

**A** SIMILAR EPIC HAS "MARY Jones," a CIA typist, stealing a secret document while in a trance. The next scene shows Mary typing at her desk as the narrator intones: "This is also Mary Jones. She has no knowledge of what she did last night." The script adds: "As she continues typing, the shadow of either a hammer and sickle or a hand moves across the screen, and the scene fades out."

Although most of the hypnosis experiments took place in the CIA's "Building 13," a number of projects were farmed out to various universities around the country. In one such case, Alden B. Sears, now a Methodist minister in Grant, Nebraska, conducted a series of hypnosis experiments at the University of Denver. The research was covertly financed by the CIA through its medical front, the Geschickter Foundation.

Sears, using students at \$1 an hour—wages were lower in the 1950s—attempted to determine whether subjects under hypnosis had improved memories for detail. Obviously, this is a quality of mind that would be of considerable usefulness to a spy. The subjects, Sears said, studied table tops littered with small objects, "miniature trains, miniature horses, cameras, about twenty to twenty-five objects on each table." After studying the tables, the students were asked to recall what they saw. "One woman developed an almost photographic memory," Sears claims.

According to Sears, the Denver experiments ("I thought it was all for the Geschickter Foundation") also sought to measure body changes during hypnosis. "We took blood counts and gave polygraph tests."

Although in general there is nothing very funny about most of the CIA's experiments, a number of the research reports are unintentionally hilarious. One secretary, who was "progressed" into the future under hypnosis, reported to the CIA scientists, their pencils poised, that she was seated at a dinner table eating her grandmother's chicken soup. Another document solemnly relates how CIA agents infiltrated a meeting of dentists to hear a lecture on the use of hypnosis as an anesthetic for drilling teeth.

And sometimes, things went wrong. In one experiment, two women were told they were at a dance, listening to the orchestra. One suddenly awakened and announced, "I don't hear any


music." A few minutes later, the second woman said, "I don't hear it either." Exasperated, the CIA Svengalis separated the two women and, the documents relate, hypnotized them each again. This progressed according to plan until (Miss Blank) was again asked to comment on the music she heard from an adjoining room, whereupon she awakened and stated, "I still don't hear it."

**C**ONSIDERABLY LESS AMUSING is an October 1955 CIA memo noting that, while experiments have depended upon volunteers, the use of hypnosis in "covert operations" requires a means for "disguised" hypnosis of "unwitting, unwilling subjects." The memo suggests that equipment used in routine medical exams, such as electrocardiogram machines, audiometers, and ophthalmoscopes, would be ideal for mesmerizing unsuspecting patients.

The memo adds that a metabulator, a machine used in determining the basal metabolic rate, offered the best possibilities since "the subject is under controlled conditions including food and water intake and medication for a maximum of twelve hours. In addition, the operator controls the very air the subject breathes at the time of the test—a perfect situation for increasing the carbon dioxide level, an alleged aid to hypnotic induction."

Yet another document proposes the construction of "a unique laboratory . . . a special chamber, in which all psychologically significant aspects of the environment can be controlled." The chamber would be equipped with a lie detector and other appropriate devices. "In this setting the various hypnotic, pharmacologic, and sensory-environmental variables will be manipulated in a controlled fashion and quantitative continuous recordings of the reactions of the subjects will be made."

The documents do not make clear whether the CIA ever built its horror chamber, but if so, it would have been the perfect setting for an experiment proposed by the chief of the agency's technical branch. "As far as third-degree tactics are concerned," he wrote in a memo, "we do not know as yet what happens to an hypnotized individual under the third-degree or plied with chemicals of various types. . . . Again this is a test that we hope to carry out in the future, as you know." □



STEVE WEISSMAN

## Norwegian spy wars

**A** SECRET SAGA OF SPIES, saboteurs, and nuclear missile submarines on NATO's arctic flank is threatening to burst into the open here in quiet Norway, as the country's normally easy-going Labor Party government tries in vain to clamp the lid on a wholly unexpected swarm of secrets leakers, muckraking journalists, and self-appointed counterspies.

In the latest episode, a court in Oslo has just found a former intelligence officer and World War II resistance hero—Major Svein Blindheim—guilty of breaking his official oath of secrecy and has given him a 75-day suspended sentence. Major Blindheim had revealed how he once trained a group of anti-Communist Finns in spying and sabotage and then sent them secretly over the Finnish border into the Soviet Union.

A second prosecution this fall threatens two journalists and a free-lance ferret named Ivar Johansen with full-blown charges of espionage. Their crime: compiling an enormous dossier on the Norwegian intelligence services, largely from public sources, and thus opening the door on the Labor government's covert collaboration with NATO and the American CIA in the sophisticated electronic spying that has become so central to the nuclear arms race.

At stake in both prosecutions—and in a continuing hemorrhage of leaks and revelations—is the untold story of how this quiet, peace-loving country came to serve as the number-one base for the United States' northern spy wars.

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Just how seriously the Norwegian government takes the present threat to its secrets can be seen in the difficult—and politically costly—decision to bring charges against the popular and highly respected Major Blindheim. Now in his early sixties and a high-school history teacher, Blindheim was a career officer in the Norwegian army who is widely known as one of the most-decorated survivors of the daring behind-the-lines war against the Nazi occupation of Norway. Blindheim revealed his official secret last summer in *Ny Tid*, the weekly paper of the small Labor Party breakaway, the Socialist Left Party. He told how in the spring of 1953, while serving as a captain on the intelligence staff of the Norwegian High Command, he was sent for several weeks under civilian cover to Helsinki, where in a series of safehouses around the city he gave secret, nighttime lessons on how to spy and sabotage to a group of 15 or so Finnish anti-Communists. He returned to Finland that summer, traveled to a hut in the far-off woods, and helped give a last-minute briefing to the Finns before they slipped silently over the border into the Soviet Union.

"Later I realized that those activities were so provocative that they could have led to serious repercussions for Norway in NATO, both from the Soviet side and from the Finnish," he told *Ny Tid*. But at the time—and for nearly a quarter century after—Blindheim held his tongue. "Those of us who had been active in the resistance during the war were used to not asking questions," he explained. "We gave orders and we took them."

**B**UT IT IS NOW KNOWN THAT the provocation was much greater than Blindheim had imagined. From the late 1940s, the CIA and British intelligence systematically used bases in Finland and others in Sweden, Denmark, West Germany, and Norway itself to infiltrate secret teams into the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to gather intelligence and to commit acts of sabotage. Recruited largely from right-wing emigré groups, the teams snuck across the Iron Curtain on foot, parachuted in from British and American overflights, or crossed the Baltic in little boats. They often received help from a large network of anti-Soviet agents already in place behind the Iron Curtain, and their exploits included everything from

blowing up bridges and wrecking factories to promoting guerrilla war.

Ironically, one of the masterminds of the entire program was the man who had served Hitler as chief of the Third Reich's anti-Soviet intelligence service, the infinitely flexible General Reinhard Gehlen, who at the end of the war turned over to the conquering Americans his anti-Soviet intelligence files and his huge network of Nazi collaborators and agents already behind Soviet lines. Major Blindheim's spy training in Finland in 1953 was a small part of this massive Cold War operation run by the CIA and the British in collaboration with General Gehlen, and it now appears that successive Labor Party governments in Norway backed the operation to the hilt, supplying skilled personnel such as Major Blindheim and permitting the use of at least five bases on Norwegian soil

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—at Kolsås, Örlandet, Rygge, Haakonvern, and Bodö—despite public pledges not to allow foreign bases on Norwegian soil in times of peace.

Blindheim's initial revelations began and ended with his Finnish experience—an episode that had soured his military career and turned the stubborn nationalist in him increasingly against Norway's involvement in NATO and its growing reliance on nuclear weapons rather than guerrilla-based resistance. But even as his case was coming to court—an apparently senseless prosecution for revealing something that happened 25 years before—a new scandal broke that helped explain why the government might want Blindheim silenced.

The tattle tale this time was that model modern bureaucrat, former CIA Director William Colby, who revealed in his newly published memoirs how, as a young CIA man in Stockholm in the early 1950s, he had worked with local allies throughout Scandinavia to cache secret stores of American-supplied weapons and train secret

networks of guerrilla fighters to form a new behind-the-lines resistance in the event Soviet troops overran Western Europe.

The entire scheme smacked of the worst kind of Cold War hysteria, and as it happened, one of those in the best position to know—and to tell—the dirty details that Colby left out was none other than Major Svein Blindheim.

As the story is now coming together, the young Blindheim was approached in the summer of 1949, just as Norway was helping to form NATO, and was asked to join the intelligence staff as an expert in guerrilla warfare, working on the very program Colby describes. The scheme involved British intelligence as well as the American CIA. Several top Norwegians—including Blindheim—were sent for a special spy-and-sabotage course at various schools in Britain and at a CIA safe-house down the street from the White House in Washington, D.C. The CIA course prepped the Norwegians on how to spot Russian units, blow up bridges, and wreck factories, and also gave them a large dollop of hard-line anti-Communism.

The secrets of this operation and the cross-border raids are still spilling, and an increasingly angry Major Blindheim is now preparing to tell even more about his military experiences, including his visit to the American special forces base in Germany's Bad Tolz and his Green Beret training at North Carolina's Fort Bragg. He is also encouraging former comrades-in-arms to tell what they know in support of his story. And, despite the suspended sentence, he is appealing to a higher court.

**T**HE SECOND PROSECUTION in Norway—the espionage case coming up this fall against Ivar Johansen and two journalists from *Ny Tid*—brings the story of Norwegian espionage up to the present and beyond, from the good old days of spies and saboteurs to the latest in electronic sensors and atomic war.

The prosecution of the pacifist-minded Johansen, a shy, awkward 27-year-old who works for Oslo's biggest publishing house, is far more serious than the Blindheim case. If Blindheim bothered the Labor government, Johansen scares them to death. Where the government prosecutors tried Blindheim for breaking his oath of secrecy, they are conducting the case against Johansen and his two

journalistic collaborators, Ingolf Teigene and Jan Otto Hauge of the ubiquitous *Ny Tid*, under the highly punitive "Spy Paragraphs," which were passed after World War II to give summary justice to suspected Nazi collaborators. They carry the threat of months and even years in jail.

The reason for the fierce response is obvious. Johansen is a spy, or rather counterspy, and for the past six years he has been spying out the who, what, and where of Norway's entire intelligence effort, from Special Branch surveillance of left-wing activists to the electronic miracles of the previously unknown Defense Intelligence Service, the *Forsvarets Overkommando/Etterretningsstaben* (FO/E).

Starting from scratch, the earnest young Johansen managed to gather an amazing amount of information, which he subsequently turned over to Teigene and Hauge at *Ny Tid*. This included lists of secret telephones, offices, and spy bases, and lists of names, which included one of Norway's top spy-masters, another Johansen, who turned out to be a close confidant of the Labor Party leadership.

The method of Johansen the counterspy was a model of the hard-work, open-sources school of investigation that is making life miserable for secrets-loving governments everywhere. He found the telephone numbers in local directories, called the appropriate offices, asked the right questions, and got the answers he needed. He also checked out the license plate numbers of the cars parked in front of key offices, read carefully through official publications, and openly interviewed past and present government officials.

His biggest crime, in fact, was that he made fools of the government and the intelligence professionals, and all on his own, as even the government has been forced to admit. No enemy agents. No foreign intelligence services. Just plain Ivar Johansen.

Almost in passing, he uncovered what the Labor government most wanted to hide—that the FO/E and American "liaison officers" were running a string of top-secret electronic monitoring bases, at least three of them close to the Norwegian-Soviet border and the Soviets' military complex at Murmansk.

From what is now known, the CIA and FO/E use some of these eavesdropping stations to keep close track of Soviet radar defenses, flying aircraft

provocatively close to Soviet airspace and forcing the Soviets to put their defense systems into operation. This allows the CIA and FO/E to get an electronic fix on Soviet radar tracking and the communications signals surrounding the related aircraft and missile defenses. The South Korean airliner that strayed over the Murmansk area in April triggered the same Soviet responses, and as news accounts inadvertently revealed, it was the Norwegian listening stations that picked up the signals from the Soviet base that forced the airplane to land.

**A**DDITIONAL WORK ON Johansen's lists has led other researchers—notably at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO)—to look into the undersea tracking of Soviet missile-carrying submarines sailing past the Norwegian coast from Murmansk. According to published reports, the tracking is now so good that Western intelligence can consistently pinpoint the whereabouts of individual Soviet subs in the northern seas, which would permit their destruction in case of nuclear war.

As in the Blindheim case, of course, the Soviets already know of Norway's present role in the electronic Cold War. But, within Norway, there is a widespread and highly articulate feeling that the country should honor its commitment not to permit foreign bases and nuclear weapons in times of peace. Hence, the matter of the Labor Party's longtime collaboration with the CIA is so potentially explosive that successive governments have gone to enormous lengths to keep the bases secret. Victor Marchetti and John Marks mentioned the bases in the original manuscript of *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*. Oslo found out, protested vigorously to Washington, and, after a lengthy court battle, the Norwegian passages were deleted from the book, along with other sections that the CIA was allowed to censor.

Now, in the case of Ivar Johansen and his lists, the Norwegian government is using the threat of long prison sentences to put the lid back on its most closely held secrets, especially the longtime cooperation with the CIA in what one critic calls "the emerging threat of electronic aggression." But, as in the Blindheim case, the threats of punishment are only encouraging new leaks and exposés.

Some governments never learn. □

## POLITICS

BANNING GARRETT  
and MARK PAUL

## Trading on human rights

**L**AST YEAR IN PEKING, A political dissident tacked up a wall poster at Tsing Hua University demanding to know why his government had not published the Helsinki accord. He was subsequently "exposed" as a "rightist" and apparently arrested. "There is a class character in human rights," Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua reportedly explained to an audience of top Communist Party officials. "From the standpoint of different classes, the standards of human rights vary. Some bourgeois newspapers and publications have joined the anti-Communist and anti-Chinese chorus to condemn us for a lack of human rights. Such allegations only expose the anti-Chinese nature of the handful of clowns, and will not hurt our national prestige a single iota."

Huang was apparently right. Earlier this summer, the Carter administration decided to loosen controls on the export of high technology to China, including oil equipment, and the White House sent to Peking the largest delegation of research officials that Washington has ever assembled.

Carter's decision to aid China in its campaign of economic and technical development stands in stark contrast to the administration's actions toward another opponent of human rights, the Soviet Union. In July, amid great publicity, Carter retaliated against the Soviet Union for the conviction of human-rights activists Aleksandr Ginzburg and Anatoly Shcharansky by blocking the sale of a Univac com-

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