

By John B. Judis

WASHINGTON, DC

**A**LTHOUGH THE JOB OF VICE PRESIDENT has changed little over the last 50 years, the choice of a vice presidential running mate has become increasingly important. Vice presidential choices can dictate campaign strategy, and the vice presidency—once a dumping ground for fading politicians—has become the path to party leadership.

These considerations alone would make Gov. Michael Dukakis' vice presidential choice highly significant. But additional factors lend weight to his choice. The 1988 election looks like it will be a close one—more similar to 1960, 1968 and 1976 than to 1972 and 1984—that could turn on the vice-presidential choice.


Even more important, that choice will not only affect the party's chances in 1988 but also shape its political direction into the next century. In current discussions among party leaders, the vice-presidential choice is being tied to the following, long-term Democratic strategies.

• **The Western strategy:** According to this scenario, Dukakis would choose a vice presidential nominee from the Midwest or Pacific Coast. Washington Rep. Tom Foley and Ohio Sen. John Glenn are currently under consideration. Dukakis would give priority to campaigning in the East and Midwest and to issues that appeal to voters there. The Democrats would try to create a national majority that more or less mirrors the Republican majority that William McKinley established in 1896. It would stretch from New England to the Pacific Northwest, with the exception of the Rocky Mountain States, and would unite the "new-collar" cosmopolitan, environmentally oriented voters of New England and the Pacific Northwest with blue- and white-collar workers of the industrial East and Midwest. The Democrats would cede the South and the Rocky Mountain states to the Republicans.

The key to the Western strategy is winning California's 47 electoral votes. If Dukakis wins California as well as those Western and Northern states that Reagan lost in 1980 or in which, because of John Anderson's third-party ticket, he got less than 50 percent of the vote, Dukakis would have 253 out of the 270 electoral votes needed to win (see accompanying story). He could go over the top by winning Ohio (23 electoral votes), which would be a sure thing if Glenn is on the ticket, or some combination of New Jersey (16), Missouri (11) and Iowa (8). But if Dukakis won these states and lost California, he would fall short of George Bush.

• **The Southern strategy:** The Democrats would try to reconstitute the New Deal coalition that elected Franklin Roosevelt in 1932 and, most recently, Jimmy Carter in 1976. Dukakis would choose a Southerner for vice president. Names currently under discussion are Georgia Sen. Sam Nunn, Florida Sen. Robert Graham, Texas Sen. Lloyd Bentsen and Tennessee Sen. Albert Gore. The Democrats would moderate their stands on foreign policy, defense and social issues, and instead focus on trade and jobs—issues that could unite the industrial South and Midwest. With Dukakis heading the ticket, they would also win votes in New England and the Pacific Northwest. But the Democrats would concentrate on keeping the South and the Midwest in the Democratic fold.

## The Democrats search for a ticket to the White House



If Dukakis won the Northern and Western states where Ronald Reagan got less than a majority in 1980, as well as the Southern states of Georgia, Alabama, Arkansas and Tennessee, his tally would stand at 244 electoral votes, without winning California, Texas or Florida. He would then have to capture some combination of Missouri, Iowa, New

Jersey or Ohio to defeat Bush. And if he were to win California, Texas or Florida, victory would be virtually assured.

• **The Jackson scenario:** Most Democratic officials and Dukakis advisers have indicated that they don't think the Rev. Jesse Jackson would be a good vice-presidential choice. But some of Jackson's backers are

pressing the proposal. They believe that if Jackson does extremely well in the California primary, party leaders may be forced to consider a Dukakis-Jackson ticket. According to the Jackson scenario, Dukakis and Jackson would try to carve out a majority among small farmers, organized labor and blacks, Hispanics and liberal whites. With Jackson's help, the ticket would attract new voters to make up for the voters alienated by Jackson's presence on the ticket. Jackson's backers believe that a Dukakis-Jackson ticket could draw from both the Western and the Southern strategies, winning most Northern and Pacific states and carrying several Southern states, including Florida, Georgia and Alabama.

But most party regulars maintain that these projections are extremely optimistic. Even among Democratic primary voters—the most loyal of Democrats—Jackson encountered a strong backlash vote in the South and in New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania and other major Northern states. In the Ohio primary last week, five of six Dukakis voters didn't want Jackson as his running mate. In

## CAMPAIGN 88

a close election, Jackson could cost Dukakis votes among both Democrats and independents.

A Dukakis-Jackson ticket could count on winning only the New England states loyal to Dukakis, as well as Maryland, the District of Columbia and the most socially liberal states like Minnesota and Oregon.

**The Nunn story:** Dukakis will not consider Jackson for the vice presidency unless Jackson forces him to. Rather, Dukakis and other national Democrats will choose among the less controversial representatives of the Southern and Western strategies. Of the two, the Southern would be preferable—if a satisfactory running mate was recruited.

Even without a Western running mate, Dukakis' "good government" liberalism already has considerable appeal in the far West; he has consistently run ahead of other Democrats and Bush in Mervyn Field's highly respected California poll. A Southern running mate could help Dukakis win several Deep South states like Georgia, border states like Missouri and states like Illinois and Ohio that have many Southern immigrants.

His choice of a Southerner would also assure Democrats of winning several additional Senate and House seats. Southern Democrats are far more sensitive to political symbolism than Western Democrats; and there are several close congressional races in Virginia, the Carolinas, Louisiana and Mississippi, whose outcome may depend upon whether Southern Democrats feel part of the national party.

There is, however, a more important consideration. In the early part of the century, the geographical divisions between the parties, with the Republicans dominating the North and the Democrats the South, reinforced the racist exclusion of blacks from Southern political life. If in 1988 the Democrats surrendered the South to the Republicans, blacks would not be disenfranchised, but they would be marginalized, and the

### Unlocking the "lock" theory

Ronald Reagan's 1984 landslide victory reinforced prevailing opinion that the Republicans had a "lock" on the electoral college. The Republicans had won 23 states five straight times, while in the last five elections the only electoral votes the Democrats had regularly won were the District of Columbia's. But as Stuart Rothenberg argues in the March/April *Public Opinion*, the "lock" theory relies too much on incumbent landslides in 1972 and 1984 and ignores the peculiar circumstances of Reagan's 1980 landslide.

That year Reagan won an electoral landslide of 489 to 49, but won only 50.7 percent of the vote. Former Republican Rep. John Anderson won 6.6 percent of

the vote, and provided Carter's margin of defeat in 19 states. If Carter and Anderson's totals were combined they would have outpolled Reagan in 22 states and captured 213 electoral votes.

In 1980 Reagan would still have picked up part of Anderson's vote, but the statistic is highly relevant to the 1988 election. Because Massachusetts Gov. Michael Dukakis has some of the same technocratic, good-government appeal that Anderson did, he would likely attract some of Anderson's 1980 vote. It is therefore more accurate to use the Carter-Anderson candidacy in 1980 than the Mondale candidacy in 1984 as a measure of Democratic chances in 1988.

—J.B.J.



By Joel Bleifuss

## Body-count accounting

Could it be that U.S. officials are playing a numbers game with the figures for U.S. fatalities in Central America? While in Honduras last year, Jerry Genesio, of the Portland, Maine-based Veterans for Peace, asked two U.S. Embassy officials and one senior U.S. military officer how many U.S. soldiers had died in that country. The embassy officials said that they could recall four deaths. The officer said he knew of at least four. Sensing a dearth of frankness, Genesio returned to the U.S. and filed a Freedom of Information Act request with the Defense Department. Eventually the National Guard, Army, Air Force and Navy released their body counts. Adding the more recent media reports of U.S. casualties, Genesio determined that 68 soldiers have died in Central America since Jan. 1, 1984. Forty, not four, of those deaths occurred in Honduras. That total is undoubtedly low. The Marine Corps failed to provide any figures, despite orders to do so from the Defense Department. According to the Marines, "The information requested is not available since records of decedents are maintained by name, not by location of death."

## The Linder autopsy goes to court


Last spring, Ben Linder and two Nicaraguans were killed by the contras as they were building a small dam near the northern Nicaraguan town of San Jose de Bocay. The contras claimed that the 27-year-old American was caught in cross fire. And Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams told a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee that as far as he knew, "Linder was in the middle of a group of armed men, which would be a legitimate target." But according to the Nicaraguan government, the autopsy revealed that after being brought to the ground with shots to his legs and left arm, Linder was stabbed 30 to 40 times in the face with a sharp-pointed instrument and then shot in the temple at point-blank range. Earlier this year the New York-based Center for Constitutional Rights discovered, through a Freedom of Information Act request, that the State Department had investigated the Nicaraguan autopsy and found it valid. Those declassified State Department memos will be among the evidence offered by the Linder family and the Center for Constitutional Rights in a \$50 million law suit against the contra leadership. The suit was filed on April 28, the first anniversary of Linder's death.

## Licensed to bribe

An unknown number of U.S. corporations are able to bribe foreign officials with impunity. The names of these companies are known to only a few CIA officials. Stephen Kurkjian and John Kelly of the *Boston Globe* recently unearthed a memo from a 1984 congressional investigation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The memo reads, "[CIA General Counsel Stanley] Sporkin confirms that there is a whole series of companies registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that are exempt from the reporting requirements of the FCPA because they are covers for the CIA. Sporkin claims these exemptions are provided for by the FCPA legislation." The unidentified congressional investigator continues, "How does the SEC assure that there are no abuses by companies with these exemptions—is it a license to bribe?" (Before becoming CIA general counsel, Sporkin was head of the SEC's Enforcement Division. He is now a Reagan-appointed U.S. District Court Judge for the District of Columbia.) Under the FCPA exemption, "the head of any federal department or agency responsible for [national security] matters" may exempt "any person acting in cooperation" with a federal agency from the provisions of the act. According to *Corporate Crime Reporter*, journalist Kelly says that "congressional investigators currently believe that the CIA's power to allow payments to foreign officials might explain why [Edwin Meese's friend] E. Bob Wallach sought and obtained then-CIA Director William Casey's approval for protection payments to Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres for the Iraqi pipeline to be built by Bechtel."

## Child labor

What do Federal Reserve Board members Martha Seger's beating heart and a pile of cash have in common? Both are cold and hard. Seger recently told a small business group that congressional plans to raise the \$3.35 minimum wage should be abandoned. A higher wage would only increase youth unemployment, she said. "A lot of them aren't worth \$3.35 an hour; they don't know anything. Maybe they're worth two bucks."



## Curfew in the Occupied Territories: another policy failure

WEST BANK, OCCUPIED TERRITORIES—It is just before sunset and the Jalazon Refugee Camp is quiet. The streets of the normally bustling camp six miles from downtown Ramallah are empty, its 5,000 residents nowhere to be seen.

As darkness comes, Jalazon, perched on the sides of a steep mountain pass, disappears into the mountainside. Electricity at the camp has been cut off since at least April 1.

Jalazon, like many of the refugee camps, villages and cities in the West Bank and Gaza, is under curfew. As of Land Day, March 30, all of Gaza's 650,000 Palestinian residents were under complete curfew, as were many villages and camps in the West Bank. Although since then some curfews have been lifted, according to the *Jerusalem Post* more than 400,000 Palestinians were still under curfew in late April when Israel celebrated its 40th anniversary.

The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) has used curfews to quell disturbances since 1967, but in the last five months of the *Intifadah* (the Arabs' name for the uprising), curfews have been used with a vengeance. At the beginning of the uprising Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, speaking on Israeli television, promised that "there will be curfews in the refugee camps and in every place where order is disrupted."

Month-long curfews have been

used to punish villages, camps and cities where demonstrations have been frequent and where stone-throwers are thought to have been given refuge from IDF troops. Hardest hit have been villages that have acted against suspected collaborators or spies.

"We are using collective punishment because in a way it is a collective uprising—all the population is participating," says Haim Ramon, a Labor Party Knesset member. "I'm not justifying everything. I'm sure that here and there some measures that were taken were wrong. But this is the nature of war; this is the nature of violence."

Under curfew, normal life is impossible. No one is allowed to leave their home or their community. But other than that basic principle, the rules governing individual curfews are arbitrary and occasionally malicious. Water and electricity can be shut off. Municipal services stop functioning. At times sewage overflows into the streets. Medical care is delayed, restricted and sometimes simply refused. Food supplies are often the first thing cut. Severe food shortages, especially in the poorer Gaza Strip, have been reported by United Nations officials.

Camp refugees charge that the IDF uses the curfew to terrorize the population. Houses built without proper permits are demolished. The local *shabab*, politically active youth, are rounded up for questioning and/or administrative detention. Nor has the curfew stopped indiscriminate use of tear gas, beatings and shootings.

"The soldiers shoot when they see anything," says Salweh, a 24-

year-old mother of four from Jalazon who escaped from the camp after more than three weeks under curfew. "Always we are looking out the windows for the soldiers. Always we are afraid."

As arbitrarily as they are imposed, the curfews are occasionally lifted. In Al Am'ari Refugee Camp the curfew is lifted one hour each day, but the IDF lifts it in the early morning hours, forcing the camp's 5,000 people to get up at 4:00 a.m. to take advantage of their hour of freedom. In Jalazon the curfew is lifted only once every four or five days.

Raja Shehadeh of Al Haq, a human rights groups based in Ramallah, says the Israelis use the curfews "to exhaust the population so that they will be too tired to continue with the uprising."

But that strategy may have already backfired. Even though at times half the Palestinians in the Gaza and West Bank have been under what is essentially house arrest, the Israelis have found the restoration of order an illusive goal. As with many Israeli policies—beatings, use of live ammunition, house demolitions, deportations, administrative detentions and other forms of collective punishment—the curfews have hardened the resolve of the Palestinians.

Many Israelis are beginning to realize that their measures are failing, but the question of what to do to quiet an uprising that shows few signs of waning has no easy answers. A final decision will probably have to wait until after Israel's November election. But the harsh measures of the last five months have made coexistence more dif-