

with the Soviets, such as the 1957 Snagov memorandum. Secret diplomacy can only limit Yugoslavia's freedom of action, and that is exactly what the Soviets want.

Belgrade's diplomacy of the seventies was rather at odds with Mićunović's prescriptions. But the publicity afforded to his views is only partially a corrective. The blurring of the differences with Moscow, however dangerous, is not a mere blunder. It has systemic roots. Whatever his intentions, Mićunović's most subtle criticisms of Belgrade's policy are elliptic. He records without comment Khrushchev's baiting of Yugoslav democracy and decentralization. It must have occurred to him that the case for the superiority of the Yugoslav system was precarious as long as Khrushchev could offer his sarcastic congratulations on Belgrade's handling of Djilas and other dissidents.

Mićunović certainly perceives that more democracy and decentralization is the best defense against attempts to reclaim Yugoslavia for the socialist camp, but this still does not mean that he sees any identity of purpose with the West. For one thing, he believes that Washington is not troubled with Soviet power behavior. The State Department finds it perfectly natural that the USSR should dominate its various clients. More important, Washington also thinks in bloc terms. American policy towards Yugoslavia is determined by Belgrade's relations to Moscow. The myopia of this approach should be obvious to the reader. It becomes intolerable when it actually hinders Yugoslavia's internal democratization.

It would be fair to say that most of the personalities, movements, and minority nationalities of Iran that have dominated the headlines since the summer of 1978 were at that time unknown to the American public. This is not simply because the shah wished to focus all attention on himself, because his opponents preferred obscurity, or because the CIA was "leashed." Rather, the only aspect of Iranian policy, besides the flow of oil, that mattered to official Washington (and therefore to the American media) was the shah's stand toward the USSR. Similarly, it is characteristic that the only question about post-Tito Yugoslavia that is ever raised in the West is whether or not Moscow will succeed in reimposing its hegemony on Tito's successors. Yet, surely the answer to this question depends on a careful appraisal of internal developments. Foreign policy cannot be willed. It is an aspect of the

domestic situation.

It is a pity therefore that Mićunović decided to shorten the translated version of his diary by "making further cuts in an effort to relieve the non-Yugoslav reader of details which, in a narrower sense, concern only Yugoslav policy or what was happening in that connection in Yugoslav-Soviet relations twenty years ago." In fact, some of the excluded sections deal more with American than with Yugoslav policy. It would have been useful for American readers, for instance, to familiarize themselves with Khrushchev's belief that Washington "fully understood" the need for Soviet intervention in Hungary. The translation by David Floyd is excellent, although he often simplifies colorful idiomatic phrases. His introduction and that of George Kennan are not particularly enlightening. Like Agatha Christie's Captain Hastings, they have a talent for pointing out the obvious. □

**THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH INDUSTRIALISM: THE FAMILY, PROPERTY AND SOCIAL TRANSITION,**  
by Alan Macfarlane. Cambridge University Press, 232 pp., \$19.95 (hardback), \$6.95 (paperback).


## Freedom and freeholders

R. M. HARTWELL

**T**HIS IS AN INTERESTING and provocative book, not as original as the author claims (other historians have viewed the origins of the industrial revolution in long-term perspective), more polemical than necessary to advance the strong thesis it does (practically the whole of the economic and social history profession is castigated), but, nevertheless, a book that challenges orthodoxies and attempts to solve big historical problems. Macfarlane is a historian and anthropologist with an established reputation in

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both fields and with a formidable list of publications about that period of English history between the late sixteenth and mid-eighteenth centuries. He is concerned with what I call "very long-term growth" as explaining England's "great discontinuity," the industrial revolution. Four problems, Macfarlane declares, "lie behind" his book: "Why did the industrial revolution occur first in England? When did England start to be different from other parts of Europe? In what, principally, did the difference consist? How far is the history of the English transformation a useful analogy for contemporary Third World societies?"

The first three related questions Macfarlane answers by arguing that "individualism" arose earlier in England than elsewhere in Europe, that individualism manifested itself in the early establishment of individual property rights in land and hence in the absence of a peasantry, and that individualism resulted finally in industrialization. The fourth question is never tackled seriously, but Macfarlane argues, toward the end of his book, that the long and unique history of English individualism offers a not very helpful or hopeful lesson for the Third World.

Macfarlane's basic thesis is that "a central and basic feature of English so-

cial structure has for long been the stress on the rights of the individual as against the wider group or the state." Individualism is defined as "the view that society is constituted of autonomous, equal units, namely separate individuals, and

dustrial revolution and the long history of "individualism" in English history—I am in broad agreement with Macfarlane. However, he "proves" neither the long history of individualism, which at least he attempts to do, nor the essential

## Macfarlane's chronology shifts the origins of capitalism back to well before the Black Death.

that such individuals are more important, ultimately, than any larger constituent group. It is reflected in the concept of private property, in the political and legal liberty of the individual, in the idea of the individual's direct communication with God." This is a definition of classical liberalism after the manner of J. S. Mill or F. A. Hayek, and not one I would quarrel with.

For the particular purpose of this book, however, Macfarlane argues that the essential proof of the existence of individualism in England is the absence of a peasantry; also that the proof of the absence of a peasantry is the existence of individual property rights in land, the frequent alienation of land outside of the family, and the existence of a large number of landless laborers. On the basis of good evidence dating back to 1500, and shaky evidence dating back to 1200, Macfarlane "proves" that the English small landholders had been buying and selling land, enlarging and decreasing estates, and passing them on at death to successors of their own choice without necessary regard for the family as a social unit. It follows, he argues, that the conventional chronology of English social and economic history, with its turning point from "feudalism" to "capitalism" in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, is incorrect. And so, Macfarlane asserts, not only are historians like Postan, Homans, Hilton, Tawney, Hill, Pocock, and Stone wrong, but the great system-builders of the past, Marx and Weber, are too. The author shifts "the origins of capitalism back to well before the Black Death" and argues that "both historians and sociologists have largely misinterpreted the basic nature of English social structure between the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries." There was no obvious break in English history after 1200 until the industrial revolution.


On the two general theses—the importance of "individualism" for the in-

relationship between individualism and industrialization. The latter problem, indeed, he completely ignores, except for a single generalization with which he presumably agrees: "A number of social historians have realized that English property rights were at the heart of much that is special about England, particularly in relation to industrialization."

**I**NDIVIDUALISM IS SEEN BY Macfarlane almost entirely in terms of individual property rights in land by small landowners, in contrast with the communal or familial property rights which he regards as the stereotype characteristic of a peasantry. His definition of peasantry, however, is drawn largely from anthropological literature, the ideal being the peasantry of Russia and Poland in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Since England diverged from this ideal early in her history, England was individualistic from that point on. This is too simple a thesis, both about peasants and about individualism. The criteria for both notions are too sharply delineated and too crudely applied. There is, in the discussion about the English "peasantry," or lack of it, nothing about the common fields or about the wide variety of field systems; little about the development of agricultural markets; and nothing about the agricultural revolution.

Again, although there is evidence enough of the comparative freedom of the English "peasant" from family obligations, there is also convincing evidence up to and beyond the fourteenth century of real constraints (for example, with "unfree tenures") on the use and disposal of land. If the historians criticized by Macfarlane place too much emphasis on familial constraints, Macfarlane places too little on both familial and feudal constraints. Property rights, even in the freest societies, are seldom

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absolute, and the history of property rights in land in England is one of gradual deattenuation, from as early as 1200, as Macfarlane shows; but it is not one of some dramatic but undated reconstruction of rights at some time before 1200, as he implies.

Also important is Macfarlane's failure to relate individualism operationally to economic change: There is no attempt, for example, to show how individual property rights in land increased the ability to innovate and to take advantage of, or create, economic opportunities. It is curious, also, that no reference is made to the now large body of literature on the economics of property rights. Nor is there a reference to North and Thomas's theory of institutional change and their well-worked out, if controversial, interpretation of European (including English) economic history in terms of the changing structure of property rights.

Macfarlane is right, I think, to stress individualism; but it was, more generally, the political and legal framework of English society that largely determined its economic history. The early establishment in England of a society whose government and laws allowed much greater individual freedom than elsewhere in Europe made possible an earlier economic growth that culminated in the industrial revolution. The reasons for this greater freedom lie deep in English history, in a complex combination of historical factors long in the making: a common law that finally absorbed the law merchant and was more flexible than civil law; a history of strong local government and of towns that early established their independence from feudal authority; the early establishment of national unity and, hence, of a national market; a large urban population of industrialists, merchants, and artisans, who were relatively uninhibited by religious constraints on the accumulation of wealth; and, finally, as Macfarlane emphasizes, the absence of a peasantry. Growth and industrialization were not the product of one freedom (the freedom to dispose of land) but of a variety of freedoms (political, social, intellectual, cultural, economic, and religious) which released men from the bonds of custom and legal controls, and allowed the remarkable economic expansion of the eighteenth century.

In charting the growth of individualism, however, Macfarlane is right to point to its early origins but wrong to imply that all was set for industrialization as early as 1200. If individualism

leads to industrialization, and if individualism existed in England in 1200, why then was industrialization so slow in coming? It is difficult, on the basis of other evidence, not to come back to the conventional chronology of development, with a build-up of freedoms from the early seventeenth century.

**T**HERE ARE OTHER IMPORTANT omissions in Macfarlane's book; in particular, there is no discussion about the role of the state. The early establishment in England of a unified state—with a common currency, common weights and measures, and freedom from internal customs barriers—provided the essential political framework, within the rule of law, for the free exercise of property rights. The civil war finally abolished the threat of arbitrary government, marking the evolution, as David Hume put it, from "a government of will to a government of law." There is nothing, also, on scientific and technological change, without which industrialization could not have occurred in the way it did, and very little on the religious changes that stemmed from the Reformation and which led to a revision of values and attitudes toward individualism. Nor is there anything on social, political, and economic thought beyond an odd mention of Locke and Smith. There is nothing, for example, on the origins of scientific economics and the political arithmeticians of the seventeenth century. Finally, there is no attempt to differentiate between "capitalism" and "industrialization," so that there is a blurring of intellectual and chronological distinctions. In this work, individualism is related to capitalism, but without analysis; and capitalism is related to industrialization, again without analysis.

In other words, Macfarlane's history is far too simple to be convincing. He is rather like the early growth theorists who assumed that capital, and capital alone, was the key to economic development. Capital would produce growth whatever the legal, institutional, educational, cultural, religious, and political context. And we all know what disasters followed from this prescription. Individualism, as Macfarlane uses it, is too vague a concept with too large a responsibility. Freedom is a better word; it can be understood more easily, and it explains more. What is needed, to make sense of the industrial revolution and modern economic growth of England, is a book on "the development of English freedoms."

**CULTURE AND ANARCHY IN IRELAND 1890–1939, by F. S. L. Lyons. Oxford University Press, 177 pp., \$14.95.**

## An intimate island

JOHN P. MCCARTHY

**T**HE PROVOST OF TRINITY College, Dublin, F. S. L. Lyons, is undoubtedly the outstanding authority on the past century of Irish history. The title of his Ford Lectures, delivered at Oxford in 1978, is a play on Matthew Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy*. Arnold viewed culture as leading society to "sweetness and light" and saving it from the anarchy fostered by middle-class Philistines and individualists preoccupied with "doing what one likes." It is the opposite in Ireland, Lyons suggests, where culture—or more specifically the rivalry of four different cultures: English, Anglo-Irish, Gaelic-Catholic, and Ulster Protestant—has been responsible for anarchy or lack of political consensus.

In the Victorian age English culture had become dominant in Ireland for a number of reasons: the colonial destruction of the Gaelic social order during the previous 250 years; the devastation of the Gaelic areas by starvation and emigration during the Irish famine of 1845–49; the penetration by English industrialism—or at least its products and marketing; and the advocacy of English-speaking as a path to advancement, by both the Catholic church and the Catholic (and utilitarian) political leader Daniel O'Connell.

Paradoxically, Irish national movements, whether constitutional, like those of O'Connell (1823–47) and Parnell (1877–90) seeking a local Irish parliament to be granted by Westminster; or revolutionary, like the United Irishmen (1798), the Young Irelanders (1848), or the Fenians (1867) seeking a separatist Irish republic by violence, all tended to be culturally English in terms of language, ideas, and types of institutions advocated. Perhaps the major stimulus

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