

RISKS AND IMPLICATIONS OF A FADING THREAT

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There are changes taking place in the Soviet Union. To deny this on the theory that what we have been witnessing is all disinformation is not realistic. There is a tendency to claim that the changes, and Soviet activities associated with these, are all part of a communist/Gorbachev conspiracy to create a mirage of a new Russia that poses little or no threat to the Free World. While such a position appeals to some circles it does not accord with an objective appraisal of the present scene.

Some Soviet new policies are no doubt real efforts at change to meet needs such as to overcome technological inferiority, to provide adequate consumer goods, to cope with the bureaucratic inefficiencies inherent in the communist system, and to generate a climate conducive to innovations essential to competing with the Free World.

Some apparently new Soviet policies are no doubt efforts to further classic communist goals by different means. These are often perceived in the West as reflecting changes in Soviet attitudes and as such can result in erroneous — if not dangerous — Free World reactions. But these various possibilities and their potential impact are mere trees in the forest when it comes to the consequences we may face if what we are witnessing is the passing of Marxism-Leninism as an ideology of worldwide significance.

Since World War II much of human activity in the major world powers has been shaped if not driven by the ideological competition between communism, with its aggressive and expansionist goals, and the various forms of Western democratic or totalitarian governments. If the changes now taking place in the Soviet Union signify the beginning of the elimination of competing ideologies as the principal basis for international conflict, and with it the likelihood of large scale

wars, their impact on all nations could be far greater than anything now foreseen. Should this occur the pros and cons of issues such as nuclear deterrence and national disinformation activities would be questions of historical interest only.

It is obviously a little early to arrive at final conclusions as to the nature and extent of the changes we are witnessing in the Marxist-Leninist world. It seems also premature to draw conclusions as to the scope or nature of future national security needs in the absence of ideological conflict between the major powers.

Before the advent of Marxism-Leninism the acquisition or defense of territory primarily drove aggressive tendencies and security requirements. Whether or not a return to this "driver" in today's over-populated and highly economically integrated world can substitute for the threat of communist aggression as justification for continuing past security policies and related activities is doubtful.

Whatever may or not come about, what we should now do is to carefully examine what is real change versus what may be disinformation or else merely perceived as change by those whose wishes tend to be "the father of their thoughts". Having done this we may be able to forecast and accommodate safely to any real, historic, transition from the Cold War to the new world environment — whatever it may turn out to be.

Even if we are witnessing the demise of communism as a driving factor in international relations and national security policies and actions, this will be a slow and evolutionary process at best. It will also probably be characterized by local conflicts and temporary reversals including efforts to return to Marxism in order to restore authority.

If, however, we are witnessing real change, and if America and its Free World Allies are to safely weather what promises to be a major historical discontinuity and the changes it is likely to bring about, the least we can do is to start at the bottom of the ladder and carefully consider all the factors and implications we may now face — and provide for these.

As one first step in this direction we should recognize the role played by what we might call the "lead time factor" or

"gap problem" in any major changes initiated by governments. This is the impact of the time gap between political announcements of intentions to bring about major changes and the earliest date at which such changes can be implemented in practice. The spread between these dates can often be measured in years and sometimes even in decades.

The Gap Problem

Given the best of intentions, *de facto* changes in, say, military force postures or weapon systems take years to implement. Political statements by a nation's leaders that they intend to make these changes are generally made long before there is any hard evidence that they will be actually carried out. The Gorbachev promises of major troop reductions and/or reorientation of Soviet force postures towards the defensive, are current examples. Given the best of intentions neither of these actions could be implemented quickly. If the U.S. were to decide to withdraw major elements of its NATO forces today it would take upwards of two years to actually get them back to the US.

As a result of this *décalage* there is almost always a natural tendency to suspect the validity of many proclaimed intentions, especially when made by one's opponents. Until actual and near irreversible steps are taken in furtherance of political promises, cautious planners quite properly advise against premature reactions to these. This is especially true in the case of the Soviets who have a reputation for the use of "disinformation" to obtain Free World reactions favorable to their aims.

Unfortunately whether or not the statements of intended change are real or merely intended to mislead, the public and many politicians all too often ignore the time gap between promises and actions and interprets the promises as if the changes they portend are a *fait accompli*. This is especially true when these promises meet their aspirations. This situation not only helps sell real disinformation efforts but also takes the pressure off valid Soviet promises when it comes to actually

carrying out the announced change.

The impact of the inevitable gap between stated intentions and confirmable actions is by no means limited to U.S.-Soviet relations. A similar "lead time" problem exists within any country with respect to the acquisition of advanced new weapon systems. In the 1950s it took between four and six years to develop and build a new weapon system after its feasibility and the need for it were established by the Government. Today it takes over 10 years.

Logically and presumably any such system would not be assumed to change the national security position of the country until it became available 10 or more years after the President or Secretary of defense announced that it would be acquired as a solution to some given defense problem. In fact the security goals for which it is acquired — *e.g.* meeting a new threat — tend to be perceived as having been met as soon as the announcement of intent to build it has been somewhat confirmed by preliminary funding or Congressional approval.

In the late 1970s, U.S. audiences, when asked what their main concerns were, generally listed the growing Soviet threat represented by the continuing Soviet build-up in offensive nuclear missiles and submarines. After President Reagan's 1983 SDI speech, that was designed to perpetuate a credible deterrent regardless of the Soviet build-up and without our having to match it, many of those asked the same question would name the deficit or trade balance as their main concern. When then asked "what happened to the threat" they would reply: "Reagan took care of that with his SDI"!! In fact we still have no SDI today although much of public opinion seems to have accepted the fact that the threat problem was solved when the solution was announced rather than when it may be implemented. One might call this an unintended form of disinformation!

From this we can conclude that Soviet announcements of new policies, that cannot be confirmed as valid intentions by actual actions taken in the near term, will nonetheless be perceived and re-acted to by the public and some Western

leaders regardless of the possibility that they could also be disinformation.

If this is inevitable it places a heavy burden on the need to analyze the impact of Soviet pronouncements as well as actions and act to mitigate any adverse effects that misreading these might bring about. This also suggests that it is probably a waste of time trying to persuade democratic countries and leaders to defer any and all reactions to these until there is concrete proof of intent to implement regardless of our past experiences with Soviet disinformation.

Glasnost and Perestroika

Glasnost has produced extraordinary and mounting criticisms of the Soviet system by the Soviet intelligentsia. In so doing they are assisting Mr. Gorbachev in purging his opposition in the party ranks. This device was exploited in a less spectacular fashion by Khrushchev who used his own brand of *glasnost*, de-Stalinization and "peaceful coexistence" to help remove his opposition. There is, a good possibility that Gorbachev's more risky *glasnost* will backfire on him by permitting too much criticism but thus far it has had the effect of consolidating his personal power.

Perestroika, or "restructuring," is an attempt to deal with severe economic problems. These problems — low agricultural production, industrial stagnation, wholesale corruption — were all in existence during Brezhnev's regime. However, the trends in the balance of forces in the world — the measure of the CPSU as to how well they were doing — was in favor of the Soviet Union. The U.S. was then internally divided over Vietnam, had scrapped its strategic defenses, and the Free World seemed to be headed in the way of socialism. Brezhnev, whether he thought it necessary or not, could not restructure the Soviet system because the ruling *nomenklatura* could easily resist change on the grounds that trends in those days favored the USSR.

When Gorbachev took over, trends in the balance of forces were in the opposite direction. The Reagan admin-

istration was restoring military capabilities, threatening to defend America and Europe with SDI, ushering in a new era of high technological progress, and capitalism was on the rise world-wide. These are some of the fundamental factors that tend to support the view that *perestroika* is genuine by virtue of the fact that Gorbachev and the communist party had no viable alternatives. This would also explain why he has so far been able to overcome party resistance to such major and internally destabilizing changes in Soviet policies.

The combination of *glasnost* and *perestroika* may be viewed in retrospect as desperate attempts by Marxists to save Marxism. They may also be viewed as the result of recognition that Marxism just does not work in this day and age. But, whether what is going on is an effort to perpetuate Marxism in some other form, or simply to shift to a form of government that will work, these developments provide opportunities for those of us who seek the demise of Marxism — albeit opportunities accompanied by some risks.

Impact on the West

There can be little doubt that there will be important revisions to the U.S. and NATO's security policies over the next year or so. These changes will be made in large part as a response to the real or perceived changes made in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. We are seeing some of these today. Those who have been consistent apologists for the Soviet Union in the past are taking pleasure in asserting that they have been right all along — "the Soviets pose no serious threat to the West"!

Those of us who recognize the risks that are developing as a result of events in the communist world must be careful as to our response to this challenge if we are to impact policy revisions on our side.

Whether or not the changes taking place in the communist world are strategic in nature — such as the demise of Marxism-Leninism, or merely motivated by tactical considerations, such as a Gorbachev effort to rescue the Soviet economy,

most observers seem to agree that they are moves away from the absolute dictatorship by Government over life in Russia. Many writers in the West view these developments as first steps towards some sort of democratic socialism that would accept some individual freedoms, competition, initiatives in the private sector, and free enterprise as being the only way to save the Soviet economy if not to stem growing public unrest.

Western Reactions

The Free World has obviously considered these trends and developments as ranging from desirable to miraculous. Many see them as promising not only the end of the Cold War and the Soviet military threats to peace but also as a major step towards the victory of democracy, or related forms of governments by the people, over communism and dictatorships.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union is a communist dictatorship and has been for some 70 years. Most of its people have never lived under any other form of government. For them to now to make the transition to some form of liberal democracy in the Western model cannot but be a major and traumatic change. And, major changes of this nature have always been destabilizing and fraught with risk during the period that they are taking place. Most have in the past come about only as the outcome of wars or revolutions whether the move was from freedom to dictatorship or vice versa.

If, for a minute, we assume that Gorbachev's efforts will succeed we will be witnessing a period of gradual change in the Soviet bloc. Considering the magnitude of the changes required and the inherent resistance to change of any large organizations or group of people it could take a decade or more before the nations now behind the iron curtain settle down to a stable new way of life. Meanwhile, the Free World will be faced with having to cope with whatever threats or problems the transition may generate and security policies and force programs and deployments must be adjusted accordingly.

One mistake many now make is to stand pat and try to argue that no policy revisions are in order because no real

change in the nature of the threat is evident since promised force reductions and other long lead time actions have not been implemented as yet. My view is that this is a losing proposition. Not only wishful thinking but the weight of real evidence is against it. By standing pat we could forfeit our chance to shape new policy.

A better approach would be to examine the current U.S. and NATO security scene, including developments in the communist world, and try to arrive at a consensus as to the nature of the threats and risks we face over the next few years. Having done this we then might be able to agree on policies and political actions to promote the desirable ones while reducing to a minimum those with adverse impacts.

Were we to do this we also define the threats that remain from past Soviet policies, attitudes, and military capabilities as well as the new threats that the transition will generate, at least temporarily. In the process we may be able to determine whether we are dealing with a tactical change that will have little or no fundamental impact on the Free World's national security requirements, or whether we are facing a major ideological change with potentially profound impacts. And, we could also assess the threats to our security that we are likely to generate ourselves by allowing political pressures to bring about premature Western actions based on Soviet promises that later turn out to be just that: "promises" — *e.g.*: intentional or even unintentional disinformation.

The Immediate Problem

Our immediate problem is to survive the transition from a heretofore stable and reasonably predictable Soviet Government in full control of its resources to some future form of national management which eventually will also be stable and predictable. The key word here is "transition". The danger is that given the euphoria generated in the West by the changes taking place and the prospects of a new era of peace at the end of the road, we dismiss too easily the risks and threats inherent in any such dramatic political adjustments.

While some may naively believe that a shift from one form of stable, if not desirable, Soviet government to another can be managed smoothly and without internal chaos and/or external threats to world peace, common sense does not support this.

Our experience with past efforts to evolve new forms of government or even changes in major national policies such as security strategy, or in social customs and traditions, all indicate that such moves are at best over very rocky roads. The American effort to eliminate slavery that led to the civil war; the European effort to integrate after World War II that collapsed over the European Army issue; and the more recent Reagan effort to change U.S. security strategy from the offensive, nuclear, dominated Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) to deterrence based on effective non-nuclear defenses (SDI) are but three classic examples.

If we are to safely survive a Soviet evolution into a new way of life and form of government we must first understand what we are likely to face during any such transition. We cannot simply assume that whatever occurs within the Soviet bloc is their problem and their management will be able to cope with it. Any such transition cannot but be stabilizing and, as a result, will include almost certain threats to world peace — threats that are likely to be greater than any posed by a Cold War between two different but stable forms of government. One way to anticipate these and prepare for them is to examine how changes of this nature normally take place.

Short of war or revolution, changes of the magnitude we are talking about cannot occur overnight. They must be pursued in a step by step fashion moving only so fast as the "systems" — the people and the establishment — can live with. There generally has to be pauses while the "system" adjusts to the new way of doing business. These can last one or more years. One must also expect periods of regression in the efforts to achieve the new situation even where there is no let up in the goal or change in those managing the transition. The attitudes and actions of outsiders, in this case free world nations, can be important.

One certainty, however, is that in any such evolution there is a high risk of failure and of a return to the original situation, especially during the early phases of the transition. We must be prepared for this, which means that nations previously threatened by the Soviet dictatorship during the Cold War cannot risk taking unilateral domestic steps in anticipation of the foreseen change that would leave them vulnerable in the event it failed to come about. Put crudely, we cannot gamble on peace with Gorbachev so long as we might wake up and find a Stalin II suddenly in command in Russia.

The Peak Roof Problem

While the above risk is generally understood, if not adequately prepared for, another risk is very likely even under ideal Soviet management conditions. This is the possibility that the Soviet government will lose control over events during the transition, and especially when they have to adopt new ways of doing things before a final form of stable government can be put into place. This risk is the most worrisome because it is not widely perceived and hence little or no planning is underway to cope with it.

The transition from one stable form of government to another equally stable form not only takes time but has to be done incrementally. Fiscal policy, the defense posture, foreign relations, police and security activities, trade, and all other "building blocks" of government have to be modified to fit the new environment. This cannot be done either suddenly or simultaneously but since many are interlocking, attempts to transition them one at a time, or unduly out of phase, can produce great strains on the ability to control and manage the country while this is taking place. The problem is to handle the transition in such a way that none of these get so far out of phase with each other or the roles they serve as to create a crisis.

One way to perceive this problem is to envision the movement from the old but stable situation to the future and presumably also stable one as taking place over a peaked roof

rather than across a level field. The first half of the trip is uphill. Progress is slow and hard to achieve. And, if and when any activity is unable to function effectively while enroute gravity automatically corrects this problem by pulling it back down into its original, stable and effective form.

Conversely, once decisions are made that take progress past the halfway mark and over the peak of the roof, any inability to function on the down side, or home stretch, is invariably corrected by the effected sector prematurely crashing on down into its ultimate configuration. This is when the transition can pose a serious threat to control and stability, and as such to the maintenance of peace.

An example of this could be the sudden and premature breakaway of a state or ally vital to national security. Even though long term plans envisioned its gradual independence when worldwide security changes made this acceptable, its premature crash could lead to revolts, revolution, or even warfare. The same could be the case in agriculture, industrial activity, currency conversion plans, and other major but interdependent functional areas.

When applied to the present situation this simple model should tell us that it really does not matter too much what Mr. Gorbachev may have in mind as a series of steps designed to eventually establish the new form of government he deems necessary to Russia's internal stability, economic growth, and the retention of her national security and world power status. From the point of view of our near term security, it does not even matter what this new form of Soviet government may look like. What matters is that the pre-Gorbachev government was stable and able to manage the Communist bloc and presumably the new one will also be stable, but the transition from one to the other is likely to be anything but stable.

The Bottom Line

As one concerned primarily with U.S. and NATO security, the message I am trying to convey is that the demise or re-formatting of communism now taking place in Eurasia, while welcome if and when successful, is not as yet something we can

gloat over. There is no such thing as a free lunch. If the Free World is not extremely careful with respect to its involvement in these events, and does not keep up its guard against the new risks and unplanned threats to peace that are likely to emerge in the present environment, the price we may wind up paying to get rid of the Cold War could be much higher than most people seem to anticipate.

In Eastern Europe the ball is rapidly approaching the peak of the roof if not already over it. Whether the most recent developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were planned or even anticipated by Gorbachev, or whether things simply got out of hand, is now academic. The problem we should be concerned about is what happens next, and if it threatens us, what should we be doing to protect ourselves. For us to proceed, with "business as usual" and assume that what is taking place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is only a problem for Gorbachev and his communist friends is "whistling in the dark."

Countries and provinces on which the Soviet economy depend are throwing out their communist governments or managers before they have qualified replacements or even the minimum requirements to establish a viable free economy such as free enterprise management experience, sources of capital, or even convertible currencies. In the Soviet Union the people are several generations removed from experience with living in a free enterprise environment. Too sudden a switch without a period of years in which to learn how to survive under capitalism could have disastrous economic and social consequences. These might then trigger off Tiananmen Square type off repressions that the euphoric free world public — lacking vision and caution — could demand their country's oppose with military means. Were this to come about the probability of escalation from such actions to nuclear warfare could be quite high.

On the military threat side there is also the possible loss of control by the Soviet authorities over nuclear or other major military weapon systems. China's Long March nuclear ICBMs are in an area controlled entirely by two Army

Commanders and their forces. When the student revolt took place, and there were rumors some of the military might support the students, I could not help but speculate on what might happen if these included the Generals in command of the nuclear missile forces.

In the Soviet Union many nuclear missiles and other Atomic resources are now deployed in provinces where unrest is reported. What happens to these if for whatever reasons the Central Government were to loose control, even temporarily? Suppose Gorbachev's Moscow authorities lost control over some of these would not the classic small atomic power deterrent argument apply? Namely, "If you try to subdue our revolt with force we will fire some missiles, at Moscow or anywhere. Are we prepared for this possibility on our side?.

For years countries such as France and India have built up nuclear capabilities on the theory that even though they could be destroyed by the Soviets the risk that any attempts to do this might result in even one or two being successfully fired was a major deterrent to the attempt. The Soviets would probably not view the obliteration of Moscow or Leningrad as a fair trade for the conquest of India. If this deterrent is valid for any small nuclear country why should it not be equally valid for a revolutionary group?. Any logical revolutionary leader with nuclear assets in the area he aspires to take over should make control over these his primary objective. This is a new factor in an atomic world and one which can turn what were previously minor domestic squabbles into global threats.

One thing should be quite clear. While peace in our time may, or not, be the end result of current events in Europe the transition from stable, measurable, and consistent communist threat to whatever may replace will be over a rocky and uncertain road. Security and survival in the West may be at greater risk from accidents, or escalating events and inadequately planned responses on our side, than they ever have been from a deliberate, premeditated Soviet attack. This prospect should tell us three things:

First, that this is no time to drop our guard, reduce our defensive capabilities, and cancel military developments and

expenditures in a random fashion. In the pre-*Perestroika* era we could forecast the nature, scope, and probability of major threats with far more confidence than we can today.

Second, that now is the time, if ever, for thorough contingency planning and cautious actions and reactions in response to any and all developments during this transition period. Part of being secure is to be prepared for any and all possible threats. Protecting parochial interests by resisting logical changes to accommodate to those being made in the east, and "playing it by ear" when obliged to react, are recipes for waste, failures, and disasters.

Third, that now we need, more than ever, to exploit western technology to ward off the one obvious global threat associated with the on going transition which is the irresponsible or accidental use of nuclear missiles. If missile defenses made sense as a way to strengthen deterrence of a deliberate Soviet first strike, they make twice as much sense now that the worldwide proliferation of missiles is accompanied by chaotic conditions and potential revolts in countries already possessing these.

In addition, common sense suggests we at least try to determine what the policies and national security postures might be in a post-*Perestroika* world before making cuts or changes in those we now have. All governments are bound to be under great public and political pressure to reduce defense spending. If we don't have some idea of what sort of defense establishment we will need in a post cold war period how can we intelligently select what we can now safely cut even under the assumption the transition is peacefully made?

Unfortunately two negative trends are now taking place. Politicians are rushing to make cuts as if all major threats had disappeared and without adequate planning for the likely defense requirements of a post-Cold War environment, let alone for any flare ups during the transition to it. And, the bureaucracy is practicing its classic tendency to resist any major changes that are suggested should be put into place on our side as a result of these events.

The result of cuts without planning cannot but be waste under the best of outcomes and acceptance of unnecessary risks under other possible outcomes. The result of the desperate efforts of bureaucrats and institutions to close their eyes to those changes that are, or have been, proposed to cope with these events – in order to perpetuate parochial interests or business as usual for as long as possible – preclude cost effective, evolutionary, adjustments when and where these should logically be made.

It is necessary that we all recognize that the potential threat resulting from activities taking place in Eurasia today is greater than it ever has been at any time since World War II. It is a two pronged threat. First, we have a growing probability that massive losses will occur as a result of atomic weapons being used accidentally, deliberately, or as a result of loss of control by Governments. This scenario will increase in probability with the worldwide proliferation of boosters now going on. Second, the inevitable changes that will come about if the Soviet military threat is perceived a terminated, let alone actually gone, could become as destabilizing to the West as are now the changes in the East.

If one examines the extent to which life in the free world has been driven over the past 45 years by fear of and reactions to the Soviet threat of deliberate military aggression, the changes that a perceived, let alone actual, demise in the Cold War will bring about are more worrisome than the increase in the possibility of nuclear explosions during the transition. The sad part is that, while rejoicing over the perception of possible "peace in our time" few if any are looking seriously at anything but the military force and budget implications of this.

Fortunately, the people in major Western democracies are frequently more logical and foresighted than their political leaders. The same common sense that is driving public opposition to irresponsible communist management in the East also works in the West to counter the vested interests and parochial attitudes of bureaucrats, pressure groups, and their institutions.

A classic example of this pertinent to the change in the

nature of the missile threat can be found in American public attitudes towards SDI deployment versus Congressional and government footdragging on this. In a recent poll, people outside of government that have evidenced an understanding and interest in national security matters were asked what they thought was the probability of a nuclear missile being fired in the present world environment. Forty-four percent thought that there was a chance they would see one fired on purpose, and 44% by accident, in their lifetime. Since purposeful and accidental launchings are independent possibilities this public opinion adds up to 74% believing that they will see a launch for whatever reason.

In answer to related questions 48% thought such a missile would come from a terrorist organization, 24% from a third world country, and only 24% from the Soviet Union. Ninety percent said they knew we now had absolutely no defenses against these although we had made dramatic progress in SDI research and could have, and when asked whether SDI should be deployed even though it would not provide a perfect defense 99% said yes.

What all this should tell us is that instead of worrying about whether the events taking place in the communist block represent genuine political and social change, or Gorbachev disinformation, our leaders should be worrying more about existing policies that make no sense in light of the obvious changes taking place in the threats to our security. One example of this can be found in the continuing efforts of the U.S. Congress to perpetuate the strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD and the obsolete ABM Treaty instead of deploying a now available and relatively inexpensive missile defense system.

Neither MAD nor the Treaty make any sense against anything but a deliberate, premeditated Soviet nuclear First Strike which is the most unlikely threat now in sight. How does one deter a terrorist or even a Qaddafi with ICBM's? It will be amusing to see what lies and excuses politicians will come up with should an accidental or other launching ever take place. Would it not be more logical to cope with the

obvious changes in the threats brought about by the apparent demise of communism and the resulting chaotic transition to new forms of government than to waste time defending MAD and the ABM Treaty.

Some non-Defense Implications

In addition to the security problems the press and politicians also seem to be afraid to consider seriously what is likely to happen happens in western nations if *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* succeed. While the wolves among these are licking their chops over how they might divvy up most of the defense budget and pay for ever more social programs, the long term consequences of a world environment without major military threats to bolster nationalism and drive advance technology do not seem to have been thoroughly or objectively studied. The fact is that they are not limited to a few job losses in the defense sector as many seem to believe.

Even a "back of the envelope" examination of how much of America's economy, politics, technology, and wealth has been driven by the Soviet nuclear threat should produce real cause for panic. Most people think of this only in terms of jobs lost either in defense industries or as a result of major force reductions. If this is the only social consequence peace on earth would no doubt be worth it. Some writers have suggested there are a few other consequences that may, however not be so acceptable. These include, the admittedly extreme view that without major external threats to nations internal dissensions are likely to progress to civil warfare to the certain loss of social and economic progress previously made possible as a result of defense activities and spending. One might also ask how much of America's worldwide influence stems from the perceived need by small countries for our military protection?

This is not to say that we must try to keep up the Cold War or perpetuate the Soviet or other threats in order to stay healthy and solvent as a nation. What it does say is that before we rush in to exploit all the benefits of the changes we now

see taking place in Eurasia — or hope will take place — we should give more careful attention to the new and different types of risks we are likely to buy if they do come about.

I am not arguing against peace or defending the Cold War and a world of tensions. What I am trying to suggest is that changes of the magnitude that may now be underway could have down sides as well as up sides. Any adverse implications, both security and social wise, should be identified and provisions made to mitigate these. At best the transition in terms of security considerations will be rocky. Hedges such as missile defense, should be provided to minimize their more dangerous aspects.

Planning must also include the consequences of success on our economies and national societies. This is not being done to my knowledge. Most Free World governments are acting as would a starving child presented with a banquet. It would be a joyous event unless it died of over-eating.

BORDER WARS¹

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"Border Wars." The very term conjures up images of an earlier America — of dusty cavalymen on the old frontier, of "Black Jack" Pershing's men pursuing bandits (or revolutionaries!) into Mexico, of the pursuit — and occasionally overtaking! — of pirates, smugglers and slavers. Indeed, it hearkens back to a time when the primary mission of America's armed forces *was* the defense of our borders, and not mounting guard overseas on a so-called strategic glacis or projecting military power into the Third World.

Regardless of how much many within and outside of the U.S. military might wish otherwise, however, the notion of "border war" also refers explicitly to the situation confronting the United States today. We are, in fact, confronted simultaneously with three types of challenges to the integrity of our borders — each of which has its precedents in our history. One is a burgeoning wave of illegal immigration, a challenge whose full socioeconomic consequences have yet to be fully understood, but which are all too likely to be considerable over the long term. A second is international terrorism, ranging in lethality and scope from disasters such as the destruction of Pan American flight 103 to the unsuccessful attempt against the family of an American naval officer in San Diego — the modern variants of piracy and cross-border raids. And the third is the threat posed by illegal narcotics traffickers, the modern version of smugglers and bootleggers that can assume especially bizarre twists and whose consequences for American society are an odds-on certainty to be even more odious.

There have been different levels of response, and success, in meeting this complex set of challenges. Public and official willingness to confront international terrorism is widespread, even though "solutions" remain elusive, especially when one has to deal with terrorist organizations supported by foreign