

nished incontestable pledges of her political and moral regeneration.

It is the same prudence which prompts many minds to maintain as complete as possible the independence of each of the Associated States. Undoubtedly in principle it is admitted that every association among States involves a certain limitation of national 'sovereignty'; but there is a very general inclination to reduce this limitation to the strict minimum necessary for concluding an international compact. The idea of a 'Federation,' and still more that of a super-State, is repugnant to the majority of minds. In this respect French opinion does not appear to have reached the same degree of ripeness as British or American opinion.

Finally, on another point French opinion is, if not hostile, at any rate irresolute, and once more lags behind opinion in many other countries. It has hitherto paid only very slight attention to the conditions of the Treaty of Peace relative to labor legislation. Most peace programmes are silent on this point, and not a single representative of the labor world has been accredited to the Conference. Only the Socialist Party and the *Confédération Générale du Travail* have drawn up an international programme of labor conditions, without awakening an echo in the Liberal or Conservative party.

We are thus forced to conclude, however regretfully, that the French programme of the Society of Nations has not developed as much as might be expected from its revolutionary origins. This reserve is to be explained by the still poignant memories of a war from which France has suffered more than any other country, and, above all, by the general timidity of the middle class, which in France is very large, very strongly attached to the existing social order, and indifferently informed by its press on the great human problems of the hour.

None the less, such words as justice, right, fraternity, never fail to move profoundly the French soul. The immense enthusiasm with which President Wilson has been welcomed in France proves that the sources of idealism in our country are far from running dry; and it may be hoped that, in fraternal collaboration with the two great English-speaking democracies, France will build tall and firm that City of the Nations whose foundations she was the first to lay in the heroic days of 1789.

The New Europe.

## II. AN AUSTRIAN VIEW

BY KARL KAUTSKY

UNIVERSAL disarmament has ceased to be a dream of the pacifists, and has become an economic necessity. International disarmament, however, is impossible without international institutions for controlling or deciding controversies between peoples and governments, which otherwise would resort to weapons to solve their differences. We do, indeed, anticipate that the coming peace will settle important disputes between the leading nations for a considerable time to come. But there will be innumerable questions of controversy between the small governments just being erected in eastern Europe after peace has been made. It is vain to hope that the peace treaty will succeed in establishing things upon a final basis in that region that will be satisfactory to all the parties affected. Mistakes in drawing boundaries are possible. Changes of attitude may occur as soon as the existing excitement and hostility have disappeared. These conditions will create a continued effort for revising the peace treaty, and result either in perpetual war or perpetual danger of war, such as we had in the Balkans for some time before the

present world catastrophe. The only way to avoid this will be to create some institution authorized to pass judicially upon such controversies, and supported by the community of nations, so that no individual government will even consider an attempt to resist, by force of arms, its superior authority.

But if we have universal disarmament and international arbitration, then national frontiers will lose their strategic importance. Consequently, those governments born out of the present war, whose frontiers are not favorable from a strategic point of view, are the most interested in having universal disarmament and international arbitration.

The world-war has also dealt a vital blow to the previous tariff system. It has produced an extraordinary shortage of food and raw material, and an abnormal increase in prices of every manufacturing country. At the same time it has accentuated in a high degree the conflict of interest between the farming population and the city working classes, which already was manifesting itself before the war. Finally, it has—at least in Eastern Europe—started a contest to overthrow the still feudalistic tenures of the great landholders.

The latter conflict is as real and present in Bohemia as in Poland and Hungary. To be sure, the Bohemian nobleman is of a different sort from the Hungarian. He has not fought for centuries for masters and existence, but has withdrawn from political activity since the battle of White Mountain, and contented himself with a quiet and retired life of ease and luxury. He is the peer of the Hungarian nobility in avarice and extortion, but not in talent and energy. His power will be broken more easily than that of his Hungarian fellow.

The characteristic features of the

period following the war will everywhere be the overthrow of Junker authority, the steady growth of opposition on the part of the city population, to agrarian demands, and an unendurable increase of prices. It is hardly likely, under these conditions, that we shall see protective duties on agricultural products restored.

But when the tariff on agricultural products disappears, the justification for a tariff on manufactures disappears. For a long period, the latter has not been a measure to stimulate manufacturing, but to insure manufacturers a monopoly market. Other methods of encouraging manufacturers in industrially backward countries may be employed with equal confidence, and at the same time be free from the objection of increasing the prices of products. Indeed they may even lower the price of products. This latter consideration will be a determining one during the era of poverty and want that is to follow the present war.

To the extent that tariffs lose their old importance and that freedom of trade becomes possible, individual States will cease to attach importance to particular economic territories, and the principles of national self-determination will be correspondingly unaffected by considerations of international commerce.

We must oppose firmly the plan of substituting tariff unions for general free trade. The latter was merely a way of grouping nations together in order to build up trade barriers between the groups. Every such group is instinctively hostile to every other, and the system bears within it the germ of economic warfare. That germ is incompatible with the ideals of universal disarmament and permanent peace.

A Balkan federation, or a Danube federation, or a Middle Europe or Russian federation, or whatever other such

scheme may be devised, will indicate no progress, but rather an obstacle, so far as these leagues are tariff unions, likely to prevent a general federation of the world. If economic necessities force nations to unite for purposes of general disarmament and international arbitration, economic necessity will rapidly extend this community of action to other fields of political and business life. We are dealing with forces whose initial manifestations are only a beginning of wider effects. But the possibility of internationalizing colonies, and open seas and canals, has been suggested. The demand that many waterways be internationalized and the freedom of the sea assured arises from a recognition that unrestricted participation in international trade, unrestricted use of international channels of communication, are questions of life and death for every modern nation. This is why it is so important now for a government to control its own access to the sea.

To be sure, in this age of railways the sea is far from being the only international route of traffic. Railways have already become more important for many nations. It may be as detrimental to the interests of a country to be dependent on the railway policies of a neighbor as to be cut off from the sea.

It was a great and significant ideal of modern German statesmen to control a railway connection extending from Hamburg to Bagdad. The only bad thing about it was that trade routes are also military routes, and that the route we planned would serve our purpose of world mastery as much as it would our desire for world commerce. But that is no reason for dropping the idea entirely; for we can deprive it of all its associations of military objects and plans of domination.

The Balkan war and the world war, which have separated Turkey, Austria,

and Russia, into a series of smaller States, have not improved the conditions for standardizing international railway traffic, but have impaired them. When we started to build the Bagdad railway, communication between Hamburg and Bagdad would have been subject to the control of but three governments, Germany, Austria, and Turkey. From now on, goods passing between Germany and Bagdad will have to pass through Czech, German, Austrian, Hungarian, Serb, Bulgarian, and Turkish jurisdictions in order to arrive at an Arabian destination.

Unless this is to remain a serious step backward, it is urgently important that this particular line, and every railway line of international importance, shall have an international administration, although it need not be international property. Every country engaged in international trade has equal interest in such a plan, particularly those nations which are cut off from the sea. On the other hand, such an arrangement, combined with universal free trade, would deprive governments of every principal motive for seeking access to the sea, and countries like Hungary, Poland, and Bohemia would feel assured of their economic future without such access.

Other new countries, whose national enthusiasm is not at high flood, and that most zealously proclaim and define their national autonomy, have a principal interest in seeing that the international institutions, that will inevitably be created by the peace treaty are given the greatest possible power and the widest possible jurisdiction.

Those countries are also mainly interested in having the international Socialist proletariat exercise the most powerful possible influence in the course of world events.

We must not undervalue the international institutions which are to be

called to life,—as do many radical Socialists,—because these institutions will be established in the first place by bourgeois governments. Such Socialists forget the dominant rôle in historical evolution that economic demands play hand in hand with the plans of governments. This dominant influence is what, in our opinion, will force the creation of international institutions that will not be the product of political desires. Such institutions are among the conditions precedent to the final victory of the working class, predicted by Engels as an absolutely certain result of the world-war, which he foresaw.

Consequently, we do not underestimate the value of these institutions. But there is no doubt but what some bourgeois governments will take this unaccustomed course with hesitation, while others will continue to strive for directer ways of attaining their selfish objects. One of the first and most important duties of the international proletariat, which is just reviving, will consist in stimulating the laggard governments and preventing these new institutions from being employed for political purposes.

The more successful we are in thus making permanently secure the self-determination of all nations, and in preventing national wars, which engage the attention and disperse the energy of the proletariat, the more readily we shall be able to unite our forces for the great final struggle against the capitalist system of production, which the conclusion of peace makes the next item upon the programme of every nation.

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### III. AN ENGLISH LIBERAL VIEW

It is no wonder that the draft proposal for a League of Nations to which

the representatives of fourteen nations recently put their signatures should have been greeted with a round of applause the world over. Every war-stricken people has come to see in the idea of a peaceable Society of Nations the one star of hope in the blackness of the night. All waited with deep anxiety to see how its great American champion would fare in his struggle with the powers of reaction and of unbelief in Europe. Mr. Wilson's latest pæan, followed by the acclamations of the statesmen of the great and small Allies at Paris, have carried everywhere the conviction that the fight for this great ideal has been won and the foundation of pacific internationalism well and truly laid. Before such universal satisfaction and applause even the most hardy Chauvinism has bowed its head. The general verdict is that Mr. Wilson has, in the familiar language of his countrymen, 'made good.'

Almost all the services with which supporters have accredited a League of Nations are duly incorporated in this plan. Almost all the perils and the stumbling blocks appear to have been averted and avoided. The league is to be no close corporation, but is to open its arms to all peoples who approach it with reliable credentials. Fruitful co-operation is made compatible with the retention of full sovereignty. Ample and appropriate adjustments are made for the equality of sovereign States in a House of Delegates and the well-tempered authority of the great States to whom are entrusted the operative functions of the Executive Council. All the well-known provisions for the equitable settlement of disputes are there, the Court of Arbitration, and presently a Judicial Tribunal for dealing with judicable cases, and processes of inquiry and conciliation for differences of policy unsuited to more rigorous processes of