DIALOGUE

Unite and conquer

s In These Times went to press, it was not clear if Serb nationalist forces in Bosnia would fully ratify the current Vance-Owen peace plan. If they do, it's an open question whether the agreement will prove meaningful. It is probably

unwise to place bets.

Whatever the result, the damage in Bosnia has already been done. And however welcome a ceasefire would be—especially the lifting of the siege on Sarajevo-a deeply compromised settlement (even more compromised by concessions granted to the Bosnian Serbs by international mediators) does not justify all past mediation errors nor guarantee a new and just mediating posture. Most important, a few signatures on a peace plan cannot wipe away the vicious nationalist policies that have emerged throughout the region.

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By Anthony Borden and Zoran Pajic peace and stability.

In at least four ways, international mediation has directly served to crush progressive, multi-ethnic forces throughout the region. Most important is the arms embargo, which the United Nations imposed on the Bosnians in exchange for forceful, good-faith mediation efforts. It is now clear that virtually no country had faith in such efforts or would back them forcefully. As a result, the Bosnians have been left unarmed, and the international community is arguably complicit in genocide.

Second is partition of the region, officially launched two months before the fighting in Bosnia at the European Community (EC) Lisbon summit in February 1992 and now enshrined in Vance-Owen ethnic-based maps.

Severing Bosnia into ethnic enclaves is a war plan imposed by the extreme nationalist leaders from Serbia and Croatia, reportedly with direct pre-arrangement. Utterly contradicting Bosnia's centuries-old history of relative ethnic harmony, it is a recipe for conflict and population transfer, and arguably played a role in sparking the war, even as it is now seen as the only solution.

Third is the international community's recognition of Croatia as an independent state. Assigning Croatia this status came against the urging of the EC's Badinter Commission report on human-rights violations, and stands as the monumental diplomatic blunder of the conflict. The move alarmed Croatia's Serb minority—which cannot forget past Croatian atrocities—and set in motion an escalating cycle of ethnic unrest. Meanwhile, Macedonia—which the commission endorsed for official statehood—has not yet been awarded this status. And Bosnia was bounced out of the old Yugoslavia, without the substantial international protection the fragile new state obviously needed. These steps have fueled violent chauvinism on all sides.

Fourth is the "super-lawyer" negotiating approach. The international process has officially recognized only chauvinistic ethnic leaders, to the exclusion of alternative and opposition voices. This focus has debased the entire mediation process with ethnic-based solutions while legitimizing back home the people who were the cause of the problem in the first place. The sole, chimeric aim has been to sign a deal, however useless or unjust, and the continuity of the process has taken precedence over any impact on the ground.

A further problem with international mediation is that Western diplomats and journalists overwhelmingly and incorrectly portray all Bosnians as Muslims—thereby accepting the very tribal mentality that has led to the war.

Another pair of failures: Tuzla airport, which could be used for aid shipments, has languished unused for months and months. And the West has not adequately supported independent media outlets in Zagreb and Belgrade, essential to counter state propaganda and break the war psychology.

Why these missteps have occurred, and whether they add

up to an actual policy considered somewhere in Whitehall or Washington, is one of the most difficult and troubling questions of the conflict. Historians may someday uncover pro-Belgrade leanings, perhaps in the French and British governments. (Bonn's early blind fascination with Croatia—based on longstanding political, military and religious ties—was clear.) Or it may be that Britain simply has a special weakness for apartheid. More likely, however, the Western stance has been adopted out of traditional great-power

political instincts, which have historically favored larger, ethnically homogeneous and ostensibly stable regimes, regardless of human-rights issues. Unfortunately, such an approach is no path to peace.

The political aim of any international intervention—diplomatic, economic or military—should be clear: reject ethnically defined territories. This would mean supporting—at whatever level they are found—

forces for democracy, tolerance and peace. And it would mean spending as much time and political capital nurturing forces for progressive civil politics as has been expended identifying individual culprits.

Such a policy would also mean utilizing the United Nations Protection Forces for the purpose their name implies: to protect—not Muslims, Croats or Serbs, but people, wherever they are, with the guarantee that they could become equal citizens in rebuilt states.

Negotiations on Bosnia should adopt as their aim not the country's effective division but the establishment of an international civil administration or transitional authority, with military backing as required. Such a strategy would not prejudge a final settlement but would recognize that there can be no political settlement with only aggressive nationalist leaders at the table and the people under siege. The first step of such a policy would be to open Sarajevo immediately—by diplomacy if possible, by force if necessary—to provide fresh air to the structures of multicultural life still surviving there and to send a message of hope to civil forces throughout the region.

Hard realists, particularly those operating the U.N./European Community peace conference, reply brusquely that civic and democratic forces in the Balkans control no troops, have few or no seats in parliaments and, therefore, cannot affect the situation on the ground. They argue that the civic vision sounds nice but is vague and unworkable,

and that, anyway, after so much violence the people of Bosnia no longer want to live together. A liberal coexistence cannot be imposed, they say, and, in short, ethnic division is the only option.

Such assumptions are simply wrong. Ask the 80,000 Serbs still in Sarajevo. Ask the Serbs who recently refused to leave Tuzla, despite an arrangement for safe passage out brokered by the U.N. Ask the multi-ethnic group in the Bosnian Serb stronghold of Banja Luka, who have forced a small

Civic Forum to keep alive the flame of tolerance and coexistence. Consider the thousands of journalists throughout the region who have been fired because of their questionable loyalty to the ideology of ethnic-based states. Visit the peace groups in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia, or the offices of the independent Belgrade magazine Vreme, the fledgling Hrvatski List in Zagreb and the besieged Oslobodjenje in Sarajevo.


This is not an ethnic war about ancient animosities but a deliberately manufactured conflict fueled by vicious populist leaders. Ethnic division is seen as the only

option because the world has bought—and largely supported—the war-mongering propaganda of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. As a result, the international effort has arguably done more harm than good, while calling into question the very legitimacy of the entire system of collective security.

It is worth remembering that the Bosnian war broke out after a ceasefire was brokered in Croatia. Similarly, the scanarios for an expanded Balkan war hinge not on the direct spread of Bosnian fighting but on the extension of the violent ideologies that the fighting and the international community's approach have fueled.

The world is already deeply involved in the Balkan quagmire, and the road out will be difficult and long. But there is a multi-ethnic approach for the Balkans, and the sooner it is adopted the sooner it will be achieved.

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A Muslim soldier plays the piano in Mostar, Bosnia.

EDUCATION

Publish and perish

ollege and university administrators are calling for the separation of faculty dedicated to undergraduate teaching from those devoted to full-time research. They argue that establishing a reputation as a researcher does not leave sufficient time for teaching and curriculum development. And they also claim that the skills essential to scholarly publication—which determines tenure-have little to do with good teaching, and vice versa.

The incompatibility of teaching and research would be news to Plato and Aristotle, Aquinas and Hegel, Bertrand Russell and John Dewey, all of whom had a deep commitment to teaching. But even so, general social trends are pushing toward the separation of teaching and research.

In the corporate sector, the separation of the labor force into two distinct groups has been proceeding for quite some time. A relatively small group of workers are encouraged to develop the special skills needed to produce high-profit commodities. Relatively high wages, benefits and job security purchase their loyalty to the company. The remainder of the workforce is only assigned relatively deskilled tasks. Lowering their wages, eliminating their benefits and making their employment opportunities more precarious lead to great profit opportunities for the corporation.

The same economic logic is at work in universities. Researchers have become "cash cows" for universities, which can now earn royalties on patents based on their research. The less time they are distracted by students, the more money they can bring in. It is in the university's short-term interest to retain their loyalty, and freeing them from teaching is a "perk" that can be thrown their way. As the majority of the faculty are put into the pool of non-researching teachers, they become "de-

skilled" and easier to replace. The gap between their wages, benefits and job security and those of researchers increases.

The number of part-time faculty members has increased faster than full-time faculty and now makes up more than 38 percent of the total teaching force in higher education, according to the National Center for Educational Statistics of the Department of Education. The number of graduate students teaching part-time and the number of full-time temporary faculty have also increased significantly, thereby forcing researchers from teaching responsibilities.

These trends may benefit the university economically, but they do not benefit students. Students are now much more likely to have contact with vulnerable, overworked and inexperienced faculty. At the same time, the salaries of "star" scientists and engineers have soared, while more and more funds are devoted to support staff and state-of-the-art laboratories and equipment. Corporate and state funding has not increased enough to cover these higher research costs. Administrators have looked to tuition hikes to make up the difference. This is the main reason why tuition and fees increased at roughly twice the rate of inflation in the '80s.

Why should anyone outside of academia care about this development? For one thing, the tuition increases have begun to restrict access to higher education to mostly white, upper-middle-class students. If present trends continue, the higher education system will worsen the already horrific stratification in our society.

Second, researchers who teach are forced to develop the ability to translate what they are doing to the general public. As a result, they are in a much better position to contribute to the formation of a more scientifically and technically

Separating research from teaching is a bad idea for students, teachers and researchers.

By Tony Smith