

let us through for humane reasons. It did so for political expediency. They expected us to rebuild the bridges and to change the road from Vilna to Wirballen to Russian gauge. When we refused to do this, they attempted to procure from us a German train of fifty cars and a locomotive.

The Russian Government hoped that the German troops at Kovno would prevent our crossing the boundary. In this case they promised us a full equipment of arms and the assistance of the Red Army under a German commander, so that we could force our way back home. Their

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purpose was obvious. It would have helped the Russians get control of Eastern Prussia.

While the railway stations in Greater Russia used to have restaurants with great quantities of excellent food, and the stations in the part of the Ukraine not yet occupied by the Bolsheviki still are thus provided, everywhere in Russia proper these places are now deserted. The inhabitants and the station officials came to our train to beg for food. Russian war prisoners who had just come back from Germany begged us to take them home with us.

JAPAN AND CHINA: AN OFFICIAL VIEW

BY BARON MAKINO

WE ask nothing for Japan but those things which appear to us just and equitable, and of the justice and equity of which we may be able to convince not only the representatives of the nations in the Peace Conference, but the people of the countries they represent. We have no demands to make; we merely advance certain matters for the same consideration by other nations as we have ourselves given to them in the light of our own position and the future of the Far East. It may be necessary to go back through the history of some years in order that we may arrive at what we regard as a fair and equitable conclusion.

After the events of 1905, the situation created was delicate, and, at times, difficult. The South Manchurian Railway runs through Chinese

territory as far as Chang Chun, and is the only rail transportation outlet for the productions of the Chinese peasants, farmers, and manufacturers. The Chinese population of that part of the province through which the line runs numbers many millions. The present Japanese population there is very small — not one half of one per cent. Quite naturally this penetration by a Japanese railway of Chinese territory, or 'invasion,' as it was called, while within the rights granted to us under the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty, added fresh fuel among the Chinese to the fire of antagonism. As a result, the opposition already existing in China against Japan was considerably intensified. From time to time the resentment showed itself in quarrels between local Japanese and

Chinese. An active propaganda on the part of those who sought to continue and increase the feeling in China *versus* Japan led the people of China generally to a conviction that Japan had territorial ambitions, and intended to seize other territories on the mainland, indeed to become the master or the suzerain of China.

Under such conditions the inevitable errors made by some of the people, who went from Japan to seek fortunes in China, or who were imbued with an erroneous idea of their own superiorities, brought about increased ill-feeling, and the irritation was intensified by the insidious whisperings of the enemy. It would be foolish to say that in the conduct of our political and commercial relations, extending over a period of twenty years, serious mistakes have not been made. On the other hand, I have no doubt that the wise people of China themselves will understand that mistakes have also occurred on their side, and that incidents arising from time to time might have been handled with greater delicacy and care. Throughout this considerable period China has become a field for exploitation for those from other lands who sought to promote or develop the vast resources which have lain untouched in all the provinces, and which by enterprise and the use of the cheaper Chinese labor could be turned into profit. Iron, gold, copper, oil, and, indeed, the almost unlimited resources of China attracted those who could command capital, or those who hoped to secure valuable concessions, which they could offer in the markets to combinations of capital for the purposes of exploitation.

Among those who came from the outside world to China for the purposes of exploitation, the Germans in recent years had been by far the most active, not only in trade, in securing

concessions or in placing loans, but particularly in political intrigue. Having established themselves, with a naval base in the Far East at Tsingtao, they proceeded to build there a magnificent harbor and a city; German in all its aspects and German in all its methods and undertakings. They built the railway from the town of Tsingtao to the great city of Tsinan, the capital of the province of Shantung. They developed also the railway through the province of Shantung north to south, connecting Tsingtao with this Tsinan line, which had its northern terminus in the city of Tien-Tsin (where they made a junction again with the railway from Peking) down to Pukow, on the Yangtse River, near Nankin.

By degrees the Germans became more and more the masters of the province of Shantung, with its 30,000,000 inhabitants and its vast treasures and possibilities. Concession after concession passed into German hands. The port of Tsingtao became more and more important, and it would not be an exaggeration to say that Germany acted as master in that province, spending money freely, and practically blocking the efforts of all others to secure a share in the yield she expected to produce as her development proceeded, aiming always at weakening the influence of other nations in the Far East.

When war was declared by France, England, and Russia against Germany in August, 1914, all peaceful commerce on the Pacific and the Indian oceans was menaced by the German fleet, housed and harbored in the new naval base at Tsingtao. Germany was confident Japan would not declare war. But, as the ally of Great Britain, Japan, within a few weeks after the outbreak of war, also declared war upon Germany, and her next step was

to tell Germany that she must evacuate Tsingtao, with naval or military equipment which might be there. In the ultimatum Japan demanded that Germany return Kiaochow to China. There was no suggestion that Japan had any desire to secure that territory as her own, or even to take the place of Germany as lessee. Germany refused, and the Japanese fleet, with British ships, a few days later lay outside the roadstead of Tsingtao. Within the time taken for transport, a sufficient army was landed and besieged and attacked the town. It was not a very difficult task to take it. The Japanese bombarded and sunk in the dock a fine modern Austrian cruiser, but, unfortunately, the main ships of the German fleet had escaped before the exit was blocked. Tsingtao fell, and was occupied by the Japanese and British forces. The operation cost Japan many millions in money and some 2,000 of the lives of her soldiers and her sons.

Throughout the years of German occupation of Tsingtao, the harbor grew from an inconsequential refuge for junks in stormy weather to a great naval base. In the building of the harbor Germany made a capital investment, and this great asset Japan is willing to return to China in accordance with an agreement between the two governments which affords Japan reasonable opportunity to share, in fair coöperation with China and other nations in the privileges which China had previously granted to Germany. Under this agreement China comes into possession of a fine harbor, built at vast cost, and the whole territory of Kiaochow eighty years sooner than would otherwise have been possible.

The Chinese territory of Shantung, the railway line to the city of Tsinan had been, up to the time they fell into Japan's hands, controlled by the Ger-

mans, while German officials were active throughout the province, and much more active than those of any other nation. In fact, immediately Japan declared war on Germany, this line, as well as the line from Tientsin to Tsinan, was used by Germany to transport troops through China to Tsingtao. During the Tsingtao campaign, Germany used the Tsingtao-Tsinan line entirely for military purposes. But immediately Japan took possession the old antagonisms came more markedly into evidence, fanned by the Germans in China, who were enraged at their loss. The old jealousies were revived because of Japan's occupation of another port within the territory of China. As in the case of the South Manchurian Railway, there were unfortunate disturbances and many complaints, just and unjust.

In 1915 Japan, in a desire to bring about a *rapprochement* with China and to settle outstanding differences, because of conflicts which had occurred at various points, made certain demands upon China, and included among these demands certain expressions as to what she would desire further in case China were willing to grant concessions. I make reference to this because we desire to clear the table of matters which confuse the public mind to some extent. In the matter of these demands and the adjunct or rider thereto considerable misunderstandings have, I think, occurred, and much blame has been laid at the door of Japan. I am not prepared here and now to discuss the rights and wrongs of that situation, which is past and done with. But out of the negotiations came a treaty or agreement entered into between China and Japan under which Japan agreed to restore Kiaochow to China. This convention is an open document, and has been published in full. Attached

to that agreement are no secret or concealed clauses whatsoever. These engagements were entered into by China, and, subsequently, in 1918 an arrangement was entered into regarding international settlements in Tsingtao and some other concessions by China, giving Japan opportunity for coöperation with China in the development of Shantung in consideration for the return of Tsingtao and Kiaochow.

The details of this agreement have not been published owing to an understanding between the two countries, and because the agreement is preliminary to business matters which are as yet in an incomplete stage, a reason which, of course, will be understood by business people as well as by governments. This agreement was made in good faith by China. We have not hitherto been led to suppose that this agreement of 1918 was more than a just, proper, and mutually helpful settlement of outstanding questions, enabling us mutually to approach the Peace Conference in better understanding. In 1917, two years after the taking of Tsingtao, China declared war on Germany. But in 1915 Japan had pledged her willingness to return Kiaochow to China. Japan has repeatedly announced that she has no territorial ambitions in China, but desires to live in amity with her neighbor.

In desiring to secure from China a right to concessions in the province of Shantung, Japan does not seek more than a fair division in coöperation with China. Surely it is not taking advantage of China to ask that we be permitted with her, on the same basis as other nations, to have equal opportunity for development purposes. China has the raw material; we have need for raw material, and we have the capital to invest with China in its development for its use by ourselves as well as by

China. I somewhat labor this point because we are accused of aims in an exactly opposite direction to those of fair coöperation and partnership, as well as being accused of the folly of making deliberate and obvious effort to take advantage of our neighbor. We realize the great change that has taken place and must take place among nations in their dealings one with the other.

We feel that after the expenditure and the loss of 2,000 precious lives, small as it may be in the great toll that has been reaped in this fearful struggle, we are entitled to receive from Germany delivery of that which she refused to deliver in order that it may be returned to its rightful owner. Let me emphasize that neither in Shantung nor in Manchuria does Japan seek to take improper advantage of China. She seeks equal opportunity, an open door, and the right of peaceful coöperation between the two nations of the Far East.

Some reference may be made to Siberia. In the year 1918 Japan, at the request of her allies, sent her troops into Siberia for the purpose of assisting the westward moving Czecho-Slovaks, whose existence was menaced by the Bolsheviki and by the thousands of ex-German prisoners who, well armed, were coöperating with the Bolsheviki, as well as to protect the vast international stores in Vladivostok and elsewhere along the Siberian Railway or the Amur River as far as Irkutsk. In the operations consequent upon this expedition, Japan, in coöperation with her allies, cleared the country of the immediate menace of the armed forces massed above Vladivostok, at Nicholaivsk, and Blagovoshensk, dispersed the bands, and seized considerable supplies of arms, as well as a number of small river vessels, which had been armed by the

Germans. I make no special point of this expedition, nor do I boast of any achievement. It is sufficient to say that in agreement with our allies, we had said that we would, with them, evacuate Siberia when order was restored and a stable government effected.

The groups of the Caroline and Marshall Islands, lying north of the equator and adjacent to Japan, were under German domination. They were taken and occupied by Japan. We have entered a claim for the right to occupy those islands for the purpose of peaceful development and profit. This claim is supported by a sense of right and justice. We believe that they can be developed in the matter of their resources to our advantage and controlled to the greater advantage of their native population than by any other nation.

The question has been asked, 'What has Japan done in this war?' I answer only by saying that Japan has done her best. It is perhaps not unseemly to state that her fleets in the Pacific and Indian oceans and in the Mediterranean traversed over 1,200,000 miles in the work of protecting transports and merchant vessels from the sub-

marines, and we escorted three quarters of a million men rushing to the aid of France and Britain. Japan's geographical position, her resources, and the fact that the Pacific Ocean was freed of the menace which has threatened the freedom of other seas, enabled us to provide considerable quantities of war supplies and materials to Russia, to England, and to France, and, including loans to Russia, the money expenditure has been a very considerable item in the budget of Japan. But these are small matters in comparison with the magnificent sacrifices of our western allies. The government and the people of Japan have been the loyal allies of Great Britain and France and the friends of Russia and of the United States. It is not for me here to enter into a relation of what we have done in detail. It is sufficient to say that what has been given or spent and what has been lost in the cause for which the allies have fought and won have been contributed in a spirit of loyalty and sympathy, and that we are here now to assist in the work of building barricades against war and in forging links of friendship and understanding between the nations of the East and of the West.

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WITH THE BRITISH ARMY IN GERMANY

BY THE RIGHT REVEREND BISHOP FRODSHAM

It would be impossible to find an invading army who bear themselves more modestly than do the British in their area of occupation in Germany. It would be difficult to imagine an invaded people who appear more satisfied to lie quietly under the conqueror's heel. A Prussian officer, living in the neighborhood of Bonn, said with some scorn that he was convinced by recent events that the Rhinelanders understood the English far better than they could ever understand the Prussians. They certainly understand the superficial placability of the English soldier. When our advance guards marched across the Belgian frontier they shouted fiercely to every German who appeared in his doorway to go in, and he obeyed. If they had been met even by sulky opposition the British invaders might have borne themselves as truculently in the streets as they did in the trenches. The German, however, bowed his head as a bulrush, and lo! the dreaded army of occupation became like an organized crowd of tourists. Guards and Highlanders, Canadians and New Zealanders, officers and men from almost every regiment in the British Isles, jostled one another in the streets of Cologne 'for to admire an' for to see.' The shopkeepers rose to the situation, and in consequence they are reaping a rich harvest. Consequential civil servants in German uniforms, policemen and such like, salute the passing British officers with due form and solemnity, while the burghers and their wives go about their lawful occasions

until nine at night, when they are forced to retire to their homes, as though there were no British army in their midst. This, on the surface, is Germany under the conqueror's heel. Is it the real Germany?

The first impression received in the area of occupation is that the Germans, on the whole, are glad to be protected by the British from the foes of their own household. The German soldiers, in their hurried retreat, did not give much ground for pride in their discipline, or for confidence in their intentions. They stole everything they could lay their hands on and sold it for anything they could get. The thrifty farmers about Aachen and Düren bought government motor wagons for 80 marks, and government horses for 50 marks. For a time they were satisfied with their bargains, but slow-footed Nemesis is overtaking them. They are now being made to hand over to the military authorities as British property their camouflaged wagons and steeds. The German army scared the well-to-do. One evening in February I heard a stout citizen in the streets of Düren tirading against some 'pig-dogs,' whom, on inquiry, I found to be certain soldiers belonging to the place. They had threatened to return to that city of millionaires as industrial reformers and had said they would commence with the works of the angry speaker. Knowledge of German methods does not conduce to a blind belief in the bogey of Bolshevism. Bolshevism may be the enemy or the weapon of the enemy. *Quien sabe?* But in