

Long billed as the salvation of the South,
the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Project stands exposed
as an illusion in search of a justification.

The Corps of Engineers in **FANTASY** **LAND** *By JOHNNY GREENE*

The invention of radio-telegraphy, which coincided more or less with the completion of the [Rondon] telegraph line around 1922, meant that the latter was completely superseded, and was no sooner finished than it became an archaeological relic of a previous technological age.

—Claude Lévi-Strauss
Tristes Tropiques

ON THE MORNING OF MARCH 29, 1977, Governor Cliff Finch of Mississippi led a small, unruly invasion force through the normally drowsy streets of Columbus, Mississippi. Finch had hit town that morning and summoned his cadets to protest President Carter's threatened termination of the 253-mile-long Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Project. Wearing hard hats as they marched to an open hearing convened to take testimony and assist Carter in determining the fate of the waterway, Finch and his army of irregulars chanted, "Tenn-Tom, not welfare."

It was an ironic chant they selected, one they sustained throughout a long, comical day in Columbus, and one they still cling to tenaciously in the face of rising national questioning of Tenn-Tom. In fact, their antithetical chant has become even more strident now that economists have identified the flatulent economic procedures used by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, builders of the waterway, to justify the eventual \$4 billion cost to U.S. taxpayers. Meanwhile, a coalition of U.S. senators intent on reducing the federal deficit has demanded cancellation of the canal, and long-withheld evidence has come to light, revealing that the waterway was already obsolete the morning Finch and his followers paraded through Columbus.

But that morning, few people outside the Corps of Engineers, entrenched Southern politicians hand-selected by

the corps, and members of a taxpayer-funded promotional agency for the canal called the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Development Authority, knew of the corps's well-concealed misdeeds: the massive cost overruns, the day-to-day juggling of figures to produce an artificially favorable cost-benefit ratio for the waterway, or secret documents instructing corps officials to lie in congressional testimony and public statements concerning the costs of the canal.

So the characters in the Columbus comedy who brandished placards reading, "God, Motherhood, Apple Pie and Tenn-Tom," today appear more pathetic than prophetic. For years the corps and allied Southern politicians had promised Finch's army of hard hats and the other supporters of the canal that Tenn-Tom would deliver untold riches to their sixteen economically deprived counties in Mississippi and Alabama. If the waterway were cancelled, economic progress would stop dead still and their region would come to resemble the South in its wasteland years following the Civil War. And so it is no surprise, in retrospect, in light of a recent court-ordered disclosure of corps documents on the waterway, that politicians who were willingly choreographed by the corps in Columbus have since enjoyed eventful, if curious, midcareer passages.

■ Bill Burgin, a Mississippi state senator, jumped to his feet when the hearing opened that morning and demanded that no opponents of the waterway be allowed to speak. He reasoned with the moderator that he and 98 percent of the people of Mississippi and Alabama approved of the ditch, and the 2 percent who did not were therefore not entitled to their First Amendment rights. To the consternation of Finch's army, Burgin was overruled. Since the hearing, Burgin has been indicted and convicted of embezzlement, thrown out of the Mississippi Senate, and deserted by his Columbus, Mississippi, law partners.

■ Governor Finch ridiculed opposition to the canal that morning and emphasized the progress brought to the region by the waterway, pointing out twenty new fast-food outlets

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in the Columbus area alone. More than a year after the hearing, Finch's constituents apparently reconsidered his assessment of progress. In his bid to replace retiring Mississippi Senator James Eastland, Finch was overwhelmingly defeated, and the Mississippi Senate seat was won by a Republican for the first time since Reconstruction.

■ Governor Ray Blanton of Tennessee, long a political ally of the corps, joined Finch that morning in trashing opponents of the canal. Blanton was recently forced out of office by a clemency payoff scandal considered by many people in Tennessee to be the most disgraceful episode in their state's history since Braxton Bragg lost Lookout Mountain.

■ Senator John Stennis of Mississippi, another outspoken proponent of the canal, dispatched his very own representative to Columbus that morning. Stennis has yet to comment on published reports of his personal investment of over \$60,000 in two prospective beneficiaries of the waterway: Mississippi Chemical Corporation and First Mississippi Corporation. According to the *Washington Post*, James Eastland also owns \$100,000 worth of stock in Mississippi Chemical, whose founder, Owen Cooper of Yazoo City, is "a close personal friend of President Carter."

And so it was that after more than twenty years of deliberately misleading and deceiving the public, the Corps of Engineers and the Tenn-Tom Waterway Development Authority could briefly enjoy their success in laying those megaditch fantasies on the people. Their victory seemed assured when, only a week later, on April 5, 1977, Bert Lance left a Washington meeting with Finch, Blanton, and others who knew, but didn't care, that the waterway was obsolete, to phone the White House and have the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Project removed from Carter's "hit list" of water projects and reinstated with full federal funding.

Anyone living on the Rondon Line might well believe he was on the moon. . . . Admittedly, there is the telegraph wire, but since it became useless as soon as it was set up, it sags between posts . . . having been either eaten away by termites or destroyed by Indians who mistake the characteristic hum of the telegraph wire for the buzzing of a hive of wild bees . . .

—Lévi-Strauss

THE 79TH CONGRESS, ON JULY 24, 1946, authorized the Corps of Engineers to dig a 170-foot-wide ditch linking the north-flowing Tennessee River to the south-flowing Tombigbee River. On paper, the plan looked simple enough. The small creeks comprising the headwaters of the Tombigbee rose in the hills of northeastern Mississippi, within

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of the Tenn-Tom canal
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win the support of
Southern politicians
for his policies.*

a hundred miles of the Tennessee River. The planners promised that if a trench were cut through those 800-foot-high hills, the upper stretches of the Tombigbee widened, and the river declared navigable to Demopolis, Alabama, then the Tombigbee River would be a year-round navigable waterway from the Tennessee River to the seaport of Mobile, Alabama.

But for more than twenty years following congressional authorization, the Corps of Engineers was unable to justify the construction of the ditch on economic grounds. In fact, the first Tennessee-Tombigbee survey, conducted by Powhatan Robinson, a corps district engineer, exposed the project for the fraud it was:

I must confess that the merits of this enterprise are utterly beyond my comprehension. I can see good sense in spending a small amount of money in improving the high water navigation of the Tombigbee, but this scheme presents nothing but incongruities in every aspect. . . . It has no national character and therefore must rest solely on its merits as an investment. No capitalist would accept it as a gift, on condition that he should keep it in repair.

In 1951 the House Appropriations Committee reached similar conclusions. After questions were raised concerning the width of the proposed ditch and the project's shaky economic justifications, a minor scandal ensued, project funds were revoked, and all further planning for Tenn-Tom was discontinued. Tenn-Tom remained in limbo for sixteen years, forgotten by the government but loyally defended by Deep South politicians who continued to demand its construction.

Probably no other waterway in the history of the nation has been proclaimed valid by the politicians of a region despite so many damaging analyses and unsuccessful economic rejustifications. Deep South political aspirants dangled the promise of Tenn-Tom before the public during every campaign. And over those years, the waterway took on an almost mythical aura in the public imagination. Increasingly, Southern senators, congressmen, and governors invoked the name of "Tenn-Tom" as if it held religious significance, as if it alone held all of the answers to the region's chronic economic stagnancy; as if it were somehow being held hostage or kept from them by mysterious, malicious forces, alien to the South. Their speeches suggested Tenn-Tom was a Southern providential right, its adherents on the side of the redress of economic evils, its detractors allied with the still hostile North. And in 1971, after years of metaphorical incantations had converted the populace, the politicians and the people of the Deep South at last received what they assumed to be their reward.

That year, the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Project was suddenly and unexpectedly resurrected from oblivion by Richard Nixon as a key part of his "Southern Strategy." Realizing the political inexpediency of the Cross-Florida Barge Canal, Nixon consented to the revocation of that project and replaced it with Tenn-Tom. It was one of the most brilliant political maneuvers of Nixon's long career: He immediately brought into his fold, there to remain until the bitter end of his Presidency, an obedient cast of entrenched Southern senators, congressmen, and governors, each of whom would reap the enormous patronage benefits of the waterway and return to Nixon the benefits of his own seniority and bloc votes.

And to the people who lived in the path of the waterway, having been assured they were now to be delivered unto a Holy Land of Riches, one reference to the imminent coming

Newspapers never questioned the tales of many jet boats and great big barge tows that would soon be floating to Mobile.

of Tenn-Tom was sufficient to silence any remaining local curiosity about the moonscape to be made of their region by the ditch. After all, when the waterway was undergoing an earlier, unsuccessful authorization study, the Tenn-Tom Waterway Development Authority had offered northeastern Mississippi as a sacrificial lamb, suggesting that area be vaporized by nuclear excavation in order to create a favorable cost-benefit ratio for construction of the waterway. Now, with Nixon's consent, the ditch was declared economically justifiable, and all that remained for the residents of the area was to wait for barges of gold to materialize on the horizon and float downstream from Tennessee.

While the residents waited, the corps went to work. The entire town of Holcutt, Mississippi, for example, was quickly purchased, evacuated, and totally destroyed. When asked about the disappearance of Holcutt, a corps official explained there was no time scheduled for sentiment. To blunt expected criticism, the Tenn-Tom Waterway Development Authority rapidly churned out press releases grossly inflating benefits to be realized from the ditch, distracting the populace with fantasy stories about jet boats racing effortlessly up and down the future waterway. These releases were reprinted, unedited and without question, by newspapers throughout Mississippi and Alabama. And if the local newspaper readers tired of tales about jet boats, the Waterway Development Authority was ready with even bolder fantasies. It released to the same newspaper, photographs of eighteen- and thirty-barge tows, claiming these tows would also glide along a waterway that, in truth, could nowhere accommodate a tow in excess of eight barges. These photographs, also reproduced by unquestioning newspaper editors, were then offered by local politicians as positive proof of the redemption they were bringing to the region through Tenn-Tom.

The unfortunate inhabitants—left behind by one of those waves of colonization . . . which sweep groups of adventurers or restless, poverty-stricken individuals on a great surge of enthusiasm into the interior and then immediately leave them stranded there, cut off from all contact with the civilized world—developed different forms of madness so as to adapt to their solitary existence...

—Lévi-Strauss

TENN-TOM MAY HAVE BEEN A PR MAN'S dream, but it has always been an economic nightmare. The problem encountered by the Corps of Engineers was basically simple. The Tombigbee River was entirely too narrow north of Demopolis, Alabama, to support any river traffic at all without being dredged out; and the river south of Demopolis could accommodate only small tows. The Tennessee-

Tombigbee Waterway Project, however, deals only with the river north of Demopolis. So when the corps planned to dig a ditch 300 feet wide north of Demopolis—thus defying legislation that had authorized a canal 170 feet wide—it suddenly became apparent that the narrower river south of Demopolis would never be capable of handling the heavy barge traffic that the corps projected to justify the project. If that traffic could not flow uninterrupted from the Tennessee River to Mobile, Alabama, the corps might as well have asked Congress to let them build Tenn-Tom on the moon.

Furthermore, the corps realized that the soaring construction costs would exceed the benefits of their imaginary barge traffic. But the agency saw these costs as figures to manipulate in public. In testimony in the spring of 1974, the corps told Congress the cost of the waterway was \$623 million, and in the summer of 1974 the corps indicated to the Office of Management and Budget and the staff of the House Appropriations Committee that the cost was \$732 million. Privately, however, corps officials acknowledged that the cost had already passed the billion-dollar mark, and some of them began calling for yet another economic reanalysis to project a corresponding increase in waterway benefits.

Richard E. Smith, the area engineer having supervision of Tenn-Tom, addressed the public posture of the corps in a memo on the costs of the project. "I would recommend," he wrote, "we hold the Federal Cost under \$1,000,000,000. Say \$975,000,000. Considering the size of the estimate, \$975 million is no less accurate than \$1 billion and it has less emotional impact."

The internal corps estimate of the cost of Tenn-Tom at that date was \$1159 million. So Smith's instructions were simple enough—lie to the public. Less than a month later, on January 6, 1975, a memo from A. G. Johnson, chief of the budget office for the South Atlantic division, confirmed this strategy. His memo states: "... since we were doing a new economic analysis, we should hold off [reporting] on the big cost increase until an integrated economic report is completed and submitted. . . . The estimate to be used is \$815,000,000."

Although Johnson apparently felt a \$315-million lie could be rationalized if new, fabricated benefits were soon forthcoming, a memo written three days later by the chief of the central budget section further explains the decision to withhold the real cost increases from Congress and the public, and pointedly implicates the corps in fixing arbitrary benefits.

"The underlying need for the study," the memo explains, "is to accurately determine the B/C [benefit/cost] ratio presented to Congress in support of further construction appropriations. . . . Pending completion of both benefit and cost studies, it does not appear prudent to raise one (costs) by nearly \$400 million since last year's Appropriation hearings, while merely escalating benefits."

The reasons for the cost overruns, as well as the internal chaos created by the corps's unauthorized plans for a 300-foot-wide waterway, were revealed in a memo of September 22, 1975, by C. G. White, the head of planning in the South Atlantic division:

"It appears that no Congressional Act has authorized a change for the 170' channel width in the 1946 report. . . . The 1966 study recommended use of an 8-barge tow in a 300' waterway. This document [the 1966 study] is silent on the river below Demopolis. Now, in 1975 we are told that

A secret report had proposed things like juggling the figures and writing off costs to show an impressive return to taxpayers.

another \$60,000,000 is required to permit use of 8-barge tows below Demopolis.

"In 1975 we also are told that 3 bridges below Demopolis will become constraints and require replacement as traffic builds up. This is another \$40,000,000.

"Several conclusions are inescapable; Mobile's report in 1966 did not address a \$100,000,000 channel problem below Demopolis. . . . These costs . . . were buried and unidentified in the projected annual charges."

Having revealed the corps's manner of hiding as much as \$100 million from Congress and the public, White further admitted, "Cutoffs, widening and bridge replacement below Demopolis have no authorization." Obviously, his memo does not explain why unauthorized plans for the waterway were earmarked for "buried and unidentified" funds. But he did go on to rally his troops to immediate and urgent action: ". . . we have one chance to salvage this project. Our time is now and will last for about 60 days. We must take our best shot right now. I am convinced this has not been done. I was keenly aware of this last week when I belatedly perceived that the only benefit estimate being prepared was for a plan that exceeds our authorization."

But while White was making his extraordinary admissions and calling for action, a secret report on the authorization of Tenn-Tom was being prepared by the head of planning for the project in the central office. As curious and criminal as the deception surrounding the cost overruns might have been, this secret report added a new dimension to the situation. One corps insider recently described it as "crazy." And a few selected passages from the report do not prove otherwise.

"The project as authorized provides for a channel with a minimum width of 170 feet . . . and 18 locks to connect the Tennessee and Tombigbee rivers. A supplement to GDM No. 1 [General Design Memorandum Number One], submitted in 1966, recommended that the project be modified to increase the channel width to 300 feet and that the number of locks be reduced to 10. The same supplement also recognized . . . additional locks to be provided at Demopolis and Coffeeville on the Warrior-Tombigbee Waterway. . . . General Counsel indicates they consider the authorization of the 300-foot channel to be 'cloudy.' Since the duplicate locks were not mentioned in the Secretary's approval of the 300-foot channel, their authorization is even more doubtful."

The report then lists various alternatives available to the corps. Of the five alternatives, three suggest the corps proceed to build the waterway. But each of the three contains the phrase "assume authority exists," or "assuming

the width is authorized." Later in the report, apparently from out of the blue, an "Alternative No. 6" is adopted: "Continue construction of the project assuming the Secretary of the Army did not exceed his discretionary authority when he approved the increase in width to 300 feet and seek authorization for the cut-offs below Demopolis and the duplicate locks at Coffeeville and Demopolis. . . . This plan is . . . the plan currently being designed and constructed."

Incredibly, having already recommended that the corps proceed on assumptions, divesting taxpayer funds on hunches of future authorizations, the report then concludes with an even more chilling recommendation: "The problem of continuing construction on a plan without economic justification . . . might be overcome to an extent by considering the funds expended to date as sunk costs. In this regard an estimated \$118,000,000 (\$110,000,000 Federal) having been expended to date on project construction, treating this as a sunk cost the resulting BCR [Benefit/Cost Ratio] would be 1.02." Thus, by juggling the figures and writing off the costs, the corps was able to show an impressive \$1.02 return for every federal dollar spent on Tenn-Tom.

Few outside the bureaucracy were privy to this information, which if revealed would have been disastrous to the corps. In retrospect it is not idle to ask how the corps got away with so many blatant irregularities and indiscretions. But governmental agencies that "assume" their self-perpetuation at taxpayer expense eventually insinuate themselves into so many different layers of the government that their tentacles corrupt everything they touch. And so it was that an audit of the corps and Tenn-Tom, delivered in 1976 to the assistant secretary of the army for civil works and prepared by the Army Audit Agency, was treated as if it were a classified document.

Had that audit been released to the public, the following would then have been known:

- The estimated cost of the project increased by more than \$1071 million (470 percent) from fiscal year 1967 through fiscal year 1976.

- The procedures used by the corps in preparing cost estimates during the early stages of large civil works projects do not provide for the reporting of realistic costs. The fiscal year 1967 estimate of \$229 million for Tenn-Tom was based on a conceptual design unsupported by survey or engineering work.

- According to available records, known cost increases totalling \$344 million were not reported in the fiscal year 1975. The records made available to the Army Audit Agency by the corps showed the costs were not reported in order to protect the project's shaky cost-benefit ratio.

- Other than items already under contract (\$160 million), the validity of cost estimates for the waterway generally could not be verified. Unit prices, lump sum costs, and quantity figures contained in detailed cost estimates were either not referred to source documents or the reasons for using the costs and quantities were not made a part of the official records. The Army Audit Agency was informed it was not the corps's policy to maintain such detailed documentation.

- Although not presently authorized or included in cost estimates, additional locks will be required at Demopolis and Coffeeville, Alabama; and certain sections of the Tombigbee River will have to be widened between Demopolis and Mobile, Alabama. This additional work could increase

the federal cost of the waterway by at least \$214 million.

■ Projected nonfederal participation in funding the waterway may not materialize, and the participation by the states of Mississippi and Alabama could fall short by as much as \$170 million.

But further disappointments would have to be endured before I realized that the sense of time did not exist in the world I was now entering. . . . I was once stuck for a whole week, because one of our mules, or so I was assured, had set off into the campo, first walking sideways, then backwards, to make sure that its rastos (tracks) could not be followed by its pursuers.

—Lévi-Strauss

TO MAKE THE TENNESSEE-TOMBIGBEE Waterway Project irresistible to the Congress, despite uncontrollable costs, the Corps of Engineers commissioned various benefit studies. The principal economic benefit claimed for Tenn-Tom's first year of operation is for navigation—\$86,587,335 out of a total assumed benefit package of \$99,412,335.

The corps based its analysis of benefits on 121 projected navigation movements. It concluded that in 1986, the first year of the waterway's operation, 28 million tons of commerce would move along the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway; of this approximately 70 percent would be strip-mined coal either for export or use in the Southeastern states. One estimate includes coal mined in southern Tennessee. But a recent article in *Coal Week* stated that if coal left that area at the rate predicted by the corps, "all of southern Tennessee's current recoverable reserves would be depleted in 15 years or around the year 2000—well before the end of the 50-year economic life of the canal."

Equally disquieting, the *Washington Post* has already reported that one major shipper, Kentucky Energy Development Company, which the corps claimed would be using the waterway, is out of business and had never produced anywhere near the amount of coal shipments the corps indicated would be forthcoming.

The Alabama Power Company's Greene County plant at Demopolis was to have received over \$20 million in coal shipments out of the \$86 million in benefits claimed by the corps. That coal was to have come from either Shawneetown, Illinois, or Harriman, Tennessee. But the Greene County plant buys coal under long-term contract with mines on the Warrior River north of Demopolis, and the amount of coal that the corps predicted would move to the Greene County plant is more than the plant can burn.

A movement of export coal from Graysville, Tennessee, to Mobile was said to represent \$10 million of the \$86 million in benefits. But documents reveal the movement was not in

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existence when the corps commissioned the study of benefits, and in 1978 the corps learned the shipper was out of business. Even so, the benefits claimed for that company remain in the corps' projected benefits.

These horror stories are representative. Overall, no less than \$60 million of the \$86 million the corps claimed in benefits was invented and nonexistent.

No sooner had he arrived than the Hungarian—who had apparently entered the priesthood to do penance for a wild and stormy youth—had an attack of the kind French colonists call le coup de bambou (tropical madness). Through the walls of the mission, he could be heard insulting his superior who . . . exorcized him with a great many signs of the cross and cries of "Vade retro, Satan!" When the devil had been finally cast out, the Hungarian was put on bread and water for a fortnight—symbolically, at least, since there was no bread at Juruena.

—Lévi-Strauss

The Corps of Engineers, now apparently realizing that its fantasy is threatened, is rushing to dig its ditch faster than ever. For the first time, the corps understands it is faced with the strongest national challenge it has yet to encounter, and from the one sector it could not buy off—the taxpayers. The loyal, docile supporters of the corps in Congress and the federal courts have held the line against all incursions. But even those ranks are thinning. Senator Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin, up in arms over the corps's "deliberate deception" of Congress, has begun mobilizing opposition to what he calls "the biggest pork-barrel boondoggle of them all."

The corps is not an organization that gives up without a fight. It has invested too many years and too many taxpayer dollars in self-perpetuation. All along the Tombigbee, the corps is proceeding with its unauthorized plans for the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway. Dredge barges hit the river banks daily, construction crews assemble at sites with their earthmovers, and by staying ahead of its Tenn-Tom critics, the corps intends to present a *fait accompli* of federal dollars spent and wasted as an excuse to build the obsolete waterway.

A federal court challenge to Tenn-Tom was recently dismissed, on grounds similar to the corps's *fait accompli* defense, by a Mississippi federal judge who had been appointed, nominated, and confirmed under the patronage of Senator John Stennis, one of the waterway's most powerful supporters. And it is feared that unless there is broad national support, a bill scheduled for introduction by Senator Nelson might suffer the same fate. Nelson's bill would sink the corps' dredges once and for all.

There are many viable alternatives to constructing the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Project. The most obvious is to stop the project now, restore as much of the Tombigbee River as can still be salvaged, and thereby save the taxpayers \$4 billion. But that will not be easy; the corps is as defiant as its supporters in Congress and the compliant politicians it manipulated that long-ago day in Columbus when the corps turned a public hearing into an extravaganza worthy of Disney Enterprises.

Indeed, if the abolition of the corps should prove politically impossible, then the U.S. government ought to proceed at once to donate the Army Corps of Engineers to Walt Disney Enterprises. There in the Fantasy Land of Disney World, cut off from their purchases of politicians, the destruction of homes and rivers and streams, the corps could take out its myriad designs for the old, obsolete Tenn-Tom, and with eyes cast resolutely on the heavens, wish with harmless abandon on any star. □

KENNEDY ASSASSINATION COVER-UP

By PETER DALE SCOTT

November 25, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MOYERS

It is important that all of the facts surrounding President Kennedy's Assassination be made public in a way which will satisfy people in the United States and abroad that all the facts have been told and that a statement to this effect be made now.

1. The public must be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin; that he did not have confederates who are still at large; and that the evidence was such that he would have been convicted at trial.

2. Speculation about Oswald's motivation ought to be cut off, and we should have some basis for rebutting thought that this was a Communist conspiracy or (as the Iron Curtain press is saying) a right-wing conspiracy to blame it on the Communists. Unfortunately the facts on Oswald seem about too pat--too obvious (Marxist, Cuba, Russian wife, etc.). The Dallas police have put out statements on the Communist conspiracy theory, and it was they who were in charge when he was shot and thus silenced.

3. The matter has been handled thus far with neither dignity nor conviction. Facts have been mixed with rumour and speculation. We can scarcely let the world see us totally in the image of the Dallas police when our President is murdered.

I think this objective may be satisfied by making public as soon as possible a complete and thorough FBI report on Oswald and the assassination. This may run into the difficulty of pointing to inconsistencies between this report and statements by Dallas police officials. But the reputation of the Bureau is such that it may do the whole job.

The only other step would be the appointment of a Presidential Commission of unimpeachable personnel to review and examine the evidence and announce its conclusions. This has both advantages and disadvantages. It think it can await publication of the FBI report and public reaction to it here and abroad.

I think, however, that a statement that all the facts will be made public property in an orderly and responsible way should be made now. We need something to head off public speculation or Congressional hearings of the wrong sort.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Deputy Attorney General

The House Assassinations Committee has shown that at least two gunmen fired at President Kennedy in Dallas. Why then did the FBI and CIA push so vigorously for the lone-nut theory?

ONE WEEK AFTER THE announcement by the House Select Committee on Assassinations that at least two gunmen had shot at President Kennedy in Dealey Plaza, the nation's leading establishment newspa-

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