

no means competent to govern a state that embraces many nations.

The Poles have been unscrupulous guardians of the national minorities entrusted to their care. They are just as unscrupulous to-day as they were in the old times of the Polish Republic.

I not only appeal to the reports of the Pogroms in Poland, which are appearing every day now in the English

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press — I would particularly call attention to the report of the American food expert, in the *Manchester Guardian* of May 9, upon the massacre at Pinsk, a massacre which the local authorities favored and the government permitted to pass unpunished.

To put this peace treaty into effect means to push far to the westward both the Pogrom frontier and the 'Balkan' frontier.

## GERMAN DEMOCRACY AND FRENCH SECURITY

BY ERICH KUTTNER

EARLY in the war one saw in many show windows, among other things exhibited, a chart showing the present population and the prospective population growth of the belligerent nations up to 1950. Each nation was represented by soldiers in their proper uniform. The size of the figures expressed the respective populations. On the extreme left of this chart was a little French poilu and during the period up to 1950, he was expected to show hardly appreciable growth. In the middle stood a stately German warrior and by 1950 he was to have grown several heads higher. Clear over to the right was an imposing Russian giant, almost three times the size of the German, four times as large as the Frenchman, and by 1950 he was to become an enormous colossus.

This chart was symbolical of the foreign policy of Germany before the revolution and of the foreign policy of France at the present time. At the

outbreak of the war Germany was dominated by a hypnotic fear of Russia. We said to ourselves: 'We can conquer Russia by arms but what then?' What effect will even the bloodiest slaughter have upon a nation whose vigorous population adds two millions to its numbers every year? In spite of all our victories Russia now is three times as populous, and will in a generation be five times as populous, as we are, and then woe to us!

This hypnotic fear was the cause of our plans for partitioning Russia and was the ultimate reason for our conduct at Brest-Litovsk. We were trying to become masters of the Russian peril by depriving Russia of everything that could be taken away from it, even territory that did not desire to be separated from Russia, such as broad and fertile Ukraina. But a strange thing occurred. Even such a policy did not diminish the Russian people to the extent we desired, and

over and above that the whole scheme was most precarious because we knew that at the very first opportunity Ukraina would seize the occasion to rejoin Russia, as it has in fact done already.

The example is full of meaning. It demonstrates that no sort of military compulsion will change the natural relations between peoples. Military compulsion assumes as its guiding principle eternal hostility and in doing so adopts the measures best calculated to perpetuate hostility among nations. It directly inspires a policy of revenge in the government, which it would hold in check by its policy of mutilation and duress. Even had the peace of Brest-Litovsk remained in force, Germany would not have been free from its fear of Russia. The Russian nation would have continued to multiply and everyone added to its numbers would have been a hater of Germany. To-day the peace of Brest-Litovsk has been torn into a thousand shreds, but, in spite of that, there is not a man in Germany who really fears the Russian danger because we have all persuaded ourselves that we were mistaken in assuming perpetual hostility with Russia.

However, the French representatives in Versailles are dominated by the same hypnotic fear of Germany that the Germans felt of Russia at Brest-Litovsk. They mourn and they cherish deep anger because of the devastation of Northern France, but the determining factor in Clemenceau's policy is the simple arithmetical calculation that there are only twice as many German-speaking as French-speaking people in Europe and that the Germans are multiplying while the French are stationary. France in spite of its victory is just as terrified by Germany as Germany was by conquered Russia. France has, as we had,

the threatening figures of the population chart before its eyes.

So we see Clemenceau resorting to practically the same measures that Ludendorff adopted in his day: Partition, separation, disarmament. If we regard these things from the viewpoint of a future war of vengeance, does France suppose that it really makes itself safer by such a policy? Assuming that we were just what the French believe us to be, mere pretenders of peace sentiments as a result of our defeat but at heart already preparing a new campaign, would not in that case France still have reason to tremble before us no matter if it occupied the left bank of the Rhine and if German-Austria were prevented from joining Germany or even if several million Germans were placed under the governments of the Poles and Czechs and Italians, and German armaments were limited? In spite of all that, there would be many more Germans than French and within a generation the relative proportions would be still more unfavorable for France than they are at present.

But all artificial restrictions and limitations upon a nation have been proved by history to be but temporary. At the first shifting of international interests, these bonds are stripped off. Ultimately the security of France cannot be assured by disarming and partitioning Germany. Its only security is in maintaining a permanent syndicate of victors opposed to Germany. But such a syndicate is a very brittle thing. It is sure to break up as soon as its first purpose is attained. When Germany was conquered, the real reason for the Entente ceased to exist. England and America have nothing to fear from us. The sole reason for a future alliance would be to protect France against German vengeance. France will occupy the position of a

perpetual *protégé* and be a permanent dependent on its associates. Its fear of Germany will make it a mere hanger-on of England. The moment this friendship is disturbed, and we have only to think of the possibility of colonial conflicts to see how easily that may occur, then France, who has lost its former ally, Russia, during the war, will have to depend solely on its own resources.

This is the situation, if we look at matters with the eyes of imperialism. In spite of all its guaranties, France is not secure. In spite of all the chains it loads upon its enemy, it is in constant terror of that enemy. Militarism and annexations will be no more effective in protecting France from Germany than they were in protecting Germany from Russia.

Consequently, there is only one real source of safety for France. It lies not in a peace of duress and compulsion but in a peace that is a peace of spirit as well as form. If Germany is perforce treated as an enemy, Germany will continue to be a danger to the French nation no matter to what extent it is disarmed and guarded, but

in this case likewise the danger vanishes the moment you eliminate the idea of hostility.

The true interest and the best protection of France does not consist in trying to render Germany incapable of future wars but in removing the inner motives for such wars. At the present moment the Germans cherish no thought of revenge. Measures of violence and duress directed against an imaginary peril may, indeed, inspire that sentiment. In the same way that the domestic transformation of Russia has liberated Germany from the hypnotic fear of Russian aggression, so should the inner transformation of Germany liberate France from a similar dread. But this cannot happen until France gives up its old military point of view.

France's best protection against Germany is a real League of Nations coöperating on a basis of equality — a League of Nations that is not a trust of the conquerors but is based upon the principles of justice and conciliation and mutual understanding and that will, therefore, afford a guaranty against any future war.

Vorwärts

# THE REGIONALIST MOVEMENT IN FRANCE

BY ALEC W. G. RANDALL

SINCE the rise of modern states, and more particularly since the French Revolution, most countries of Europe with an independent national history of any considerable length have been the battle-grounds of two contending political ideas which, though they sometimes have different labels, we generally call Centralization and Decentralization. The struggle has been waged in France,—an example of supreme interest,—in Belgium, in Great Britain, in Italy, in Switzerland, in Spain, and in Germany. Switzerland, which has probably come nearer an ideal solution of the difficulty than any other country in Europe, is still faced with it from time to time; Great Britain, which has also been not unsuccessful, occasionally hears echoes of it — apart from the Irish question, which is properly a national problem and not really a difficulty of centralization. Both France and Spain are bending their energies to find a way of reconciling the two contending principles, and, after the peace terms have been accepted by both Germany and Austria, we may expect to see a revival of the same antagonism there, too — the antagonism between the centralist state, Prussia, and the decentralizing states in the South and in the Rhineland; between the advocates of the so-called *Einheitsstaat* (*état unitaire*, unitary state) and of the *Bundesstaat* (*état fédéral*, federal state).

The idea which stands as a challenge to centralism is frequently called regionalism. As has been indicated, the term is primarily a political one, and

the best English connotation of it the phrase 'local government.' But it can have a wider signification and be taken to include cultural and literary activities having for their aim or their result the stimulation of corporate self-consciousness in the inhabitants of a certain district or region. In its historical aspect regionalism is closely analogous to, is, in fact, an extension of, nationalism, and the relationship of a region to the country in which it is situated is on practically the same level as the relationship of a nation to that larger unit we call Europe. The one obvious difference is, of course, that the conscious loyalty of the European toward his continent is by no means so strong as the instinctive and often well-cultivated loyalty of the inhabitant of a region toward his country as a whole. As the units grow larger, emotion becomes more diffuse — an axiom of political psychology which makes one eager to watch the working out of the League of Nations, that attempt to impose the 'larger loyalty,' not merely on Europe, but on the world. Of its practical success we need not doubt; but will it ever evoke an emotion comparable with the sentiment of patriotism? Will men ever be moved by, be willing to die for, an international political ideal dissociated from any personality?

These questions are of the kind we must ask if we wish to explain and make clear to ourselves the real nature of regionalism in general and its origin and development in France in particular. Race psychologists, of