



The Dalai Lama's Nobel Prize reflects harshly on China.

Nobel bares China's Tibetan repression

By William Gasperini

The violent government suppression of the pro-democracy movement in Beijing this spring focused intense scrutiny on China's human rights record. Now, the awarding of the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama of Tibet should increase that scrutiny on another Chinese issue long ignored by the West—Beijing's policy toward the remote mountain kingdom it has ruled with an iron fist since 1950.

The Tibetan capital of Lhasa has been under martial law since March when the army broke up protests marking the 30th anniversary of the aborted uprising that forced the Dalai Lama to flee to exile in India. Hundreds of Tibetans, mostly Buddhist monks and nuns, have been killed, arrested or imprisoned in riots that have shaken Tibet in recent years.

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"Before, the media and people in the West were skeptical of our claims of harsh repression in Tibet," said Tenzin Tethong, personal representative of the Dalai Lama in the U.S. "Now even the most skeptical of skeptics will have a hard time questioning us when they can see for themselves what the Chinese regime does to its own people."

China first invaded Tibet one year after the Communist victory in 1949, claiming Tibet had always been a part of its territory even though Tibetans speak a completely distinct language and had a wholly independent government. Throughout his people's long ordeal, the Dalai Lama has professed his commitment to non-violent resistance to Chinese control.

In a recent New York appearance he told an assembled audience, "I have come to think of non-violence and compassion not as something high and religious, but as the common connective tissue of the body of all human life." Commitment to these principles underlies the ongoing public teachings of the Tibetan leader to his Buddhist followers around the world. And it is what led the Nobel Committee in Oslo to award him the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize.

A simple Buddhist monk: Wherever he goes, the short man clad in saffron robes with an irrepressible smile seems to be a living example of compassion. In his talks the 54-year-old Tibetan leader exudes a deeply spiritual radiance, even as he displays uncanny modesty. "I am a simple Buddhist monk, nothing more," he told reporters earlier this year on a U.S. visit. Despite such selfless assertions, he is clearly something more, especially at a time when the Tibetan crisis has entered a critical phase in the wake of China's hardline crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in June.

Although the world may now become more sympathetic, Tethong and other exiled Tibetan officials feel that in the short term the incidents in Tiananmen Square may only deepen the Chinese government's resolve in Tibet. Hard-liners in the Communist Party have long blamed the "liberalization" policy pursued through much of this decade for the recent upsurge in protests, beginning with bloody riots in Lhasa in September 1987. Under that policy, China sought to rebuild some of the 6,000 Buddhist monasteries and shrines destroyed since 1959, mostly during the Cultural Revolution. Although Beijing now acknowledges that abuses occurred as fanatical Red Guards sought to exterminate Buddhism—the core of Tibetan culture—officials downplay the extent of destruction. Beijing still claims it helped develop what it considered a backward region.

Despite claims of progress, most Tibetans still live in crippling poverty. Malnutrition and illiteracy are widespread, largely because of failed attempts at forcibly collectivizing a traditionally nomadic people. These policies led to outright famine in the 1960s. More than 1 million of a total population of 6 million Tibetans are estimated to have died since the Chinese takeover, with hundreds of thousands more imprisoned.

Although Tibetans' rights are supposedly guaranteed as one of several "national minorities," critics say that Beijing has tried to co-opt the Tibetan people through forced assimilation, promoting immigration of Han Chinese into Tibet. Encouraged by higher salaries and other economic incentives, Chinese immigrants now far outnumber Tibetans in their own land, a land that has been split into several renamed provinces. China has also maintained a massive military presence in Tibet since the 1950 takeover, leading many to believe it was a strategic move to control Asia's "high ground." This process has slowly destroyed one of the world's most unique cultures, and has led international organizations including the United Nations to pass resolutions accusing China of a deliberate policy of genocide.

Tibetans consider the Dalai Lama to be a god-king, the 14th in a line of rulers stretching back centuries. He was born into a peasant family in eastern Tibet the day the 13th Dalai Lama died. At the age of two, regent monks deemed him to be the 13th Dalai Lama's reincarnation after he recognized several of the previous ruler's personal belongings.

Man without a country: Since 1959 he has headed a government-in-exile based in the northern Indian town of Dharamsala. He maintains offices in key Western cities,

including Washington and New York, to publicize the Tibetan issue—particularly human rights abuses. While many governments are sympathetic to the Tibetans' plight, no country recognizes the Dalai Lama as a head of state. Governments instead treat the Tibetan issue with extreme caution, because of China's political and economic importance. "As one-quarter of mankind, China seems to be too big and too important," Tethong said.

Until the events in Tiananmen Square, limited progress toward an understanding between Beijing and the Tibetans seemed underway. After the 1987 riots the Dalai Lama made a five-point proposal to declare Tibet a "zone of peace" and to negotiate the region's future.

In June 1988 the Tibetan leader raised the stakes with an offer to acknowledge China's claims to the mountain kingdom, allowing Beijing to oversee defense and foreign policy while granting Tibetans local autonomy. This offer, made in a speech before the European Parliament in Strasbourg, triggered dissension within the exile communities as some accused the Dalai Lama of capitulating on long-held demands for Tibet's full independence. But Chinese authorities reacted by calling even these concessions a "disguised means of achieving independence"—something they have ruled out completely. Nonetheless, Communist Party leaders agreed to meet with the Dalai Lama and said he could return home if he renounced the demand for Tibetan independence. Without warning, however, they postponed a meeting planned for January in Geneva and have set no new date or agenda.

When Chinese students called for democratic reforms this spring in Tiananmen Square, the Communist leaders' reaction was not unlike their earlier claims about the troubles in Tibet—saying "counterrevolutionaries" instigated the violence, aided and abetted by "foreign in-

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stigators." On a similar note, Hgapoi Jigme, head of the China National Peoples' Congress, recently told a local Communist Party meeting in Lhasa, "Only the Communist Party can make Tibetans masters of their land. There is no way out for the few separatists to advocate independence for Tibet and go on stirring up riots."

Widening circles: With Beijing holding firm, the Tibetans say at least they are encouraged by signs of support among exiled Chinese. In late September, Tibetan delegates attended the founding conference of the Federation for a Democratic China in Paris, a coalition of exiled leaders and intellectuals. After addressing the congress, Tethong said that for the first time Chinese nationals acknowledged that the Tibetans have legitimate claims. "Although they still don't seem to grasp the real dimensions of the problem, they say no long-term solution is possible in China itself without also addressing the Tibetan question," he said.

Meanwhile, the Dalai Lama is broadening his international contacts in search of support. In June he met with Costa Rican President Oscar Arias and later with Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, reportedly to discuss the "zone of peace" proposal. According to a close assistant, they and the president of Ireland are the only heads of state to receive the Tibetan leader officially.

For the moment, little progress seems likely until the situation within the Communist Party leadership in Beijing stabilizes. In the meantime the Dalai Lama will continue as he always has, a living symbol of peace and understanding both in Tibet and the world in general—his stature increased as a Nobel Prize winner.

"We have been invaded since 1950 and nearly extinguished as a people, and it's easy to get discouraged," he said recently. "But I have always believed in the ultimate triumph of truth. All people need non-violence and compassion, no matter what they believe. Without these things not even the slightest conflicts would ever be resolved."

By John B. Judis

WASHINGTON

CABLE NEWS NETWORK'S "CROSSFIRE" IS organized as a debate between liberals and conservatives, but the evening after the abortive coup in Panama, something seemed to go haywire on the show. One of the hosts and both of the guests behaved as expected, with host Michael Kinsley, an editor of *The New Republic*, and Rep. Peter Kostmayer (D-PA) opposing American military intervention, and former Reagan administration State Department official Elliott Abrams favoring it.

But the other host, pugnacious conservative columnist Patrick Buchanan, locked horns with fellow conservative Abrams rather than with the more liberal Kostmayer and Kinsley. "Our vital interests are the American personnel down there and the safe operation of the Canal, and if those two are taken care of, why do we have to go in and install the elected representative down there and risk the loss of American troops?" a skeptical Buchanan asked Abrams.

To anyone following the conservative press, however, Buchanan's response to Abrams was no surprise. For the last month, Buchanan has hotly debated Ben Wattenberg, Charles Krauthammer and other neoconservatives over what kind of post-Cold War foreign policy the U.S. should adopt. This debate is actually a continuation of an increasingly bitter conflict between "paleoconservatives" and "neoconservatives" that has wracked the conservative movement since 1981.


Democracy uber alles: The most recent round began last March when neoconservative Ben Wattenberg, a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, wrote a *Washington Times* column on what issue should replace anti-communism at the center of conservatives' foreign policy agenda. "It is time for a new bumper sticker," Wattenberg wrote. "Americans have a missionary streak, and democracy is our mission. The new sticker should read, 'pro-democracy.'"

Wattenberg then proposed an 18-fold increase in the budget of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the government agency headed by former Social Democrats U.S.A. apparatchik Carl Gershman, as well as increases in the budgets of the U.S. Information Agency and State Department. Wattenberg called on the U.S. to intervene in Third World countries to promote political democracy and free-market economics.

In a September column in the *Washington Times*, Buchanan, borrowing a phrase from former secretary of state Dean Acheson, took Wattenberg to task for "messianic globaloney." "We are not the world's policeman, nor its political tutor," Buchanan wrote. "Whence comes this arrogant claim to determine how other nations should govern themselves, or face subversion by the NED, the Comintern of the neo-cons?"

Buchanan appeared to object to Wattenberg's proposal on two grounds. He argued that with its economic problems, the U.S. didn't have the money to fund a global democratic crusade. "Democracy *uber alles* is a formula for permanent conflict and national bankruptcy," Buchanan wrote.

But echoing old-right doctrine from the '50s, if not before, Buchanan also objected to supporting democracy rather than economic liberty. "Conservatives exploded



Elliott Abrams: a neoconservative the paleoconservatives love to debunk.

Slurs fly in right's uncivil war

when Earl Warren gutted federalism to impose his one-man, one-vote dictum," Buchanan wrote. "How, then, demand that other peoples be governed by this democratist ideology?"

Buchanan took particular exception to Wattenberg's endorsement of opposition forces in Chile and South Africa. "The Boer Republic [Buchanan's quaint name for South Africa] is the only viable economy in Africa. Why are Americans collaborating in a U.N. conspiracy to ruin her with sanctions?"

Hyper-isolationists: Wattenberg and neoconservative *Washington Post* columnist Charles Krauthammer rushed to attack Buchanan in separate columns. Although failing to respond to Buchanan's charge of "imperial overreach," both Wattenberg and Krauthammer scolded him for backing South Africa, Chile and "non-democratic Moslem nations" and charged him with making common cause with the "unilateralists" and left-wing "hyper-isolationists" who had opposed the Vietnam War.

Buchanan responded by arguing that the U.S. was inexorably moving toward "unilateralism" and away from Wattenberg and Krauthammer's "internationalism." "Americans are not going to forever maintain a \$300 billion military umbrella over a Japan that steals our markets and buys our banks and industries with the profits; nor are we going to forever keep 300,000 troops in Central Europe, defending a rich continent that has been freeloading for a generation."

Buchanan was supported by *National Review* editor Joseph Sobran. Writing in the *Washington Times*, Sobran charged that Wattenberg and Krauthammer's real agenda in pressing for a democratic crusade was to maintain continued American aid to Israel. According to Sobran, the neoconservatives' "interest in world affairs often centers on Israel."

Three years ago, neoconservatives had charged that several columns Sobran had

written were anti-Semitic, including one praising a virulently anti-Semitic and racist publication, *Instauration*. By equating neoconservatives with Jews who support Israel, Sobran appeared to be walking down the same path.

Bloody outrage: In the broadest terms, the Buchanan-Sobran-Wattenberg-Krauthammer split goes back to the end of World War I, when President Woodrow Wilson tried unsuccessfully to win American support for a League of Nations. Supporters of the League argued that it would keep the world safe for democracy, while opponents charged that it would entangle the U.S. in more European wars.

League supporters, who formed organizations like the Council on Foreign Relations, became the internationalists and later Cold War liberals, while League opponents formed the backbone of the pre-World War II isolationist movement. The neoconservatives are former Cold War Democrats who backed the war in Vietnam and who began drifting away from the party after Sen. George McGovern's presidential nomination in 1972. The paleoconservatives, on the other hand, are the heirs of the Midwestern Republicans who in 1939 opposed American entry into World War II, and after the war consistently opposed foreign aid, beginning with the Marshall Plan. As the Cold War has receded, these divisions between the internationalists and isolationists have resurfaced in American politics.

The most recent split between the two factions dates from the fall of 1981, when the paleoconservatives backed Southern agrarian M.E. Bradford and the neoconservatives backed former Democrat William Bennett to head the National Endowment for the Arts. The neoconservatives waged a fierce and somewhat unfair campaign in the press against Bradford, defeating him but earning the ire of his allies. Since then, the factions have repeatedly skirmished over immigra-

tion, civil rights, trade and foreign policy.

In attacking the neoconservatives, the paleoconservatives have engaged in anti-Semitic innuendo. At a May 1986 meeting of the conservative Philadelphia Society, University of Michigan historian Stephen Tonsor read the neoconservatives out of the movement, declaring that conservatism's "world view is Roman or Anglo-Catholic," while neoconservatism represents the "instantiation of modernity among secularized Jewish intellectuals."

In October 1988, paleoconservative Russell Kirk, the author of the 1953 movement classic, *The Conservative Mind*, prompted charges of anti-Semitism when, speaking at the Heritage Foundation, he attacked the neoconservatives for their loyalty to Israel. "Not seldom it has seemed as if some eminent neo-conservatives mistook Tel Aviv for the capital of the U.S.--a position they will have difficulty in maintaining as matters drift," Kirk said.

Neoconservative Midge Decter, the director of the Committee for the Free World and the wife of *Commentary* editor Norman Podhoretz, denounced the speech as a "bloody outrage, a piece of anti-Semitism by Kirk that impugns the loyalty of neoconservatives. He has defined [us] as a bunch of new right Jews [and] said people like my husband and me put the interests of Israel before the interests of the U.S."

Last May the feud erupted once more when the Rockford Institute of Illinois, which publishes the paleoconservative monthly *Chronicles*, shut down and confiscated the files of the Center on Religion and Society, a New York affiliate run by Pastor John Neuhaus. Neuhaus, a close ally of the neoconservatives, had accused *Chronicles* of covert anti-Semitism and anti-immigrant nativism.

Observers from other political galaxies might wonder whether the blows between these erstwhile allies are feigned, but they need only remember the internecine rivalries in the '30s between Communists and Trotskyists or in the '60s between the Weatherman and Progressive Labor factions of Students for a Democratic Society. Just as a Communist would sooner discredit a Trotskyist initiative than overthrow the bourgeoisie, the paleoconservatives would sooner debunk Abrams or Podhoretz as defeat a liberal childcare bill or arms control proposal.

Although paleoconservatives have justly been accused of anti-Semitism, nativism and other intolerances, they are raising legitimate questions about foreign policy. Democratic liberals and moderates are split over the same range of issues, from funding for American troops in Europe and Asia to armed intervention in Panama. On Panama, for instance, while some liberals like Kostmayer questioned whether American intervention was desirable, moderate Sen. David Boren (D-OK) criticized President George Bush for not using force.

In addition, while paleoconservatives and liberals might have different reasons for taking similar positions, they both speak for a much less ideological but no less definite public sentiment in favor of paying more attention to economic problems at home. This sentiment will be an important political factor in the '90s and could transform parts of the right and left into strange bedfellows. □

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