

The National Government will operate the railways henceforth as a single system.

ACCORDING to *Heraldo de Madrid*, the old controversy between the partisans of local autonomy and the supporters of centralized government has just come to the surface again in a novel debate over the regulation of gambling. Gambling houses are a source of local revenue, the funds thus derived ordinarily going to support public charities. It is now proposed to place such funds under the charge of the central government, and a motion has been made to appoint a parliamentary committee to investigate this measure.

AMONG the numerous proposals for reviving the spirit of industry among German working people, increasing production, and restoring national solvency, is the novel plan of appealing to the patriotism of the workers to contribute one hour's labor a day to the state.

A Captain Schmude, has organized a Workingmen's Coöperative Settlement in the Helmstadt coal and potash district. Gathering together a large number of unemployed, he put them to work in his lignite mines under an agreement by which a bonus on their wages is to be devoted to purchasing the property. Several thousand men are reported to have joined the undertaking.

SINCE the outbreak of the war, Belgium's public debt has increased from less than a billion dollars to nearly four billion dollars. The real result of this year's budget remains obscure because of the uncertainty regarding payments to be made Belgium under the Versailles Treaty. Commenting upon the general condition of the country, *Vossische Zeitung* says: 'There is no doubt but what the economic standing, and with it the financial standing, of Belgium is improving relatively faster than that of any other Entente country on the Continent.'

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## HOW TO USE THE LEAGUE

BY PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY

UP to a few weeks ago believers in the League of Nations preached, practically speaking, a creed with one article — that a League of Nations ought to exist.

Now that the League has come into being the issue is changed. The nations must have a policy with regard to the League, and the League itself

must have a policy in world affairs. And the believers in the League, including such bodies as the League of Nations Union, must begin to think clearly what that policy is.

For the true believer the first steps are sufficiently clear. The machinery of the League must be completed. Only the Secretariat, the Council, and

the Labor Conference have so far come into being. The League has not yet a fixed home, though the decision to settle in Geneva still stands. The Assembly has not yet met. The various International Commissions on such subjects as armaments, mandates, the control of anti-social trades, the freedom of legitimate commerce, and the protection of public health have not yet been constituted, and no steps have been taken for the establishment of the International Court.

All this must be done. The machinery of the League must be completed, and as it is completed must be used. I do not see what other policy is possible to those who genuinely believe in the principles of the League as the only means of preventing a repetition of 1914 and preserving the world order from collapse. Yet the policy involved is a bold one, and will probably reveal differences of opinion among those who have hitherto worked together for the establishment of the League.

Some people, I fear, will have lost their faith in the League owing to recent events in America, and will argue that without America the League cannot safely be used at all. As to that, one can only say that if America, followed by a number of neutrals, does eventually refuse to take any part in the League, the situation will be very serious, and it may be impossible to set up any body which shall be truly impartial and international. But I am still assuming that, whatever reservations may be made, America will be a member of the Council, and will take a due share in the direction of the international agencies which the League is to set up.

A commoner opinion will be that the world is not yet ready for the League, or at any rate not for a real League. It has not yet been pacified. The war

has merely broken up into scattered centres of disturbance. Apart from the actual war in Russia, there are countless regions where order is precarious and soldiers, especially British or American soldiers, would be worth their weight in gold. 'It is no time,' such critics will say, 'to start the untried machinery of the League of Nations with its bias toward internationalism and disarmament. It is a time for strenuous military effort to maintain the new world order, to see that the dew free nationalities are not strangled in their birth, and also that the German and Turkish agents who have escaped from the war shall not work their revenge by wrecking the British Empire. The burden may be terrible, but it must be borne. We must keep up our army and navy. We must, by our own strength, with such help as France and Italy and Greece and Belgium can give us, save the Entente Powers from German revenge and the world from anarchy.'

Now, I need not argue at length against this point of view, or point out that it involves a claim, or at least the appearance of a claim, to an imperial position among all nations which the rest of the world is not likely to tolerate. Because the truth is, it is an impossible policy. In the first place our financial position does not enable us to keep an army and navy of anything like the dimensions necessary for this almost single-handed policing of the world. In the second place, even if it were financially possible, it is not so politically. The British nation could not be induced to accept it. However, there is sure to be a continuous pressure in this direction. The War Office will try, even if it cannot obtain a whole and consistent policy on these lines, at least to save such fragments as it can. And this must produce a direct clash with the policy of those

who wish to use the League of Nations.

In order to use the League the first step is a simple one. It is to summon the Assembly. The Assembly will probably represent thirty-two original members, plus thirteen new members who were neutral during the war. At any rate there will be over forty states represented; and, except for two omissions, the Assembly will make a fair approach to representing the public opinion of the world. The omissions, of course, are those of the late enemy powers and of Russia. The League cannot pretend to be a fully representative and impartial body as long as one side in the Great War is excluded. The Assembly, however, has power, by a two thirds majority, to admit new members provided certain conditions are satisfied. Some of the nations not yet included, such as Turkey and Russia, have certainly not yet satisfied the conditions, and Turkey is for some time hardly likely to do so. But Germany and Austria can probably pass the test already, and for my own part I think, in the interests of justice, of safety, and of the moral authority of the League, the sooner they are admitted the better.

But meanwhile what is the Assembly to do? It has, except when special decisions are referred to it, no executive power. It can only speak and ask questions. In the present state of the world that is a formidable and, I believe, a very beneficent power.

The Old Germano-Turco-Irish propaganda has never died. It is not heard of so much over here, where it could be mostly disproved and laughed out of court; but it rages in Russia, Persia, Afghanistan, India, in the neutral countries of Europe, and, of course, in America. It works wherever it can hurt us most. I am not one of those who defend Great Britain through thick and thin. Our activities are so

widespread and unceasing that a large list of blunders and misdeeds can be made up against us. But if the first meeting of the Assembly were to set itself to raising all the most awkward questions it could find; I believe that on the whole, for this country, the result would be a great and resounding acquittal.

A clue to the policy of 1918 is the Persian Treaty. The British Government acted, as far as I can judge, somewhat wrongly and very unwisely in making a treaty with the pro-British Persian Government without the knowledge of the Nationalist Persian deputation at Paris. No one could be surprised at the outcry which arose against this treaty both in Europe and America. But Lord Curzon's next step went far toward putting the matter right. He announced that the treaty would be laid before the Council of the League of Nations to see if there was anything in it which went contrary to the principles of the League. I believe that the result of the League's inquiry will be a justification of the terms of the treaty. But what if it should be otherwise? Lord Curzon's offer was presumably made in good faith. If the League does find any part of the treaty contrary to its principles we must be prepared to alter it.

Exactly the same with Egypt. Amid a cloud of misinformation and unreasonableness in the refusal of the Egyptian Nationalists to have any dealings with the Milner Commission there emerges one clear point. They assert that when the British Government proclaimed its Protectorate over Egypt in 1915, the proclamation stated definitely that the Protectorate was established as a war measure, and would be withdrawn or reconsidered at the end of the war. This matter must be cleared up, and it is fortunate for us that there is a tribunal before

which it can be cleared up. The International Court, indeed, does not yet exist; but we have the opportunity of laying before either the Assembly or the Council of the League the documents on which our case rests and asking for a judgment whether or not there is anything contrary to the principles of the League in the policy which we propose to follow. Our main case is certainly sound. But it is likely enough that in the turmoil of war our representatives have contradicted themselves or one another or made mistakes. Such mistakes must be admitted, and with the disinterested help of the League some tolerable way out must be discovered.

It is quite possible that questions may be raised in the Assembly which might seem to Great Britain to be domestic in character and unsuitable for the League. It may be disputed whether in such doubtful cases we should take a stiffly correct line in resisting all legitimate inquiry, or whether we should rather embrace the opportunity for publicity. I should like to lay before the League, or the Commission on Mandates, not for action, but for information, a full account of the Government of India, including the Montagu Bill.

The proposal may be premature. But I am convinced that the world-wide hurricane of hatred and slander to which the Empire is now exposed — though we hear little of it in this country — is a real danger to its continuance. All empires are apt to be hated; but we are at present hated too much, and mostly on false grounds. Patriotic propaganda is no answer at all; it is useless in itself and has been utterly discredited during the war. If it be true that the Empire and the whole rule of Europe over Asia and Africa is an edifice built on tyranny and force, so that incidents like those of Amritsar

are both necessary and normal, then it must be agreed that the interests of the Empire demand secrecy and concealment and that any suggestion of publicity is suicidal.

I confess I do not. I believe that the world order established by the British Empire is emphatically a good thing though not a perfect thing. It is enormously in the interest of mankind that it should develop, and it is at the present time dangerously unpopular and exposed to a campaign of hatred. The one way of safety for the Empire is to convince the world of its value to the world order.

That public opinion of the world, as the war has shown, is already a great and an increasing force. We cannot elude it. We are lost if we defy it. But if we meet it boldly it will be our strongest friend.

Passing now to foreign policy in general, we are faced at once with two pressing questions, one military and one financial.

It is almost universally agreed that the policy followed by the Entente Powers with regard to Russia has been disastrous. We need not here try to trace to their various origins the amazing inconsistencies through which our governments have plunged. In the main one can see a battle between two forces inside the Supreme Council: one force apparently small but vigorous, the other much more largely supported by popular feeling but helpless and lacking in clarity of thought. The important point is that this fluctuation of policy has been throughout dependent on secrecy. Every nation has been kept in the dark. Every statement about Russia has been issued with a purpose. It is as though some section in the War Office or in the Quai d'Orsay had bundles and bundles of documents, some old, some new, some genuine, some less genuine, which

were issued from time to time as it was thought desirable to justify an anti-Bolshevist or a pro-Bolshevist move. It is obvious that such a state of affairs is wholly injurious, and it is the duty of the League of Nations to put an end to it as soon as the machinery starts working.

First, the Assembly of the League must have the facts out, so far as they are known. They will probably be rather damaging to everybody, but not nearly so dangerous as the present state. Next, as Lord Robert Cecil has suggested, the Council of the League should arrange for a Commission of Inquiry to visit Russia. The Russian Government has asked for this, so that it is not impracticable. At the same time, under Article 25, the League should set the Red Cross to work at the task of repatriating those who survive of the prisoners of war in Russia and Siberia. Thirdly, if it is possible, we must have peace. We ought to have had it a long time ago; and should have had it if neutral opinion had had its due weight in our councils. The Council of the League will represent the Entente Powers plus four neutrals; the Entente Powers are already evenly divided between peace and war, so the neutrals will probably decide the matter.

Europe needs this peace with Russia badly, almost desperately; but, of course, even here it does not follow that we can have what we want. In their early days the Bolsheviks proclaimed a truceless war against all their neighbors so long as those neighbors maintained the present order of society. Bolshevism was to be an international anarchist crusade. If they hold to that view peace is apparently impossible. But it seems to be almost certain that they have changed. They have again and again offered peace. Their system of government has been

greatly modified. Above all, they are now a real government, and, like most governments, probably care more about preserving themselves in power than about any principle or programme. And their continuance in power probably depends, when once the stimulant of foreign invasion is removed, on the comparative comfort or discomfort of the national life under their rule. So they have strong motives for desiring peace. When once peace is made, if the Red army is disbanded, and if the government shows itself reasonably stable, no time should be lost in inviting Russia to join the League of Nations. She is far too big and dangerous to be left outside, unbound by agreements, uncontrolled by meetings in council, and urged into enmity by the fact of exclusion.

As to the terms of peace one principle is clear: that it must be a general peace. It must include all the European and Asiatic neighbors of Russia. There must be no more thought of using Poland as a 'spearhead.' The whole policy of playing on the inflamed nationalism of that unhappy country in order to goad it into wars of aggression in the interests of the Entente Powers is a nightmare which will not stand a day's public criticism in the Assembly of the League. Where the frontiers of Poland should lie is a difficult question, and can be settled by no authority but that of the League. The Poles will certainly have to retire. But their retirement from East Galicia is probably even more necessary than from the provinces of White Russia now occupied by Pilsudski.

While the Bolsheviks maintain an enormous conscript army general disarmament is not practicable. When once they disband, the path ahead becomes clearer, but still not entirely open. The British Empire will always need garrisons and small expeditionary

armies. The subject peoples of the Turkish Empire cannot be simply abandoned to the new massacres which will presumably follow on the withdrawal of all Entente troops. Also the whole French nation feels, and is quite justified in feeling, that it must be protected against the revenge of Germany. France is much weaker than Germany; by the help of England, America, Italy, and some score of other nations, she has beaten Germany, and beaten her very badly; and now the other nations are proceeding to say good-bye and to go about their respective businesses. France has every reason to be alarmed.

The methods which some French militarists would have preferred are frankly stated by M. Hanotaux in his remarkable volume of memorials recently published. They are, first, enormous black armies recruited in Africa. *'On demande ce que nous cherchons en Afrique,'* says M. Hanotaux. *'Tout simplement, des soldats.'* Secondly, the permanent economic disintegration and political dismemberment of Germany. M. Hanotaux wishes to annex all German territory up to the Elbe — not the Rhine — and to prevent for all time any form of union between the various German states. It is suspected that the impossible demands for the surrender of war criminals made by France upon Germany were intended to furnish an excuse for carrying out this dismemberment. Thirdly, he wishes for a military alliance between France, England, and America.

The last of these proposals apparently is refused by the United States; the others are in various degrees crimes against civilization and contrary to the interest of mankind. The League of Nations cannot, if it is true to its principles, allow any one of them. And that refusal throws upon the

League the duty of safeguarding France in some other way. For, of course, France must be safeguarded.

This is not because the League ought to favor France against other nations or more than other nations. It is simply because, in the interests of all Europe, Germany included, there must not be a war of revenge. France must not fear it, Germany must not hope for it. It must be ruled out of the possibilities that influence practical statesmen. No power except the League of Nations can achieve this end, and that a League of which Germany and Austria are members.

The security of France cannot be assured by any sudden and mechanical device. France is safe at present because Germany is too weak to fight. As time goes on she must be made safe by a wise international policy accompanied by universal disarmament. But for a time it will be clearly important that the armies at the service of the League, though individually small in numbers, shall be real armies, ready for rapid action. Total disarmament cannot precede the restoration of confidence in Europe; it can only follow it.

Restoration of confidence is, of course, impossible without some parallel restoration of financial stability. It is no part of my present argument to point out the immense need for some coöperative effort on the part of all Europe to reëstablish the economic life of the various ruined or semi-ruined territories. The case is stated, to my mind, with unanswerable force both in Mr. Keynes's book and in the joint memorial asking for an international economic conference which has been presented to the Prime Ministers by leading economists in all the European countries and endorsed with reservations by those of America. I wish only to comment on two points,



to show where the use of the League of Nations comes in.

In the first place, any such conference would have to survey the same ground as the Reparations Commission appointed under the Treaty of Versailles for fixing and exacting indemnities due from the conquered Powers. Why, then, should the work not be left to the Reparations Commission alone? The answer may be seen in a moment by comparing with the text of the joint memorial the eloquent directions given by M. Millerand to the Reparations Commission at its first sitting. M. Millerand instructs the Commission that its duty is to wring the fullest payment possible out of a cunning and mendacious debtor; it must disbelieve his pleas of poverty; it must bleed him dry and not spare him. The Reparations Commission, in fact, belongs to a past epoch, an epoch of delusion, when dishonest politicians persuaded ignorant electors that Germany would pay fifty thousand millions of indemnity, or more if wanted, so as to relieve England and France of all the cost of the war. Public opinion has got beyond this, both in France and England. The present problem is not how to make Germany and Austria, out of their abundance, pay our debts for us. The problem is how to prevent the economic ruin of Germany and Austria from becoming incurable and infecting the rest of Europe. And that is work for an International Economic Commission, with Germany and Austria represented, as proposed by the signatories of the joint memorial.

The appointment of such a commission, of course, implies the possibility of international action involving credits and probably loans. And to any such step Mr. Glass, on behalf of the American Treasury, has made an energetically worded objection. 'Such

things as international guaranties are utterly impracticable so long as there exist inequalities of taxation and domestic financial policy in the various countries involved.' Naturally, this objection had been foreseen by the able men whom Mr. Glass is answering. They say plainly, 'There can be no social or economic future for any country which adopts a permanent policy of meeting its current expenditure by a continuous inflation of its circulation and by increasing its interest-bearing debts without a corresponding increase of its tangible assets. In practice every country will have to be treated after careful study and with due regard to its individual conditions and requirements.' The whole passage is too long to quote. But it is clear that the memorialists conceive their Commission as having the power to review the financial policy of every country, and only admit to the benefit of the international credit those countries which adopt the necessary financial measures for helping themselves. That is, the Commission must derive its authority from the League of Nations. No other body has either the right or the power to exercise such an inquiry.

The above sketch of policy is, of course, both rough and summary. I have not attempted to indicate the various modifications in the Peace Treaty which, on the one hand, are necessary to European peace, and, on the other hand, cannot be made by any authority except that of the League. My object has been to show how, both to Great Britain in her imperial position and to all the nations of Europe in their military and economic distress, the League of Nations can be used, and indeed must be used, if we are to find any way through the discomforts of the present and the dangers of the future.

So far the League of Nations has attacked only one problem, the inter-

national regulation of labor conditions. Decisions were taken at the League's Labor Conference at Washington with regard to the application of an eight-hour day, night work for women and children in factories, unemployment, the protection of women at child-birth, and the labor of children under fourteen. The machinery for applying these decisions is now being worked out in detail. This particular undertaking has been, by general admission, an almost unqualified success, and no

one can mistake its importance. I will not dwell on it further except to point out three things: that representatives of both employers and employed, and also of government, were present; that both Entente representatives and representatives of Germany and Austria are now present; and that the force of mere publicity was found to be overwhelming in bringing doubtful or recalcitrant parties into line. The League could not have started with better omens.

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## WHAT INSPIRES A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

BY PROFESSOR RUDOLF KJELLEN

IF we ask why the great idea of a League of Nations should have taken concrete form just at the present time, we get three answers. We discover three groups of motives of different depth, three responsive chords of different sensitiveness. First and foremost is hatred of war. This is not hatred of civil war, which is still a favorite sport of the very classes that are loudest in condemning war in general, nor a war of starvation by blockade, for this is being legalized as a future weapon in the very Covenant of the League. It is international war — the frank, brutal war of machines which we have just experienced — that has been made an object of universal hatred and abhorrence by our recent suffering. This sentiment is associated with an impulsive conviction that the great crisis was precipitated by the evil design of certain individuals, and that it might have been

prevented had there been a super-government above national government — some higher authority, some supreme political organization.

We need not stop to consider how far these beliefs are justified. We shall not even attempt to plumb the depth of the sentiment against war. Perchance that sentiment is merely an expression of weariness and consequently a passing one, like similar waves of feeling following earlier crises in history. What we desire to fix in our reader's mind is merely that a condition of sentiment plays a large rôle in the present effort to create a League of Nations. Perhaps that condition is not a very stable support, but it nevertheless constitutes an extraordinarily favorable opportunity for those who believe themselves called to be the architects of the future.

This gateway of opportunity is widened by the strong and permanent