

SOUTH AFRICA: THE SECOND REVOLUTION

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Decolonization without a Colonial Power

To be sure, it is a rather special type of revolution, quite unlike the celebrated European and American revolutions over three centuries. However, it does have much in common with the typical stage-managed African revolution of the mid-twentieth century. In particular, it resembles those in which the conscience-stricken and cash-strapped colonial powers were challenged by a westernized non-traditional élite, and, after lengthy negotiations spiced with a modicum of black-on-black tribal violence, duly served up by the international media, agreed to be 'expelled'.

Invariably, for the benefit of the face-saving colonial powers, there was an understanding between the abdicators and their successors that transitional processes were to be conducted in a seemly fashion and that 'democratic' structures, designed to protect the masses against the extravagances of the new élite, were agreed upon before 'independence'. Paul Johnson has summed up the essence of the revolutions which led to self-determination in the colonies in his comment that "... if decolonization did possess an ethical principle, it was that political forms were the ultimate standard of value."¹

South Africa's second revolution during this century, the revolution of the 1980s,² is from motivation to execution a revolution of this genre, but *sans* the colonial power. The protagonists are the African National Congress (ANC) in alliance with the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the features which characterize this kind of revolution are the following:

(a) The Main stimulus for the revolution is not indigenous, and does not come spontaneously from the masses:

The notion of self-determination is fundamentally mean-

ingless to most of the peoples of sub-Saharan Africa since they do not share the western conception of nationalism. In Africa, the source of the demand for national states lies in external social and political movements, and governments, whose object it is to 'liberate' black people from the governance of whites for a variety of reasons, some of them self-interested. Nationalism is, therefore, not a 'natural' aspiration among the people of Africa, as the use of the term 'self-determination' might suggest. This explains largely why nation-states had no prior notion of territorial boundaries or of institutional permanence, before colonialism tried to instill these concepts, and failed.³

The ANC, like many other 'nationalist' movements in Africa during the height of the decolonization period, is sustained by external forces which make use of the idea of 'nationalism' to promote the overthrow of the existing, usually white but in the case of Ethiopia non-white, regime. Wherever whites or other non-Africans are involved (Asians in East Africa) the external forces do not seek, in the first instance, to promote the emergence of a nation, but to remove the 'foreign oppressors'. In South Africa the whites are viewed in the same light as were colonial governments in pre-independence Africa. An African Nationalist government, therefore, is one in which Africans do the ruling. External forces which support 'African' rule for the sake of African rule, are less concerned with the quality of that rule than with the fact of that rule. It follows that the criteria governing external support for political contenders strongly favor long-standing political organizations, high on rhetoric, which claim the sanction of tradition. Aggression, a willingness to sacrifice, and to die (or to kill) for the cause, is an essential recommendation; in short, revolution is a romanticized ideal. The ANC, in the late 1950s, became the epitome of such an organization — under the tutelage of its foreign sponsors.

(b) The revolutionaries are few in number, relative to the size of the population⁴

Revolutionary organizations are made up of two elements:

(i) *an externally based core group*, which is heavily dependent on foreign support, expertise and money. This group acts principally as a propaganda and publicity machine for the promotion of the revolutionary ideal in South Africa. It maintains close links with organizations and governments around the world, which, for one reason or another, favor revolution rather than reform in South Africa. In the cases of the Soviet Union, its satellites and dependencies, revolution is favored, *inter alia*, for ideological reasons.

(ii) *internally active cadres*,⁵ who develop and exploit whatever elements and ingredients of the South African situation that offer the opportunity for sowing disorder and dissent, principally, though not entirely through the use of violence and the establishment of front organizations.⁶

(c) *The classic conditions which are commonly associated with revolution in the Western mind are not present in South Africa.*

Frantz Fanon argues, with regard to the colonial states, that The proletariat in the colonial countries is not the suppressed masses of the poor industrial workers, but a small privileged group of wage earners, who have, in contrast to the peasants, far more to lose than their chains.⁷

In South Africa, too, the proletariat closely resembles that of the erstwhile colonial states, but in South Africa, the governing elite is neither a colonial administration able to pack up and leave nor in terminology appropriate to Fanon a parasitical bourgeoisie profiting from the colonial economy. It is an "inventive, productive, entrepreneurial class,"⁸ the epitome of the 'Marxian' bourgeoisie, in fact. The ruling élite is today, therefore, more than willing to negotiate a settlement of the political future of the country on any terms which take into full account the essential role which it plays in maintaining the welfare of the society and its inhabitants, including themselves.⁹

In conforming with this requirement, which greatly complicates the situation of the would-be revolutionaries, the ruling white élite lays down the following conditions for

negotiations:

* That parties to the negotiation should renounce the use of violence as an instrument of political action; and

* That in any future dispensation, provision must be made for the protection of the right to the preservation of group identity and for inter-group sharing of wealth power and resources.

Because the ruling white élite is willing, and as external pressure on the society mounts, is ever more eager to negotiate, there is impatience about the slow rate at which reform is taking place, but there is also comparatively little outright antagonism towards the government on the part of what are increasingly termed the 'moderate' black people, *i.e.* the 'masses', in the jargon of the left, or 'the silent majority', in that of the right.

The Moderates

The moderates fall into a number of loosely coordinated political groups¹⁰ together with the ruling parties in the national states or homelands which are not to any significant degree beholden to external sponsors and which, therefore, do not act, consciously or unconsciously, as the instruments of foreign governments and organizations, as are and do the exiled movements ANC (African National Congress) and, to a far lesser extent, the PAC (Pan Africanist Congress).

These moderates — of which the leading figure (though not, of course, the leader, since the groups represent various different constituencies including tribal constituencies) is, at least for the time being, the chief minister of Kwa Zulu, Dr. Mangosothu Buthelezi — recognize that fundamental changes have taken place, and are taking place, in South Africa.

Black moderates are fully aware that changes in the political sphere have been modest and, thus far, not in the political sphere of central government, but they recognize the significance of black political advances in the realm of local government and in particular with respect to the conditions of life of blacks, without their having to do very much to push

the process along.¹¹

Moreover, the moderates are acutely aware of and fear the claims to sole legitimacy made by the ANC, and they hesitate to become more fully involved in the process of directing and accelerating evolutionary peaceful change (*i.e.* reform as opposed to revolution) for fear of reprisals from the ANC's murdering thugs in South Africa. These latter are the agents of revolution and have nothing to gain from reform.

What is missing from the South African political scene, and in effect, what has delayed the negotiation phase of the second revolution for the last two to three years, is a mechanism for getting negotiations on the road. During colonial times this role was played by the colonial power themselves.

Several reasons may be offered for this inertia in the case of present-day South Africa:

- * None of the moderate black groups has so far been prepared to take the first step towards accepting the proposals for negotiation — in which they themselves do not participate — as collaboration.¹²

- * Some moderates feel that since the process of change is moving along so well, there is little reason to commit themselves to negotiations. One well-respected moderate, who is regarded favorably by the government, has only half humorously stated that all that was necessary to keep the benefits rolling was to keep on making demands. Naturally, this strategy may be applied most successfully to the campaign for material benefits like new houses, recreational and other and communal facilities mainly for urban blacks, and education. But there is little denying that material benefits are of far more interest to the black masses than they are to aspiring black leadership élites, for whom the object of agitation and unrest is not material benefits, which as leaders they already enjoy,¹³ but the power to confer upon or to deny them to others.

- * Whilst the ANC is explicit about its aim to seize

power and install a socialist economic order, none of the moderate groups know precisely what demands to make in 'open-ended' negotiations with the government. Dr. Buthelezi's frequent calls for a 'declaration of intent'¹⁴ by the government, illustrate the nature of the problem. The moderates want an offer of a new political dispensation from the government in order that they can challenge it and, thereby, experience a sense of political purpose and, at the same time, enhance their credibility amongst their followers. If, in the other hand, they themselves initiate the negotiation process, by making the opening demands, they can hardly ask for less than the ANC asks, that is, 'one-man-one-vote in a unitary system'—the 'total power' formula.

The moderates cannot make such a demand, partly because it would threaten to unleash a raw struggle for power which would advantage the men with the guns — the government and the ANC — and possibly sow divisions amongst the moderates themselves. Sensing that their strength lies in time, numbers and unity, the moderates have a strong vested interest in a gradual transformation. There is, naturally, a great deal of sympathy among moderate blacks for a 'federal solution', that is, one which would enable the whites to feel secure enough not to halt or reverse the processes now going on in South Africa, which is steadily empowering the far more numerous black people.¹⁵ Moreover, the moderates know that they cannot wrest *total* power in the South African polity from the government instantly either by negotiation or, as the ANC appears to think, by force. Ideally, the moderates would like to be seen by the outside world, by the whites, coloreds and Indians and by the black masses as winners in the outcome to reasonable negotiations. But if the government claims no ground, (*i.e.* it refuses to stake out an opening position — a declaration of intent) and the moderates have, therefore, either nothing to negotiate about or nothing to gain from the negotiating process, they must eventually end up looking like

'stooges.'¹⁶

Yet another reason why the moderates need the government to declare its position ahead of negotiations, is that they are not 'monoliths'. Each group amongst the moderates has its own position and would, in negotiations, make its own demands. Moreover, for tribal and other reasons, the moderates would, certainly ahead of negotiations, find it difficult to unite.

The ANC

The ANC has, up to the present, been encouraged by its external supporters throughout the world to maintain a belligerent revolutionary stance.¹⁷ For this reason it has thus far refused to abandon violence. The violence which it threatens is directed both at the state, which it hoped to render impotent, and against any groups which enter into negotiation with the government. The evidence is contained in the unmerciful attacks made on black councilors in the townships, their homes, which have been gutted, and their families.

On the strength of this last point, it may be argued that, as has been the case elsewhere in Africa, in particular, in Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique, the 'managed' revolution in South Africa has been stalled by the reluctance of a radical elitist faction, strongly influenced by Marxist/Leninist ideology, to compete with other interest groups for political participation under a new dispensation.

The ANC is, in effect, demanding a transfer of power directly from the dominant white group (the Afrikaner group) to itself. If the ANC is successful, it is not unreasonable to assume that South Africa will travel a road similar to that traveled by those other states in southern Africa which have become, or like Zimbabwe, are in the process of becoming, part of the Soviet African imperium. The ANC already poses rhetorically as a vanguard party of the working people. The principal features of such parties are ...'(to) acknowledge Marxism-Leninism as their ideological basis, build their activity on the principles of democratic centralism, and add to

their ranks by individually selecting the best representatives of the working class, the peasantry and other working strata of the population. (They) are prototypes of Marxist-Leninist parties'¹⁸

The Two Stumbling Blocks in the path of the ANC and other revolutionary parties.

The government's opposition to the use of violence:

It is by no means a foregone conclusion, as many external observers appear to think, that the ANC will succeed in its efforts to gain sole undisputed power in South Africa. A number of obstacles stand in its way of which the following may be decisive:

The first is the rigid determination of the South African government not to make concessions that would give the ANC or its sponsors any reason to think that there will be a weakening in the resolve of the government not to negotiate with the ANC as long as it advocates revolution, practices violence and executes terror against the civil population. In spite of the considerable pressure placed on the government to release the imprisoned leader of the ANC, (an act would undoubtedly earn South Africa considerable relief from its Western critics) the government continues to insist, right up to the date of writing, that it will release Mandela, who is in prison because of his former conviction for involvement in violent crimes, only if he forswears the use of violence and desists from its advocacy. Mandela, for obvious reasons and at least for the present, cannot accept these terms and maintain his credibility within the ANC. He therefore remains in prison. The government's insistence on this point and the ANC's (and no doubt its principal sponsor's) unwillingness to give up violent tactics will continue to inhibit any official contact between the two, regardless of how many unofficial meetings take place, and regardless of who sponsor them. Of course, if the ANC abandons violence, it will lose the edge it currently has over the moderate groups. Its tough, no-compromise stance is partly responsible for retaining its

present following, as is its readiness to use violence in order to intimidate its opponents.

The South African government's determined attitude on the related questions of holding Mandela and of negotiations with the ANC is a major source of vexation outside of South Africa and is exploited to the hilt by the ANC, and by its domestic and external allies, including the anti-apartheid lobbies entrenched in the West. This refusal to bend is branded by these lobbies, and characterized by the media, as evidence of the South African government's determination not to make concessions to black demands for political rights, and as it is usually expressed, to 'perpetuate apartheid'. Even some of the moderate groups in South Africa, like Inkatha, are uneasy about Mandela's continued imprisonment.¹⁹

However, these allegations that the government is unwilling to bend or, worse, is determined to entrench apartheid, are scarcely borne out by the record. The government's reformist actions (many of which are demonstrably in response to specific black demands in such fields as education, wages, employment conditions, housing, etc.) and its repeated affirmation of its determination to eliminate apartheid in every sector, clearly testifies to its readiness to carry through the reform process, but in a controlled fashion. Furthermore, of equal, if not even greater importance, is the white public's continued support for a government committed to and engaged in reform — as elections and referendums constantly confirm.²⁰

The government's refusal to negotiate with the ANC as long as the latter uses violent methods against its rivals, or indeed against anyone, as it does at present, would be more easily understood outside South Africa if the transition from white to black government in South Africa were not regarded as so burning a moral issue. That it is, is a product of two things: misunderstanding based on ignorance of the nature of the South Africa society and polity (what is being attempted is not simply decolonization) and the complexities of conducting political reform in an ethnically and

developmentally diverse society; and an emotional anti-white – in some cases anti-Afrikaner – and pro-revolutionary rhetoric supported by a sustained propaganda campaign against the Nationalist government in South Africa.²¹

But it is evident, nevertheless, to anyone who is pragmatic about change in South Africa, that unless all the political, ethnic or tribal minorities are free from all restraints to participate openly in any negotiations about South Africa's future, no progress towards a more open or freer society in South Africa is possible. Violence on the part of the ANC inhibits the negotiation process, and can only produce secret deals between the non-violent black opposition and the government.

As things stand at present, the South African government clearly cannot do what the outside world wants it to do, that is, to simply hand over control of the country to the ANC. The organization's impressive external support is totally out of proportion to its weak internal support, a fact which has led to its campaign of violence and necessitates the continuation of violence. The ANC, on its record, finds no moral impediment to practicing violence and has no intention of refraining from intimidatory acts of violence against any other group of whatever race, color or persuasion which is willing to negotiate with the government on the question of power-sharing. The result of this stalemate is that the ANC's campaign of terror against all sections of the population, but especially against black moderates, continues, constrained only because of increased vigilance of the authorities made possible by perpetuation of the state of emergency.²²

Through its agency, violence has been curbed by the government, but it has not stopped. Deaths continue to occur not only, but mainly, in the black townships as a consequence of mob actions and police reactions, and black retaliation against revolutionary elements associated with the banned ANC and UDF, and their numerous affiliates. The state of affairs in the Pietermaritzburg area of Natal is especially bloody.

The Independent and semi-Independent Black States

The second stumbling block to the ANC's confrontational strategy is the existence of independent and semi-independent black states in South Africa. In spite of the refusal by the international community to recognize them, four black states have accepted independence from Pretoria under elected black governments. The four are Transkei, Ciskei, Bophutsatswana and Venda.

These states are territorially based on land excised from South Africa and substantially, though not fully, consolidated. The anomalies of 'islands' in South African territory still do remain. Naturally, South Africa's critics, including the United Nations, uniformly refuse to recognize the validity of these arrangements, but it is undeniable that their black governments do exercise control as completely over these territories as does any other state on the continent. Moreover, the states are multi-party democracies.

Two of these states, Transkei and Ciskei, are peopled almost entirely by tribesmen of the Xhosa tribe, the first tribe to come into contact with whites in the Cape Colony in the 18th century. There is an endemic rivalry between the two states which has led to open conflict more than once since they became independent, conflict which South Africa has mediated. A curious feature of the Xhosa tribe is that the bulk of the supporters of the ANC are Xhosas, the majority of them living and working outside of the two Xhosa homelands. This group therefore constitutes the third faction amongst the Xhosas. Both Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo are high-born Xhosas.

Bophutatswana, situated to the north-west of South Africa is home to those Tswana tribesmen who lived in South Africa at the time when the other Tswana state, Botswana, across the border²³ became independent in 1967. Like the two Xhosa states, the Tswana states are rivals, sometimes enemies. Batswana (people of Botswana) frequently cross the border to shop in more prosperous Bophutatswana, and to visit relatives there.

The state of Venda on South Africa's far northern borders,

is home to the Venda people who have fellow-tribesman across the border in Zimbabwe, where they constitute a tiny minority.

There can be no doubt that the four states which have claimed independence constitute a serious obstacle in the path of the ANC. Although the international community has resolutely resisted all the blandishments of the South African government, as well as of the governments of the states themselves, to endorse their independence, the years alone have gone a long way towards consolidating their independence and legitimating their leadership. Naturally, the leadership in these states is intensely hostile to a political movement which would have them dismantled and returned to the body of South Africa to be ruled after an ANC take-over by the ANC, and subjected, accordingly, to the domination of a faction of the Xhosa tribe supported by the USSR and its satellites.

The ANC has for long been fully aware of the dangers and difficulties presented by these internal offspring of separate development, and has been vigorous in damning them abroad. In this it has scored a major triumph. The independent states have not managed to obtain the smallest degree of recognition in the outside world. However, its internal efforts at creating disaffection amongst their inhabitants have been singularly unsuccessful.

So the ANC's external triumph has, in a sense, been a Pyrrhic victory, because international recognition or lack of it does not feature in the internal contest between these states and the ANC and between the ANC and the people of the independent states. And since these four states are home to about 6 million people, or approximately 20% of the population of the entire territory which the ANC regards as constituting South Africa, (i.e. South Africa's original borders) the loss is a serious one.

The six semi-independent, or internally self-governing 'national' states, created by the partially implemented policy of separate development, compound the problem for the ANC.

The difficulties confronted by the ANC over these states, is that they legitimate, validate and even help to consolidate

tribal groupings in the political contest for the future of South Africa. In this respect, they present just as much of a threat as the independent states, described above. However, internal political rivalries within these states are susceptible to ANC meddling, because, unlike the independent states, the central political question of independence has not yet been resolved, *i.e.* the question of whether or not independence should be accepted. Naturally, those who oppose independence find a natural ally in the ANC, which is ready to resort to violence and intimidation in order to prevent these territories from accepting independence.

One of the national states deserves separate comment, the state of Kwa Zulu which is situated in the province of Natal. It constitutes the most serious barrier to ANC aspirations because the majority of the Zulu people, and the overwhelming majority of rural Zulus, do not accept the political leadership of the ANC on any grounds. It will be recalled by those who are familiar with nineteenth century South African history that the mighty Zulu empire was the only black political entity which offered any determined resistance to both Boers and the British, when they clashed over white dominion in South Africa. This leads us to several important observations.

First and foremost, it is important to realize, the Zulus will not bend to Xhosa leadership. Second, whereas the ANC, in common with most African nationalist movements, represents, behind a facade of multiracialism, a black/white confrontation, the Zulus consider themselves a separate people and see the political struggle in different terms: that is, as Zulu power against Afrikaner power. Third, the Zulus are the largest tribe in South Africa, numbering some 4 million people. Clearly, given their historical role in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the arbiters of the fates of all other tribes in the region, and their superior numbers today, the Zulus will not be contented to play second fiddle to any other black or colored group. Finally, the largest political party in South Africa, outside the National Party, is probably the Zulu party

Inkatha. It has offices throughout those parts of the country where Zulus live and party organizers operate in the urban areas, where concentrations of blacks are found.

The Chief Minister of Kwa Zulu, and leader of the Inkatha party, Gatsha Mangosothu Buthelezi, is a former member of the ANC, expelled because of his willingness to co-operate in the creation of the Kwa Zulu state as part of the system of national states which was the principle goal of the Verwoedian policy of separate development. Although Chief Buthelezi claims to support the leader of the ANC, Mandela, in his struggles to attain greater freedom for blacks throughout South Africa, Buthelezi opposes the ANC, and in particular its violent actions which have caused serious losses to his people, and he deplores its Communist associations and its external affiliations. Buthelezi is a Christian and strongly supports the free enterprise system.

It is highly unlikely that the Zulus will throw in their lot with the ANC. Having fought a long and bitter struggle against the whites in the nineteenth century, the Zulus will continue to resist the intrusion of new external elements of ideologies from abroad, which would inevitably accompany ANC rule in South Africa. They regard themselves as the indigenous élite in South Africa, and are not likely to surrender that claim. For this reason, although Buthelezi has accepted the power base bestowed upon him by Pretoria in the shape of Kwa Zulu, he will never accept the formal separation of the Kwa Zulu from the rest of South Africa. Clearly, the Soviet Union has recognized in Buthelezi and the Zulus a formidable opponent in the stakes for political control of South Africa. For the ANC, the fragmented Xhosas represent an easily exploited tribe, whilst the united Zulus offer no hope of penetration.

The Odds against the ANC

As the above discussion suggests, the ANC is far from occupying the overwhelmingly dominant position in South African politics that its foreign backers and propagandists would have foreign observers believe. On the contrary, the

amount of popular support which the ANC could muster in an open competition with other political organizations would probably be far below that which the Afrikaners (in the shape of the National Party) could muster under the same conditions. The following factors might be mentioned in a debate on this issue:

- * The ANC is tribally rooted in one faction of the Xhosa tribe.

- * The ANC's leadership has been in exile, and therefore out of touch with events in South Africa for many years.

- * The leadership provided by the ANC prior to its banning in the early 1960's was clumsy and inept. As a result of its amateurish efforts, its leaders were caught red-handed in a foolhardy and premature attempt at violent revolution and the organization was effectively put out of action for the following fifteen years.

- * The movement's military wing, Mkhonto we Sizwe, (The Spear of the Nation) has signally failed to score any victories against the South African state during its two decades of existence. Its attacks on civilians have resulted in the deaths of more blacks than whites. Its membership has been thoroughly compromised by penetration over and over again.

- * The ANC is heavily dependent on the dedication and organizing ability of the South African Communist Party, which has for many years, since the 1920s in fact, exploited black dissatisfaction in order to advance its ideological cause. The SACP has, for over seventy years, been a devoted vassal of the Kremlin.

- * The ANC has amply demonstrated its rejection of the free enterprise ethic, and its unswerving allegiance to Marxist socialism. Blacks in South Africa, like many on the continent, endorse some form of socialism, which they believe corresponds to the regimen under which they lived prior to the arrival of whites. However, they are not prepared to embrace the kind of socialism which might bring the Soviets into the country as latter-day colonialists. Neither are they prepared to import the failed economics of Soviet socialism. The impact on the ANC of current changes in Eastern Europe

has yet to be assessed.

* The ANC's determination to render the country ungovernable in an effort to precipitate revolution does not readily appeal to the majority of black people. Too many urban blacks have a stake in stability and associate revolution with the behavior of uncontrolled youth and thugs. Rural blacks (who actually make the vast majority of black people) are heavily dependent on whites and on government for survival under difficult circumstances. If the ANC were to triumph in South Africa, blacks would have to experience very severe deprivation in the cities (since revolution would assuredly bring with it an economic collapse and massive unemployment) and would be subjected to greatly intensified intimidation, as happened in Rhodesia, Kenya and elsewhere in Africa.

* Although the ANC would appear to be an ideal tool in the hands of external interests, it is the product of non-indigenous forces: it espouses an alien ideology; its leaders do not suffer with the people, but enjoy comfortable lives as celebrities abroad; its leaders do not communicate with the mass of the people and wishes of the ANC are enforced by coercion and violence. The ANC seeks to impose ideals on the people which are at odds with their traditional norms and beliefs as well as their experience in a modernizing western socio-economic environment. In short, the ANC is the South African counterpart of the romantic illusion of liberation movements which has become part of western consciousness in the twentieth century. Its only reality lies in Soviet military support, the prospects of which may be fading if Gorbachev's policies result in reduced Soviet support for their dependencies in the third world.²⁴

Measuring ANC Support

One of the more difficult tasks which has confronted commentators on South African affairs over the years has been to assess the degree of support enjoyed by the ANC in South Africa.

The problem has not been solved satisfactorily yet, and,

indeed, may not be solved until an election in which the ANC participates is held. Yet, the issue is a crucial one to the ANC, because its claim for legitimacy, as the authentic representative of the people of South Africa, rests morally upon the degree of support which it enjoys amongst the South African population. This is because the ANC demands from its external backers not simply moral rhetorical support for its cause, but also material support for its military campaign and for its acts of terror against the civilian population. Such support requires some degree of conviction in the minds of the donors, certainly those in the West, that the ANC must, demonstrate to its supporters that it is fighting not any war, but a just war, and that its credentials are impeccable. This requires more than a mere handful of followers; it requires the overwhelming endorsement of the masses, which are asked to suffer and perhaps die in the foreign-backed crusade of the ANC.

Until fairly recent times it has been difficult for the ANC to show how much support it has — just as difficult as for the government and moderate black leaders to show how little the ANC has. Failing an election, the ANC on the one hand, and its opponents on the other, have resorted to making educated guesses for propaganda purposes which have been almost entirely arbitrary. For its part, the ANC has claimed the support of the 'black masses' in South Africa (which certainly suggests an overwhelming majority) together with that of 'progressive forces' in the other groups. It has dealt with high-profile blacks like Chief Buthelezi, who vociferously oppose the ANC and challenge its claims, by alleging that they are 'stooges' of the regime.

As regards the whites, although white youth has increasingly, during recent years, been wooed with some success through the anti-conscription movement (the ECC), the ANC has written off the majority either as racist oppressors or as unwitting and conscienceless collaborators in racist oppression.

Some recent polls conducted in an effort to determine what domestic support exists for sanctions, (a campaign solidly

supported by the ANC) have provided some insight into internal support for the ANC. The following results, though not by any means conclusive, are worth noting:

1. The Schlemmer Surveys:

In mid-1984, Professor Lawrence Schlemmer, a respected sociologist, undertook a survey among a representative sample of 551 black factory workers in seven industrial regions throughout the country. Trained black field-workers asked six questions designed to discover the extent of support for sanctions. The results showed that a minimum of 75% of the workers opposed divestment (*i.e.* not more than 25% supported it). This result confirmed that of a survey conducted by the same researcher in 1979 in Natal.²⁵ Following criticism of his survey based on the nature and extent thereof, Schlemmer commissioned another survey through a reputable research organization. In this survey, a minimum of 79% of the interviewees rejected divestment.²⁶

In the latter survey, as well as others conducted by other researchers,²⁷ it has been shown, according to Schlemmer, that "some 46% of the middle class (black) elite support divestment."

2. The Orkin Survey:

In 1987 another survey, this time of all segments of the black population, was attempted by the sociologist, Mark Orkin, a director of the independent Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE). In Orkin's survey there were 800 respondents.

With regard to support for sanctions, Orkin's results differed markedly from those which Schlemmer had commented upon or had produced. In Orkin's findings, about 40% of the respondents favored sanctions, and 60% were cautious (or unenthusiastic).

However, in the process of this survey, Orkin also tried to establish the degree of support enjoyed by the ANC. He found that in the urban areas, 35% supported the ANC and 13% the

ANC affiliate, the UDF, a total of 48%.

This figure compares with that which Schlemmer noted in support of divestment in the 'middle class élite' of the urban areas, viz. 48%.

Likewise, in the rural areas and small towns, Orkin found a lesser degree of support for the ANC/UDF. This figure is not available to the writer, but the nationwide figure shows 31% support, which is not too far from the figure Schlemmer gives for support for sanctions, in his first 1984 survey, *i.e.* 25%.²⁸

3. The Chamber of Mines survey:

In May, 1989, the Chamber of Mines commissioned a Gallup²⁹ poll to determine the degree of support for sanctions. Its results showed that some 84% and 85% opposed sanctions and divestment respectively. 85% of blacks think that divestment is a bad idea and 82% that sanctions are undesirable. The sample in this survey comprised 2000 individuals, (1400 blacks, 400 whites and 200 Asians and Coloreds (of mixed race).

An interesting sidelight to this survey was its reflection of the low level of support for the ANC and its affiliates. Given a choice of parties and leaders, the following results were recorded:

First Choice:

ANC	11%
The State President, Mr. P.W. Botha:	11%
Chief Buthelezi:	10%
Bishop Tutu:	6%
Cosatu (an ANC supporting trades union)	5%
UDF	6%
Mrs. Helen Suzman	4%
(figures below 2% are disregarded)	

The figures for ANC, Cosatu, and UDF total:	22%
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4. 'The Star's Save South Africa Poll':³⁰

In this poll a sample of 1052 men and women over the age of 18 years was surveyed.

In answer to a question about sanctions the following results were obtained:

Support sanctions though they might lead to hardship:	15%
Oppose sanctions:	83%

On the question of whether the ANC ought to be drawn into negotiations about South Africa's future, the results were:

ANC should play a relevant part in negotiations:	33%
ANC should be admitted under certain conditions:	37%
ANC should be ignored:	28%

The latter result is open to the interpretation that 33% of the respondents felt that the ANC, regardless of its radical policies and of its violent strategies, ought to be admitted to negotiations, a position which implies a radical stance on the part of the responder, whilst 65% was either not prepared to accept the ANC as a participant or would impose conditions, a position which does not favor the ANC as it is at present.

If it is assumed that the pro-sanctions position represents the views of South Africans who have adopted a hard line on the question of political, social and economic change in South Africa (a position which the ANC whole-heartedly supports in its external propaganda), it would not be too far-fetched to conclude that the percentages of the population which have come out in the several polls in favor of sanctions would roughly correspond with the percentage which would, *mutatis mutandis*, support the ANC in an open election. What the above figures show is that those who have come out in favor of sanctions number somewhere between 25% of the population by the Schlemmer findings, 40% by Orkin's findings, and 15% by the Chamber of Mines Survey and by 'The Star's' poll.

It might be argued that the percentage which supports

sanctions, to judge by these results, must be at any given time, in the region of 25%. Accordingly, about 25% of the population may be regarded potential supporters of the ANC in the event of an election in terms of the sanctions polls.

A second deduction can be made from the figures quoted above that points in the same direction, namely that by Orkin's figures as well as by the Chamber of Mines survey on the popularity of leaders, not more than about 27% of the population indicates support for the ANC and its affiliates (*i.e.* 31% in Orkin and 22% in the Chamber's survey).

The Star's poll suggests that the estimate of approximately 27% may be a little on the high side. Perhaps it would be reasonable to conclude that overall the ANC with its radical policies is favored by not more than about 26% of the population and possibly fewer.

The Impact of the Geographical, Racial and Tribal fragmentation of South Africa on the support of the ANC

If one considers the demographic patterns which emerge from the fragmented structure of South African society, the odds seem to be stacked against the ANC. Let us consider the following: (All the percentages are based on the answers to the question 'Which one of the following leaders or organizations do you support most?' in the Chamber of Mines Gallup poll, except the figure for the Zulu homeland which is an estimate based on personal discussions with Zulu leaders)

Group	Total number	Estimated % for ANC	Total for ANC
Non-homeland:			
Blacks	8,287,552	20	1,657,510
Whites	4,576,690	1	457,669
Coloreds	2,832,705	12	339,924
Indians	783,978	10	78,397
Homeland:			
Zulu	3,736,802	20	747,360
Shangaan	494,987	20	98,995

Swazi	388,783	20	77,756
Ndebele	282,568	20	56,512
N. Sotho	1,842,206	20	368,440
S. Sotho	182,629	20	36,524
TOTAL	23,408,900		3,433,304
PERCENTAGE FOR ANC			14.7%

If the independent states are included, the figure for the ANC would improve somewhat. Here, the assumptions might be made that domestic opponents of the ruling élite, (in effect, the ruling clan), of any one or of all of these states may consider that the only chance they might have of gaining political control would be by allying themselves with a powerful outsider, such as the socialist bloc, through the mediation of the ANC. This has certainly been the pattern which has been followed elsewhere in Africa and, indeed, in Southern Africa. In terms of this scenario, one might speculate on domestic support for the ANC reaching as much as 40% in these states (i.e. twice that which the ANC might obtain in the homelands).

Group	Total number	Estimated % for ANC	Total for ANC
Transkei	2,947,058	40	1,178,823
Ciskei	925,095	40	37,003
Venda	454,797	40	181,918
Bophutat- swana	1,667,478	40	666,991
TOTAL	29,403,328		5,498,039
TOTAL PERCENTAGE SUPPORT FOR ANC			19.88%

On this basis, the ANC might command at present about 20% of support from South Africans of all groups, both within the National States and outside of them.

If the independent states are excluded (as they might well be in a 'final settlement', the percentage of ANC support based

on the above estimates declines to 14.6%.

However, in spite of the probably low level of support which the ANC currently enjoys, some important concessions must be made to the movement with regard to its claim to political leadership segments of the South African people:

(a) First, the ANC, in spite of its present affiliations with Communist states and movements, has a long history of black resistance to white domination, although it is less certain whether it can ever have warranted the description 'nationalist', in the sense of "South African," in view of its close identification with the Xhosa tribe.

(b) Second, the ANC has succeeded in attaining the status of a legitimate government-in-exile outside South Africa. This recognition is of particular importance in the United Nations, in the OAU and amongst the leadership of the so-called 'Frontline States'.

Beyond this, the ANC's diplomatic successes are impressive. It has achieved a high standing amongst both state and non-state actors in the international community, and frequently operates in tandem with the PLO, IRA and other movements which employ terrorism and mass propaganda as a strategy to maintain international status. The ANC is a fully-endorsed and supported front organization of the USSR and, along with many other organizations of similar character, it is recognized by most governments. Its financial support derives from public support, worldwide, international organizations and government aid grants.

(c) Third, the ANC is at present the only organization which claims to represent elements from all segments of the South African population. It claims that its membership shows that it is 'non-racial', *i.e.* it boasts support from whites, blacks, coloreds and Indians, although in fact, blacks are dominant. Apart from known Communists (members of the SACP, for example) and 'fellow travelers,' few whites have had links with the ANC.

(d) Fourth, the ANC can with some justification claim to have been 'effective'. Certainly the government has not been

able to ignore its existence. Ever-growing numbers of foreign governments regard the ANC as the 'authentic representative of the South African people', thereby according the organization legitimacy while denying the white South African government's claim to legitimacy. Domestically, ANC terrorist attacks on civilian targets have cost hundreds of lives and resulted in substantial damage to property. Moreover, government efforts to counter ANC initiatives have cost the South African economy millions of Rands annually, much of which might otherwise have been added to the millions which have been put into developmental programs for blacks, particularly since the late seventies. To the direct costs, which include the massive loss of highly productive white manpower to the economy because of the need for conscription, must be added the loss of reputation as a result of cross-border raids against ANC bases in neighboring states, acts which facilitated the major international campaign against South African destabilization.

In attempting to evaluate the ANC's claim to power in South Africa, one must endeavor to place these ANC 'assets' in perspective.

What value can be attached to the long history of the ANC? Is institutional longevity, *per se*, a qualification for accession to power? Incidentally, the same questions might be asked about personalities like Tambo, Mandela or Slovo. Is the Presidency of a future reformed South Africa to be awarded as a prize for endurance or for long prison sentences? Where this has happened elsewhere in Africa, as part of the managed revolution, it has often had disastrous results.

Even the ANC's diplomatic successes may not constitute valuable assets, once in power. The dilemma of Angola and Mozambique demonstrates this point graphically. Both are ruled by governments which once enjoyed, as 'liberation movements', the wholehearted endorsement in the West. Today, both Frelimo and the MPLA, under Soviet/Cuban control, reject Western values, and, apart from welcoming Western aid, they have no desire to become involved with or

beholden to the West.

Whilst the claim of the ANC to be 'non-racial' has an instant appeal to many Europeans and Americans, there is very little substance to the ANC's claim. The 30-member National Executive of the ANC in 1985 boasted only one white, Joe Slovo, reputed to be a Colonel in the KGB and therefore scarcely a representative of white South Africa. There are only two Indians and two or three coloreds in the ANC Central Committee. The Chamber of Mines poll showed that both coloreds and Indians favored P.W. Botha, the former South African State President, over all other leaders and parties.³¹

If the National Executive is to be taken as a sample of the cross-racial composition of the ANC, it is, by comparison with dozens of other groups, organizations and institutions in South Africa, a very poor showing. A white political party such as the Democratic Party, for example, can actually show that it has substantial support from all groups in South Africa. Even the much-abused tri-cameral parliament, which as an institution has been pointedly rejected by anything up to 50% of the colored and Indian electorate, can still boast a far higher degree of multi-racial co-operation than can the ANC. The fact of growing non-racialism in South Africa seems to have passed the ANC by during the long years in exile. During the sixties, for example, open association between and amongst whites and blacks in South Africa was only practiced and accepted socially in politically radical circles. Since the late seventies however, and particularly during the eighties, there has been a noticeable flowering of cross-racial contact to which, ironically, the ANC leaders, who live in the past, have not been able to adjust. What has happened in South Africa is that whites, in very large numbers, have made the effort to accept and to welcome the new social and economic roles which non-white people now play in South Africa. One result has been that it is no longer *socially* acceptable for any whites to be overtly abusive or rude to black or colored people.³² Even those with the deepest and most stubborn prejudices

publicly display a manner which does not give offense to blacks and does not embarrass other whites.

But does this mean that blacks who are non-Marxist must also be excluded? Clearly not — because according to the strategy of Marxists 'war of national liberation' all blacks, whether or not they are Marxist, are members of the oppressed class, and must be encouraged to accept liberation by the ANC (in alliance with the SACP). The following passage from the ANC publication, *Sechaba* (printed in East Germany), of September 1985, puts it clearly:

We in the ANC know that the nationalist struggle and the socialist struggle are not one and the same thing, and they do not belong to the same historical period. The two represent two distinct categories of the revolution...³³

Once "liberation" of the blacks is accomplished, the struggle for socialism commences. As *Sechaba* puts it:

We must not allow our desire for socialism to intoxicate us. The people of South Africa must be taught the bitter truth simply, clearly and in a straight forward manner: the chief content of the present phase of our revolution in the national liberation of the black people. It is actually impossible for South Africa to make even that advance to socialism before the national liberation of the Black oppressed nation.³⁴

Finally, it is necessary to comment upon the fact that the ANC has succeeded in attaining the distinction of becoming accepted throughout the world as the 'authentic' interpreter of the aspirations of South African blacks. This is, without doubt, its greatest achievement.

Yet the fact that the outside world believes the ANC to be a suitable successor to the present government, hardly confers legitimacy on the organization in the eyes of the black people of South Africa. In the light of its present support, it would in free competition with other groups, parties and movements, be only one of a number of alternatives. It would hardly be able to exercise democratic power without forming a coalition with

other groups, and it is difficult to see what other group would feel comfortable in an alliance with the ANC. Given its proclivity for violence it is scarcely to be believed that once in power it would adhere to liberal-democratic principles, guarantee individual and group rights and freedoms or even retain the international support which it presently enjoys. In fact, the ANC's claim to legitimacy is based exclusively upon the weakness of the South African government's claim to legitimacy. If legitimacy is to be defined as "founded on opinion... (It is) nothing but the regard in which a polity is held by its members: the extent to which that polity is thought to be worthy of support".³⁵

As far as contemporary world opinion is concerned, no white (or non-African) government in Africa can be legitimate, simply because it is non-African. But any black (or African) government is presumed to be legitimate until it behaves so abominably that even the most indulgent are forced to withdraw their endorsement.³⁶ The fact that the present white government of South Africa is not regarded as legitimate, coupled with the fact that the ANC is the only political organization which has been able to convince external opinion that it totally rejects the South African government and all its works (*i.e.* including separate homelands) creates an opinion which favors the presumption of legitimacy with regard to the ANC.

Quite simply, the ANC is supported in its outrageous claim to be the only true representative body for blacks in South Africa because there is no other credible claimant to that title. As things stand at present, the ANC is quite determined that no other claimant to that presumed legitimacy will arise. This is what lies behind the campaign of terror conducted in South Africa against blacks who have attempted to forge other alliances. In the outside world, of course, the ANC has successfully disposed of its rival, the PAC, which was not backed by the Soviet Union (but in an earlier phase by the Chinese).

The long-term prospects of the ANC hang on its ability to

suppress its rivals. In particular, it must discredit or, eliminate groups which might be predisposed to enter into negotiations for a non-violent settlement of South Africa's political problems. Particularly dangerous are groups which may succeed in bringing about alliances across tribal lines, first, because tribal alliances (like Inkatha) are not regarded by contemporary Western political theorists as politically worthy successors to Afrikaner rule; second, because the ANC uses tribal antagonisms to incite violence; and, third, because the only identification amongst black people which overrides tribal affiliations is a religious, and, in particular, a Christian identification. There are, of course, two problems here for the ANC: the unifying propensity of Christianity in its African forms, and the ideological conflict between the Old Testament Christian beliefs of the African churches and Marxism/Leninism.

Conclusion

"One black leader said to me: You will probably talk to a lot of whites, including members of the government. Just give them one message, and that is we don't want to replace them we just want to join them."

This was part of the farewell statement to the press in South Africa of the outgoing American Ambassador, Edward Perkins, who left the country in May 1989 optimistic about the future:

I have a sense that among blacks and whites — and I don't just mean those in government — there are people who are trying their best to figure out a way to get closer to a model which allows people to continue to examine where they are and to enable them to move onto the next step.

Ambassador Perkins' conclusions about the second revolution suggest that it is far from over, but that the way things are going, it will not erupt into the violent confrontation which the ANC, their Communist Party backers

of long standing and their Soviet bloc sponsors desire. The reason is that violent confrontation is not a viable strategy for the majority in South Africa, and the majority knows it. South Africa is not a colonial state wherein blacks can eliminate the inhabitants by calling on the colonial powers to do the job for them. White South Africans have no home country to which they can return.

If, then, whites are to be permanent, it is obvious that they will not voluntarily surrender their security, the most important element of which is the privilege of living in an orderly society governed according to the norms of Western states and societies. The consequence for blacks is that they will have to find ways to enter the society which whites have created in South Africa and to compete with whites for the goods available in that society. The evidence that this can be done is all around them as more and more black people move up the professional, economic and social scale. Blacks are already joining whites in substantial numbers, and this process will continue unless the leaders of the outside world insist on the romantic solution of bloody revolution.

For the West, the fact must be faced squarely that South Africa cannot be 'decolonized' because it is not a colonial state. The well-trusted remedy for solving third world problems must fail in South Africa.

FOOTNOTES

1. Johnson, P., 'Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Eighties', Harper Row, New York, 1983, p. 510.
2. The first, having taken place in 1899 against the British colonial rule, was brought to a conclusion in 1910 when the British agreed to the eventual independence of the country.
3. Bozeman, Adda B., 'Conflict in Africa: Concepts and Realities', Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 24, observes that 'None, (of the African states) however, with the possible exception of Somalia, can be convincingly described as a nationally and territorially unified state, for all are conglomerates of multiple, often hostile, tribal communities... Indeed, it is difficult not to acquiesce in an African scholar's (*i.e.* Christian Vieyra's) judgement that the modern African state exists under the trusteeship of indigenous forces'. On the question of the formation of nations, the reader is referred to Smith, Anthony D., *The Ethnic Origin of Nations*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986. Smith speaks of the triple revolution in the West which favored nation formation. 'These were the revolutions in the sphere of division of labor, a revolution in the

control of administration and a revolution in cultural co-ordination.' The revolutions have not yet taken place in Africa. (p. 131)

4. Tom Lodge, writing on "The ANC of South Africa", has quoted Stephen Davis, *Season of War: Insurgency in South Africa*, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, MA, 1982, p. 207, that the 'total ANC establishment numbered 9000 people, of which 5,400 were military personnel and the rest being either administrative or educational'.

5. Numbering 200-300, according to *ibid*.

6. For a description of the ANC's role as a Soviet front organization, see Radu, M. 'African National Congress: Cadres and Credo' in *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XXXVI, dated July-August, 1987.

7. From Grohs, G.K., 'Frantz Fanon and the African Revolution' in Apter, D.E., and Andrain, C.F., (eds.) *Contemporary Analytical Theory*, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1972, p. 274.

8. *Ibid*.

9. As recently as May 14, 1989, the new leader of the National Party, Mr. F.W. de Klerk, in a television interview, in which he addressed the question of a single parliament in South Africa, spoke of a 'balance of power, in which no group dominated another'.

10. Included amongst the moderate black parties and movements are the United Municipalities of South Africa (UMSA), the Federal Independent Democratic Alliance (FIDA), the Urban Council's Association of South Africa (UCASA), the Church Alliance of South Africa (CASA), Inkatha, and the National Forum (NF). These movements aspire to political status. A giant movement, the Zion Christian Church (ZCC) overshadows most of these, but does not try at the present stage to exercise any political influence over its millions of adherents. CASA, which is based on church membership, claims 12 million black followers.

11. 'I am committed to the politics of negotiation because it is only through negotiation that we can arrive at a non-violent settlement of issues that would otherwise divide us.' Dr. Mangosothu Buthelezi in a public address February, 1988, quoted in *Clarion Call*, Vol. 1, 1989.

12. The government's efforts to persuade black leaders to come forward to negotiate a new future political arrangement for South Africa started in 1985 but have so far had no success in attracting participants. The first forum suggested was a constitutional council; when that failed to stir up interest, former President Botha spoke of the launching of a 'Great Indaba'. This was to take the shape of a National Forum. In May, 1989, an effort to launch a black political party, to be called the National Forum, for the purpose of responding to the obvious need for negotiations, foundered when the strongest black moderate groups, Inkatha, UMSA, and UCASA dissociated themselves from it. (see footnote 10).

12. It is only necessary to look at the life-styles enjoyed by individuals such as Winnie Mandela, Archbishop Tutu and the exiled leadership to appreciate this point.

14. Having repeated this demand on innumerable occasions, Chief Buthelezi has finally put forward a document which he describes as an example of the kind of 'declaration of intent' he has in mind. Its principal provisions are: 'power-sharing', 'universal adult suffrage', and 'common citizenship'.

15. One of the black moderate parties, FIDA, (see footnote 10) has even declared itself in favor of a system similar to the Swiss cantonal system which was mooted in the early eighties by the government as a possible model for South Africa. A strong case for this model has been made in Louw, L. and Kendall, F. *South Africa: The Solution*, Amagi Publications, Bisho, 1986.

16. This position is fully expounded in an article in the Inkatha journal 'Clarion Call', Vol. 1, 1989, entitled 'We want an Agenda for Negotiations'. The following passage from a speech by Buthelezi is quoted: 'The new constitutional dispensation which the Bill talks about will be a myth unless categorical statements are now made about the scope of the South African Government's willingness to reconstitute South Africa.' It is interesting to compare the position of Joshua Nkomo in the negotiations which took place in Rhodesia in 1960 to the position of the moderates in South Africa today.
17. In spite of current speculation to the effect that the Soviets are encouraging negotiation, it appears that they are still training ANC fighters and saboteurs. This emerges from the news item that a Soviet airliner was forced to land in Dar-es-Salaam in mid-May 1989 because a fight had broken out between ANC cadres on their way to Moscow for training. See *The Star*, Johannesburg, 20 May, 1989.
18. Yu. V. Irkhin, *Voprosy iistorii*, No. 4, April 1982, abstracted in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. xxxiv, No. 27, August 1982.
19. Chief Buthelezi's right hand man Oscar Dhlomo, has recently reiterated the point. 'For one thing we believe that the government now takes us seriously when we insist that neither Dr. Buthelezi nor any other black leader worth of the name will negotiate while Mr. Mandela and his colleagues are in jail. We are fairly certain that when Mr. Mandela is released it will be unconditionally.' *Sunday Star*, Johannesburg, 2/5/89.
20. The most dramatic demonstration of the change in white attitudes is demonstrated on the question of scrapping separate residential areas, the bastion of white exclusivity. Although a major debate on this issue continues to rage in the media, some leading social scientists have concluded that resistance to change has abated significantly. Accordingly, Prof. L. Schlemmer is quoted in a media report, 'Most whites are ready for well planned change.' (*The Star*, 29 May, 1989).
21. This campaign has for over two decades been orchestrated by the United Nations, but it has been strangely supported by the Soviet Union, which has had regional and global objectives which would be served by revolution in South Africa, by many socialists and third world states – as a response to either apartheid or capitalism or both. Domestic rivals of the Afrikaner-dominated government of South Africa, have had no hesitation in trying to capitalize on this campaign.
22. In the 21 months before the emergency was declared in 1986, radical groups in the black residential areas had been responsible for destroying or badly damaging 3500 vehicles. 73 black people had been killed, 295 of them murdered by the 'necklace' method.
23. Formerly the British protectorate of Bechuanaland.
24. Reports that the Soviet Union is attempting to encourage the ANC towards negotiation has been common since the conclusion of the Angolan peace accords. One South African Soviet specialist, Dr. Philip Nel of the University of Stellenbosch, has even suggested that the Soviet Union could become the 'ideal mediators' in South Africa (see *Soviet Revue*, University of Stellenbosch, May, 1989.)
25. See *Leadership South Africa*, Vol. 4, No. 4, June 1975, p. 39, as well as *Africa Research Bulletin*, Sept. 15 - Oct. 14, 1984, p. 7446).
26. *Ibid.*
27. *The Sunday Star*, Feb. 17, 1985, and the Human Sciences Research Council).
28. For further details see *S.A. Barometer* Vol. 1, No. 18, Nov. 1987).
29. 'The Voice of the South African People: A Survey of South Africans on the Subject of Sanctions and Foreign Corporate Divestment', The Gallup Organization, 53 Bank St., Princeton, New Jersey.
30. *The Star*, Johannesburg, October, 1988.
31. 'Question 48: Which one of the following leaders or organizations do you support

most?

Asian		Colored
5	ANC	6
5	UDF	6
26	P.W. Botha	11

32. This point is well illustrated by the cases of the towns of Boksburg and Carletonville in the Transvaal which recently attempted to restore all the trappings of petty apartheid which had been eroded during recent years. The Councils of these towns drew down on themselves the scorn and wrath of the entire country, and it is evident that their challenge to the new spirit of change in South Africa will ultimately fail.

33. *Talking with the ANC*, Bureau for Information, Pretoria, June, 1966, p. 19, quoting 'Sechaba' of September, 1985.

34. *Ibid.*

35. Moulakis, A. *Legitimacy: Proceedings of the Conference in Florence June 3 to June 4, 1982*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin and New York, 1986, p. 3. The definition continues 'In order to elicit and obtain support, a government must exist. No ruler can claim legitimacy unless he is in fact in power or has a good chance of obtaining it. The appeal to the highest principles, the embodiment of the most admirable virtues, the possession of the most venerable titles will be of no avail to a government unable actually to obtain obedience'.

36. The cases of Idi Amin of Uganda or Bokassa of the Central African Republic demonstrate this point.

TRADITIONAL AMERICAN CONSERVATISM AND "NEO-CONSERVATISM"

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Opinions as to the present general condition of the United States vary widely according to the philosophy and perspicacity of the holder. The great mass of Americans seem currently to believe that the economy is in good shape, since unemployment is low, inflation is low, and therefore that all is well. The American dollar at the time of writing is stable, and in fact has been frustrating the attempts of the central banks to prevent it from strengthening once again. The Dow Jones is currently high, and only a few voices, albeit reputable voices, warn against the dangers inherent in the unprecedented governmental budget deficit and the gigantic balance of payments deficit which normally should be pulling the value of the dollar down. Hard money enthusiasts, who formerly put their faith in gold, have suffered severe losses, as world gold production has increased and the dollar has held its position. On the surface, there seems little to worry about.

However, many conservative ideologists do not share this optimism. The conservatives of America, once a powerful force, have been set back by fundamental divisions within their ranks.¹ On the one hand there are the traditional conservatives, whose primary emphasis still lies in loyalty to America as a nation of people proud of the cultural and scientific achievements of their forebears. On the other hand, there is a new breed of "neo-conservatives" who correspond more closely to nineteenth century liberals.² The latter place economic individualism above the interests of the nation, and often look for financial prosperity not in strength at home, but in unfettered worldwide trade. The "neo-conservatives" think not of nations but of individuals, and they chaff above