tion. But the White House also saw the imbroglio as a God-sent opportunity to tar the liberal press, the peace movement, and the Democratic Party with the "villain" Ellsberg. Ehrlichman's notes from a meeting with the president on June 17 include the line, "Win PR, not just the court case."

Put in charge of that effort, Ehrlichman established a team headed by David Young and Egil Krogh, Jr., known officially as the Special Investigations Unit, informally as "the Plumbers." The team asked the CIA for a psychological profile on Ellsberg's vulnerabilities, but the agency's first effort was so bland as to be useless. Clearly the Plumbers needed the raw data in Dr. Fieldings' files. Late in July, the FBI sought to question Fielding, who declined to violate his confidential doctor-patient relationship. Shortly thereafter, Krogh, Young, and two of their new investigators—Howard Hunt and Gordon Liddy—discussed a "bag job" on the psychiatrist's office. What happened next is amply documented by memoranda now in the public record, but never even mentioned in Ehrlichman's account.

In a memo to Ehrlichman on August 11, Krogh and Young wrote, "We would recommend that a covert operation be undertaken to examine all the medical files still held by Ellsberg's psychoanalyst." The memo left spaces for Ehrlichman to "approve" or "disapprove." Ehrlichman initialed "approve," adding "if done under your assurance that it is not traceable."

On August 27, Ehrlichman wrote Chuck Colson, "On the assumption that the proposed undertaking by Hunt and Liddy would be carried out and would be successful, I would appreciate receiving from you by next Wednesday a game plan as to how and when you believe the materials should be used."

Can one possibly believe that at this point Ehrlichman did not know the nature of the Hunt-Liddy operation? The FBI had already asked Fielding for his cooperation. He had refused. The material the Plumbers wanted lay in Fielding's files. Obviously Hunt and Liddy were going in to get it. Ehrlichman's protestations of innocence strike me as sheer flimflammery.

There is at least one of his stories I do believe. On April 27, 1973—two days before he resigned—Ehrlichman accompanied the president to Meridian, Mississippi. During the trip, he went up to the flight deck. "As I stood there," he recalls, "I was taken with the realization that I could end everyone's troubles by throwing myself against the controls, wedging myself between the pilot's control yoke and the pilot. We'd all be gone in about a minute and a half."

In an administration suffering from an apocalyptic death wish—and quite prepared to bring the rest of the country down with it—*that* has the ring of truth.

PAWNS OF YALTA: Soviet Refugees and America's Role in Their Repatriation, by Mark R. Elliott. University of Illinois Press, 301 pp., $17.95.

The last secret

NIKOLAI TOLSTOY

*PROFESSOR ELLIOTT'S A*chievement is immense. A glance at his twenty-five pages of bibliography shows how widely and comprehensively his researches have ranged. He has combed national and private record centers with exemplary industry, and has deeply studied the American and Soviet published literature. Among other fascinating detective-work, he shows that Soviet literature after Stalin, which began grudgingly to acknowledge that vast numbers of Soviet citizens fell into German hands and returned, contains a significant blank regarding the time between 1945 and 1955 (when Khrushchev issued an "amnesty" to survivors in camps and prisons). Finally, when the fact *was* publicly accepted, it was combined with the absurd claim that the millions of Soviet citizens in the Reich constituted a (perhaps *the*) major European resistance group. The indisputable fact that, partly despite and partly because of German brutality, nearly 1 million Russians (most of them under the command of Lieutenant General Andrei Vlasov) actually joined the German war effort is something the Soviet Union has never dared admit. But it is not enough to state the bare outlines of Soviet shifts in attitude, and Professor Elliott provides us with an admirably full excursus.

Important though all this is, however, it tells us little that we could not guess if we wished. The Soviet regime came into existence and survived only by the consistent and continual practice of terror. The repatriates were subjected to a terrible fate, but it was more terrible only in degree than that of the Soviet citizens who stayed behind. What is really fascinating are the motives and reactions of the American statesmen and soldiers who joined with their British allies in handing over more than 2 million "Russians" (including a high proportion of Ukrainians, Turkomans, etc.) to a dictator whose barbarities had only been rivaled while Hitler lived.

Thousands were indiscriminately massacred (at times in the presence of U.S. troops), others were subjected to brutalities of which actual torture was a regular component, and hundreds of thousands were driven off into the slavery of the camps. There is no avoiding the fact of British and American complicity in this mass purge, which tragically sullied the last days of a crusade that in other respects really had been one of light against darkness. The responsibility cannot be avoided, and it is the historian's delicate task to apportion it as meticulously as possible.

My own researches revealed a pronounced difference between British and U.S. attitudes. The moment the question of the use of force against reluctant Russian returnees arose in the spring of 1944, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and his officials adopted the policy with unqualified enthusiasm. They never attempted to bargain with the Soviets, never expressed regrets over the inhumanity or the illegality of the measure, never attempted to mitigate the suffering involved, and never wished to see the policy ended.

As if this were not enough, the British Foreign Office encouraged or countenanced brutal treatment of women and children, and tolerated on occasion actual murders committed in the West by representatives of SMERSH (the Russian counterspy organization) in the Soviet Repatria-

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tion Commission. Perhaps worst of all was the independent conspiracy engineered by Harold Macmillan in Austria, when between 2000 and 3000 high-ranking tsarist officers were surrendered to SMERSH, despite the fact that they had never been Soviet citizens and were not covered by the Yalta Agreement. They were predictably hanged in Moscow (or they died in labor camps north of the Arctic Circle).

The Foreign Office permanent officials included men like Sir Geoffrey Wilson (now chairman of the international Oxfam charity), who was an uncritical admirer of Stalin and NKVD (the Soviet secret police) rule in the USSR. The evidence is strong from their own minutes and letters that they regarded their task as congenial and fulfilling. No amount of eyewitness accounts of appalling massacres at Murmansk, Odessa, and elsewhere shook their resolve, and never since have they been known to express any regret.

Naturally, the picture is not entirely black and white. Prominent figures like Churchill himself, Lord Selborne, and Field Marshal Harold Alexander were distressed by what was happening and in varying degree attempted to mitigate the harshness of the policy. The troops called on to perform their unmilitary task were almost unanimous in regarding it with revulsion. But their resistance was largely in vain, and the operations continued for nearly three years. It is a shabby story, almost universally condemned in Britain today.

The American story, as I saw it, presented many contrasts. So far as I knew, the Americans never contemplated the use of violence against women and children, or the illegal handing over of White Russians. They appeared to have entered upon the policy with great reluctance, and amid much high-placed opposition. Despite this they *did* decide on force, and employed it in a number of very ugly incidents: at Fort Dix in the United States, and at Kempten, Dachau, and Plattling in occupied Germany. These I documented in detail, but what struck me as forcibly as the brutality involved was the disgust it aroused: amongst the soldiers, predictably, but also within the State and War Departments and in Macmillan's counterparts among the Americans in Europe, Alexander C. Kirk and Robert D. Murphy. The Russians' rights under international law, totally discounted by the British, were a matter of serious concern to American statesmen such as Joseph C. Grew and Henry L. Stimson.

Muddled, ill-informed, unscrupulous on occasion, American policy was nonetheless rarely deliberately bloody-minded or even enthusiastic.



American ignorance of European concerns, a subject of regular derision on the part of British functionaries, played a significant part in their agreement to the repatriation. British commitment to the use of force was decided in September 1944, long before Yalta. In contrast the Americans signed the agreement at Yalta seemingly without being aware that it implied coercion. Despite this they came to accept the British interpretation and undoubtedly sent thousands of helpless people to death or indescribable suffering. But again it must be said that opposition was vociferous at all levels, and virtually every bloody incident aroused major reappraisals of the entire policy.

Muddled, ill-informed, unscrupulous on occasion, U.S. policy was nonetheless rarely deliberately bloody-minded or even enthusiastic. Many will consider it to have been shameful enough, but it cannot be compared for sheer insensitivity and even malice with the British record.

SUCH WERE MY TENTATIVE conclusions, and I was filled with curiosity to see how Professor Elliott's researches would, as he once claimed, come to refute them. I was surprised, therefore, to find that in the main his evidence strongly confirmed the mitigating features of U.S. policy. The opposition of Henry Stimson and Francis Biddle was unknown to me, and the degree of muddle was even greater than I had suspected. He uncovered no new evidence of brutali-

ties beyond those I had already documented. In what way then was American policy so much worse than I had described?

Here one is reluctantly compelled to note that Professor Elliott's admirable achievement is seriously flawed. He claims that from an early date Generals George C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and John Deane "agreed to Moscow's insistence upon forced repatriation," and that when Deane signed the Yalta Agreement on February 11, 1945, he was aware that it implied the use of force, despite the fact that its text nowhere alludes to that delicate issue. For this assertion, which flies in the face of all the evidence, Elliott cites no references whatever beyond Eisenhower's December 1944 plea that "the only complete solution to this problem from all points of view is the early repatriation of these Russians." But Elliott is unconsciously employing hindsight here: Eisenhower did not as yet appreciate that force might be necessary. Until evidence to the contrary can be produced, the only possible assumption (confirmed by Charles E. Bohlen, the veteran foreign-service officer who eventually became ambassador to Russia) is that the U.S. signatory at Yalta was *not* aware that the agreement involved the use of force. This view has recently been confirmed by Averell Harriman, who says of the Yalta Agreement: "I don't think it ever occurred to anyone on our side that the Russians would refuse to return home because they had good reason to suspect that they would be sent to their deaths or to prison camps. . . . Nothing in the Soviet-Allied agreement required the U.S. and British commanders to repatriate Soviet soldiers against their will." In any case Elliott himself in a later section of his book flatly contradicts his earlier claim, writing that "General Deane . . . signed the Yalta repatriation accord without realizing the sentence he was imposing upon millions of Soviet nationals."

The fact is that at the time of Yalta the Americans had not yet committed themselves to the use of force, nor were they fully aware that such a contingency existed on any large scale. It was in the coming months that they half-heartedly, gradually, guiltily undertook the commitment they literally had not bargained for. It was then they found themselves embroiled in the shameful and bloody episodes mentioned earlier. These resulted in an abrupt stop to the program, which took up its shabby culmination in the so-called McNarney-Clark Directive, whereby only male Soviet citizens in German uniform who had provided material aid to the enemy were held liable for return.

It is often forgotten today how Britain's traditional world role and greater experience affected the U.S. during World War II.

Elliott effectively castigates U.S. failure to drive a harder bargain with the Soviets, the lack of moral principle involved in forced repatriation, and the childish gullibility of many officials in the face of Soviet cruelty and rapacity. Unfortunately, however, he presents an overall picture that is seriously distorted, since U.S. participation in Stalin's purge of the (largely involuntary) Soviet expatriates was almost entirely based on ignorance of Soviet realities, faulty diplomacy, and a general failure to understand the issue's implications. For a policy that caused so much suffering, ill will and premeditated inhumanity played a remarkably negligible part.

The most serious flaw in Elliott's work, however, is not the degree of minor factual error, but of massive omission. Presumably because he felt I had covered British participation fully in *The Secret Betrayal,* he confines his story to the American record. There would clearly be no point in repeating at length what is set down elsewhere. But it is not possible to understand American actions without a full grasp of British policy. British intransigence Elliott dismisses in a few passing sentences inadequate to its enormous influence on U.S. policy.

It is often forgotten today how Britain's traditional world role and greater experience impressed and affected the United States during World War II, particularly in the fields of diplomacy and intelligence. On forced repatriation the Foreign Office held rigid views that it was determined to enjoin on the Americans. By preempting the decision to use force they placed the Americans in a position where it was difficult not to follow suit. Russians captured or liberated in France by U.S. troops were being repatriated to the USSR by the British through Egypt and Iraq long before there had been any U.S. decision.

At Yalta it was largely British pressure that resulted in the Americans' agreeing to a separate but identical document containing no provisions for protection of the repatriates from ill treatment on return. British pressure, directed by the Foreign Office, continued up to the end unremitting in its efforts to induce the Americans to join in maximum cooperation with the Soviet Union until the last fugitive—man, woman, and child—had been safely handed over.

Finally, Elliott notes critically that "the United States still stuck to the policy as long as the British." This is true so far as it goes, but he has evidently overlooked Thomas Brimelow's claim, made at the British Foreign Office in January 1946, that the Americans only agreed to resume operations "under British pressure." Brimelow may have been wrong or exaggerating, but the historian of America's repatriation policy cannot afford to ignore such indications.

IMBALANCE IS THUS THE serious weakness of this otherwise admirable book. In discussing the fate of the Russians after their return, for instance, Elliott gives a very full and fascinating account of Soviet suppression and distortion of news of the event. But he virtually ignores the voluminous first-hand émigré accounts, which are far more important since they describe what *did* happen. Possibly, again, this was because I had made full use of these memoirs, but a summary at least would not have gone amiss. Much more startling is his almost total failure to obtain information from survivors of the events, thousands of whom are still living. His list of interviewees comprises six names, three of which are anonymous and one his own. Why no first-hand accounts from Harriman, Bohlen, George Kennan, Mark Clark, Robert

Murphy, or other surviving highly-placed officials and generals? What of the numerous senior Vlasovite figures living in the States, or defecting Soviet figures? By ignoring such invaluable sources Elliott not only deprived himself of unique testimony, much of it now irretrievably lost, but also inevitably produced a rather colorless account, much affected by hindsight and providing scant impression of the reality of life in the terrible turmoil of 1945.

With all these strictures, however, there is no question but that Elliot has made an invaluable contribution to the study of an enormously important historical event. Whatever else comes to be written on the subject, historians from now on possess the first fully documented account of American policy, one that is essential reading and unlikely to be superseded.

STALIN'S AMERICAN POLICY: From Entente to Détente to Cold War, by William Taubman. W. W. Norton, 291 pp., $18.95.

Cold War origins

WALTER LAFEBER

WITH HIS USUAL MODESTY, Dean Acheson entitled his memoirs of U.S. foreign policy between 1941 and 1953 *Present at the Creation.* Those years ushered in the Cold War era that has distorted, corrupted, and nearly bankrupted American, if not international, society. The stumbling stupidity of the Reagan-Haig-Weinberger foreign attitudes (they have yet to reach the stature of policies) is a simple extension of the Acheson-Truman world view. That world view climaxed in early 1950 with a strategic plan, NSC-68, aimed at overthrowing the Soviet "totalitariat" and quadrupling U.S. military spending.

William Taubman, a professor of political science at Amherst, argues that in similar fashion Leonid Brezhnev's Cold War policies are closely linked to those of Joseph Stalin; or, as Taubman ends his book, "a true meeting of the minds [between the United States and the USSR] must await the day when it can no longer be said as it can today—Stalin's American policy lives!"

The revisionists undercut much of what Taubman writes about Soviet-American relations.

This could be a useful insight if the volume precisely analyzed either Stalin or his American policy, or if it offered a consistent interpretation that opened new insights. Instead, this is another extended essay on the Cold War's origins, one more reconnaissance mission to discover a middle way through the ideological mine-field that has on one side the "orthodox" historians, who largely accept State Department explanations (yes, such people still exist), and on the other side "revisionists," who are critical of U.S. policy. Taubman, however, is not certain about who his targets are in the revisionist trenches. He zeroes in on Gar Alperovitz's *Atomic Diplomacy* and destroys Alperovitz's argument that it was Harry Truman's toughness (and ignorance) that triggered the Cold War. Taubman never understands that other revisionists, especially William Appleman Williams, Gabriel Kolko, and Lloyd Gardner, rejected Alperovitz's thesis—and nailed Franklin D. Roosevelt with much of the blame—more than a decade ago. They also undercut much of the story that Taubman tells about relations between the United States and the USSR in the 1940s.

In his journey through the mine-field, Taubman exemplifies Robert Frost's dictum that the middle of the road is, after all, the most dangerous place to walk. The political scientist, unlike the poet, wants to have it every way. When Stalin is a tough bargainer on German issues he is being voracious, but when he is accommodating he is only shrewdly biding his time. The most important word in this book is "but." In the summary pages, nearly every assessment of Soviet policy is followed by a quick return to the white line in the middle ("the old ideology is dead.... But ideology also contributes ... to making genuine accommodation an unreasonable subject for Soviet diplomacy"). The priorities, the considered ranking of what was most important in Stalin's diplomacy, is lost. The reader sympathizes with Truman's complaint that he needed one-handed advisers to spare him from the liberal liturgy of "on the one hand... but on the other...."

There are two reasons why such hedging continues to plague Cold War literature. First, Soviet perspectives, including Stalin's view of the past, are often ignored. George Kennan set the bad example when, in his Mr. "X" article of 1947 that outlined the containment policy, he somehow forgot to mention that Russian fear and mistrust of the West might be related to the thousands of U.S., British, French, and Japanese troops who invaded and occupied parts of the Soviet Union between 1918 and 1920, or might have something to do with the Anglo-French attempt (especially at Munich in 1938) to turn Hitler's armored divisions eastward. Roosevelt went along with that Anglo-French policy until he saw that the Munich agreement would not work, but then it was too late. Stalin drew his own conclusions and made a deal with Hitler to carve up Eastern Europe. Taubman discusses the deal, but he never analyzes either the West's actions that led up to it, or even Stalin's public statements in 1938 and 1939 blasting capitalist diplomacy for appeasement.

It is striking that in discussing Stalin's assumptions the author never deals with the most important American debate on the subject. In 1946 and 1947 Kennan argued that since misguided Marxist ideology and Stalin's (and his inner circle's) selfish sense of self-preservation paralyzed Soviet policy, negotiations were of little use. Walter Lippmann attacked Kennan by reasoning that historic Russian insecurity and a necessary reliance on military power shaped Stalin's policy. Lippman concluded that negotiations could deal with the insecurity and result in a mutual withdrawal of troops from Central Europe. (Kennan later admitted that Lippman was correct and that negotiations should have been attempted.) There

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