

POLITICAL ÉLITES AND PARTY ORGANIZATION IN GREECE: AN ENTREPRENEURIAL MODEL

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The influence of élite dominant groups in shaping national and international developments has been of sustaining interest to political scientists and political sociologists alike. By élite dominant groups is meant all those who by profession and institutional affiliation occupy structural positions. These positions are strategically located in the social and political structures. Because of their strategic location, élite groups directly or indirectly influence policies and decisions that have far reaching consequences for political and social change. This is clearly the position in Greece, where the ruling PASOK party and the major opposition party, New Democracy, are organized around charismatic political leaders, whereas the KKE or Communist Party, operates on a strict basis of Marxist organizational principles.

The literature on the conceptual and empirical analyses of élites in the United States has been quite extensive and includes the writings of Lasswell (1961, 1965), C.W. Mills (1956), Hunter (1953, 1959), Dahl (1961), Presthus (1964), Keller (1963), Domhoff (1971, 1978a and 1978b), Dye (1983), and Baltzell (1964). The literature on political élites and political development in other countries is also extensive. To

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mention only a few comparative works one has to include Robins (1976); Czudnowski ed. (1983a and b); Prewitt (1970); Putnam (1976); Useem (1984).

One can distinguish two major theoretical and empirical streams of thought in the study and analyses of *élites* in general and political *élites* in particular: the aristocratic or conservative and the radical views. The former draws from the writings of classical *élite* theorists and their contemporaries while the latter view is represented by radical structuralists such as Mills, Hunter, and Domhoff. The aristocratic theory of *élites* is predicated on two assumptions which are interrelated. The first is the belief in the natural superiority of the *élites* and the second in the necessity of *élites* for any directed political and social change in society. This latter view sees the masses as distrustful and inconsistent in initiating any substantive changes and/or incapable of ruling themselves.

In contrast to the conservatives, the radical analysts are rather critical of *élites*. They point out the inherent undemocratic and oligarchic tendencies of *élites*. They do not believe in *élite* inevitability nor do they perceive the masses as inconsistent or distrustful. Both radical and conservative *élite* analysts view the *élites* as a cohesive group. C. W. Mills (1956), for example, described American society as ruled by a "power *élite*" — a tripartite power group of corporate executives, top government officials, and high ranking military chiefs. Unlike Mills and Hunter who stressed structural aspects, Domhoff emphasized the social nature of the governing class which he equates with the capitalist ruling class. The study of *élite* integration and recruitment is central to the understanding and behavior of *élites* and leaders alike. Michels (1959) argued that there is a social-psychological transformation of political *élites* and leaders when they occupy positions and roles of authority. It was his contention that there is a tendency among *élites* and leaders of organizations/institutions, including political ones, toward what he called the "iron law of oligarchy." Political

élite integration has a bearing on social and political change. Likewise, recruitment can be both an important dimension of élite integration. Who is recruited to fill incumbent élite positions is important in fostering unity or disunity among the élites.

While the literature on élite recruitment is substantial this is not the case with respect of élite integration. Most élite integration studies deal with societal integration in general, especially among developing and emerging nations and societies. The study of élite integration and recruitment in society and polity will be an exercise in futility if it were not for the consequences that both phenomena have on such specific and important issues as stability and democracy, oligarchy, system's effectiveness, political conflict, extremism, and social and/or political change in general. Numerous scholars, for example, have advanced hypotheses concerning the consequences of élite integration and recruitment. To mention only a few, one has to include Lipset (1981), Field and Higley (1973), Putman (1976), Michels (1959), C. W. Mills (1956).

The argument of élite integration as fostering political stability and effectiveness is very persuasive. Élite integration especially among developing and emerging nations is exceedingly difficult to achieve due to fragmentation and the onset of socioeconomic modernization in these societies. In the 1950s and 1960s, many believed that military élite integration through a proliferation of military coups and counter coups would lead to élite cohesiveness and therefore directed political and social change from above. These beliefs, however, had no empirical support. Neither civilian political party rule nor military rule can guarantee élite unity. Even if it does, military élite unity or one party rule may foster oligarchic and undemocratic tendencies. One can find many examples of prætorian and oligarchical rule in most of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.

For some, élite integration fosters political stability and effectiveness, for others it leads to oligarchic tendencies. Élite

integration may be undesirable in a democracy. Élite integration and stability might be good for business and multinationals but not necessarily for human rights and individual freedom. Élite unity can be achieved basically in two ways – through conformity (élitism, oligarchy) – or through diversity (pluralism, democracy, interdependence).

In terms of recruitment there is a similar argument. For some élite recruitment is heavily drawn from the upper levels of society and therefore unrepresentative of society at large. For others élite recruitment does not have to be representative as long as élites are genuinely interested in the aspirations and the legitimate demands and rights of people. Both of these views are supported by different groups and individuals with varying oligarchical or democratic tendencies.

A number of students of Greek politics and society (Legg, 1969; Pollis, 1965; Kourvetaris, 1971a and b, 1977; Kourvetaris/Dobratz, 1984a and b) have suggested that Greece's problem as an unstable democracy lies not so much in the nature of its people but in the process of recruitment and personality of its leaders. In other words, it is more of a problem concerning the top rather than a problem at the bottom of the social and political structure. The dominant groups have been one of the major problems of Greece since inception as an independent nation in the mid-19th century. The modern political and social history of Greece is replete with frequent military interventions, coups, counter-coups, revolts, civil wars, and political crises, in general.

Recently, there has been an effort to empirically study social and political leaders in Greek society. Alexander (1964) studied the Greek industrial élites, Kourvetaris (1971a and b) the military, Kourvetaris/Dobratz (1984a and b) Greek politics and class élites, Legg (1969) the Greek political parties, and Meynaud (1966) political forces in Greece.¹ The frequent military interventions and the breakdown of democratic regimes in the past have contributed to the negative perceptions of the people toward the effectiveness of their political leaders. Such negative public perceptions may

weaken the effectiveness of the political system.

In the overall world, the Greek capitalist system finds itself in the semi-periphery. While Greece has made relatively great economic progress in the last 30-40 years, its political institutions, bureaucratic, and political leadership have not developed as rapidly. Greece has experienced political instability, frequent military interventions, and praetorian rule. While the literature on national and/or cross national studies of political, and other social élites and leaders, in general, is substantial, in the case of Greece we find very little on leaders and élites in general and political élites in particular.

The emphasis in this paper will be on the integration of élites in the major Greek political parties. *Élite integration* will be defined as cohesiveness and unity of those who occupy different levels of political positions.

A Profile of Political Forces in Greece

On October 18, 1981, and again on June 2, 1985, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), under the charismatic leadership of Andreas Papandreu, an American educated former professor of economics, won landslide victories with 48.06% and 46.51% of the popular vote and the majority of the 300 member parliament (*Voule*) or 172 and 162 deputies respectively. The PASOK victories gave Greece two socialist governments in the last eight years. Andreas Papandreu became prime minister and minister of defense in the first socialist government. PASOK's platform was clearly opposed to that of the New Democracy, which had been in power since the restoration of democracy in 1974. In his campaign Andreas Papandreu promised "allaghe" meaning change. Most people perceived PASOK as the party of change while the ruling party of the New Democracy was perceived as the party of the establishment and the privileged classes. In most domestic and foreign policy issues, PASOK was the antithesis of the New Democracy. While the New Democracy had a basic pro-Western platform (pro-

NATO, pro-EEC, and pro-U.S. bases in Greece), PASOK ran on a pro-Greek independence stand rather than adherence to any superpower. A number of polls indicated that the major issue that worried people was inflation. (Greece has one of the highest rates of inflation in Europe running currently about 18%-20%.) PASOK capitalized on anti-Western, anti-American feelings among the young, idealistic, and liberal-oriented Greek voters especially in the 1981 electoral campaign.

Since 1974 Greece has experienced a series of dramatic sociopolitical and economic changes, both on the national and international levels, which have had far reaching consequences for Greek society and politics. We can only list some of the most dramatic changes here: The disengagement of the military from politics and the restoration of civilian government in 1974; the adoption of a new constitution and a change from a crowned constitutional democracy to a republic; the legalization of the Greek Communist Party (KKE); the withdrawal of Greece from the military wing of NATO in 1974 (due to NATO's tacit support of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus) and the more recent reentry of Greece into the military wing of NATO in 1980; the official accession of Greece to the EEC on January 1, 1981; the election of the first socialist government in Greece on October 18, 1981; and its re-election on June 2, 1985.

Greece has a multi-party system. Despite the proliferation of a smaller number of political parties and political groupings and/or political formations in Greece, there are three major political parties and/or political formations in Greece. The governing Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) is a left of the center political movement rather than a political party. The opposition, the New Democracy, is the second largest party — the old political right — which has tried to change and adopt a more middle of the road political image. The old center party disappeared in the 1981 national elections. Its more liberal faction joined PASOK and its more conservative faction joined the New Democracy. The

third largest party of Greece is the Communist Party (KKE) which was split into two factions, those who follow the Moscow Communist Party line (Exterior) and the Eurocommunists (Interior). The pro-Moscow faction is the strongest of the two and elects about a dozen deputies or receives 10%-12% of the popular vote in national elections. The Eurocommunists or the Interior is a small party which does not receive more than 2% of the popular vote or elect more than one deputy. Recently the Eurocommunists renamed their party the Party of the Left. Their leader is Leonidas Kyrkos, a former deputy who served in both the Greek and European Parliaments at different times.

The New Democracy Party is the progeny of the Greek Radical Union Party, founded and dominated by one man, Constantine Caramanlis, the Cincinnatus of Modern Greece, who dominated Greek politics for a half century. Likewise, PASOK is a product of Andreas Papandreou, an economics professor and a son of the late George Papandreou, prime minister of Greece. Political élites are not unlike other social élites in Greece. In general, social élites, and political élites in particular, are competitive, antagonistic, personalistic, and factional. The political game is survival in a highly competitive and antagonistic social structure in which political rewards and political power are as scarce as anything else in society in which clientelism, in-group cronyism, kinship and family solidarity are institutionalized. In Greece, all political parties, with the exception of the KKE, tend to be personality bound. Parties and political movements are virtually inseparable from their leaders. People more readily identify with the leader of the party or movement than the party platform.

The *Voule*, the Greek parliament, is the main legislative branch of government and the party that controls the majority of deputies is the governing party. Greece is a parliamentary presidential democracy. It has a prime minister and a president of the republic. The prime minister is the leader of the majority party and serves for four years. The

president is elected by the 2/3 majority of the *Voule*. All Greek citizens who are 18 years of age or older are eligible to vote. To be elected as a deputy candidates must be 25 years of age. Certain civil servants, military officers, civil servants of municipalities, and state employees cannot run for office unless they resign their appointments.

In his study of social composition and political cartography of *Voule*, Metaxas (1981) has found that in the national elections of 1964, 1974, and 1977, 60% of the deputies were lawyers and doctors (50% mostly lawyers). Metaxas gives three major reasons why lawyers are over-represented in the Greek *Voule*. These are: professional, class, and the bureaucratic function of the state. By profession, lawyers are better equipped and socialized to succeed as politicians. They develop a political consciousness. They deal with personal freedom. The majority of the lawyers are progressive. Metaxas also found that in 1964 91.91%, in 1974 96.75%, and in 1977 99.41% were university graduates. Compared with all the parties, the center-right political forces were better educated. Those who studied overseas and the more traditional political forces were found to be better educated. PASOK came second. In terms of Ph.D.s, the traditional political forces came first, the center second, and PASOK third. From the analysis of biographical material of parliamentarians, Perdikaris (1981) found that the nature of social and economic transformation in Greece, to a large extent, was related to the nature of social composition of its political leadership. The sociological composition of the parliament represents an expression of the relatedness between the social class and systems of dominant values.

Data Collection and Research Procedures

The data were collected during my sabbatical in the spring of 1984. In the summers of 1982 and 1983, I visited Greece and familiarized myself with the new political forces developing in Greece. My interest in Greek politics in general and political élites in particular spans my entire

academic career. During my frequent visits to Greece I kept abreast and became acquainted with the new socialist political élites by conducting a pilot study in the summer of 1983 to be followed up with a study of political recruitment and integration of political élites later. I mailed a 4-page questionnaire to all 300 Greek deputies in the summer of 1983. A variety of demographic and issue oriented Likert type questions on domestic and foreign affairs were included in the pilot study. The rate of return, however, was very small (10-15%) and I did not follow up because, in the meantime, I had to return to the U.S.A.

On the basis of the pilot study and extensive reading, I finalized the interview schedule which I used in the spring 1984. Originally, I planned to interview 1/4 of the 300 deputies of the 1981 parliament (*Voule*) from the two major political parties of PASOK (The Panhellenic Socialist Party $n=166$) and ND (New Democracy $n=113$), and all the independents ($n=9$) and communists ($n=12$) represented in the 1981 *Voule*. Despite my Herculean efforts to contact deputies from all political parties, I was unable to arrange or was refused interviews with most PASOK and communist deputies, with the exception of two PASOK women deputies and one member of the KKE (Interior), who subsequently became the leader of the EAP or the Party of the Left (formerly the Eurocommunist Interior Party). The reasons for refusal were simply that they were instructed by the central committee or the leadership of their party not to give any interviews. My subsequent efforts to contact deputies of PASOK were also unsuccessful, and consequently most of my interviews were conducted with deputies of the New Democracy, the opposition party in the Greek *Voule*. Thus PASOK was presented to me through the eyes of the opposition and my own perceptions of the political forces at work.

All in all, I managed to complete 37 interviews of one to two hours duration each. The interview schedule included questions on their political career and beliefs of politicians,

their view on domestic and foreign issues, political trust, perceptions of political leadership, government policies, democracy, oligarchy, the dominant groups/institutions/élites in Greek society and a number of socio-demographic questions. Of the 37 respondents 30 were deputies of ND, 4 independents, 2 PASOK, and 1 Eurocommunist. Of the four independent deputies three were formerly PASOK members who became independent in protest of PASOK's policies. During the June 2, 1985, national elections, two of the three independents were elected deputies under the New Democracy Party. All three who quit PASOK were directly or indirectly connected with the armed forces as former officers (one a retired general, another a first lieutenant, and the third a former deputy minister of defense in the PASOK government). All three were leaning toward the center or New Democracy. The fourth independent was the grandson of a former prime minister of Greece. This deputy had been elected to the *Voule* fourteen times — and was by far the oldest and the most experienced politician, who had served many times as minister in previous governments and was founder of a national party — a conservative and an extremely educated person. He spoke English and other foreign languages fluently.

An Entrepreneurial Model of Élite Recruitment and Integration: Discussion and Analysis

In this analysis interviews were held with deputies elected in the 1981 national elections which, like those of 1985, resulted in a victory for PASOK, the Greek socialists. Of 300 deputies in the *Voule*, 288 were elected and 12 were chosen from the political parties as outstanding individuals — known as *Vouleftes* of *epikrateias* (a sort of superdelegate or honorary deputy). Of the 300 *Vouleftes* represented in the *Voule* as of Nov. 5, 1984, there were 166 PASOK, 113 ND, 12 KKE, and 9 independents.

As a group, the *Vouleftes* are professional, educated, by and large all male, and upper middle to upper class Greeks.

Almost half of them (138 or 41.4%) were lawyers, 27 or 8.1% were engineers, 17 or 5.1%, were military officers, 14.5% teachers, 19 or 5.7% university professors, 11 or 3.3% economists. The rest represent an assortment of businessmen, civil servants, sociologists, bankers, accountants, actors, journalists, farmers, industrialists, and clerical or blue collar workers.

In terms of frequency of deputies elected to *Voule*, it was found that the majority of PASOK deputies were elected for the first term. This was to be expected because it was a new political party. With an exception of two dozen or so deputies and ministers, the majority of deputies and ministers of the governing party were new. This was less true of the opposition and communist parties. In the 1985 *Voule*, PASOK had 161 deputies out of 300. In addition, there was a new president of the Greek Republic who replaced Constantine Caramanlis when the latter resigned after PASOK decided not to support his re-election.

On the far right was EPEN, the National Political Union. Its leader is George Papadopoulos, the coup-maker and dictator who ruled Greece during 1967-1974, but was subsequently imprisoned when his government was overthrown. EPEN participated in the Euroelections of June 17, 1984, but received only 2.29 percent of the vote, electing one representative for the European parliament. However, in the June 5, 1985 national elections it failed to receive enough votes to elect any deputy to the *Voule*.

With the exception of the Communist Party (KKE), both Exterior (Soviet-aligned) and the Party of the Left or the former Interior (Eurocommunist), all other political parties in Greece are organized around their leader. Charismatic political leadership plays an exceedingly important role in Greek politics which essentially represents a three party system with PASOK and New Democracy as the dominant political parties and the KKE holding a smaller position. All other minor political parties currently play a rather insignificant role in Greek electoral politics.

Recruitment and Integration of Political Élites

There is an entrepreneurial model for the recruitment and integration of the Greek political élites operating through what might be called "push" and "pull" factors. The processes of recruitment and integration are quite different for each of the three parties represented in the 1981 *Voules*. Although over 100 political parties were legally registered, only a dozen or so took part in the national elections of 1981. In Greece there are as many political parties as there are political entrepreneurs, and the saying is that if two Greeks disagree they start two different political parties. There is some truth to this hyperbole. For purposes of conceptual clarity each of the three political parties will be discussed as entrepreneurial models. The term entrepreneurial is used here to mean, broadly, the innovative, business-like political leader and his party or movement who tries to attract votes in an ideologically charged marketplace of political sloganeers and political marketeers. The voters are seen as politicized consumers who shop for political ideas and products offered by the political entrepreneurs.

PASOK began as more of a political movement than a political party. It started outside Greece, mainly in Western Europe and Canada, as a protest movement against the military dictatorship. It was then known as the PAK (the Panhellenic Anti-dictatorship Movement). In the words of many of the opposition members, PASOK is not really a party but a movement. The reason PASOK does not want to establish itself in the customary form of a regular political party, according to many of my respondents, is the lack of consistency in its political ideology. PASOK is more innovative and flexible. The embodiment of PASOK is its charismatic leader, Andreas Papandreou, who was arrested on the eve of military dictatorship on April 21, 1967, and then released by the coup-makers in response to worldwide pressure from the academic community. Opposition to military dictatorship thus started as an anti-junta movement

abroad (PAK). This developed into the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), which has for some years been the governing socialist party of Greece.

Integration of political élites takes place within each party and does not cross political lines. Even within each political party there are degrees of political integration. The more committed the members are to a party ideology or to a political leader, the more integrated and cohesive the political élite. What unites most PASOK political élites are their attachment to their political leader and their share of political ideology and political activism. PASOK political élites are still in the making. With the exception of three or four PASOK cabinet ministers, PASOK politicians are little known beyond the political district they represent. The entrepreneurial model of élite recruitment and integration is depicted diagrammatically in figure 1.

There are three sets of characteristics relating to the integration of the political élites in Greece. The *first* set includes ascriptive/sociodemographic factors (age, cohort generation, sex, education, region, social class, and the like). The *second* includes characteristics such as opportunity, associational, and sociometric ties, and client-patron relations. Both of these sets represent the pulling factors which pull political eligibles and political activists toward a particular political party or movement. The *third* set of factors includes such pushing sociopsychological and dynamic factors as motivation, ambition, ability, political efficacy. All three sets of factors, or ABC, interact with each other to explain élite recruitment and integration. AB and AC represent the pulling factors, while BC (the base) represents the pushing factors. A tripartite model of political recruitment is depicted in Fig. 2. In contrast with the governing political party (PASOK), the other two parties do not have any governing political élites on the executive cabinet level. Members of the PASOK cabinet and the committee chairman are recruited from the pool of activists and subélites.

For purposes of brevity, the concepts of recruitment and

Fig. 1. An Entrepreneurial Model of Recruitment and Integration of Political Élites





Fig. 2. A Tripartite Model of Political Recruitment in Greece



integration will be discussed simultaneously within each political party or movement.

PASOK

The recruitment and integration of PASOK legislative and ministerial political élites is dominated by the party's charismatic leader, Andreas Papandreou, prime minister of Greece and chairman of PASOK. Papandreou is the integrating force of his political movement. Most PASOK legislative and ministerial political élites are new people with little or no political experience. With a few exceptions the majority of PASOK recruits, especially on the ministerial, key legislative, and committee levels, are those who are faithful and adhere to the political ideology of PASOK. This ideology is a mixture of neo-nationalism, Third World socialism, and "New Deal" American legislative reform. The political integration of PASOK legislative and ministerial élites is facilitated not only by its strong political and charismatic leader but by the pulling and pushing factors of political forces at work both in Greece proper and abroad. The threat of Turkey in Cyprus and the Aegean unites both the people and its political élites. PASOK, more than the New Democracy, favors change and legislative reform. It reflects a demographic and political shift within the Greek electorate. It is a movement of the lower and lower middle classes, the small farmers, small businessmen, and young professionals. It is a political party/movement of the less privileged classes of Greek society. With a few exceptions PASOK has managed to keep its supporters intact. Those who disagreed with PASOK and its leadership left the movement and joined either the communist party (at least one former minister who resigned joined and was elected on the communist ticket) or the New Democracy (two brothers and a former general left PASOK and ran on the ticket of New Democracy). The latter disagreed with PASOK because of the abolition of the "cross of preference" of deputies. PASOK as the governing party abolished the cross of political preference from constituents

who elected their local deputy. The deputies now are elected nationally. This means that the party leader has more power to select who is going to be on the slate and thus control his legislative and cabinet members. The argument made by PASOK for abolishing the cross was the tendency of Greek politicians and the Greek electorate to establish client-patron relations which were perceived as favoring the more privileged classes of Greece (Mouzelis 1978, Kourvetaris/Dobratz 1984b). Almost all New Democracy deputy respondents saw the abolition of the cross as a decline in the representative nature of the legislature, and an increase of the power of the executive branch of government. However, PASOK argued that the abolition of constituency preference helped the country "by undermining clientelism and thus strengthening democracy."

In legislative matters, deputies follow the party line and, in most issues, vote as a block. As a group the PASOK deputies and ministers are young, inexperienced, but ambitious and highly motivated. They follow their leader more faithfully and conform to the party line. Those who find reason to disagree with PASOK policies either resign or are forced out of the party. In this way PASOK maintains its unity.

The ideology of the socialist party is defined in a booklet known as the Declaration of the 3rd of September, 1974, which lays down the fundamental principles and aims of the Panhellenic Socialist movement. A translation of this document from Greek into English is contained in the book by Spourdalakis (1988: 288-296). Although often stridently anti-Western and anti-American, PASOK did not fulfill its threat to take Greece out of NATO and EEC or to close down the American bases in Greece as it threatened to do in the 1981 pre-election campaign. During the 1985 pre-election campaign, PASOK chose to play down foreign issues. In general, however, PASOK tends to be more critical of U.S. government policies than New Democracy.

New Democracy

New Democracy is the progeny of the "old right," which adopted its present name to attract voters and has modified its political ideology somewhat to adjust to changing political circumstances. Yet it still represents the people who have dominated Greek politics for most of the 150 years of Greece's independence from Turkey. New Democracy, like PASOK has a left, a center, and a right faction. For the last few years, it has moved to capture the old center, which was eclipsed during the 1981 national elections and Euroelections of June 1984 and again in the 1985 national elections. The founder and former leader of the New Democracy is Constantine Caramanlis, a former prime minister and former president of Greece. Mr. Constantine Mitsotakis has since become the leader of New Democracy after Evangelos Averoff resigned from the party for reasons of health and age. Mitsotakis was elected to the leadership of the New Democracy with a 70-41 vote of the 111-member parliamentary group of his party, and he was re-elected again in 1985. Mitsotakis and Papandreou share a mutual hatred for each other which goes back to 1965.

Constantine Mitsotakis is a senior politician who has been active in politics for a long time. He became the archrival of the present prime minister of Greece, Andreas Papandreou, in 1965 when he and a number of deputy members of the Center Union Party of the late prime minister George Papandreou, the father of the present prime minister and chairman of PASOK, defected from the party over a dispute regarding the ministry of defense portfolio. After the fall of Papandreou's Center Union government, the Center Union split, and Mitsotakis became the leader of the anti-Papandreou faction of the party, known as the *apostates*. According to many PASOK politicians and students of modern Greek politics, the defection of these Center party politicians generated a series of political intrigues led by the then King Constantine, which culminated in the military dictatorship of April 21, 1967. As a result, Andreas

Papandreou has accused Mitsotakis of being responsible for the 1967 military dictatorship and the subsequent invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974.

New Democracy suffers from an identity problem of leadership. The departure of its aging leader Constantine Caramanlis *and* elderly leaders has created a vacuum and internal dissension problem. For the last fourteen years, New Democracy changed leadership four times. The departure of Constantine Caramanlis resulted in a struggle for political power within the party and its ability to face PASOK was and still is the major issue among the contenders of political power of the second largest political party of Greece.

The New Democracy party was found to be less cohesive in its top political leadership but more cohesive at the legislative deputy level. On the élite political power level one could discern at least five political factions within the New Democracy Party. Three of the political leaders were in their 70s and two were in their 50s. In the 1981 national elections, George Rallis, former prime minister and a son of a former prime minister of the time of the German occupation, ran against Andreas Papandreou and lost. Mr. Evangelos Averoff, a former minister of foreign affairs and national defense, was elected chairman of the New Democracy party. In the June 17, 1984, Euroelections, in his bid to defeat PASOK, Mr. Averoff and his party failed to win the majority of the votes, although his party elected nine deputies (including himself), with PASOK electing ten, and the rest going to the communists except for one elected by the EPEN — the far right party. In New Democracy, Mr. Averoff was later replaced by Mr. Mitsotakis.

The system of recruitment of New Democracy deputies follows the party's conservative political ideology. Overall the members of the New Democracy political élite were found to be more experienced, more well-to-do, and older than their PASOK counterparts. Despite the election of a number of young and dynamic new deputies, the New Democracy party still has the public image of a conservative political

party which favors the rich and the more privileged classes of Greece. However, more recently the New Democracy Party was split between the old guard, headed by Mitsotakis, and the forces of Constantine Stephanopoulos, a younger and more dynamic New Democracy politician who represents a force for renewal within the New Democracy Party.

KKE

The most integrated and committed political élite is the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). Organized strictly on the political ideology of Marxism-Leninism, rather than on the basis of loyalty to a single charismatic leader, the Greek communists of the Exterior stress a world view along the traditional Soviet model, whereas the Eurocommunist Party of the Left follows a more independent national course. The Communists are very much a minority in parliament, and their policies remain anti-Western, anti-NATO, anti-American, and anti-capitalist. It is critical both of New Democracy and PASOK.

As the old Marxists die out due to age, new recruits are coming to the party. The communists are strong amongst the working class, particularly those of a refugee and factory background. But many young recruits are found among high school and university students and the KKE draws about 10 to 12 percent in any given national election or Euroelection. In 1968 it was split into the KKE (Exterior) and KKE (Interior or Party of the Left). The latter is much smaller and draws the more intellectually and professionally oriented Greeks to its ranks. It is similar to the Eurocommunist political parties of Italy and France, and it is independent of Russia. It is critical of all three major political parties including the KKE. It is against the politics of polarization and supports the EEC in the interest of the "European working class." It declares itself to be against any hegemony or paternalism from either the East or West. In some ways it is similar to PASOK. The Eurocommunists are an offset of KKE who follow a more independent line and are critical of

the monolithic posture of KKE. They support the political and economic integration of European nations. Communists who run for deputies are recruited from the membership of the communist party, and they must show allegiance to the principles of Marxism and be pro-Soviet in their policies.

Since the restoration of democracy in Greece in 1974, the KKE has been recognized and has participated in the national elections, Euroelections, and municipal elections. Over a period of fourteen years the KKE has not increased its voting power. Its leader Charilaos Florakis is an old warrior and stout pro-Russian communist who opposes the U.S., NATO, EEC, and Western European and American capitalism. By international standards the Communist Party of Greece is more conservative and orthodox in its ideology than the Russian communist party itself. The leadership and its deputies are held together by its anti-Western, anti-American, anti-NATO, and anti-EEC posture. It is critical of the New Democracy, PASOK, and the Eurocommunists. Some of its members are well known internationally. Mikis Theodorakis, for example, the internationally known composer, was a deputy of the KKE. The KKE draws from the hard core working class, the students, those who were victimized during the civil war and the military dictatorship, the unemployed, the underemployed, and the descendants of Asia Minor refugees.

Conclusions, Propositions, and a Commentary

In this paper an effort was made to explore the issues of recruitment and integration of political élites in Greece – no effort was made to operationalize the major concepts. An entrepreneurial model of recruitment and integration and a tripartite model of recruitment were suggested. PASOK, like New Democracy before it, was founded and built on the personality of one man, Constantine Caramanlis. Like Caramanlis, Andreas Papandreou, the chairman of PASOK and prime minister of Greece, has become the leading political personality and force in modern Greek politics.

PASOK is a political party in the making and is synonymous with its charismatic leader. Papandreou has followed somewhat similar paths of establishing his political power as Constantine Caramanlis did before him.

Political élite integration was achieved as long as Caramanlis was in full control of his political party. However, it began to disintegrate when he decided to step down from his party and assume the presidency of the Greek Republic. Since his departure from the top leadership of his party his successors have not succeeded in uniting the party and leading New Democracy to victory. One can suggest that the New Democracy Party faces the same problem as the Democratic Party in the United States. The difference, however, is that while in the United States politics and the electorate have been moving toward neo-conservatism for the last ten years or so in Greece and other Mediterranean European societies (Spain, Portugal), politics and the electorate are moving to the left. It is not by accident that all three nations have socialist governments following the collapse of military dictatorships and the disengagement of the military élites from civilian politics.

Greece along with other Mediterranean European societies have been divided by a host of issues in the past — royalists vs republicans, church vs the state, political left vs political right. Greece has experienced many military coups, countercoups, civil wars, revolts in its recent political history. Following the restoration of democracy in Greece in 1974 and the collapse of the military dictatorship, the New Democracy Party opened the door for a shift in Greek politics — from the political right to the political left. New Democracy and its leader Constantine Caramanlis restored democracy and recognized the Communist Party.

Élite political factionalism is the norm rather than the exception in modern Greek politics. Élite factionalism led to the downfall of the Center Union government in 1965, which in turn led to the military dictatorship takeover April 21, 1967. The more cohesive and integrated a political élite the

greater the likelihood for institutional stability. Likewise, the less cohesive a political élite is the greater the likelihood of political instability. Stability, however, does not always contribute to freedom and human rights. Stability can be brought up by a military dictatorship as in most countries in the Third World at the expense of democracy and freedom. Democracy is better served when unity and cohesiveness are achieved through diversity and not through conformity. Diversity is the lifeblood of democracy. Élite political integration is more characteristic of oligarchical political regimes. The greater the openness and the more democratic the political regime and its élites the less the cohesiveness and integration of the political leadership.

Charismatic political leadership is characteristic of those societies undergoing a crisis and intense social change. Greece is a society in transition, a nation in search of an identity, from a traditional society to a modern, industrialized nation (Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1987). The greatest problem charismatic political leaders face is the problem of succession when the political leader who holds the party together dies or retires. This was true of New Democracy. It is suggested that unless PASOK moves away from charismatic politics, in due time, it will, like New Democracy, face the problems of a political vacuum and internal dissension.²

According to Lipset (1981), parties of representation (as compared to parties of integration) are less likely to resort to political extremism. In countries in which parties of representation exist (Anglo-Saxon, Scandinavian), and cross-pressures are allowed to operate, there is a greater chance for democracy. The opposite is also true. In military dictatorships and one party states, where cross pressures are not allowed to operate, there is less chance for democracy and a greater intensity of political extremism. Lipset argues that a two party system is more likely to have a low political intensity than a multiparty system. A two party system is more stable politically, it exhibits less ideological political conflict and permits more political compromise than a multi-

party system. Greece has a multi-party system, therefore one must expect Greece's political system to be more unstable and conflict prone.

Political activists within a political élite are more likely to hold intense political beliefs and attitudes than non-activists, and as such political activism within a political élite is a deterrent to élite integration. Greek political élites must try to minimize political passions not only during elections but also during debates in the *Voule*. The political leaders must show more integrity and devotion to their country. Political parties and political leaders must lead the nation and not divide it into polarized political factions.

Who runs or who is appointed to a political office is important. The criteria for such an appointment or election must be public trust, competence, public service and dedication to the ideals of democracy, freedom, and human rights. The common good and national interest must guide those in positions of authority. Greece as a nation, society, and culture is too important to be left to the political intrigues of charismatic personalities. The Greeks invented politics in the sense that they were the first to introduce participatory democracy and legislative politics. To cite Pericles' notion of Athenian democracy "Here each individual is interested not only in his own affairs, but in the affairs of the state as well....we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all."

Footnotes

1. Most recently a number of general works on Greek politics and the Greek socialists have been published. Richard Clogg's *Parties and Elections in Greece* (1987) is a post World War II historical survey of parties and elections in Greece. In his introduction to *The Rise of the Greek Socialist Party* (1988), Michalis Spourdalakis states that his book is an effort "to explain the failure of PASOK to reach its (radical) potential and fulfill its promises" (1988:1). Another book is by Nicholas Stavrou *Greece Under Socialism*, Caratzaas Brothers, New York, London, 1988.

George Kourvetaris and Betty Dobratz's *A Profile of Modern Greece in Search of Identity* (1987) is a general book on Greek social institutions including modern Greek politics. The analysis and interpretations are based on social science research of the

last 25 years.

2. Such dissension is already present following the recent banking scandal known as the Koskotas affair. Indeed, the Koskotas banking scandal has badly shaken the Papandreu government and has led to many ministerial resignations. A recent "no confidence" motion by the opposition was defeated but new elections are scheduled for June 1989, and many observers believe that Papandreu will lose the elections. The problems of PASOK are the problems of Papandreu himself. He underwent a serious heart operation, and then fell in love with a former stewardess half his age, abandoning his American born wife. At present it would seem that it will require a miracle for Papandreu and PASOK to survive this series of political and personal crises.

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SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE FAILURE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY

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Within post-colonial African societies the initial determinant for the creation of new public enterprises and the modification and perpetuation of the existing former colonial parastatal boards tends to be the nature of the colonial relationship and the circumstances within which national political independence was achieved.

Where the colonial socio-economic relationship tended to be pervasive (e.g. in the so-called "colonies of settlement" such as Kenya and Zimbabwe) with the economy dominated by the colonial state through parastatal bodies, and by the representatives of European commercial/mercantile companies, individual European merchants, syndicates etc., complemented by "pariah" entrepreneurs of Lebanese (e.g. in West Africa) or Asian (e.g. in East Africa) origin, the colonial economy offered little scope for the development of a vigorous indigenous entrepreneurial class. Apart from the competitively stifling influence of these established and powerful foreign entrepreneurs on the development of indigenous entrepreneurs, in some cases such as Kenya and Zimbabwe the colonial state had actively instituted legal statutes specifically to exclude the development of indigenous entrepreneurs in any significant commercial line outside petty trade. In general, European commercial groups dominated the commanding heights of colonial commerce viz., wholesale import and export, bulk retailing etc. The "pariah" entrepreneurs operated immediately below these colonial commercial giants, breaking down the bulk-retailed goods into smaller units for distribution among the in-