance in disarray.

The economic and diplomatic decline of the U.S. have gone hand in hand. The U.S. attempt to sustain the Western alliance, which required the maintenance of a dollar "good as gold" and the prevention of socialist revolution in Europe and the less developed countries, undermined its economy. No other country besides the U.S. could have shouldered the Western defense burden. German or Japanese rearmament with nuclear weapons would have frightened allies in the West as much as adversaries in the East. As long as the alliance's objective was to keep third world markets open to raw material exploitation and direct investment, the U.S.

The diversion of investment from essential infrastructure to armaments has cost dearly.

has had to spend much of its GNP on defense.

Conversely, the American economic decline clearly removed an important prop from under the Western Alliance. In the late '40s and the '50s, European expansion was based on American trade, investment, loans and the use of the dollar. It was not then in the interest of Europe or Japan to diverge from the American development strategy. But in the '60s, relations among the countries began to change dramatically. In 1960, the U.S. was Germany's leading trading partner; by 1970, it had dropped to third place, and by 1979 to sixth. The European internal market and the OPEC countries each accounted for more German trade, while the most rapidly expanding part of Germany's trade was with Eastern bloc countries. From 1970 to 1979, Germany's trade with the East tripled. Germany became the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries' leading trading partner. (The Soviet Union's second leading trading partner was Japan.)

Both Western Europe and Japan have also expanded their influence in the third world. Japan now has more direct investment in Brazil than does the U.S.

The American decline relative to Western Europe and Japan has fuelled growing political differences. European bankers, fed up with inflated American dollars, played almost as important a role as the North Vietnamese army in forcing the U.S. in 1968 to resign itself to a strategy of "peace with honor" rather than "victory." European-American rivalries in the Mideast prevented a unified response to the OPEC nationalizations. Less developed countries have been able to extract greater concessions from the West by playing European, Japanese and U.S. multinationals against each other. And the growing European and Japanese trade links with the East, combined with growing Soviet military strength, has eroded support for the revived Cold War.

At the risk of over-simplification, one can describe American foreign policy woes as a vicious circle. Growing Soviet military strength and growing sentiment for economic and political independence in the third world has encouraged the American resort to arms and to rising arms budgets. Rising arms budgets and wars have imperilled the American economy, which has created new strains in the Western alliance, and has given impetus to independent European and Japanese initiatives toward the Soviet bloc and the third world. Growing American isolation has convinced policymakers that their only recourse is expanded defense budgets and a harder line toward the Soviet Union and the third world, which has in turn helped further to isolate the U.S. and to fragment the Western alliance.

Carter vs. Reagan.

During the '70s, there was considerable debate among policymakers about how to respond to the American decline. The left wing of the Democratic Party argued that the U.S. should escape the vicious circle: The U.S. should reduce military spending, withdraw its troops from Western Europe and Asia, expand arms control agreements with the Soviet Union and conserve energy to reduce American dependence on the Mideast. It was assumed that as the less developed nations became apprised of American democratic intentions and economic resources, they would eventually, whatever their current political stripe, become strong American and Western allies.

As for the American economy, Democrats like Senators George McGovern and Edward Kennedy called for greater government planning of investment and resource use, wage-price controls rather than recessions as the means to dampen inflation, and redistributive tax reform to create revenues needed to sustain social spending.

The opposing faction, identified most closely with the Republicans, but including many Democrats, argued for a return to the Cold War. They wanted to increase arms spending, to restore the American lead over the Soviet Union and to reassert American ability to intervene in third world countries opposed to the West.

On economic issues, the new Cold Warriors favored tax cuts to create more potential investment funds for corporations and the rich, tight recessionary monetary policies and sharp reductions in social spending, both to discipline labor and to prevent enormous inflationary budget deficits from the arms spending and tax cuts.

Corporate opposition and public indifference doomed the left-wing alternative, but during the first years of the Carter administration, there were several contradictory thrusts, centered in the State Department. A vigorous Cold War lobby both inside and outside the administration finally won Carter over by portraying the Nicaraguan and Iranian revolutions as administration defeats.

Carter's 1979 budget, which included major reductions in social spending and a 3 percent real increase in military spending, signalled surrender to the Republican strategy. But Carter was reluctant, begrudging and incomplete. He retained vestiges of left Democratic commitments to détente and human rights, and his party's concessions to the poor and unemployed.

What Carter accepted unenthusiastically, Reagan embraced with gusto. Ronald Reagan made a return to the free market of the '20s and the Cold War of the '50s the centerpieces of his campaign. And as President, he has unabashedly called for tax cuts for corporations and the wealthy, massive reductions in social spending, tight money, a huge increase in defense spending, and a hard line against liberation movements in the third world.

Long-term disaster.

In almost every respect, Reagan's policies, intended to restore American supremacy, will condemn the U.S. to more rapid decline in the '80s. Probably the most damaging part of Reagan's economic program is the increased defense spending. Reagan's projected military buildup for 1981 to 1986 is 25 percent larger than the escalation in Vietnam in the years from 1965 to 1968. It would raise the percentage of GNP devoted to defense from 5.7 to 8.1 percent. No matter how it is financed, it will be inflationary, as the armaments sectors are already operating at high capacity, and there is a shortage of skilled labor and technicians. With deficits expected, Treasury borrowing for defense costs will compete with private borrowing and drive interest rates up. And defense spending will continue to divert talent from civilian to military production.

To discipline labor and hold down the deficits caused by arms spending and tax cuts, Reagan has also pushed through reductions in social spending. A considerable number are aimed at reducing federal spending on industrial infrastructure. For instance, the Reagan budget called for a one-third reduction in funds for energy conservation and for the development of alternative fuel sources (solar energy was cut 60 percent); funds for highways and mass transit were cut 13 percent; funds for passenger railroads were cut 40 percent, freight railroads 20 percent; funds for sewer construction were reduced by 30 percent; and funds for scientific research were, in some cases, cut 100 percent.

These spending reductions have won Reagan some kudos from the most narrowly self-interested business leaders obsessed with balancing the budget, but they will have a uniformly deleterious ef-

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False prophet of anti-Islam

Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey
V.S. Naipaul
Knopf, 399 pp., \$15

By Edward W. Said

Naipaul the writer now flows directly into Naipaul the social phenomenon, the celebrated sensibility on tour, abhorring the post-colonial world for its lies, its mediocrity, cruelty, violence and maudlin self-indulgence. Naipaul, demystifier of the West, crying over the spilt milk of colonialism.

The writer of travel journalism—unencumbered with much knowledge or information, and not much interested in imparting any—is a stiff, mostly silent presence in this book, which is the record of a visit in 1979-80 to Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia. What he sees he says because it happens before him and more important, because it confirms what, except for an occasionally eye-catching detail, he already knows.

He does not learn. They prove. Prove what? That the "retreat" to Islam is "arupofaction" in Malaysia Naipaul is asked, "What is the purpose of your writing? Is it to tell people what it's all about?" He replies, "Yes. I would say comprehension." "Is it not for money?" "Yes. But the nature of the work is important."

Thus Naipaul travels and writes about it because it is important, not because he likes doing it. There is very little pleasure and only a bit more affection recorded in this book. Its funny moments are at the expense of Muslims, wogs after all, who cannot spell, be coherent, sound right to a wordy-wise, somewhat jaded judge from the West. Every time they show their Islamic weaknesses, Naipaul the phenomenon appears promptly.

A Muslim lapse occurs, some puerile resentment is expressed, and then, *ex cathedra*, we are given a passage like this:

Khomeini required only faith. But he also knew the value of Iran's oil to countries that lived by machines, and he could send the Phantoms and the tanks against the Kurds. Interpreter of the faithful, he expressed all the confusion of his people and made it appear like glory, like the familiar faith: the confusion of a people of high medieval culture awakening to oil and money, a sense of power and violation and a knowledge of a great new encircling civilization. It was to be rejected; at the same time it was to be depended on.

Remember that last sentence and a half, for it is Naipaul's thesis as well as the platform from which he addresses the world: The West is the world of knowledge, criticism, technical know-how and functioning institutions, Islam its fearfully enraged and retarded dependent, awakening to a new, barely com-

trollable power. The West provides Islam with good things from the outside, because "the life that had come to Islam had not come from within." Thus the existence of 800 million people is summed up in a phrase and dismissed. Islam's flaw was at "its origins—the flaw that ran right through Islamic history: To the political issues it raised it offered no political or practical solution. It offered only the faith. It offered only the Prophet, who would settle everything—but who had ceased to exist. This political Islam was rage, anarchy."

Belated Kipling.

After such knowledge what forgiveness? Very little obviously. The Islamic characters encountered by Naipaul—those half-educated schoolteachers, journalists, sometime revolutionaries, bureaucrats and religious fanatics—exude little charm and arouse scant interest or compassion. One, yes, one person only, an Indonesian poet, suggests some nobility and intelligence. Carefully set and dramatized, Naipaul's descriptions tend to slide away from the specific into the general. Each chapter ends with some bit of sentimentousness, but just before the end there comes a dutiful squeezing out of Meaning, as if the author could no longer let his characters exist without some appended commentary that aligns things clearly under the Islam/West polarity. Conversation made in a Kuala Lumpur hotel in the company of two young Muslims and a book left by one of them with Naipaul are suddenly instances of "Islam" (uncritical, uncreative) and the "West" (creative, critical).

It is not just that Naipaul carries with him a kind of half-stated but finally unexamined reverence for the colonial order. That attitude has it that the old days were better, when Europe ruled the coloreds and allowed them few silly pretensions about pur-

instance, "One Out of Many," a deft story published in *In a Free State* (1971). At the end Santosh, the Bombayan immigrant to Washington, watches the city burn. It is 1968; blacks run amuck and, to Santosh's surprise, one of them scrawls *Soul Brother* on the pavement outside his house. "Brother to what or to whom?" Santosh muses. "I was once part of the flow, never thinking of myself as a presence. Then I looked in the mirror and decided to be free. All that my freedom has brought me is the knowledge that I have a face and have a body, that I must feed this body and clothe this body for a certain number of years. Then it will be over."

Disavowal of that admittedly excited community of '60s revolutionaries is where it begins. Then seeing oneself free of illusion is a gain in awareness, but it also means emptying out one's historical identity. The next step is to proceed through life with a minimum number of attachments: do not overload the mind. Keep it away from history and causes; feel and wait. Record what you see according-

did it, *Newsweek* did it, *The Guardian* and *The New York Times* did it. Naipaul wouldn't make a trip to Israel, for example, which is not to say that he wouldn't find rabbinical laws governing daily behavior any less repressive than Khomeini's. No: his audience knows Israel is OK, "Islam" not. And one more thing. If it is criticism that the West stands for, good—we want Naipaul to criticize those mad mullahs, vacant Islamic students, cliché-ridden revolutionaries.


But does he write *for* or *to* them? Does he live among them, risk their direct retaliation, write in their presence, so to speak, and does he, like Socrates, live through the consequences of his criticism? Not at all. No dialogue. He snipes at them from the *Atlantic Monthly*, where none of them can ever get back at him.

What is the result? Never mind the ridiculous misinformation (on page 12, for example, he speaks absurdly of loyalty to the fourth imam as responsible for the Shia Iranian "divergence") and the potted history. The characters barely come alive. The de-

ment. Doubtless he hasn't dreamed of the possibility that the very same *Hajja Baba* by James Morier that he quotes to assert the fanatical religious gullibility of Iranians, was translated into Iranian early in this century by Mirza Habib Esfahani and in this version, according to Professor Keddie, the book is more critical of "Iran's faults than the original."

Little of what took place in 1979 is mentioned here. Naipaul's method is to attack Islamic politics without taking account of what its main currents and events are. In Pakistan Zia's much-resented, much-resisted assault (with U.S. help) on Pakistani civil society is nearly invisible to Naipaul. Indonesian history is the Japanese occupation, the killing of "the communists" in 1965, and the present. The massacres of East Timor are effaced. Iran is portrayed as a country in the grip of hysteria. You would not know from Naipaul that a tremendous post-revolutionary battle occurring while he was there, continues to go on.

All this goes to promote an attitude of distant concern and moral superiority in the reader.



Naipaul sets free his superego on places that his liberal constituents won't stick up for.

ity, independence and new ways. It is a view declared openly by many people. Naipaul is one of them, except that he is better able than most to express the view. He is a kind of belated Kipling.

What is worse is that this East/West dichotomy covers up a deep emptiness in Naipaul the writer, and for which Naipaul the social phenomenon is making others pay, even as a whole train of his present admirers applauds his candor, his telling-it-like-it-is about that third world which he comprehends "better" than anyone else.

One can trace the emptiness back a few years. Consider, for

ly, and cultivate moral passions. **Not OK.**

The trouble is that a relatively mind-free body gave birth to an astonishingly assertive superego. Unrestrained by genuine learning or self-education, this persona—Naipaul the ex-novelist—tours the vulnerable parts of his past, the colonial world he has been telling us about via his acquired British identity. But the places he visits are carefully chosen. They are absolutely safe, places no one in the liberal culture that has made him its darling will speak up for.

Everyone knows Islam is a "place" you must criticize. *Time*

descriptions are lackadaisical, painfully slow, repetitious. The landscapes are half-hearted. Without the languages, he talks to the odd characters who happen by. He makes them directly representative of "Islam," covering his ignorance with no appreciable respect for history. On the first page we are told that Sadeq "was the kind of man who, without political doctrine, only with resentments, had made the Iranian revolution."

An unacceptable exaggeration. Millions of Iranians, not just the Sadeqs and the Khomeinis, but the Shariatis, Taleqanis, Barahenis, and many many more poets, clerics, philosophers, doctors, soldiers—they made the revolution. All one has to do is to look at Nikki Keddie's *Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran* (Yale, 1981) to find out what doctrines and persons made the revolution. But no, Naipaul petulantly says, it was just resent-

Despite its veneer of personal impressionism, this is a political book in intention. On one level Naipaul is the late 20th-century heir of Henry MacKenzie, who in *The Man of Feeling* (1771) averred that "every noble feeling rises within me! every beat of my heart awakens a virtue!—but it will make you hate the world! No...I can hate nothing; but as to the world—I pity the men of it."

That these men happen to be brown or black is no inconvenience on another level. They are to be flogged for not being Europeans, and if this is a political pastime useless to them, it is eminently useful for anyone plotting to use Rapid Deployment Forces against "Islam." But Naipaul isn't a politician. He's just a writer.

Edward W. Said is professor of English at Columbia University and author, most recently of *Covering Islam*.

CIVIL RIGHTS



Why the FBI spied on King

The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.

By David Garrow
Norton, 311 pp., \$15.95

By Chuck Fager

This book is as important for what it is as for what it says. Among other things, it is an indication of just how much we stand to lose if the current congressional and administration assaults on the First Amendment and the Freedom of Information Act are successful. It has already been the target of Bureau attempts at suppression, including possible bribe offers and veiled threats of legal action.

What it says is that the FBI unleashed and unexamined is a very dangerous institution. What it also says, for the first time candidly, is that Dr. Martin Luther King's personal vices played into the worst aspects of the FBI's bureaucratic pathologies, with tragic results both for him and for the civil rights movement.

No wonder that the first printing of more than 20,000 copies is already gone. Garrow and Nor-

ton may even have one of that rare species, a scholarly best-seller, on their hands.

David Garrow is not an activist or a reporter but a scholar, with a Duke Ph.D. and a string of fellowships to prove it. He is young-looking, mild-mannered and normally occupied with the teaching grind of a junior faculty member in the political science department at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His major scholarly project, an analytical chronicle of Dr. King's career, is, he says, to be published by Yale University Press in 1983. His first book, *Protest at Selma*, looked at another aspect of the same subject. His research came inevitably to consider the FBI's role, because the Bureau was almost a constant in Dr. King's life, at least for his last seven years.

Garrow wandered down trails of evidence and interviews that led to the book's sensational disclosures of the identities of several longtime FBI and CIA secret agents. These include two brothers, Jack and Morris Childs, who made up the FBI's most prized and closely guarded

source of information in the Communist Party in the past quarter century.

It was in hopes of preventing these disclosures that the FBI tried to stop publication of the book. During the last 12 months Garrow was repeatedly visited by FBI counterintelligence agents, one of who asked him whether he would be willing to forget about the book for \$100,000. Garrow says his only response was a guffaw, whereupon the agent upped the figure to \$250,000. When Garrow kept laughing, the suggestion was dropped. More recently, the FBI sent agent Michael Steinbeck, a Headquarters Counterintelligence Unit chief, down to Chapel Hill to try again. Steinbeck pointed out to Garrow that under the provisions of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, now in Congress and expected to pass, his disclosure of "Solo" Childs and the others would constitute a felony worth a big fine and up to five years behind bars. (The FBI has refused comment on these assertions.)

Since this proposal is not yet law, however, Garrow was not

deterred. He is now amused at reports from Washington book-sellers that the Bureau has since bought about 400 copies. But he is keenly aware of the impact that the Intelligence Identities bill could have on his and other future work, calling it "a major impediment to all serious scholarly work concerning the FBI and the CIA."

The proposal to exempt these agencies from the Freedom of Information Act, also before Congress with administration support, would make such works as his simply impossible. Garrow interviewed a pack of former FBI agents, to flesh out and make sense of the often heavily censored files he got from the Bureau. But, he said, "you can't write something solid on a source like Solo without the files to back it up. Without them you're just depending on the memories of 20 old guys, and that's not enough." He also points out that not many scholarly analyses of the FBI have yet been done. Most books are either journalistic accounts based on more limited data, or memoirs, friendly and unfriendly, by former

agents. Garrow believes there are plenty of other stories like those of the FBI's work against King waiting to be chronicled, analyzed and understood.

The paranoid spy.

It is *understanding*, after all, that Garrow is really about. Solo and the other disclosures, useful as they are in selling books, are incidental to this purpose. *Why*, he is asking, did the FBI develop such a fixation with spying on and trying to destroy Dr. King? What accounts for the shifting focus of this attention, from supposed communist influences on King in 1962-63, to a determination to "expose" his extracurri-

FBI agents tried to bribe the author into dropping his research.

cular sex activities in 1964-65, to concern over his increasingly radical politics in the last two years of his life?

Garrow believes that the personal passions of Hoover and his close aides and the structure of the Bureau, while significant, do not fully explain the agency's vendetta against King and other dissidents. Instead, he argues that the FBI embodies and represents what historian Richard Hofstadter identified as "the paranoid style in American politics," a deep-rooted and recurring strain of hostility to people whose race, behavior patterns or political views challenge conventional norms.

Garrow says that "the Bureau actually was more a reflection of American beliefs and society than it was either the product of idiosyncratic individuals or a unique institutional structure.... American popular thought long has had strong themes of nativism, xenophobia and ethnocentrism. These very same qualities were writ large in the FBI." He quotes Harvard's James Q. Wilson, one of the few other scholars who has looked closely at the bureau, as affirming that "throughout virtually all of Hoover's administration, the mission of the FBI was fully consistent with public expectations, beliefs, and values." (This analysis is in my view further corroborated by Ronald Reagan's swift pardon of the FBI agents convicted of doing a black bag job on Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.)

King, Garrow argues further, went against this conventional grain on all three major points. The FBI first began intensive surveillance of his activities because of his friendship with the late Stanley Levison, a white New York businessman. The Bureau regarded Levison as a "communist influence" on King and tapped the New Yorker's phone for years. Garrow, however, exhaustively reviewed summaries of hundreds of bugged conversations between Levison and King, during which Levison rarely sounded much more radical than, say, George McGovern in 1972.

Yet there was a basis for the Bureau's concern, Garrow discovered. In the early 1950s, he writes, Levison had been deeply involved in the affairs of the American Communist Party, to the point of participating in the financial transactions involving a secret Soviet subsidy to its U.S.

subsidiary. But Levison abruptly dropped out of Party activities around 1955, before he became friends with King. Thereafter he steadfastly denied to anyone who asked ever having had any such connections. This included King, who inquired after being warned by both Robert and John Kennedy that Levison was a person of "subversive" associations. Levison lied to King, Garrison says, as he lied to others. Since the FBI's information about Levison's communist activities was all gathered through Solo, the Bureau and the Kennedys refused to offer King any evidence to back up their charges against Levison, in order to protect their source. But without evidence, King chose to believe his friend over the Bureau and the Kennedys.

Later, however, Dr. King's own views and programs became more radical. He came out strongly against the Vietnam war, he spoke more often of the need for "revolutionary" change in American society if justice and equality for blacks were to be established. His last planned series of demonstrations, the Poor Peoples Campaign in the summer of 1968, was intended to go beyond earlier efforts both in its demands and the level of disruptive tactics. The FBI, without forgetting Levison, monitored this evolution and sent a steady stream of reports about it to the increasingly besieged Johnson White House.

"Lively episodes."

But it was King's sexual activities that provoked the most intense FBI reaction, and moved the Bureau to its repeated efforts to destroy King, both personally and professionally. The nadir of this campaign came in December 1964, as King was on his way to Norway to accept the Nobel Peace Prize. It was a package sent to him anonymously, containing a tape of "highlights" from various of his escapades as recorded by hidden microphones, plus an unsigned letter written by the late William Sullivan, then Assistant Director. These excerpts make chilling reading even 17 years later:

King, in view of your low grade...I will not dignify your name with either a Mr. or a Reverend or a Doctor.... King, look into your heart. You know you are a complete fraud and a great liability to all of us Negroes.... King, like all frauds your end is approaching. Your 'honorary' degrees, your Nobel Prize (what a grin face) and other awards will not save you. King, I repeat, you are done.... The American public, the church organizations that have been helping...will know you for what you are—an evil, abnormal beast. So will others who have backed you. You are done.

King, there is only one thing left for you to do. You know what it is.... You are done. There is but one way out for you. You better take it before your filthy, abnormal, fraudulent self is bared to the nation.

But contrary to Sullivan's expectations, the package did not lead King to commit suicide. It did not even break up his marriage, though he and Mrs. King apparently listened to the tape together. But it did send King into a deep depression, and feelings of guilt over what he interpreted as "a warning from God." Once he recovered, however, he resumed his pursuit of what Garrow rather elliptically calls "lively episodes" with as much abandon as before.

Continued on page 23

WOMEN

Panorama of feminism

Woman's Worth: Sexual Economics and the World of Women

By Lisa Leghorn and Katherine Parker
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 356 pp., \$24.95 hardcover; \$12.95 paper

Subject Women: Where Women Stand Today—Politically, Economically, Socially, Emotionally

By Ann Oakley
Pantheon Books, 406 pp., \$17.95 hardcover; \$7.95 paper

By Annette Kolodny

At a time when many of the policies associated with Reagan-

makes clear, despite the illusion of slow but steady improvement in countries like England and the U.S.—in the courts, in education and through legislation—English and American women have made only sporadic, erratic progress toward achieving equality with men.

It is difficult to read either book and come away optimistic about any improvement in the status of women, at home or abroad. It is equally difficult to come away without a renewed sense of the sanity of such a course. One might quibble, for example, with the naivete informing Leghorn's and Parker's speculative, utopian vision of "a consciously female-val-


male sexism that can be held solely responsible for the emergence of subversive feminist movements." For her, the two are always "linked." Therefore, Oakley argues, it is feminism's peculiar challenge to understand the many-faceted linkages between institutionalized, systemic oppression and individual behavior or attitudes in any culture or society.

Feminist fictions.

Even so—and unlike Leghorn and Parker—Oakley shies away from contemplating the new society such change might generate. All she will assert is that the rise of women "demands a new language

can. To my mind, this is a strange way for an otherwise astute European social theorist to end a book about contemporary Euro-American feminism.

Besetting both books are infelicities of style and the lack of depth that comes from attempting any panoramic overview. (The full title of Oakley's book gives some indication of just how much she has attempted to put between two covers.) The pursuit of comprehensiveness also leads to a diffusion of central focus. This is particularly true of *Subject Women*, where the reader is often hard-pressed to determine if Oakley has any central organizing thesis. *Women's Work* maintains a clearer focus throughout. But even here analysis gets lost amid a welter of (often fascinating) anecdotes from Morocco or India, or work songs from African tribal women. Each, however, offers a valuable and accessible introduction to economic, political, social and personal issues now being



Steve Kogan

Exploitation of women's work is an international phenomenon.

omics threaten to decrease women's participation in the nation's paid workforce, *Woman's Worth* demystifies economic theory by making two simple points: Whatever the cultural milieu or official economic system, women's work—whether paid or unpaid—contributes significantly to the "product" and "value" of any society, but "women rarely benefit [from] or share in the wealth they have produced."

And at a time when the fragile gains of the last dozen years of the American women's movement are being eroded, *Subject Women* reminds us that even the most advanced of the European feminist theorists still look to America, both as a repository of research and as a laboratory for strategy and method.

Read together, the books are at once sobering and frightening. Sobering because, as Leghorn and Parker indicate in their cross-cultural perspective, the exploitation of women's labor is a pervasive and virtually unquestioned phenomenon all across the world. And frightening because, as Oakley

ue-centered" economic organization. There is insufficient evidence to accept their notion that women from different cultures share similar values, such as anti-war or conservationist sentiments. Nonetheless, the closing section on "The Economy of the World of Women" at least posits an attractive and survival-oriented range of alternatives "toward a fundamentally transformed...world" and, no less important, it offers a spectrum of tried and workable strategies for initiating such change.

Oakley's study by contrast eschews programs for change or ideological guidebooks for defining (and doing away with) the evils of patriarchy. Instead, she ends by insisting that we comprehend the complexity implied by the questions, "How are women oppressed?" and "Are women oppressed?" These questions, she persuasively argues, "have different and ambiguous answers depending on where you are looking at that particular moment. Both men, in the guise of husbands, fathers and breadwinners, and capitalism, in the sense of a mode of production that gives rise to a certain division of class interests, can be held responsible for the habit of according women a second-class status. Because men can be individualized whereas capitalism can't be, men are the more immediately blameable of the two enemies." "Yet in communist countries," she continues, "it is neither the simple failure to realize the full flowering of the classless society, nor an abundance of unadulterated

and new structures of thought to gestate a completely different society." That "different society," however, "exists at the margins of our imagination," and to approach it, Oakley swerves from data and analysis to "fiction." Her closing paragraphs comprise a brief survey of recent feminist science fiction by Joanna Russ,

debated within the international women's movement.

Of the two, Oakley's is the more original work, stamped by the personality and sociological research interests of the author, but nonetheless making excellent use of work by other feminists in a variety of fields. Leghorn and Parker are more derivative, eclectic



Peggy McMahon

Oakley takes heart from feminist science fiction such as that of Marge Piercy.

Ursula LeGuin and Marge Piercy.

The problem, of course, is that none of these writers—despite their other excellences—point to realistic solutions to pressing and immediate problems. As a result the prospects for change, in Oakley, are equated with a leap of the imagination into the fantasy of a possible future. It is a bold demand for imaginative vision within the women's movement but, at the same time, a disappointing prognosis. Equally unexpected is the fact that all three science fiction writers are Ameri-

tically drawing together the work of economists, anthropologists, poets and novelists. Feminist analysis has always used the work of other women, declaring itself a communal enterprise. The footnotes of Leghorn and Parker and the bibliography of Oakley testify to the wealth of work already done. These books also indicate that much more yet remains to be done.

Annette Kolodny teaches English and women's studies at the University of New Hampshire.

ART «» ENTERTAINMENT

POPULAR MUSIC

Diaspora of the drum

By Bruce Dancis

Roots.

Joni Haastrup & the Afrikans haven't yet reached the Keystone Berkeley stage, but their show has already begun. Nine men walk in a line through the crowd, chanting, slapping drums, shaking maracas and *sekere*, making the traditional rhythms of West Africa. The rhythms continue when they climb up on the stage, but now some band members are picking up or sitting behind musical instruments that are associated with a decidedly different culture—electric guitar and bass, synthesizer and electric piano, trumpet, saxophone and a modern rock drum kit.

The music that ensues is startlingly distinctive, yet at the same time irresistibly danceable and filled with familiar reference points. African polyrhythms remain at the music's core, but under the skilled leadership of Haastrup—who sings, dances and performs on a variety of drums and percussive instruments—the band easily incorporates elements from reggae, calypso, jazz, rock, funk and Afro-Latin music, as well as the modern West African sounds of highlife and Afrobeat.

At a time when Western musicians as diverse as Herbie Hancock, Talking Heads and Mick Fleetwood are exploring African music, Haastrup is tracing the evolution of the music from his birthplace, Nigeria, to the music created by Africans spread all over the world by the slave trade. He calls his music "Afro-root."

Joni Haastrup's personal history is nearly as remarkable as his musical project. Haastrup was born in Nigeria in 1947, growing up as a prince in a royal family. "My ancestors originally came from Ife, which, according to the history that I know, was the first city in West Africa and said to be one of the first cities in the world." His great-grandfather was a king, and Haastrup was raised in a palace. As a youngster, he was taught traditional music and dance, learning from the drummers and dancers who often entertained the palace, and he sang in a church choir.

Haastrup's first exposure to Western music occurred in the late '50s, when records by artists such as Sam Cooke came into Nigeria via England. As a teenager, he broke with family tradition by leaving the palace and joining a traditional dance troupe. In 1963, when the Beatles were helping to spread rock music throughout the world, Haastrup formed his first rock band.

Although electric instruments had been introduced in Nigeria during the late '40s or early '50s, Haastrup remembers that he "was one of the few boys in the country who was then inquisitive enough to get involved with Western music. I could locate in Western music a lot of rhythms that sounded like what I understood traditionally, rhythmically. This really attracted me, like

some of the things that Chuck Berry was doing. I felt that this music must have evolved from here, from what I was doing at that time, which was traditional."

Wide exposure.

By 1966 Haastrup started singing soul music, in his words, "to copy James Brown and Otis Redding." He became extremely popular, recording his first record and winning various competitions to become "Best Soul Singer" in Nigeria. In 1969, while on his way to a competition to determine who was "Soul Brother Number One" in West Africa, Haastrup met Ginger Baker—an encounter that would change his life.

Baker was then one of the most famous rock drummers in

been a major influence on David Byrne of Talking Heads) introduced Baker to traditional drummers and exposed him to a wide range of African rhythms in Nigeria and Ghana.

Haastrup's nine months with Baker, during which Joni helped Air Force fuse African rhythms into rock, gave him the opportunity to play with outstanding musicians such as Steve Winwood and Graham Bond. The experience convinced Haastrup "to not go back to copying soul music or rock music like I used to do. It made me more confident in deciding to be original."

During the '70s, Haastrup, who now lives in the Bay Area, returned several times to Nigeria to record albums, one of which, *Dawn of Awareness* (1975), was released in the U.S. on Capitol

contributed to, in Joni's words, his "enlightenment."

"It's an ambition on my part to try to explain to people what I have discovered in terms of the relationship of music all over the world to Africa," he says. Haastrup has formed a band so he can go on stage "and actually project this evolution, the way it started from one man and his drum—the drum being the first musical instrument that the African used both in communication and celebration." When the children of Africa were forcibly taken to different parts of the world, Haastrup continues, "going with them were these rhythms and songs in their minds. Some of them have forgotten, through the pressures of their experience, what the actual things were. But one way or another, they've been able to retain traces of it."

In their songs, Haastrup and

Haastrup, a Nigerian prince, grew up listening to Sam Cooke.

musicians express their own thoughts. Flowing out of Jamaican Keith Jones' bass are riffs based on reggae, calypso and funk, while in guitarist Marvin Boxley and keyboardist Muziki, one can hear the influence of such musicians as Carlos Santana and Herbie Hancock. Similarly, sax player Bazuki and trumpeter Marty Payne are obviously well-grounded in jazz and rock.

For Haastrup, these talents and influences not only help establish his main musical point, but also "make it easier for the listener to digest. If you hear the guitarist and he plays something that sounds like what you understand—like Jeff Beck or Carlos Santana—[you might say] he plays really good. In that way, while you are doing that, subconsciously you are also digesting the polyrhythmic effects that we are sending across to you under that thing he's doing."

Judging from the extremely enthusiastic response Haastrup & the Afrikans have received at Bay Area clubs during the past few months, their musical message appears to be taking hold. In fact, Joni finds the awareness of Bay Area fans nothing short of amazing. Haastrup has nearly finished work on a new album, recorded at Different Fur Studio on San Fran-



"When one drum talks, the other responds," says Joni Haastrup.

He traces the flow of polyrhythms along routes of the slave trade.

the world, having recently starred with Cream and Blind Faith. Visiting Nigeria for the first time in order to study African rhythms, Baker was brought by a local journalist to a nightclub to hear some local bands. Haastrup was in attendance and was called up on stage by the performing band to sing two songs, the Beatles' "Hey Jude" and Sly Stone's "Sing A Simple Song." On the spot, Baker asked Haastrup to join his new group, Air Force. Joni and two friends (including Fela Ransome-Kuti, a popular singer who has recently

Records. He also performed on LPs by Taj Mahal and Hugh Masekela. Over the years, Joni affirmed his belief that much of the music and culture of the world evolved from Africa; in terms of tradition and cultural awareness, Haastrup even saw many similarities between Africa and Japan, China and India. In this period, he also developed what he calls his "political awareness."

"From the first time I stepped out of the palace and saw the world outside," he says, "I was able to see that being inside the palace was some kind of fantasy that I didn't need to be enslaved to. I was exposed to the fact that some people have been oppressed in different areas of the world, and some other people have been the oppressors. People should be able to live just as human beings and not live as somebody's subject." The Soweto uprising in South Africa in 1977, Idi Amin's rule in Uganda and the civil war in Eritrea all

his band begin with the initial role of the drum as communicator: "When one drum talks, the other drum responds." Thus, African rhythms and polyrhythms take on human functions—question and answer, call and response.

"On top of that question and answer between two drums," he explains, "there's other drums that also have something to say. But they wouldn't be saying it at the same time with you or me; they have to say it at their own different time. So if you have four drums, you would have criss-cross rhythms: one would be the caller, one would be the responder, and the other two would be the interceptors."

Once the drummers—Haastrup, C.K. Ladzekpo and Moddy (on congas and African traditional drums) and Ahuma (on Western or "trap" drums)—establish their churning rhythmic bottom, which itself is adaptable to a multitude of styles even within a single song, the other

cisco's Berry Street. Once the album is released, he intends to pursue a dream he has had for a long time—to make a world tour with his band that would include Africa, Europe, Japan and North America.

Such a tour would not only demonstrate the interconnections of much of the world's music, but would have a broader goal as well. "I see this band," Haastrup explains, "as an educational medium for the whole world—including Africans in Africa. Music is our only common language. In this music we can locate one another; we can identify one another. In that way, we can show that we are all existing in the same one conceptual world, except that politics makes it all look different. This is the real purpose of this band."

Bruce Dancis' music criticism has appeared, among other places, in *Billboard*, the *San Francisco Bay Guardian* and *In These Times*.

Wajda

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documentary *Workers '80*—the moment-by-moment strike negotiations at the bargaining table filmed by Polish film students in concert with Solidarity—actually works against the film. Andrzej Gwiazda and Walesa demand of the vice-premier why people have been arrested without charges.

The interchange is more electrifying and revealing of the relationship the movie develops than any single confrontation between the fictional characters. When Walesa appears, with his energy and dedication, he wipes other characters off the screen. The street footage—both genuine and reconstructed—from 1968 and 1970 has more fascination than the blow-up between father and son over the protests.

Wajda may have let the excitement of events overtake him. The film was produced in record time. It has said since its release that he would like to re-edit it for aesthetic reasons, but no one will let him because "Everyone sees himself in the film, and feels that any cut is taking out something cathartic that must be said." One veteran of a protest movement said that the film is "like a touched-up wedding portrait—the way we imagine ourselves at the moment of our wedding."

What is wrong with the movie, in part, is what is wrong with photos like that. It's a little too pat, a little too righteous. The heroic worker's son reincarnates his father's saintly innocence, his almost apolitical purity. He rejects intellectuality along with elitism, refusing a college education because "I'll have more to lose" if he gets his degree. He converts to his cause the young filmmaker, showing her a higher vocation than her art.

That's a surprising position for a filmmaker who traditionally has focused on the importance of producers of images, art and information. This is the latest of Wajda's films making a journalist the protagonist. Both *Man of Marble* and *Without Anesthesia* concerned the courage and persecution of journalists. Here, though, Wajda himself seems to be afflicted with doubt about the role of media producers in social movements.

Wajda's driven filmmaker of *Man of Marble* has "mellowed," she tells Winkiel. (Actually, you feel a little relieved to hear this, after enduring her nearly pathological intensity portrayed so relentlessly in the earlier film.) She assures him that she learned, through working as an organizer, that there are more important things than filmmaking. She has been freed of her ambition.

Wajda was recently quoted in the *New York Times Magazine* as sharing that opinion. He criticized himself for not having signed a petition protesting the writing of the Communist Party into a central position in the 1976 Constitution (he was afraid *Man of Marble* would not get finished if the government took action against signers.) "I should have signed," he said, "and I can never forgive myself. I have learned a lot since August 1980...the same lesson as the young filmmaker from *Man of Marble*—that maybe making films isn't the most important thing in the world."

But it has been something close to that for Wajda for more



Tomczyk's friends restrain him during his rebellious student days.

than 30 years of an internationally-celebrated career as filmmaker, leader in the Polish filmmaking establishment and teacher of filmmaking, although he has always also dedicated himself to freedom of expression. His realization that filmmaking may not be the most important thing in life comments on the profundity of the shock to established values that the Solidarity process has had.

Nonetheless this realization gets uncomfortably close, in *Man of Marble*, to anti-intellectualism—unless the intellectuals can marry into the working class. Wajda destroys Agnieszka's film career in order to save her.

Perhaps this device seems more crude here than it does there, however. In a bureaucratic society careerism is what narrow profit-mongering is to a capitalist one. In a *Cineaste* interview last year Wajda pointed out that in the absence of the chance to "become a celebrity" that the West offers, advancing one's career means "invariably to stoop to rotten deals and swinish behavior."

Wajda has other problems in telling this story. How to chronicle the victory, especially when you are a member of the intellectual elite, without sounding sanctimonious or aggrandizing someone else's struggle? This is a historical moment when the position of the protagonist in *Man of Marble*—the eager truth-seeker outside official reality—is no longer necessary.

Wajda's solution—putting the doubting Thomas in the center—obscures the problem, but doesn't solve it. It makes of Winkiel a blurry window on other people's dramas; his personality becomes more indistinct the more we learn through him. And all around the confused, tired alcoholic is a psychologically oversimple world: heroic dissenters, evil officials. The good guys win—so far.

The sharpest criticism of the intellectual elite seems traditionally to come, in Poland, from filmmakers. Some of the courageous young filmmakers whose work has come to Western attention since August 1980 (in *Mother Jones* and *Cineaste*, Daniel Bickley called it the "cinema of moral dissent," noting that filmmakers function as a kind of public conscience that seems unimaginable here) were trained by Wajda. Films like *Man of Marble* and those of Krzysztof Zanussi expressed and mobilized public dissent before Solidarity.

As far back as 1929 a group of Polish filmmakers asserted that "film must be socially useful." They established the Polish film school in 1947. When Gomulka came to power in 1956 their dream of a "director's cinema" (rather than a cinema controlled by producers for profit or by government for propaganda) moved closer to reality with the setting up of three-year-long training groups centered around veteran directors. The veterans ran interference with the government and maintained artistic autonomy from each other. These units have accounted for a variety of styles and have been a continuous source of new filmmakers.

Since Solidarity, Polish filmmakers have played a crucial role in the democratizing process. The importance of cameras at

the strike negotiations—as a public, broadcast witness to the government's behavior—is clear from the interchanges that the filmmakers capture in *Workers '80*.

Documentaries have been the most exciting new development in Polish film, from reactions at the two latest Gdansk film festivals. *Workers '80* was rushed at the last minute to the 1980 festival, where, with a handful of other documentaries, it became the talk of the festival. This year a series of documentaries was scheduled, including *100 Days*, chronicling the construction of the Gdansk monument to the workers who died in the 1970 strikes and with conflict-filled footage from the Solidarity convention. Also shown this year was *Peasants '81*, also done by Polish film school students with Solidarity. *Peasants '81* follows the formation of Rural Solidarity from the beginning meetings to the signing of a government agreement with the farmers.

Although both *Workers '80* and *Peasants '81* were made through the Documentary Film Group of the Polish film school, the Group has refused to acknowledge either. But Solidarity bought both films and has used them widely. (*Workers '80* is in international distribution as well.) The documentaries tend to look rough, but they don't need polish—the drama is

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all there in the action.

That kind of success, of course, only makes more important the question of the emerging relationship between intellectuals and workers. So much so, in fact, that Gdansk film festival participants this year joked about the documentary they want to see next year: *Intelligentsia '82*.

The possibilities for filmmakers in Poland today are breathtakingly open. This is a country where you can use the resources of a state-funded film unit to produce and distribute a film sharply critical of the state. Wajda's film openly indicts the government for sabotage, dirty tricks, smear campaigns, police raids and murder of unarmed protesters—not even to discuss his ever-present references to bureaucratic privilege and favoritism.

Auditing the government.

Wajda has had equal success in boldly raising administrative issues. At the 1980 festival he and others last year accused the government of sleight of hand in counting ticket receipts. This year the charges were harsher and proposals more dramatic.

Members of the Association of Polish Filmmakers and the Solidarity filmmakers union formed a "Committee to Save the National Cinematography" to demand basic reforms, and government officials serving on the Gdansk Film Festival Committee calmly heard their complaints.

As president of the association, Wajda charged that the government could and might stop Polish film in its tracks by not releasing to filmmakers the funds generated by Polish film profits. Filmmakers, he said, also lack raw materials, especially stock. Finally, Film Polski, the film distribution unit, runs a short-term profit organization, with no concern for getting quality films to an international public.

The Association with Solidarity hunted this year for coproduction and codistribution arrangements with foreigners, which would force Film Polski to compete with outsiders for control over Polish films. Wajda further demanded that profits from *Man of Iron* be re-invested in film production. Most basically, filmmakers demanded that film production be self-governing and self-financing. According to a *Variety* report, that demand was generally seen as pie-in-the-sky, but Wajda was happy with the vision of filmmakers having even 50 percent access to the funds generated from profits of their films.

The Poles are now in the unique position of having a well-developed film industry and trained filmmakers at a time of social transformation. *Man of Iron* is only one of the many possibilities at this hectic moment. With all its uneasy positions, it's as much a promise of change as it is a retrospective of victory.

SYLVIA

by Nicole Hollander



Decline

Continued from page 16

fect be as dramatic in the prospering Sunbelt as in the slumping North, because many Sunbelt cities lack an industrial infrastructure capable of accommodating an onrush of private investment. Houston, for instance, doesn't have a mass transit system, and Dallas' sewage system is already inadequate.

Reagan's other means of holding down inflation and disciplining labor is by restraining money supply growth. But this policy also has disastrous longterm consequences. Higher interest rates discourage domestic investment making consumer loans and small business loans more difficult to procure. They also raise the value of the U.S. dollar and therefore reduce the competitiveness of American exports. At the same time, the overvalued dollar encourages multinationals, who are not dependent on external financing, to invest their funds overseas.

Reagan's foreign policy is similarly self-defeating. The international consequences of his domestic economic policies—higher interest rates and therefore increased debt payments in the third world, recession in Western Europe, and the higher dollar-denominated oil prices—have already alienated American allies. His confrontational posture toward the Soviet Union increases the distance between the U.S. and its NATO allies, who view themselves as trapped uncomfortably between the superpowers; his support of unpopular anti-Communist dictators in the less developed nations increases the gulf between the U.S. and the European strategies toward the third world.

Reagan's policies enmesh the U.S. in the vicious circle from which Carter's "doves" tried to extricate it. Economic decline leads to international decline, which leads to increased arms expenditures, which leads to further decline and to increased political divisions within the Western camp.

In short, Reagan's economic, military and diplomatic initiatives will worsen the American situation. Viewed from an analysis of what caused the decline of the U.S. in the first place, Reagan's solutions appear to be repetitions of past errors. Their widespread acceptance testifies to some deep-seated irrationality within the American public and its corporate elite.

The logic of decline.

A look at the way two past leaders of world capitalism—the Dutch and the British—dealt with their decline reveals striking similarities to the American case. (The Dutch parallel was suggested by former *In These Times* managing editor Robert Shaeffer.) These similarities help explain the seeming irrationality of American policies and politics.

The Dutch reign over world capitalism was brief: from about 1650 to 1700. Dutch superiority had its basis in manufacturing—particularly, its textile and shipbuilding industries—and the dominant role in world trade that Dutch ships and finance played. According to British historian Charles Wilson, the main reason for the Dutch decline was the high taxes citizens paid to finance the Dutch army and navy, which in those tempestuous times were responsible for defending not only Dutch territory, but also its extended trade routes. The higher taxes, exacted upon a population half the size of England's and a fourth the size of France's, were translated into higher wages for Dutch workers. One historian estimates that Dutch wages were 16 percent higher than English wages. Higher wages and inflated prices squeezed the profits of Dutch manufacturers, who were increasingly undersold by the British and French. As Dutch manufacturing stagnated, the Dutch turned increasingly to trade and finance for revenue, thus becoming dependent on a still larger army and navy, which required still higher taxes, greater national debt and the virtual strangulation of Dutch industry.

The British case fills in the picture. British world supremacy, usually dated from Napoleon's defeat in 1815, was

based both in superior manufacturing—of textiles, iron and steel, coal and railroads—and in world finance and trade. But Britain's industry began to lag behind the U.S. and Germany at the end of the 19th century. The reason was that British businessmen believed—correctly—that it was more profitable to invest their profits overseas than to modernize their domestic industry. Britain's annual investments abroad began to exceed those at home around 1870, according to Eric Hobsbawm. As a result, Britain was becoming "a parasitic rather than a competitive economy," living off the remains of her empire.

The rise and fall of the U.S. after World War II parallels the Dutch and British experience. Like the Dutch, the U.S. undertook large defense expenditures as leader of world capitalism. These expenditures contributed to the decline of its industry. While one may argue about their size at any moment, they were unavoidably larger than those of its principal rivals. And these defense expenditures now are one of the U.S.'s few claims to leadership over world capitalism.

American industry also followed, although not as dramatically, British industry's practice of using its profits overseas rather than at home. Economist Arthur MacEwan estimates that corporate profits from overseas investment grew from 12.2 percent of total corporate profits in 1960 to 23 percent in 1979. American corporations that invested overseas now naturally support policies to preserve and enhance their investments abroad—for instance, monetary policies that increase the value of the dollar.

These examples show a logic of decline that affected the Dutch and the British and is now affecting the U.S. The present American policies—as ultimately self-defeating as they are—follow from a certain historical necessity.

Imperial nostalgia.

There is also a special component to imperial decline that can be seen in Britain as well as in the U.S.—a nostalgia for past ways and past solutions. In the '20s, Britain was still widely regarded as the world's leading capitalist country. In 1925, the British Conservative Party took office on a pledge to restore the British pound to its pre-World War I parity with gold.

Opposition did not come from the Labor or Liberal Parties, but only from economist John Maynard Keynes. Keynes argued that Britain's future depended on its international financial position. Now he pointed out that raising the value of the pound would price British exports out of the world market and force British manufacturers either to reduce wages in order to reduce prices or to go out of business. But the Tories, with Winston Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer, went ahead with the revaluation.

The British revaluation led, as Keynes predicted, to attempts to depress wages and to the general strike of 1926. It also helped cause the world depression of the '30s. In 1931, the British finally went off the gold standard.

The interesting thing about the British decision is that while it would benefit only the financial sector, it was supported by labor and manufacturers as well. One can guess that they were motivated by political nostalgia that identified the conditions of Britain's past glory—the superiority of its pound—with the imperatives of its recovery.

A similar process is at work in the U.S. Reagan's economic policies—his promise to "get government off the backs of the people"—recalls pre-New Deal laissez-faire conditions, while his pledge to restore American military superiority is an attempt to recreate the world of the '50s. These policies will benefit only a tiny number of Americans, but they have been embraced by small businessmen, many workers, and even some unemployed.

During the summer 1980, the AFL-CIO took a poll among its members that revealed widespread support for laissez-faire and Cold War notions. The poll found that 65 percent of union members favored a balanced budget, 66 percent

thought there had been too much government regulation of business, 72 percent opposed any reduction in military spending, and 60 percent opposed the Panama Canal treaties.

The missing left.

One reason for this widespread support is political nostalgia, but there are two other reasons why particular groups of Americans support Ronald Reagan's politics. American workers' acceptance of laissez-faire is largely the result of the absence of an anti-capitalist left in the U.S. This has allowed what historian Louis Hartz called "Lockean liberalism" to persist into the 20th century among people who in Europe would have turned to socialism or social democracy.

Even after the New Deal, most Americans continued to view the economy in Lockean terms as a "state of nature" upon which the government intrudes, often for worse. When economic ills arise, they are more likely to blame the government than business. To the extent that Americans support certain kinds of state intervention—from social security to wage-price controls and rational health insurance—they do so piecemeal.

There is also another factor that makes some Americans look right rather than left. There is one important difference between Britain in the 19th century and the U.S. today. While Britain had to face capitalist rivals, the U.S. not only has to face other capitalist nations, but also a growing socialist bloc.

The social systems of the "socialist" nations have little in common with Marx's ideal, which envisaged socialism as the culmination of democracy and political liberty. But these countries represent an embryonic threat to national and international forms of capitalist organization. With the rise to power of socialist governments in democratic Western Europe, the threat becomes even greater.

The threat of world socialism is partly responsible for the blind conservatism of many American leaders. Even such rudimentary state capitalist measures as wage-price controls or public works are seen as steps toward socialism and are resisted as such. Investment consultant Alan Greenspan, the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors during the Ford administration and a key Reagan advisor, expressed this during the

1980 campaign.

Referring to government investment programs designed to provide employment, Greenspan wrote, "Such policies can easily become self-justifying. It can be argued that private investment is weak and therefore centrally planned government investment is needed to fill the gap. But as central planning spreads, private investment incentives atrophy still more, justifying the initial premise that more central planning is needed. At the end of this path is a regimented economy."

Greenspan's warnings are characteristic of the way many businessmen and policymakers view the world. Many had misgivings about the particulars of Reagan's proposals—especially the tax cuts—but they came to see the issue as the defense of the free market and fell quickly in line.

There are alternatives being offered to Reagan and the Republicans. Wall Street Democrats like Felix Rohatyn and Henry Kaufmann have called for rudimentary government planning. Left trade unionists in the United Auto Workers, the Machinists, and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees advocate reductions in defense spending, along with government planning. But these voices remain marginal to the mainstream, which is dominated, if not by Reaganism, then by the broader free-market/Cold-War tendencies that it represents.

In Britain, of course, the Conservatives' folly in 1925 led to the first installation of a Labour government. But the rest of the story is less encouraging. The Labour government, lacking a real alternative, soon discredited itself, and Britain went through a depression and World War II under Conservative leadership. And in 1981, Britain is still governed by a politics rooted in its imperial past.

There are therefore reasons to fear that even if Reagan fails to last more than four years, Reaganism, in some form, will be around a while longer, and the U.S. will continue blindly on a downward trajectory.

This article is based on a paper delivered July 31, 1981, to a symposium on "The USA today" sponsored by the Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales in Mexico City. It will appear in an anthology published by Siglo Veintiuno Editores.

CALENDAR

Use the calendar to announce conferences, lectures, films, events, etc. The cost is \$20.00 for two insertions and \$10.00 for each additional insert, for copy of 40 words or less (additional words are 35¢ each). Payment must accompany your announcement, and should be sent to the attention of Bill Rehm.

ST. PAUL, MN

November 6

Fundraiser for *In These Times*' Fifth Anniversary. Our Guest is James Weinstein, the Editor and Publisher. Join us for refreshments and informal discussion. \$5. 7-10 p.m. at Twin Cities Friends Meeting House, 295 Summit Ave. For more information call Becca Brackett, (612) 588-9532.

MINNEAPOLIS, MN

November 7-8

Farmer-Labor Association State Convention, "Economic Democracy: Defining Our Vision"—Speakers: Paul Wellstone, author of "Powerline," Michael Cassidy, Leader, New Democratic Party Ontario, Sara Evans, author "Personal Politics," Harry Boyte, author "Backyard Revolution," James Weinstein, editor *In These Times*. At Willey Hall, U.M.N., Mpls. Campus, Registration \$10. Contact: FLA 3200 Chicago Ave., S., Minneapolis, MN 55407, (612) 823-7081.

November 9-13

The Citizen Heritage Center will sponsor "Reclaiming Our Culture and History," an intensive five-day session on use of cultural and historical resources in effective citizen action. Registration is limited to 25, on a first-come basis. Contact: Citizen Heritage Center, 2001 University Ave., S.E., Minneapolis, MN 55414. (612) 623-1800.

NEW YORK, NY

November 8

Support the Polish workers! Join labor, anti-

war and social activists in an afternoon in solidarity with Solidarity. Tadeusz Kowalik, a Polish economist serving on the National Commission of Solidarity, will be a special guest speaker. Other speakers include: Pete Camarata, Barbara Garson, Michael Harrington, C.L.R. James, Joanne Landy, Diane Lacey, Conrad Linn, Sam Meyers, Grace Paley, I.F. Stone and Paul Sweezy. Reception and entertainment. Washington Irving High School, 40 Irving Pl., New York, N.Y. From 2-6 p.m. \$2.50 contribution. For more information or advance tickets write: S.S.C., 99 State St., Brooklyn, NY 11201. Make checks payable to Solidarity Support Campaign.

ANN ARBOR, MI

November 13-14

"Alternatives to Reaganomics." A conference sponsored by Ann Arbor DSOC, featuring John Conyers, Lee Webb, Randy Barber, Karen Nussbaum, Zoltan Ferency. \$5 registration, \$2 for low income. DSOC, c/o Adams, P.O. Box 7373, Ann Arbor, MI 48107, or call (313) 662-6597.

WASHINGTON, DC

November 15-16

Women's Pentagon Action, Sunday—a women's gathering in Washington. Monday—a demonstration including non-violent civil disobedience at the Pentagon. Contact: WPA, 3601 Locust Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104. (215) 386-4876.

MILWAUKEE, WI

December 4-6

Mobilization for Survival's National Conference will take place Dec. 4, 5 and 6 in Milwaukee, Wisc. Join Holly Near, Holly Sklar, Mel King and other activists in building a movement for disarmament, an end to nuclear power and human needs. Call (212) 533-0008 or (414) 272-0961.

MAN OF IRON—THE NEW film by Poland's leading filmmaker, Andrzej Wajda, its subject Poland's recent history—has finally arrived in the U.S. (It will open in Chicago, which has the highest Polish population in the country.) Having debuted and garnered the top prize at Cannes, the film could cause as much debate as its predecessor, *Man of Marble*, but for different reasons.

Man of Marble, when it broke long official silence on protests of Stalinism in Poland in 1977, galvanized popular sentiment against the strictures of the Polish regime. It had weathered more than a decades' worth of rewrites, some of them adapting to changing social issues and some simply to avoid censorship. Wajda had chosen, finally, to truncate the film rather than end it with a reference to the Gdansk shipyard strike of 1970. Even as it was finally shown, the film resulted in both the minister and the vice-minister of culture losing their jobs.

But when *Man of Iron*, made in consultation with strikers and union organizers, was completed within months of the events it focused on, the first person on the government's prescreening board to comment said, "Anyone who speaks against this film speaks against Polish culture and democratic renewal." Lech Walesa, on the other hand, is reported to be nervous at the film's bold pitting of dissidents against the Polish government.

This is a sequel of sorts. *Man of Marble* told the story of a young filmmaker, Agnieszka (Krystyna Janda), who uncovered the truth about an exemplary Stalinist-era worker who later disappeared. He had, it turned out, continued to protest against undemocratic government. She finds his son, who seems on his way to showing her what happened to his father when the film school blocks her film. She and the son Tomczyk (Jerzy Radziwiłowicz) leave as determined as ever to voice the issues the worker's disappearance raised.

In *Man of Iron*, they fall in love, marry and take leading roles in the Gdansk shipyard strike of 1980. Through flashbacks to Tomczyk's relationship with his father, the once-forbidden history of protest 1968-1980 is recounted, and the father's vision transmitted to the next generation.

The unlikely protagonist of this history is a schlemiel. Winkiel (Marian Opania), a clever but weak-willed TV broadcast journalist, is a doubting Thomas. Once he was a tough investigative reporter and even gave Agnieszka the tip that led her to Tomczyk. But he has spent time in jail and become a drunken, defeated member of the corrupt government media.

During the 1980 strike Winkiel tears himself away from a rehearsal of women pretending to be anti-strike moms and wives on a talk show to get his orders from the top: an undercover assignment to collect dirt on strike leader Tomczyk for a smear campaign. Even though he will have to go into a Solidarity-declared dry zone, Winkiel is anxious for the responsibility. But once he gets to the shipyards, his cynicism wars with the hope all around him, and his cowardice contrasts badly with the suffering and faith of the people he is supposed to spy on.

His investigations are the device that lets Wajda summarize recent history. Winkiel runs into an old acquaintance, a radio journalist and old friend of Tomczyk. He recalls their days as student protesters in 1968, when Tomczyk's father refused to rally workers to support what he termed dangerous power politics in which everyone would get hurt. In 1970, when workers went on strike, students refused

The best part of Andrzej Wajda's *Man of Iron* is the history.

By Pat Aufderheide

SO LI DA RI TY THE MOVIE

to support them, and Tomczyk was roused from a sulk to hunt for his father's body after police fired on workers. Tomczyk then gave up on school and went to organize in the shipyards; his union leader opposed his organizing during the 1976 strike.

Winkiel then visits the mother of a young woman organizer. She describes their hunt for Tomczyk's father's body, the attempts to bury him, the disappearance of his grave and her steadfast conviction that in the end the protesters will win—that the government will eventually have to negotiate in good faith with Solidarity.

Finally he meets the one-time filmmaker Agnieszka, who recalls her romance and marriage with Tomczyk and the romance of their organizing work, even through hardships brought on by raids, ransacked apartments and a lonely pregnancy for her while he was jailed.

When Agnieszka talks to him about her work, recalling her "horrible ambition" to be a career filmmaker and her present fulfillment in being able to "speak the truth without worrying about the consequences," he suddenly realizes that he is trapped. He can no longer spy, and he can't quit. The thoroughly rotten police officer (he labels himself a "shit-swallow") who has him under surveillance lets him know that.

Winkiel finally opts for Solidarity—just too late to make any difference, and just in time for his new colleagues to denounce him for a spy. He is the only despondent member of a mad parade of joy once the government signs the agreement with Solidarity. Even this is misunderstood. His boss pulls up to him in a luxury car. "Why so glum?" he asks. "Don't worry, a contract signed under duress isn't valid."

As for the good guys, Tomczyk makes peace with his father, visiting the site of his father's murder with a copy of the new agreement; and he and Agnieszka are reunited.

The film, with its schematic history of protest, clearly shows how risky those August 1980 negotiations were and how pervasive was the discontent on which their success was founded. It also delineates the social groups involved.

Each of the characters plays an exemplary role within this struggle. In fact, *Man of Iron*, part fiction and part documentary, is less a dramatic film than an allegory. The truthful intellectual joins with the militant worker; their union in the Church is given strength by the democratic grassroots struggle. (Lech Walesa plays a bit part as a witness at their Church wedding, admonishing them self-consciously to practice democracy in the home.) The corrupt intellectual loses all by cowering to state intimidation.

It doesn't quite work; history has outstripped art. The reality is so dramatic, so cathartic that we don't need allegory to understand the message Wajda sends. Whenever he uses documentary footage or inserts real characters like Walesa, that fact is clear. One scene he uses from the

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