

JACKSON, FULBRIGHT AND THE SENATORIAL CRITIQUE OF DÉTENTE

By Gary Bullert

During the last twenty years, three major figures who pivotally influenced the conduct of American foreign policy are Senator J. William Fulbright, Senator Henry Jackson, and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. They advocated conflicting synoptic approaches to foreign policy which collided over the merits of détente. Regardless of the terminology employed, these three perspectives still provide the locus for the current debate over American foreign policy. As chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee until 1974, Fulbright skillfully utilized his strategic position in order to orchestrate opposition to the Vietnam War. In addition to providing a respected alternative voice for the media, Fulbright authored best-selling books, ie. *The Arrogance of Power* (1966) and *The Crippled Giant* (1972). He was both a product of and a spokesman for the adversarial journalistic-academic community. Senator Jackson was voted 'the most influential Senator' by his colleagues. He served as chairman of the Senate Arms Services Subcommittee on Arms Control which offered a forum for attacks on détente. Jackson's influence also centered within the defense bureaucracy in Washington D.C. His foreign policy outlook exerted a potent influence during the Reagan Administration, particularly through his former associates, Jeane Kirkpatrick and Richard Perle. In his memoirs, Kissinger acknowledged how formidable an opponent Jackson proved to be. As one of the few survivors of Watergate, a testimony to his considerable political skills, Kissinger is credited with fashioning a novel approach to American foreign policy appropriate to its inevitable role as imperial power.

While both Fulbright and Jackson were Democrats who co-existed in the Senate for over twenty years, their backgrounds and political outlooks spurred repeated clashes. Fulbright was a Southerner who defended segregation; Jackson staunchly supported the Civil Rights movement and organized labor. Fulbright remained a relentless critic of Israeli foreign policy while Jackson was one of its most ardent champions. On the Vietnam War, SALT I., various military appropriations, human rights

policy, Soviet trade, and the viability of the United Nations, Jackson and Fulbright were bitter rivals. Fulbright called him 'the Senator from Boeing' in a Senatorial debate. Both were insulated from serious electoral challenges for most of their careers which enabled them to exercise candor on divisive foreign policy issues. Jackson's outspokenness was tempered only by his aborted efforts to win the Democratic Presidential nomination in 1972 and 1976. However, the Democratic Party had been captured by leftist activists for whom Jackson's foreign policy was extremely unpalatable.

I

On September 19 1974, Secretary of State Kissinger appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and formulated his most detailed explanation of detente. He acknowledged that there existed "profound differences with the Soviet Union — in our values, our methods, our visions of the future." These differences required simultaneously maintaining a strong national defense and an imperative need to develop a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. The Cold War era of competition must be replaced by cooperation. To pursue peace exclusively would lead to strategic surrender while unrestrained rivalry would result in nuclear holocaust. Kissinger endeavored to waylay opponents of détente by posturing his policy as the only realistic alternative to these unacceptable options.

American efforts should be directed at encouraging a relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union through a "carrot and stick" approach. The Soviet Union could be incorporated into a new international order which promoted stability and mutual restraint, accepting the Soviet Union as a status quo power. The inducements would consist of cooperation in science and technology, opening up trade on a most favored nation basis, limiting strategic weapons competition, adopting treaties legitimating Soviet control over Eastern Europe, and ceasing to exercise pressure diplomatically or ideological criticism of the internal policies of the Soviet Union. Kissinger held that détente was "indivisible" and that the Soviet Union should be judged by its external political conduct. If it initiated a threatening build-up of its military capacity, engaged in fomenting crises by sponsoring wars of national liberation, sought to undermine the

Western alliance system, and violated the process of détente in spirit or letter, then the United States must respond with "firmness." Kissinger insisted that, "exploitation of crisis situations for unilateral gain is not acceptable."⁽²⁾ Through a process of negotiation, the causes of international crisis could be resolved in a spirit of cooperation.

Though the protracted process of détente ought not to be judged exclusively upon its immediate successes, Kissinger defended its accomplishments. Major progress has been evidenced by: 1) the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement over Berlin, 2) negotiations through the European Conference on Security and Cooperation, 3) the 'honourable termination' of the Vietnam War, 4) strengthening of the American alliance system by removing fears that friendship with the United States involved confrontation with the Soviet Union, 5) containment of incipient crises, lessening the level of conflict in comparison to the 50's and 60's, 6) SALT I. limitations on the arms race, and 7) cooperation on the issues of global interdependence — science and technology, environment, and energy.⁽³⁾ Kissinger strove to justify détente on factual substance and not atmospherics.

Crucial to the effective implementation of détente was the relative insulation of foreign policy from popular pressure and congressional scrutiny. This typified Nixon's managerial style as President. State relations must be conducted privately, even secretly, and Kissinger continuously demanded a free-hand in the implementation of foreign policy, unshackled as well by the State Department bureaucracy. By conducting the Nixon foreign policy as National Security Advisor, Kissinger was protected from congressional inquiry. Nixon's "prime time" initiatives to the Soviet Union and China can be understood as an effort to implement a foreign policy without a popular consensus. This style of diplomacy kept critics off balance, gained the media spotlight, and reinforced the notion that faith and trust should be afforded the Administration in operating foreign policy. Vigorous autonomous leadership was mandated in order to maintain a strong national defense when the relaxation of tensions would incline democratic peoples irresistibly toward a slackening of vigilance. A precondition for successful détente requires a freedom of operation above the untutored, simplistic moralisms of American public opinion.

Fulbright deemed détente to be a significant advance over

the crusading ideological anti-communism of the cold war. The Nixon-Kissinger practice of traditional balance of power politics contained both virtues and defects. Its virtue resided in internal coherence and rationality while its defect lay in its premises: a preference for 'process over purpose' and for 'power over people.'⁽⁴⁾ Having the United States serve as enforcer of the balance was utterly alien to its national experience. Balance of power geopolitics remained inherently fragile; no more durable than the statesmen who practiced it. When manipulated by shrewd leaders, like Metternick and Bismarck, it could preserve order temporarily. Lasting peace required a system of laws, not men. Fulbright endorsed the old internationalism of Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt which deliberately repudiated power politics and sought world peace through an international organization, like the United Nations. However, Fulbright denuded this old internationalism of any allusions to the democratic universalism which animated Wilson and Roosevelt.

Balance of power politics remain fundamentally amoral because they prioritized mere survival and reduced international relations to a ceaseless struggle for power. By backing the weaker party in conflicts despite the merits of the issue, for example, the United States support for West Pakistan against the Bengalis in 1971, questions of humanity and justice assumed a secondary significance.⁽⁵⁾ President Nixon declared that America must accept the responsibilities of a super power in the modern world. Fulbright observed that this mentality typified what Herbert Marcuse described as "totalitarianism of the established fact."⁽⁶⁾ Young Americans were appalled during the 60's by this purposeless, deterministic philosophy of power politics. Fulbright attributed this antiseptic, dehumanized rationality to the barbarism of the Vietnam War and the sickness of American society domestically. He claimed that a pre-occupation with warfare and power politics over an extended period of time would estrange America from its democratic ideals and result in dictatorship.⁽⁷⁾ He identified some fatal symptoms in Nixon's "imperial presidency." Its usurpation of congressional powers in foreign affairs and denial of access to Kissinger as policy advisor exemplified this executive dictatorship. Fulbright sought nothing less than a qualitative transformation of international politics which would supplant national sovereignty by world government.

Jackson defined "détente" as the "relaxation of tensions accompanied by the effort to achieve mutual accommodation through the negotiation process."⁽⁸⁾ This approach was plausible but must be judged on its substantive results and actual Soviet behavior. Jackson could detect scant evidence that genuine détente was manifested by Kissinger's foreign policy. He described Kissinger's détente as "a body without a soul — a policy indifferent to human rights."⁽⁹⁾ Foreign policy must incarnate America's democratic and humanitarian heritage — human rights should figure in the daily calculus of policymakers and also in the negotiation process. Authentic peace necessitated a moral consensus founded on respect for the individual. Human rights provided an inalienable standard for distinguishing between communist regimes and free democratic governments. Kissinger's silence on the nature of Soviet politics was epitomized by the fact that not once did he mention "communism" in his discussion of Soviet détente before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. By stifling criticism of the Soviet regime, détente sanctioned the rulers of the Soviet Union, rendered communist propaganda more effective, and weakened the resolve of the West to resist Soviet imperialism. During a Senate debate on Soviet policy, Jackson introduced a character profile of the eleven-man Politburo. ⁽¹⁰⁾ This action outraged Fulbright, who accused Jackson of opposing all negotiations with the Soviet Union. Jackson, responded that, like any prudent businessman, the United States should understand the character of those with whom we are negotiating. He deemed Soviet imperialism to be the major foreign policy problem confronting the United States.

Like Fulbright, Jackson criticized the "obsessive secrecy" and private diplomacy of the Nixon-Kissinger approach. A successful foreign policy required cooperation between Congress and the Executive, an impossibility when essential information was withheld and prior consultation denied.⁽¹¹⁾ By managing a foreign policy grounded in secret agreements, the Administration courted a disaster. While undermining democratic processes, secret agreements were tenuous since they were without the consent of Congress, they undermined confidence in government leaders, and distorted public debate. Unlike Fulbright, Jackson charged that the exercise of détente effected a cover-up of malignant facts regarding Soviet activities. This refusal to acknowledge facts about Soviet treaty violations,

sponsorship of international terrorism and war, espionage, military expansion, and internal repression of dissidents, fabricated a deceptive, ethereal, and potentially deadly atmosphere surrounding détente. Jackson charged Kissinger with replacing a realist approach with one cultivating atmospherics in order to sustain the momentum of détente.

Jackson's objection to Kissinger's approach revolved around conflicting appraisals of the Soviet Union's intrinsic nature, aims, and specific actions. He maintained that, "contrary to the reassuring view of some people, I do not know how to assess the Soviet Union except as an opportunistic, unpredictable, and dangerous opponent — with rapidly expanding military capabilities."⁽¹²⁾ He insisted that the shift in correlation of forces in favor of the Soviet Union would prompt it to engage in risk-laden adventurism, fomenting new crises. In 1969, Jackson noted several myths which beset American policy toward the Soviet Union.⁽¹³⁾ The first myth argued that the Soviets were on a fixed course toward more peaceful and moderate policies. They were willing to leave their neighbors alone. As witnessed by the invasion of Czechoslovakia and affirmation of the Breshnev Doctrine, the facts spoke to the contrary. The second held that the Soviet leaders were evolving toward a more liberal civil rights policy, while Jackson perceived a war on dissident intellectuals and the refurbishing of Stalin's official image. The third maintained that the United States was fueling the arms race. Jackson argued that the Soviets were first to develop long-range ICBM's, first to test an ABM, first to test a 60 megaton bomb, and first to develop a fractional orbiting bombardment system. This intensive military expansion led some to conclude that the Soviets were striving for strategic superiority. The fourth myth insisted that the only means to resolve conflict was "instant negotiations," as a safe alternative to the risks of the cold war. This notion seemed comforting and convenient but was false since it rested on a misguided notion of negotiations. Pressure was part of the negotiating process, a means to obtain victory through words and not weapons. Jackson was alarmed about the radically different approaches to the negotiating process and how this severely disadvantaged the West. Communism thrives on crises and strove to instigate them as a method of destroying western resolve. In 1961, the 20th Communist Congress adopted an extended strategy of national liberation wars in order to exploit the instability of the under-

developed world. Nothing in Soviet activities indicated that they had renounced this policy. Jackson argued that American military strength deterred Soviet adventurism though negotiations could proceed in areas where actual interests converged.

Under the sponsorship of his Arms Control committee, Jackson published an 'Evaluation of Détente,' written by a group of specialists, including: Lec Labedz, Robert Conquest, Brian Crozier, Bernard Lewis, Richard Pipes, Leonard Shapiro, and Edward Shils. The article contended that the Soviet government's aspirations for détente were to: 1) weaken the Western alliance by making it appear to be unnecessary, indeed dangerous to peace, 2) reduce the pace of the American defense effort and eliminate the American defense presence in Europe, 3) secure from the West financial and technical assistance which would directly enhance Soviet military power, 4) isolate China in order to counter the consequences of hostile confrontation with both East and West, 5) legitimize its domination over Eastern Europe.⁽¹⁴⁾ The net effect would produce a decisive shift in a world balance of power favourable to the Soviet Union with an eroding capacity of the West to safeguard its values and way of life. Leonid Brezhnev proclaimed that détente, as indirect warfare during the nuclear age, would actually intensify the struggle between the two systems. No matter how cleverly orchestrated, Jackson viewed détente as a form of struggle which would exploit all of the vulnerabilities of the West.

In 1973, George Arbatov, director of the Institute of United States Studies in Moscow, published a book which succinctly diagnosed Kissinger's détente as a more subtle strategy than direct confrontation, but one which was prompted by the growing weakness in the West. ⁽¹⁵⁾ Arbatov then proceeded to delineate the Soviet rules for "peaceful coexistence." These guidelines for Soviet policy were: 1) direct support for wars of national liberation, 2) intensification of ideological warfare, 3) belief that American propaganda is criminal and subversive (therefore, incompatible with peaceful coexistence), 4) support for overseas revolutions against imperialism and defense of the freedom of socialist nations (Brezhnev Doctrine), 5) normal good neighbor relations and beneficial cooperation with the West on mutual interests, 6) recognition that class conflict between capitalism and socialism is historically inevitable and

with it the total destruction of capitalism. (15) This official Soviet policy statement established a radical incongruity between itself and the benign principles signed by Breshnev and Nixon. Jackson never wavered from his conviction that the United States was enmeshed in a deadly global struggle.

Both Jackson and Fulbright supported Kissinger's nomination as Secretary of State which occurred shortly before the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Jackson maintained that it was preferable to have a Secretary of State who was actually conducting foreign policy. Fulbright praised the policy of détente and attempted to shield Kissinger from hostile Senate interrogators. Both recognized Kissinger as politically talented and intellectually gifted, well-qualified to conduct the Nixon Administration's foreign policy.

II.

Jackson's critique of détente concentrated on three key areas of American-Soviet relations: Soviet policy in the Middle East, Soviet military-strategic expansion, and Soviet human rights policy. These offered empirical test cases for détente's utility in crisis management, achieving a relaxation of tensions, and cooperation toward preserving international stability. If competition still persisted between the two governments, according to Kissinger, it should be conducted by mutually understood rules that would prevent an escalation into world war. In his "Pacem in Terris" address of October, 1973, Kissinger prescribed the framework for détente as precluding the effort to achieve a position of global predominance, exploiting détente to weaken American alliances, and entailing a pervasive lessening of hostilities leading to broad-ranged cooperation. Détente was "indivisible," requiring Soviet restraint in all foreign policy areas. However, the linkage of détente to the Vietnam War was already peripheral since Soviet military-diplomatic support for Hanoi coupled with American troops in the field was not deemed to be an obstacle to cordial American-Soviet relations. Kissinger credited the Soviets with helping to bring an "honorable resolution" to the conflict in Vietnam, an example of détente's efficacy. In generally supporting the Nixon policy in Vietnam, Jackson did not employ it as an issue in the debate over détente. The Vietnam War could have raised considerable ambiguity over whether Soviet support for wars of national

liberation violated the spirit of détente or at least necessitated a selective focus that would alter the indivisibility of détente.

"The Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," which was signed by President Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow (1972), was crafted to articulate the mutual framework for peaceful coexistence. Principle No. 2 stated that both nations would attach "major importance to preventing the development of situations causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations." Both nations promised to exercise restraint and be prepared to negotiate differences by peaceful means. It affirmed that, "Both sides recognize that the efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives." A prerequisite for strengthening peaceful relations was "the recognition of the security interests of the Parties based on the principle of equality and the renunciation of the use or threat of force." When problems emerged, the United States and Soviet Union pledged to maintain consultations, if necessary, on the highest level of government. During the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, these principles provided Jackson with a litmus test for détente.

III.

On March 8, 1971, Jackson declared that, "the central fact in the Middle East is the Soviet Union's drive for hegemony." (16) Soviet ambitions, not ultimately the conflict between Israel and the Arab states, provoked instability in the region. He argued that the Soviet Union had a vested interest in heightening tensions which radicalized the conflict. They sought three geopolitical goals: 1) imperiling the oil supply to the western allies, 2) outflanking NATO to the south, 3) opening up the Suez Canal as a means to double the effectiveness of the Soviet fleet, assisting in the penetration of Africa. Jackson criticized the Nixon Administration's policy of support for United Nation's Resolution No. 242, which demanded the return of territories that Israel had occupied since the 1967 Six-Day War. By opposing Israel's position, the United States undermined the confidence of its friends while strengthening the intransigence of its enemies. Commitment to a general settlement damaged Israel's bargaining position.(17) Jackson

repudiated efforts involving United States pressure to impose a settlement on the immediate parties. Reconciliation must transpire between Israel and her Arab neighbors, Jackson argued, with acknowledgment of Israel's right to exist, if peace were to be genuine.

On August 17, 1970, the United States, Soviet Union, Egypt, and Israel entered into a stand-still cease-fire agreement which was arranged by Secretary of State Rogers. Jackson charged that Soviet-Egyptian violations occurred that very night with new surface-to-air missiles placed within the 30 mile zone limit of the Suez Canal. He stated, "the Russians were deeply involved in the planning and execution of the violations." (18) Jackson recalled that he had told Kissinger to get the SAM missiles removed, but the Administration simply ignored these "brazen" violations. The effectiveness of Israeli air power was jeopardized, which caused a heavy toll in blood when the battle was launched. Indeed, it rendered militarily feasible Egypt's offensive surprise attack. In 1970, the Institute of Strategic Studies in London reported that, "the sheer volume of Soviet military arms for the United Arab Republic during 1970 was without any precedent." (19) Jackson charged that these actions violated the U.S.-Soviet Summit Agreement to refrain from the threat or use of force against the allies of the other party.

What evidence exists regarding Soviet cooperation in the Egyptian attack of October 1973? 1) The Soviet Union provided Egypt and Syria with numerical arms superiority. 2) They trained Egyptians and Syrians in offensive tactics. 3) Soviet newspapers contended that the Arabs had the right to "use every means of struggle" available. They encouraged the Arabs to employ the oil weapon against the West. 4) On September 13 1973, the Soviets warned of an imminent Israeli attack, preparing the rationale that the Arabs were reacting defensively. 5) A week before the attack, the Soviet Union sent up eight communications and reconnaissance satellites over the future battlefield. 6) The Soviets evacuated civilian dependents from Egypt 48 to 72 hours before the war began. Foreign Minister Gromyko declared in TASS during a March, 1974 trip to Cairo that, "political consultations between the Soviet Union and Egypt played an important part in the coordination of our actions in the period before October 1973 and during the events of last October." (20) It seems inconceivable that Soviet military

advisors were unaware of the Arabs' plans or that Egypt would have launched the attack without prior assurances of Soviet resupply and support. The Soviet failure to communicate with the United States would appear to be a violation of the principle of restraint and not making gains at the expense of American interests.

After the attack was launched by Egypt on October 6 1973, the Soviets championed the Arabs and did nothing to restrain them. In fact, they attempted to widen the war by encouraging other Arab and African states to join the battle. They mounted a massive resupply effort, introducing more advanced weapons, like SCUD missiles and MIG-25 aircraft. Meanwhile, the United States found the Europeans unwilling to cooperate. At a press conference, Kissinger denied that the United States considered itself to be in a "confrontation" with the Soviet Union.⁽²¹⁾ He held that "Soviet behavior has been moderate and not irresponsible." Jackson responded, "let us call it what it is, Arab war of aggression, even if the Secretary of State will not."⁽²²⁾

On October 24 1973, the Soviet Union delivered a diplomatic message which Jackson termed "brutal and threatening." The Soviets had mobilized seven airborne divisions and vowed to deploy them if the United States didn't immediately halt the Israeli advance. In response, President Nixon placed American troops on Red Alert. Jackson argued that "Israel must win the war and win it decisively." To permit the Soviet Union or the United Nations to terminate the war would serve as an inducement to aggressors that they could be protected if the battle turned against them. Kissinger pressured Israel into accepting a withdrawal from its advancing positions, enabling Egypt to obtain a diplomatic victory out of what would have been certain military defeat. Kissinger claimed that détente provided a moderating influence in settling the crisis. In Jackson's judgment, the Yom Kippur War demonstrated how the Soviets exploited détente for their own advantage.

Senator Fulbright praised Kissinger's "great determination and restraint" through his peace efforts. This whole episode constituted a vindication of the utility of détente. Fulbright objected to Jackson's description of the Soviet message of October 24 as "brutal." He termed it "urgent." Fulbright regretted that it was thought necessary to call a Red Alert. He suggested that this was a budgetary ploy by the Pentagon in

order to increase appropriations.(23) Fulbright applauded the United Nations decision to send a peacekeeping force. Conceding that the Mideast War had provided ammunition for the cold warriors, he reasoned that the logical implication of the conflict proved that there was no alternative to American-Soviet cooperation and the need to strengthen it.(24) He stated that, "détente in its essence is an agreement not to let these differences explode into nuclear war."(25) During an October 25 1973 press conference, Kissinger also appeared to embrace this operative definition of détente by holding that it signified that "confrontations are kept within bounds that do not threaten civilized life."(26) This minimalist view of detente implied that Soviet wars of national liberation were legitimate provided that direct nuclear confrontation with the super powers was avoided.

Fulbright insisted that the Soviet's move toward unilateral intervention in Egypt was an emergency operation intended to rescue the trapped Egyptian Third Army. The United States would have taken similar action if an Israeli army had been trapped. No objective difference existed between the Arab oil embargo to influence American policy toward Israel and the United States trade sanctions as a lever on Soviet emigration policy. He concluded that, "they [the Russians] demonstrated once again that they tend to be prudent in a crisis and that they are quite as resolved as we are to keep the Middle East conflict within bounds."(27) He chastized Jackson for expecting to find immediate tangible results in the Soviet Union, holding that America must not "force the pace" of détente. The true lesson of the Yom Kippur War exemplified the policy imperative of great power cooperation through the United Nations.

Fulbright nurtured an extensive public record as an inveterate critic of Israeli foreign policy. Israel represented a "garrison state" with expansionist aims, pursuing a militarist policy in open contempt of world opinion and censor by the United Nations. It symbolized a virtual antithesis of Fulbright's design for international relations. He charged that Zionists controlled the United States Senate and that Israel's belief that it had firm United States support obstructed a possible Middle East settlement.(28) After the Six Day War in 1967, Nasser initiated a war of attrition along the Suez Canal. Despite the availability of aerial reconnaissance, Fulbright concluded that the evidence was

“inconclusive’ that the Egyptians had violated the ceasefire by moving their SAM missiles closer and closer to the Suez Canal. The Egyptians demanded that the Israelis withdraw from all occupied territories as a condition to start negotiations. Israel emphasized the necessity of secure and recognized borders. Fulbright argued that Israel should accept the principle of withdrawal and adopt a policy of “flexibility” and “magnanimity.” (29) Instead of vainly striving for strategic depth, following a futile and hopeless path of continued military superiority, real security could emerge only by Israel winning the friendship of her Arab neighbors. He endorsed the Nixon policy of supporting U.N. Resolution 242.

In opposition to Jackson, Fulbright endorsed a decisive intervention by the United Nations in order to impose a settlement in the interests of world peace. The Great Powers possessed a “vital interest” in the Middle East only because they allowed themselves to be manipulated by their client states.(30) The United States and the Soviet Union had become mirror images of one another — similar to the gridlock on strategic policy. Fulbright mocked the notion that the Soviets possessed any grand geopolitical aims in the region. By 1970, he held that the Soviets had seen the folly of continued rivalry and their national interest closely paralleled that of the United States in the region.(31) Since 1967, the Soviets displayed more prudence than the United States, in withholding arms supplies and acted cautiously by not supplying Egypt with offensive weapons.(32) In 1972, he proclaimed that, “the Russians have consistently counseled the Arabs that they would not support a military operation across the Suez Canal.”(33) The “weight of evidence” indicated that the Soviets were pushing for a compromise settlement that could reduce great power tensions.

Fulbright reasoned that the Soviet Union became an unwilling victim of initiatives concocted by an Arab client state (Egypt) because he discerned no ultimate conflict of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East. The contention that the Soviets would subordinate their interests to an unreliable client, like Egypt, appears implausible. The Soviets didn’t exercise restraint since wars of national liberation don’t violate their ground rules for détente, regardless of the depth of American commitment. While theoretically détente is rooted in realism and can be judged empirically,

the Yom Kippur War might illustrate how it constitutes a faith commitment that is dependent upon a tacit ideology which filters the interpretation of events. Its fruition as a process can be postponed to the indefinite future. Despite what many deem evidence of Soviet misbehavior, it still would be justified as an inescapable approach to avoid nuclear holocaust. During his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 1974, Kissinger scrupulously desisted from any reference to the Soviet Union's role in the Yom Kippur War. Fulbright sponsored an amendment, after he lost the battle over aid to Israel, that such military aid ought not to be construed as a commitment by United States to its defense. In his last major address as a Senator, "Israel: Trying to Hold Off the Inevitable," delivered at Westminster College where Churchill gave his 'Iron Curtain' speech, Fulbright charged that the military balance had shifted inexorably in the Arabs' favor, dooming Israel to ultimate defeat.⁽³⁴⁾ He advised that deluding Israel about these harsh facts beckoned "destruction and possibly ours as well."

IV

Jackson was convinced that Soviet foreign policy was grounded in a realistic examination of the correlation of forces. He became increasingly alarmed that the substantial build-up of Soviet conventional and strategic forces would lead to an imbalance highly unfavorable to Western interests. When informed that détente has set the Union on an 'irreversible' course toward moderation, he responded in 1969 that, "the cold fact is that the military balance in central Europe has been significantly altered to the disadvantage of the West."⁽³⁵⁾ The concerted development of mobile long-range conventional capabilities would eventuate a more adventurous projection of Soviet power. Jackson insisted that, "the first priority in this dangerous and uncertain world is to maintain a greater nuclear power and strength than the Soviet Union. Strategic parity with the Soviet adversary is not enough. The survival of our nation and our allies in freedom depends not on a parity of nuclear power but on a margin of advantage in nuclear power for the peacekeepers over the peace-upsetters."⁽³⁶⁾ Though Nixon advocated a margin of safety in the 1968 election, the advocacy of strategic superiority was jettisoned for mutual assured destruction

“sufficiency.” Any frank espousal of nuclear superiority has virtually disappeared from public political discourse. Even Jackson would have to couch his critique of the SALT negotiations in the rhetoric of nuclear parity, as though this policy rather than American superiority would create more military stability with the Soviet Union.

In a *Time* interview (June 3, 1972), President Richard M. Nixon declared, “we must remember the only time in the history of the world that we have had extended periods of peace is when there has been balance of power. It is when one nation becomes infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential competition that the danger of war arises . . . it will be a safer world and a better world if we have a strong healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, and Japan, each balancing the other, not playing one against the other, an even balance.” Would a strong, healthy Soviet Union lead to a better and safer world? How could Japan, with virtually no military capacity, be deemed an equal partner? Without belaboring the historical accuracy of Nixon’s balance of power views, they mould Nixon’s grand design for world politics. Henry Kissinger openly questioned the utility of nuclear superiority. He later acknowledged that it could be decisively employed by the Soviet Union to blackmail and intimidate in order to exact concessions or determine the outcome of crisis situations. Jackson consistently argued that as the Soviet Union approached military equality and superiority they would become “more resolute and more adventurous.”(37)

Jackson became a leading proponent of the Safeguard ABM program. The Safeguard had many functions: 1) help defend the Minuteman system for retaliatory attack, 2) keep technological pace with the Soviet ABM program, 3) provide limited protection, 4) shift strategic policy towards providing cities with an active defense instead of simply building more offensive weapons and hardening existing silos.(38) He noted the ominous deployment of Soviet SS-9 ICBM’s with 25 megaton warheads which were capable of attacking hardened silos.(39) This Soviet weapon was introduced after the SALT talks were underway and afforded testimony to the extent of the Soviet escalation. Jackson argued that the deployment of the Safeguard was an “essential condition for the SALT talks to succeed.” The ABM Treaty with the Soviet Union killed this

approach in the cradle until rehabilitated by Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative.

On April 26 1971, Jackson announced that the United States was no longer militarily superior to the Soviet Union. (40) He warned that the Soviet's unprecedented peacetime expansion threatened all three components of America's strategic triad. This augured grave consequences for world politics. Jackson held that a build-up of America's offensive arsenal would be too costly. Accepting the Soviet SALT proposal limiting ABM'S would cripple America's defensive option. The United States should at least protect its deterrent forces and achieve an arms control agreement that offered a strategic balance. Noting that the Soviet Union was not committed to a policy of Mutual Assured Destruction (deterrence only), Jackson held that the ABM defense must be employed around America's Minuteman system. The United States did not have a first-strike system to penetrate Soviet silos and the leaders of the Kremlin knew this. The Soviets proposed to limit defensive systems while not reducing their offensive capability. The Soviets understood the tremendous psychological impact on Western public opinion that the demoralizing threat of mutual annihilation presented. Though defensive systems were non-nuclear and posed no threat to the Soviet heartland, they did undermine Soviet ideological initiatives. The Soviets had a vested interest in making the world radically unsafe. Jackson advocated a mutual freeze on offensive systems which would "lay down the sword and keep the shield." (41) He demanded some evidence of Soviet restraint from the Nixon Administration to bolster its claims that we were moving from an era of confrontation to one of negotiation.

When the terms of the SALT negotiations began to surface publicly, Jackson accused the Nixon-Kissinger team of placing the United States into a position of strategic inferiority. He declared, "the simple fact is that the Soviets could be pursuing an aggressive policy of qualitative improvement of their offense, and acquire the capability to destroy our deterrent force." (42) Under SALT I, the Soviets were given a 50% edge in ICBM's (1398 to 1054), over a 50% edge in payload (4 to 1), and a three to two advantage in nuclear submarines (60 to 42). Jackson also charged that the Soviet Union would develop MIRV technology (multiple warheads) which would enable them to

realize a vast superiority due to their larger and more numerous ICBM silos. Kissinger contended that America possessed a MIRV technological advantage with more individual warheads while the Soviets had a quantitative advantage in numbers and throw-weight. This constituted a rough equality of forces. Kissinger's private understanding that the Soviets wouldn't MIRV their ICBM system was quickly disregarded by the Kremlin. Jackson asserted that "the treaty contained ambiguities, there appeared to be secret understandings of which the public, including the U.S. Senate was unaware." He demanded that the facts be placed before the public. He repudiated Kissinger's 'momentum argument' that America should sign the treaty because the widening weapons gap would become much greater without the agreement. The timely question was why the United States permitted itself to be confronted with an unrestrained Soviet strategic escalation.

Fulbright accused Jackson of attempting to delay the vote on SALT ratification. Jackson responded by claiming that Fulbright had expended only a few minutes to discuss a treaty in which the very preservation of western freedom was at stake. Fulbright reiterated that, ". . . the President of the United States, after all, controls the negotiations." (43) Jackson observed that Fulbright had advocated previously that the Senate was abdicating its constitutional responsibilities in foreign policy. Accusing Jackson of 'arrogance,' Fulbright held that, "the agreements depend primarily, not upon any legal right in any court . . . they depend upon the confidence each country has in the agreement." (44) Jackson was charged with poisoning the climate of friendship by providing cause for the Russians to question our good faith. In contrast to those who felt any limitation of nuclear arms was desirable, Jackson maintained that either numbers matter or agreements don't. He was simply practising the 'Fulbright Doctrine' in order to afford the Senate with a greater voice. Should the Senate acquiesce in granting the Soviets strategic superiority? During the Senate debate, Fulbright accepted the principle of strategic equality. He did not come prepared to debate the technicalities of the treaty. Jackson formulated a Senate resolution, which was accepted by the Nixon Administration, requiring that in any future strategic weapons agreement, the United States would refuse to accept provisions, such as those in SALT I, which

would leave the United States numerically inferior.

Fulbright expressed discomfort that Nixon justified increased military spending only to employ it as a bargaining chip in future negotiations. He attempted to defend the Soviet advantage in nuclear submarines by arguing that America had more forward bases for its submarine fleet. Jackson responded that there was little foundation for the claim that the U.S. had a favorable geographical position. The Soviet Union possessed a larger land mass between American submarines and their strategic targets. Fulbright praised the agreement of May, 1972 limiting ABM sites and deploying offensive weapons. He proclaimed that, "... giving up the ABM — except for each side retaining the option of two sites — is probably the single most planners to accept past decisions as if the superpowers had a commitment to coexistence. In so far as each side abandons the effort to make itself invulnerable to attack or retaliation by the other, it also commits itself to peace and to the survival of the other's power and ideology." (45) He embraced the logic of mutual assured destruction as the path to peace while others would increasingly question whether the Soviets shared this commitment.

In holding that 'real détente' must be established upon substantive results and actual Soviet behavior, Jackson deemed SALT I. to be an 'inauspicious beginning.' (46) SALT II. would reveal the genuine implications of the SALT process. He recognized that in SALT II the Soviets strove to consolidate their advantage and described Kissinger's response as 'disappointing in the extreme' Instead of rectifying the imbalances of SALT I., Kissinger had prioritized short-term proposals which extended the process of negotiation but achieved little substance. Jackson proposed a sharp reduction in the levels of strategic forces, i.e. arms reductions rather than arms limitations. He argued that the 1974 Vladivostok Agreement actually provided extremely high strategic force ceilings. (47) He blamed Kissinger for initiating a decade of détente which left the United States less secure than it was when the SALT negotiations began. Soviet spending on strategic forces increased after the 1972 SALT Agreement; they spent three times as much money on strategic offensive and defensive weapons as did the United States. (48) Kissinger's assertion that the Soviets had tempered their military activities and force levels could not

be empirically substantiated.

V.

In 1975, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment passed the Senate by an 88 to zero vote. The amendment denied the Soviet Union most favored nation status if it refused to open up its emigration policy for Soviet Jews and other dissidents. Kissinger and Fulbright criticized this legislation as meddling in Soviet internal affairs. Defending such embattled minorities aggravated the prospects for peace and jeopardized American national interest. Jackson charged that Kissinger posed a false choice between avoiding nuclear war and defending values of human decency.⁽⁴⁹⁾ Jackson denied that he intended to restructure Soviet society. The right of emigration was modest and manageable as well as being adopted by the United Nations Charter. The plight of Soviet dissidents heightened public awareness on a personal level of the profound differences between the Soviet regime and the Western democracies.

Jackson vigorously disputed Kissinger's contention that helping Soviet dissidents could best be realized through private diplomacy. Kissinger has cited as evidence the removal of the Education Exit Tax in 1971, seen as a ransom for potential emigrants, as proof of détente's utility.⁽⁵⁰⁾ Jackson contended that this tax was rescinded before the 1972 election and then reapplied after. *The New York Times* reported that improved relations with the West prompted the Soviet secret police to launch a crackdown on the dissident movement.⁽⁵¹⁾ When the Soviet authorities forcibly expelled Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Ford, again with Kissinger's counsel, snubbed Solzhenitsyn.⁽⁵²⁾ Jackson described this action as 'ignoble' and 'reprehensible.' He sponsored Solzhenitsyn to address the United States Senate. Jackson declared that, "the action of the Soviet authorities against this brave and decent man underscores the question whether the Soviet Union wants a genuine détente — a stable international society that can only result from respect for the free expression of ideas and the lowering of barriers to the free movement of ideas."⁽⁵³⁾ The depth of American commitment to individual liberty would prove decisive in moulding the emerging policy with the Soviet Union.

On August 1, 1975, President Ford signed the Helsinki Peace

Accord with the Soviet Union. In exchange for legitimating Soviet control over East Europe, the Soviet concession consisted of a promise not to assist terrorist activities and to implement a freer flow of ideas, information, and people. Shortly after Helsinki, Breshnev announced that, "no one should try to dictate to other peoples on the basis of foreign policy considerations of one kind or another, the manner in which they ought to manage their own internal affairs." (54) Jackson charged that the Soviets had already dishonored the Helsinki agreement by intensifying the harassment of Soviet dissidents, like Andrea Sakharov. (55) He asked whether anyone was so naive as to believe that the Soviet Union allowed freedom of expression in Poland or would honor human rights commitments made at Helsinki. During the Ford-Carter Presidential debate, Ford would realize Jackson's worst fears by declaring Poland to be a free country. The Soviets continued to violate the agreement, even jailing individuals who were supposed to monitor it. Jackson later revealed that, "one of the great coverups in this century is the effort by Western governments, who know better, to muffle the facts about Soviet bloc support for international terrorism." (56) While violations of the Helsinki Accord could embarrass Soviet diplomacy, the Soviets minimized any damaging longlasting impact upon détente. The inner logic of the policy assumed a reduction of tensions and acquiescence in Soviet misbehavior since worsening hostilities could only push the world to the brink of nuclear annihilation.

Fulbright, Kissinger and Jackson differed on the viability of human rights. Adopting the posture of cultural relativism, Fulbright asserted that, ". . . there is no greater vanity than the assumption that one's values have universal validity." (57) While downplaying the role of intentions in analysing Soviet foreign policy, Kissinger ignored Marxist-Leninism as a catechism for Soviet leaders. Operationally, his balance of power approach relegated ideological differences to mere obstacles to business-like diplomacy, concentrating instead upon pressing state-to-state relations. When classical balance of power politics reigned in Europe, a consensus of civilized values existed between the various heads of state. Though not explicitly proclaiming values to be relative, Kissinger's statecraft trivializes them as objects of policy. Jackson did not highlight Marxist-Leninist theory as a foundation for Soviet policy. He appealed to 'human decency,'

'common sense,' and 'individual liberty,' as a tacit foundation for human rights. Instead of advocating a universalistic philosophy of democracy (which contains its own dangers), Jackson preferred the level of concrete abuses of human rights and Soviet political-military misbehavior. The factual documentation could function efficaciously within the Washington political-military briefing rooms but the general public might require greater emphasis upon the radical opposition of the two regimes intrinsically in order to provide the frame of reference to apprehend the ultimate values at risk.

VI.

In focusing upon Kissinger's implementation of détente during the Nixon-Ford Administration, one must remember that both before and after his tenure in office, Kissinger insightfully criticized this very approach. In his *The Necessity of Choice* (1961), he condemned the incapacity to make moral distinctions and the pitfalls of bending over indulgently to acknowledge the legitimacy of others' point of view as fermenting the debilitating malaise of appeasement that helped lead to World War II.(58) The belief was sedulously cultivated, similar to Fulbright's posture, that if America was drained of its moral conviction, then peace would materialize by depolarizing self-righteous ideologically driven camps. The crusading cause for belligerency would be dismantled. In 1961, Kissinger acknowledged that this Hobbesian relativism would induce a paralysis of will by holding that, "when skepticism becomes an end in itself, it can easily lead to stagnation or resignation. Where nothing is certain, nothing will be strongly maintained. This may make for ease of relations in a stable society ... But liberty may indeed require a readiness to face death on its behalf."(59) When fear of violent death supplants love of liberty as the architectonic social value, the process of appeasement becomes irresistible. Kissinger noted that if one deems nuclear war to be the greatest evil, "nuclear blackmail is almost a fool-proof strategy." This contention was defended before and after but not during his time as a power holder, when the fear of nuclear war was employed as a weapon to fend off critics. In 1979, he acknowledged that, "the practical result (of Soviet strategic advantage) is that in a local, regional crisis the Soviet capacity for intervention must become more politically signifi-

cant than in the past . . . The conduct of American policy in crises will inevitably become cautious. This is an event of geopolitical significance.” (60) Kissinger subsequently supported the Strategic Defense Initiative, rejected the Soviet offer at the Iceland summit on strategic arms, and criticized the proposal to remove American intermediate range missiles from Europe. However, his policy of *détente* has left the more permanent imprint historically upon American foreign policy.

Détente has its defenders, even among neoconservatives, who might have been expected to endorse Jackson’s approach. Irving Kristol praised Kissinger for revolutionizing the American way of thinking about foreign policy.(61) In the past, American policy has gravitated between popular spasms of isolationism and interventionism rooted in competing ideological visions. By Europeanizing American foreign policy on the realistic basis of national interest and balance of power, Kissinger endeavored to establish a policy appropriate for an imperial republic. Kristol identified Kissinger as adopting the model developed by George Kennan. Kennan articulated with logical rigor the policy implications of *détente*, implications that some have termed solicitous and submissive toward the rise of Soviet power. Though Kristol conceded that it was impossible to define national interests without taking values into account, he declared that, “a doctrinaire refusal to compromise one’s values is the sign of perpetual adolescence.” (62) In the age of nuclear weapons, this pragmatism was “an absolute and overriding truth.” America had reached middle-age, lost its idealistic innocence in Vietnam, and must lower its foreign policy expectations. This mid-life crisis demanded a prudence which necessitated international stability as the prime purpose of a responsible great power. Kristol held that a buoyant foreign policy consensus was “too grandiose and too confining for statesmen. While Jackson sought to revitalize a bipartisan consensus foreign policy, Kristol opted for elite control, insulating policy from the unsteady and uninformed shifts in popular opinion.

In an era of mass democracy and prime-time Presidency, the Nixon-Kissinger statecraft strove to conduct a foreign policy outside of the channels of political scrutiny and immediate popular support. Foreign policy was an arena to enable the President to mobilize mass domestic political

support. This effort to maintain exclusive power over foreign policy required a symbiotic relationship between Kissinger and the media. Rather than pursuing mere stability, foreign policy would become the realm for dramatic and bold presidential initiatives. By orchestrating history-making media events, confidence in presidential leadership could be reinforced through an activism which would dominate the political agenda. This was not an attempt to professionalize foreign policy through the State Department diplomatic corps. Kissinger shrewdly coopted the media by nurturing personal contacts which resulted in a virtual cult of personality and media trust in his superior capacities as an intellectual and diplomat. He made no visible effort to educate the media or transform their opinion on issues like the Vietnam War; the relationship was cooperative and ingratiating, unlike Nixon's siege mentality regarding the media. To perpetuate this international high-wire act demanded rare and remarkable political capacities.

Jackson concluded that the Kissinger diplomacy was very fragile and doomed to fail. Détente required a succession of treaties or events which could capture the popular imagination but these would also sacrifice long-range national interests for short-term political advantage. Jackson realized that Kissinger's hard détente, "the carrot and stick" approach, could not maintain "firmness" in response to Soviet misbehavior. Kissinger discovered this when he attempted to rally support against Soviet-Cuban adventurism in Angola. One cannot atrophy public threat perception through détente's relaxation of tensions and call simultaneously for greater defense expenditures and military vigilance. The momentum of détente cannot be obstructed by reversals which challenge its initial premises. The policy can easily slide into Fulbright's "soft détente," mandating faith in Soviet goodwill, removal of potential sources of Soviet distrust, rationalizing away or concealing evidence of Soviet misbehavior, and instituting unilateral military disarmament as an immediate domestic benefit of the program.

As direct Soviet-American military confrontation subsided due to the threat of nuclear warfare, the Soviets recognized that ideological war would be crucial and also intensified. While conceivably détente could encourage some Soviet leaders to accept the West's benign intentions and become a status quo power, Kissinger's détente constituted a unilateral ideological disarmament. Fulbright sought to eliminate Radio Free Europe

and the Voice of America as annoying remnants of the Cold War. In the battle to influence Western public opinion, the Soviets possess substantial advantages which they have effectively exploited. They run little risk of internal opinion being subverted. The Soviet's ability to manipulate Western peace movements, capitalize on an open system with political cleavages, and utilize fears of war or nuclear annihilation, has left Western leaders without an effective countervailing strategy. Both Nixon and Kissinger accepted the loss of American public will as an initial premise and engaged in no concerted effort to reverse this disastrous trajectory. Democratic statesmanship mandates that leaders educate the public regarding the burdens and sacrifices that they should assume in order to preserve their freedom. Kissinger refused to call upon Americans to transcend their narrow private interests and then justified his policies as the best possible course amidst the decline of American power.

Jackson had greater faith in the resilience of the American people. In a free society, the Nixon-Kissinger policy could not stifle public criticism sufficiently to conceal its basic defects. The inducements for the Soviet Union to behave like a status quo power proved less seductive than the immediate opportunities to exploit the weakness of the West. Jackson retained sources within the defense-foreign policy bureaucracy who provided him with the tangible evidence of Soviet treaty violations and military expansion which undermined détente. He attacked it on a solid empirical basis. However, the effort to craft a bipartisan consensus requires the rhetorical ability to conduct the ideological struggle on a statesmanlike basis. One must reinforce public commitment to the transcendent values of the nation that are beyond mere survival while retaining the flexibility to cope with the complexities of foreign policymaking. Henry Jackson's critique of détente ran against the drift of opinion, particularly within his own political party, thus eliminating whatever chances he might have had as a Democratic candidate for the office of President.

FOOTNOTES

(1) *Senate Hearings of 1974 on Détente* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 247.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 251.

- (3) Ibid., pp. 256-7.
- (4) Fulbright, *The Crippled Giant* (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), p. 7.
- (5) Ibid., p. 7.
- (6) Ibid., p. 8.
- (7) Ibid., p. 158.
- (8) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 120, pt. 9), April, 1974, 11301.
- (9) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 122, pt. 10), April 29, 1976, 11795.
- (10) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 115, pt. 14), July 9, 1969, 15907.
- (11) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 121, pt. 9), April 17, 1975, 10655.
- (12) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 115, pt. 6), June 12, 1969, 15709.
- (13) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 115, pt. 6), March 20, 1969, 6998.
- (14) Leo Labetz, "Detente or Deception," *International Review* (Spring, 1974): pp. 13-14.
- (15) Georgi Arbatov, *The War of Ideas in Contemporary International Relations* (Moscow: Soviet Government Printers, 1973), p. 262.
- (16) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 117, pt. 4), March 8, 1971, 5348.
- (17) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 117, pt. 10), April 29, 1971, 12766.
- (18) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 119, pt. 33), December 19, 1973, 42437.
- (19) *Institute of Strategic Studies* (London: ISS Press, 1970), p. 46.
- (20) Foy Kohler, *Middle East War* (Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1974), p. 89.
- (21) Kohler, *Middle East War*, p. 68.
- (22) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 119, pt. 27), October 18, 1975), 34639. *Congressional Record* (Vol. 119, pt. 33), December 19, 1973), 42437.
- (23) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 119, pt. 27), October 26, 1973), 35072.
- (24) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 119, pt. 28), November 9, 1973, 36478.
- (25) Ibid.
- (26) Theodore Draper, "Detente," *Commentary* (June, 1974): 39.
- (27) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 119, pt. 28), November 9, 1973, 36478.
- (28) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 117, pt. 6), March 23, 1971), 7357.
- (29) Fulbright, *The Crippled Giant*, p. 113.
- (30) Ibid., p. 110.
- (31) Ibid., p. 130,; *Congressional Record* (August 24, 1970), 29799.
- (32) Fulbright, *The Crippled Giant*, pp. 113, 134.
- (33) Ibid., p. 140.
- (34) *Congressional Record* (November 18, 1974), 19451.
- (35) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 114, pt. 22), October 3, 1968), 29278.
- (36) Ibid.
- (37) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 125, pt. 5), March 1, 1977, 5635.
- (38) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 115, pt. 15), July 15, 1969, 19859.
- (39) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 116, pt. 20), August 5, 1970, 27438.
- (40) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 117, pt. 9), April 26, 1971, 11903.
- (41) Ibid., 11909.
- (42) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 118, pt 21), August 14, 1972, 28032.
- (43) Ibid., 28037.
- (44) Ibid.
- (45) Fulbright, *The Crippled Giant*, p. 46.
- (46) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 120, pt. 9), April 23, 1974, 11301.
- (47) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 121, pt. 7), March 26, 1975, 8664.
- (48) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 125, pt. 12), June 4, 1979, 14903.
- (49) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 120, pt. 3), February 8, 1974, 3143.
- (50) *Senate Hearings of 1974 on Detente*, p. 258.
- (51) *New York Times* (11 December 1972), p. 1.
- (52) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 120, pt. 3), February 8, 1974, 3143.

- (53) "Détente and Individual Liberty," (February 13, 1974), Jackson Papers (200-50), University of Washington Library.
- (54) *New York Times* (2 August 1975), p. 8.
- (55) "Détente and Individual Liberty," (February 13, 1974), Jackson Papers (200-50), University of Washington Library.
- (56) *Congressional Record* (Vol. 125, pt. 14), July 13, 1979, 18600.
- (57) Fulbright, *The Arrogance of Power* (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 72.
- (58) Kissinger, *The Necessity of Choice* (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), pp. 207-8.
- (59) *Ibid.*, p. 296.
- (60) "Kissinger Interview," *The Economist* (February 3, 1979): 1.
- (61) Kristol, "The Doctor's Dilemma," *International Review* (Spring, 1974): 7.
- (62) *Ibid.*, p. 12.

**THE REVOLUTION OF RISING EXPECTATIONS,
NATIONALISM AND THE PROSPECTS FOR FREEDOM
IN THE SOVIET BLOC**

By Oleg Zinam

In this study the term Eastern Europe is used to refer to the six members of COMECON — Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania, whose economies operate under Soviet tutelage. The term West is used to refer to the nations of Western Europe, Northern America, and for practical purposes, Japan also. The primary object is to examine the impact of Western trade with and loans to the East European and Soviet economies on the prospects for social and political change in the Soviet bloc which are so widely discussed today.

There is general agreement that the Soviet Union needs Western trade and technology for at least three reasons: (a) to modernize its inefficient, over-centralized planning methods; (b) to improve the efficiency of its economy as a base for its military-industrial complex; and (c) to modernize its non-defense sectors without transfer of technological talents and resources from top priority defense sectors.(1) Eastern Europe needs Western trade and technology for primarily economic reasons. Without the importation of advanced technology from the West, Eastern European nations cannot sustain adequate economic growth to meet the demands of their people for improvements in their standard of living.(2) The need for Western trade is enhanced by (a) the general scarcity of advanced technology in the Communist bloc; (b) the "lack of stimulus to produce quality products" and (c) "inadequate price and monetary relations" among its members.(3) In their efforts to expand trade with the West, East European countries are caught in a vicious circle: Without importation of Western technology they cannot attain the quality of exports acceptable to the West; without substantial exports to the West they cannot pay for the import of technological goods. To break this vicious circle they need a substantial extension of loans from the West. Yet their indebtedness has reached such a high level that further expansion of loans appears to be a risky financial venture, not really justified by expected gains from future