participants become unwilling to take the opposite side of the trades required by the sell orders, and the decline accelerates. The result is potential for a scenario similar to that of 1987, except that the selling is not coming from portfolio insurers, but from firms that have written puts.

This is the truly worrisome message of the book.

Edward M. Miller

Luxury and Status: Why Money Fails to Satisfy in an Era of Excess
Robert H. Frank
The Free Press, 1999

Robert H. Frank's book is dedicated to showing that excessive real resources are devoted to conspicuous consumption when other uses for these resources would be better for society. Of course, many others have said this. However, Professor Frank does a better job of explaining why this is so, and discussing the resulting policy implications. The basic reason is that human wants are interdependent. What one has affects what another wants.

Frank is one of the few economists seen at evolutionary psychology meetings. Given this, it is a little surprising that his lucid explanations don't include a better explanation of why human wants are so interdependent. Evolutionary psychology is built on the idea that the genes that increase in frequency are those that contribute to the individual's leaving the most descendants, not necessarily those that contribute most to human happiness.

One of the necessities for leaving lots of descendants is survival. As part of this, humans desire food and shelter. Medical care and medicine also contribute to survival. Many human wants can be explained in terms of such simple needs. Traditional economics, where the individual is taken as having a set of wants that are fundamentally independent of the wants of others, deals adequately with these material needs. People can be visualized as trading off the desire for meat versus the desire for vegetables. The gain in one person's happiness (economists use the term utility) from sating his hunger, or from warming his body in winter, or from eliminating the pain of a disease does not have much effect on others' happiness.

At one time, most economic activity, at least among the working classes and peasants, was directed toward meeting such material needs. It was in such conditions that Adam Smith's book *The Wealth of Nations* was written. Even today, economics textbooks implicitly have such needs in mind.

However, today in the industrial world most people have their material needs for food, shelter, and medical care met. Instead, our efforts are devoted to seeking status, and conspicuous consumption. Today, most consumption is not to meet material needs, but to impress others.

Frank frequently uses a large house or a fancy automobile as examples of conspicuous consumption. While such consumption raises the status of those that have the items, it also lowers that of those that do not have them, leaving little net benefit. He argues convincingly that if we all bought less expensive versions of such items we would derive equal satisfaction, while additional income would be freed up for other purposes, some of which would actually increase our happiness without lowering that of others.

Frank provides empirical evidence for the folk wisdom that material goods do not bring happiness. Surveys of happiness and satisfaction with life conducted at regular intervals show that happiness has not increased even over time-frames where the level of material consumption has greatly increased.

In spite of his evolutionary psychology background, Frank does not go deeply into why we derive pleasure from conspicuous consumption. The evolutionary psychology literature provides the explanation (for a recent exposition see Low 2000). The reason is that humans compete for mates, and especially, men compete for women. Over the thousands of years of human evolution, women who selected high-status males for mates enjoyed more protection and resources for themselves and their children. This permitted them to leave more grandchildren, and this caused the genes for such behavior to spread. By now humans have a built-in tendency to seek status and to seek to impress other humans. Because our mating success over the years has depended on our status, we are status-seekers. Much of our desire for conspicuous consumption evolved because signaling our resources increased our reproductive success.

One of Frank's complaints is that the human desire for conspicuous consumption leads to too little saving. This doesn't follow logically from a desire for conspicuous consumption. Since conspicuous consumption in the future will also be sought, saving for future consumption is encouraged, just as current consumption is.

However, the evolutionary reasons that lead to a desire for conspicuous consumption also may make current consumption preferred. Humans are a pair-bonding species that usually marries young, and often stays married for life. Reproductive success has often depended on the quality and number (for males) of mates they could acquire. Mate acquisition occurs young, and those who impress future mates at a young age normally would have left more descendants than those who retained the resources for future use. A more comfortable (or longer) life after children have been raised does little to increase reproductive success, and impedes success if it reduces the resources available for mate acquisition. Admittedly, parents can use resources to assist children or grandchildren. However, because on-average children have only one-half of the genes of a parent, and grandchildren only a quarter, a given amount of resources has more value if devoted to the parent's survival and mate acquisition early in life than if passed on to children or grandchildren.

Thus, although Frank is correct (he provides calculations) that if the typical family would only reduce their consumption for a few years, they could consume more for the rest of their lives, his belief that the problem is the desire for conspicuous consumption remains unproved. The reluctance to save is adequately explained by humans preferring current consumption to future consumption. As noted, there are good evolutionary reasons why humans have evolved to have such preferences.

Frank clearly believes that higher savings and the resulting higher rate of economic growth are good things. He also recognizes the standard argument for letting people decide on their savings rates, and hence on how rapidly their consumption will grow over time. He suggests that growth has external benefits similar to that of defense (p. 247). However, he fails to recognize that because growth contributes to defense, and a strong economy deters other nations from waging war, there is a defense externality (see Miller 1976).

There are several problems with the book. His basic policy proposal is a progressive consumption tax. In practice this would be achieved by modifying existing income taxes to allow unlimited deductions for savings. The unsaved part of income represents consumption.

Interestingly, he leaves out the major theoretical reason for thinking the replacement of an income tax by a consumption tax would increase savings. That is, that the income tax greatly lowers the return to saving since the interest and dividends are taxed, and the compounding is taxed. With a 40% income tax, sacrificing a dollar's worth of consumption lowers the rate of return on investment by 40%, say from 10% to 6%. Compounded over many years, the gain from saving and investing are greater in a world where consumption is taxed, than where income is taxed.

Alas, for a book that argues for a change in the tax system there is very little discussion of the problems of implementation and of transition. In theory, repaying debt and saving are the same, and borrowing is negative saving. Thus, if one exempted saved funds from the new tax, one would also include borrowings. Normally, people save during their working years and then dis-save during retirement. Under the current system they are taxed heavily during their working years, and are taxed relatively little during retirement when their income is much less. Under a consumption tax, the retired would pay heavier taxes and those saving for retirement less. However, during the transition there would be a generation who had been taxed while saving for retirement, and are again taxed heavily during retirement. This would be inequitable. However, this rather obvious problem is not mentioned in the book. Likewise, an obvious problem would be the person who saved heavily, and then went abroad to spend his money and avoided being taxed on this consumption. Solutions are possible, but one would like to have seen at least a mention that there are such problems.

He argues that a consumption tax would favorably affect career choice (p. 236). An earlier book of his dealt with the "winner take all" economy. He argues that in many parts of the economy there are very high returns from being first, such as in athletics, music recordings, law, mergers and takeover investment banking, etc. Because the rewards in these fields are so large, the brightest and best often enter these occupations. Like many social observers, he believes that social welfare would be increased if more went into teaching, engineering, and the civil service. He mentions a study that argues that the US growth rate would be increased by half a percent by a doubling of enrollments in engineering, while doubling enrollments in law would actually reduce it by one half of one percentage point. His argument is that if taxation took more of the returns from the winner-take-all occupations, people would be more likely to select more socially useful occupations. The chief problem with this argument is that if people derive great pleasure from being first in consumption, a consumption tax that causes everyone to consume less will still leave some consumers as clearly being first. People will continue to compete to enter the occupations that pay enough to permit them to engage in conspicuous consumption.

Shortly afterwards he argues that the problem of occupational choice is similar to gold prospecting. Without providing a citation or a strong argument, he claims that additional prospectors contribute very little to the total amount of gold found, although they may contribute to the gold being found earlier. He never spells out the model, but this outcome is unlikely if prospectors stake out a parcel of land and intensely search it. They will stop searching when they have explored that land. The outcome he describes is possible if there is no ownership of claims and prospectors just randomly search the same lands without marking which land they have searched. If there are enough prospectors to search the whole gold region, there can be wasteful duplication. If it is the latter model he has in mind, he should have said so. He uses acquisition and merger lawyers as an example where there is a limit to the total fees to be earned and argues that too many of America's brightest are competing for these positions.

If it is true that material objects are the major signs of status, it is true that people will seek out the higher-paid occupations. However, there are other things that bring status. Academics seek a long publication list and fame from their discoveries. Many seek a reputation for good works. One set of policies Frank does not discuss would try to raise the prestige of these other activities.

Britain is very fortunate in that much prestige comes from being knighted. Those who have been knighted are called Sir, and are treated with high respect by others. Frequently the activities that lead to knighthood are socially useful, probably more useful than the usual accumulation of material goods. The US and other countries might benefit from having similar, well-recognized honors.

Frank praises time spent at home with family and friends. He contrasts paid work with the delights of socializing with friends and family and spending time on ones hobbies. However, much time spent on hobbies and activities outside of work is really devoted to seeking status. An example is building up impressive collections containing rare objects other collections lack. Much time is devoted to winning competitions of various types. If we had more free time, we would probably devote more time to such activities. However, it is not clear we would be much happier.

In a book devoted to showing how wasteful and non-satisfying our efforts to accumulate luxury goods are, one might have thought that Frank would come out in favor of taxes on status goods. Having given the standard economist's argument for taxing activities that produce pollution (an adverse effect that is not reflected in market prices), Frank could be expected to propose taxes on forms of consumption that make others feel less good. But he does not.

The author of this review has written a paper proposing the taxation of status goods (Miller 1975). Status goods are those that serve to establish status and derive much of their value from the ability to impress others with their cost. A classic example would be a piece of diamond jewelry, much of whose purpose is to impress others. If diamonds were to be twice as expensive, a somewhat smaller jewel would probably serve the purpose just as well. Suppose there was a heavy tax on diamonds. Diamonds would be more expensive, but the owners of a diamond of a particular price would probably derive about as much utility (happiness) as before. Yet the government would have additional revenue that could be used for many desirable purposes. Similar arguments apply to other status goods such as large houses and high-performance automobiles.

Why does Frank reject this argument? He points to the problems in designing and administering such taxes. Since the manufacturers and consumers of goods classified as luxury goods will be hurt by such taxes, they will expend much effort and money in lobbying against them (economists sometimes call this rent-seeking). Frank points out the same good may be wanted sometimes for status reasons and sometimes because of the pleasure it brings the owner in some other way. His example is that one person may like a high-performance car because of the pleasure of driving it, while for another the chief utility is in impressing others. A tax aimed at the first individual will also penalize the latter one.

There is also a risk that resources will be wasted in evading status taxes. Suppose a low-priced car is regarded as a necessity (at least in America) and a heavy tax is placed on the price above a certain amount. Cars will be sold that fall under the cut-off price, but which can easily be upgraded (e.g., the basic car is without fancy electronics or air-conditioning, but the purchaser then has these installed).

These problems definitely exist, but it still seems clear that some items of expenditure are for the relief of pain (most medical care) or discomfort, and others much more for status. Major social gains might be derived by a system of selective taxation of status goods.

Another possibility is to try to increase the prestige society gives to accumulating wealth. Keynes pointed out that society seems to have an implicit agreement with entrepreneurs. They would be allowed to accumulate vast fortunes with the understanding they would consume only a little of the income from these fortunes, investing the rest. Such reinvestment contributes to economic growth and serves to raise the incomes of the laboring classes, since they have more capital to work with.

However, there is social pressure not to boast of how much you have (to do so would be gauche) and much wealth is held as stocks and bonds where it lacks the visibility of a family business. Thus, people resort to conspicuous consumption as a way of obtaining status (and indirectly mates). If people are able to obtain status without conspicuous consumption, they may do less such consuming, freeing up resources for satisfying other human wants and needs.

Overall, Frank has done a good job in documenting that human wants are interdependent, and that economic theory and policy that treats individuals as being isolated from each other is over-simplified. However, he does a poorer job of making a strong case for what he believes to be the policy implications of these interdependencies.

References

Low, Bobbi
2000 Why Sex Matters. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Miller, Edward M
1975 "Status Goods and Luxury Taxes." *American Journal of*

Economics and Sociology, April, 141-154.
Miller, Edward M
1976 "The Defense Externality." *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, October, 271-274.

Edward M. Miller

The American Dream: Can It Survive the 21st Century?
Joseph L. Daleiden
Prometheus Books, 1999,
Amherst, New York 738 pages, Hardcover

Can "The American Dream" survive the 21st Century? Based upon the author's findings, the answer is "no". And if the U.S. government continues current policies, which are economically myopic, socially dysfunctional, and politically centrifugal, not only "The American Dream" but America, itself, will not survive. These destructive policies, as the author explains, are the result of successful lobbying by two "powers" that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s. They are: (a) special interest groups advancing agendas based on race, ethnicity, religion, language, culture, age, sex, sexual orientation, handicap status, and academic and business "needs", and (b) the ideological fixations of liberals and conservatives.

These "powers" were able to exert such influence because "The American Dream" lost its original meaning. The dream expressed by Thomas Jefferson in the American Declaration of Independence to "establish a nation on the principle that all men had the 'right to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness' " has been replaced over the years by a multitude of different, at times, conflicting definitions. If "The American Dream" can denote everything, it means nothing. Absent a common bond, the unraveling of society is all but inevitable. This slow unraveling became a rapid deconstruction after radicals from the 1960s assumed leadership roles in the academic, economic, and political fields. Since then, "The American Dream" has been redefined to mean the superiority of the individual over society, of rights over responsibilities, of materialism over morality, of consumption over savings, and of the present over the future.

Can this self-destruction be reversed? The author – who has worked as a statistician, demographer, business economist, urban policy analyst, and strategic planner in the public and private sectors – argues it can be provided the public recognizes the solution is complex, multifaceted, and requires immediate implementation. To highlight this importance, Chapter One is entitled "Two Scenarios for the Year 2050". Here, depending on whether or not the necessary reforms have been instituted, two radically different Americas are presented in the State of the Union address given in 2050 by the President of the United States to Congress. Without necessary reforms, the United States has politically disintegrated, like the old Soviet Union, with seven Southwestern States seceding and forming an independent "Hispanic" country. The rump United States has declined to the level of a Third World country due to overpopulation already at 500 million and projected to reach a billion in fifty years – and its corollaries: environmental destruction and rampant crime. The second scenario, after the necessary reforms have been adopted, depicts a United States that has remained united politically and culturally, is economically and academically sound, and is enjoying an improved standard of living that is, most importantly, sustainable into the future.

In the next twelve chapters, the author examines the serious problems confronting the United States – population growth, immigration, environment, deficit, trade, poverty, welfare, education, crime, health care, and taxation. Various solutions are presented balancing those advanced by liberals with those proposed by conservatives. After offering a critique on their respective strengths and weaknesses, the author submits his own recommendations.

The author advocates, first and foremost, a liberation from the mental straitjacket of the political ideologies of liberalism and conservatism as they currently exist. As a matter of faith, liberals believe in egalitarianism and conservatives in meritocracy. To prove the truth of their respective "faiths", the former seek bigger government and more regulations, while the latter seek less government and fewer regulations. Commitment to these secular "faiths" insures that specific government programs are continued even when empirical evidence shows they do not work.

Therefore, the author calls for solutions based on pragmatism. This pragmatism would promote what he calls "the three harmonies" and a modified theory of Rawlsian justice.

The three conditions are:

> 1. Individuals must, to some extent, have the opportunity to fulfill their basic biological needs to be in harmony with their genetic nature.
> 2. Fulfillment of the needs of individuals must be reconciled to the needs of others, i.e., to a reasonable extent, individual needs must be brought into harmony with societal needs.
> 3. The aggregate needs of society must be fulfilled in a manner that is in harmony with the environment, i.e., aggregate consumption cannot exceed the carrying capacity of the environment."

These are complemented by a modified theory of Rawlsian justice that reads: "All social primary goods (liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the basis of self-respect) are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all these goods is to the greater (relative) advantage to the least favored."

One of the first important points raised by the author is how the metamorphosis of "The American Dream" into the pursuit of materialism has not, contrary to advertisers' assertions, produced happiness. "A 1995 study showed that most Americans felt poorer than they did thirty years before when real incomes were almost 30 percent lower than the 1995 levels."

Next he addresses the Gross Domestic Product or GDP. While the rising GDP of the United States is frequently cited by the government, economists, and the media as proof of the country's economic well being, the author points out that since the GDP is an average it presents a false image of prosperity.

The author presents data the GDP ignores. For example, from 1966 to 1970, the lowest quintile of American families saw their income increase by 22 percent. However, from 1980 to 1997, that income dropped by one percent. Meanwhile, the top quintile saw their income grow 29 percent from 1966 to 1979 and a further 34 percent from 1979 to 1997. It appears "99 percent of all the economic gain between 1979 and 1994 went to the upper 5 percent of income earners."

In 1980, CEOs made 42 times what factory workers received. By 1994, CEOs made 53 times the average factory worker's pay, and among the largest U.S. companies it was 225 times greater.

This occurred while the hourly earnings adjusted for inflation, which had risen 50 percent from 1950 to 1970, from $5.34 an hour to $8.03, dropped by six percent, to $7.54, from 1970 to 1997.

At the same time, weekly earning, which had increased 48 percent from 1950 to 1970, dropped 21 percent by 1997 to 1973 levels.

During the 1950s and 1960s, family income grew on average by 3 to 4 percent. After 1973, it grew by less than 1 percent.

Real per capita disposable income adjusted for inflation actually rose 59 percent from 1950 to 1970 and 62 percent from 1970 to 1997. This was due in large part to more hours worked and the necessity of having a two-income family.

The result has been a growing gap not only between rich and poor, but between the rich and the middle class as well. The emotional impact of such growing economic inequalities are reflected in the Louis Harris poll used to calculate an Alienation Index. This index jumped from 29 in 1969 to 65 in 1993.

Alienation based on the perception among the middle class – the corner stone of a stable and prosperous democratic society – that their economic position is deteriorating, and among native-born poor, especially poor blacks, that they are economically worse off today than they were years ago are recipes for potential political instability.

The author explains how the economic, social, and political problems confronting the United States are the result of overpopulation. And this overpopulation is driven by Third World immigration. The combined number of legal and illegal aliens entering the United States annually is now approximately 1.5 million – the highest level in the history of the United States.

Immigrants and their descendants accounted for two-thirds of the U.S. population growth during the 1990s. They are projected to be responsible for virtually all of the population growth in the United States hereafter. The Census Bureau now projects that the U.S. population will increase from 269 million to 400 million by 2050. However, Census Bureau projections are notorious for underestimating U.S. population growth. If immigration, legal and illegal, is higher than anticipated the U.S. population could reach 500 million by 2050. And by 2080, it could exceed 800 million.

What are some of the consequence of such population growth?

Currently, "one percent increase in the immigrant composition of an occupation reduces wages at least 0.7 percent".

By 2050, U.S. arable land will be reduced by nearly 40 percent from 470 million acres to 290 million acres due to population generated development. The United States, historically a food exporter, will become a net food importer. The standard of living will fall towards Third World status.

There are more immediate problems. By admitting Third World immigrants, the US government is importing poverty, illiteracy, infectious diseases, and crime.

Third World immigration is also responsible for higher unemployment among blacks, lower wages for the poor, and increased costs for welfare, SSI, and public education, and increased environmental degradation.

Below are a few examples cited by the author of how Third World Immigration adversely impacts employment, social services, and crime:

- Immigration cost U.S. workers $133 billion a year due to depressed wages.
- From 1974 to 1996, the minimum wage dropped 34 percent in constant dollars.
- More than 2 million U.S. workers were displaced in 1992 alone.
- Third World immigrants are beneficiaries of affirmative action programs originally meant for black Americans allowing Third World immigrant-owned businesses to discriminate against blacks with impunity.
- Net cost of immigration to U.S. taxpayers since 1970 reached $65 billion annually by 1996 and is projected to jump to $866 billion for the period 1997 to 2006.
- Immigrants are a net cost to Social Security of about $1,000 per person annually.
- Immigrants who arrived before 1988 were 56 percent more likely than native born Americans to be living in poverty and 25 percent more likely to receive public aid and have an average per capita income from public assistance of 14 percent more than native born.
    - In 1995, the General Accounting Office, GAO, reported immigrants are now twice as likely to receive public assistance as the general population.
- By 1990, the cost of bilingual education was $7.5 billion – one thousand times the original 1968 estimate.
- Incarceration rate of illegal aliens is three times the U.S. average.
- In 1994, 25 percent of inmates in federal prisons were aliens.
- Since 1980, there has been a 600 percent increase in alien inmates.
- In Los Angles, alone, there are an estimated 600 ethnic gangs with over 100,000 members.

In the last chapter, "Putting It All Together", the author lists specific proposals to save "The American Dream". The reader may find many of his recommendations to be controversial, but all need to be given a fair hearing. Since America's problems are interconnect, the author warns that partial measures, or "compromises" in the vocabulary of politicians, will not be successful, and will only result in the proverbial rearranging of the deck chairs on the Titanic.

Joseph E. Fallon

Crimes and Mercies

James Bacque

Little, Brown and Company (Canada) Limited, 1997

"At least 9.3 million Germans died needlessly soon after [World War II], the great majority because of the conditions imposed by the four major victors," according to historian James Bacque in a sequel to his earlier book *Other Losses*. The figure may go as high as 13.7 million.

Does anyone care? The myths that survive in Western public opinion and within the prevailing intellectual culture seem impenetrable. Bacque's is the latest of several learned books, including those by Alfred-Maurice de Zayas and Victor Gollancz, that have appeared in recent decades about the atrocities committed against German civilians and prisoners of war in 1945 and for five years thereafter. A reason for yet another book is that Bacque has had the benefit, as those who preceded him have not, of the KGB archives in Moscow. The opening of the Soviet archives has been a source of illimitable information for those seeking to understand the twentieth century. Another reason, of course, is that the world has largely ignored the earlier books. Serious scholars will need to repeat again and again the many facts that are required to give perspective and balance to the understanding of history. Otherwise, myth and prejudiced selectivity will remain as the permanent historiography of our age.

The title *Crimes and Mercies* reflects Bacque's desire to remind us that, along with the atrocities, some wonderfully humane things were done (hence, the "mercies"). There was potential famine in many parts of the world at the end of the war, precipitating a concerted effort especially by the United States, Canada, Australia and Argentina. It is an amazing figure, but former U.S. president Herbert Hoover, who spent much of his adult life in food relief, estimated that as many as 800 million lives were saved.

The post-war atrocities committed against the Germans took a grisly toll on three categories of people: the residents of occupied Germany, of whom 5.7 million are said to have died; the 15 million who were expelled from eastern lands and forced west toward what later became West Germany, of whom anywhere from 2.1 to 6.0 million died (it was Konrad Adenauer who put the figure at 6 million); and the prisoners of war, of whom from 1.5 to 2.0 million died.

The residents of occupied Germany. For a considerable period after the end of the war in May 1945, the German people were subjected to starvation conditions despite an abundance of available food. Germans speak of 1947 as the *Hungerjahr*. Red Cross food trains were sent back to Switzerland; all foreign governments were denied permission to send food; fertilizer production was sharply reduced; such food as there was was even confiscated, especially in the French zone; and the fishing fleet was kept in port. In 1945, Mennonites were forbidden to send food to their co-religionists in Germany. The taking of eastern Prussia to make it a part of Poland deprived Germany of 25 percent of its arable land. "What finally assured the prolonged starvation of Germans was the enforced reduction of industry," Bacque says. The Morgenthau Plan to reduce Germany to an industrial wasteland was said to have been cancelled, but it wasn't. "By autumn 1945, industrial production was deliberately reduced to around 25-30 percent of pre-war levels," even though the war itself, with all its bombing, had hardly affected German industry, which at the end of the war still had 80-85 percent of its plant intact. The dismantlement of German industry was still continuing, indeed rising, in 1949, which saw the removal of all or part of 268 factories. In January 1947 the allotted daily ration per person in the French zone was 450 calories, whereas health experts say that from 2 to 3 thousand calories are needed for good health. Influential American senators such as Taft, LaFollette and Wherry protested "the deliberate and wholesale mass starvation" in the American, British and French zones of occupation. Wherry told the Senate that "the truth is that there are thousands upon thousands of tons of military rations in our surplus stock piles that have been spoiling right in the midst of starving populations."

The starvation is confirmed by the experience of Arthur Jacobs, the 12-year-old American boy who, born to German parents, was deported to Germany from the United States at the end of the war, transported in mid-winter in an unheated box car for four days, held in a prison at Hohenasperg (where he turned thirteen), and then forced to grub for food, along with the rest of the German population, to survive. He later returned to the United States and became a career officer in the United States Air Force. Readers of the *Journal* will recall the review of his book *The Prison Called Hohenasperg* in the Fall 1999 issue.

The starvation wasn't all. At Yalta, for example, it had been agreed that Stalin could take "reparations in kind." It is estimated that he transported 874,000 German civilians to the Soviet Union for slave labor, of whom 45 percent perished.

The 5 million expelled from the east. The creation of the Slavic states out of the break-up of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire at the end of World War I had created a diaspora of some five million Germans who then lived outside Austria. In late 1944 and early 1945 as the Red Army swept into eastern Europe, large numbers of these Germans (and others from the eastern regions of Germany) fled west in a desperate effort to escape the multiple rape, killing, even crucifixion, or seizure for slave labor that awaited them. The slaughter at Nemmersdorf and many other towns deserves to be as infamous as the Soviet execution of the Polish officer corps at Katyn. It was a period known as "the time of the women," since the refugees consisted almost entirely of women and children.

Atrocities against these refugees were committed not just by the Red Army but by Czechs, Jews, Tito's partisans, and others. The refugee columns were strafed, ships loaded with thousands of refugees (such as the freighter *Goya*, with 6 to 7 thousand refugees aboard) torpedoed and sunk. Perhaps the greatest mass atrocity was committed by the combined U.S. and British air forces when they fire-bombed Dresden, a city with no military significance, in mid-February 1945. The city was filled with perhaps as many as 600,000 refugees. The bombing was done by 1,400 British planes, followed by

450 American bombers. The International Committee of the Red Cross estimated 275,000 dead; other estimates run from a low of 40,000 to a high of 400,000. This mass killing of refugees was an extension of the wartime policy of "area bombing" to kill German civilians, particularly in the working-class neighborhoods around industrial areas. It is estimated that 600,000 German civilians were killed by this bombing during the war.

The flight westward as the war reached its final stages was followed during the post-war period by the expulsion of German civilians from East Prussia, Pomerania, East Brandenburg, Silesia, Bohemia, Moravia, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Transylvania that began in March 1945 and continued into 1949. These were Germans whose ancestors had lived in those areas for as long as 700 years. Even though the Potsdam Agreement had specified that the removal was to be "humane and orderly," the brutality was often extreme. Many of the deportees were placed in camps to await expulsion, and were met with sadism and slow starvation. De Zayas reports that "tens of thousands of German civilians perished in Polish internment camps while awaiting 'transfer' to Germany." According to de Zayas in *The German Expellees*, Tito's camps in Yugoslavia "were consciously and officially recognized as extermination centers."

The German prisoners of war. Bacque says the Western democracies "maintained camps where about one million German prisoners of war died of starvation, exposure or disease." The United States Army maintained prisoner-of-war camps in France in 1945 and later in Germany, and placed the prisoners on greatly reduced rations. "Martin Brech, retired professor of philosophy at Mercy College in New York, who was a guard at Andernach in 1945, has said," according to Bacque, "that he was told by an officer that 'it is our policy that these men not be fed.'" "Brech saw bodies go out of the camp 'by the truckload." More than half a million died in the American camps during 1945-6, a fact that was kept secret for 40 years.

This is a history that is to be taken seriously. It is written by capable scholars and published by reputable publishers such as Little, Brown, Charles Scribner's Sons and St. Martin's Press. The events recounted here are no more than a sample of the chilling details. It must be the task of academic historians not to leave such events as the province of a few authors "crying in the wilderness." People of goodwill everywhere, now and in the future, as well as the victims, deserve the fullest explication of what happened and why.

It wouldn't be surprising if some people will justify such mass killing on the ground that "the Germans supported Hitler, caused the war, and committed countless atrocities of their own; there is justice, then, in their suffering, even immensely." The trouble with such a justification is that it overlooks three things: First, that even (or most especially) Nazism was itself a movement rooted profoundly in anger and desire for retribution, based on events of a still earlier period. If atrocities can be justified if they are for retribution, this will justify virtually all atrocities, if one looks back into the historical antecedents. Virtually none arise out of a vacuum. Second, the West has been deeply hypocritical about who precisely has been evil, and why. There is no comparable sensibility toward Stalin (who deliberately starved ten million to death in 1932-3, just to mention one of his horrors), Mao (an estimated 30 million in the Great Leap Forward alone), and Pol Pot. Even this list is far too restricted, since mass murder has occurred in many times and places, not just in remote history but in our own day. What, then, makes German women and children more or less deserving of slaughter than others? Third, it is a peculiar sense of justice that will justify the mass killing of women and children, even if one were to accept the premise of "collective German war guilt."

Bacque, de Zayas, Gollancz, Theodore Schieder for recounting the treatment of the Germans; Nikolai Tolstoy, Julius Epstein, and Nicholas Bethell for telling about the forcible deportation of Russians, and even of Cossacks and non-Soviet Russian emigres, into Stalin's eager but unwelcoming hands at the end of World War II; and Robert Conquest for writing about Stalin's deportation of whole nationalities – all are scholars of courage and great perseverance who deserve to be heard by the "mainstream." What is at stake is our understanding of the twentieth century not in terms of fantasy but of fact.

Dwight D. Murphey

Man
Between Past and Future

Brunetto Chiarelli

University of Florence, Italy

CONTENTS

ISBN: 0-941694-34-8
160 Pages, Illustrated, $15.00

Joyride to Infinity

Robert A. McConnell Ph.D.

Joyride to Infinity is an alarm-sounding book that manages to be at the same time both conservative and radical in its encyclopedic exploration of our future.

The theme is over-population and the resultant evils of mass immigration and environmental pollution. If mankind cannot control its actions, Nature, in her cruelty, will do it for us. The author is a reluctant radical who was forced to acknowledge the extreme findings that he uncovered in his exhaustive pursuit of reality.

Professor McConnell argues that the globalization of our economy is leading to the end of nationhood, mass migration and the uncontrolled growth of population. The causal links are now clear. He sees no hope for sub-Saharan Africa and little hope for China, which faced its population problem too late. The rest of the world is having to cope with the overflow from the regions that are over-reproducing.

Planning for the future requires caring about the future. Those cultures which have no past to preserve will have no future to live in. Cultural Diversity, which begins by denying the past, will never summon the will to sacrifice for the preservation of the Earth as a worthy habitat.

The author is both an engineer and a scientist. As an engineer, his competence was proved as a radar development group leader in World War II. As a scientist with a Ph.D. in physics he is a Research Professor Emeritus of Biological Science, a Life Senior Member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, a Fellow of the American Psychological Society, and a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

ISBN 1-878465-35-X

Paperback, 440 pages, January 2000, Price $25.00

MASTERCARD/VISA ACCEPTED

Scott-Townsend Publishers

P.O. Box 34070, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20043

Tel: (202) 371-2700 Fax: (202) 371-1523 Email: socecon@aol.com