

where Russian producers and dealers feel certain that they will reap the fruit of their labors. Another necessary preliminary will be practically rebuilding the railway system and all the machinery of domestic trade. Present attempts to resume dealings on a large scale will meet defeat, because the whole economic organization of Russia is in ruins. The latter can never be restored while the Bolsheviks are in control. To rebuild the system will require the coöperation and material aid of foreign countries. There is room in Russia for everyone. There is no occasion for international rivalry and jealousy. The country's needs should inspire us to united action directed toward helping the Russian people to use the wealth which lies at their hands. Any policy we may adopt will be useless so long as the Bolshevik rule. The first, indispensable condition of success is to end their government.

[*Le Temps* (Radical, Anti-Socialist, Opportunist Daily), *February 12*]

II. Lloyd George and Russia

MR. LLOYD GEORGE has made a full statement of his Russian policy. It is based on two assumptions. First, that Russia is able to export enough raw materials and provisions to reduce the cost of living in Western Europe; second, that if Russia is permitted to exchange commodities freely with other countries, the Bolshevik Government will disappear.

He concludes from this that we ought to trade with Russia without formally making peace with the Soviet Government. Mr. Lloyd George does not say that he will never negotiate with the Bolsheviks, but he desires them to reform first. He says that as long as we have no assurance that the present rulers of Russia will abandon

their barbarous methods, and govern in accordance with the usages of civilized society, no modern power in the world will be willing to make peace with them.

In brief, Mr. Lloyd George's programme may be summarized as using the Bolsheviks to overthrow Bolshevism. He plans to accomplish this simultaneously in Russia and in Western Europe. Western Europe would receive abundant supplies of wheat, timber, flax, and other agricultural products. The cost of living would decline. The masses of workingmen would be more contented. Bolshevism would find fewer partisans among us, thanks to the abundance that would flow out of Bolshevik Russia.

In Russia, itself, on the other hand, lifting the blockade would revive economic activity. Individual interests would arise within the Communist society. These private interests would wax strong and insist upon order and liberty. Mr. Lloyd George says that he believes that we can save Russia through commerce — that commerce will terminate sooner than any other measure, the present régime of pillage and the attendant abuses existing under Bolshevik rule. So the Soviet Government, which is so proud of having secured the lifting of the blockade, is to be overthrown or reorganized by the results of its own success.

This is Mr. Lloyd George's theory. Undeniably it is a very ingenious one. Incidentally, we might add that the overthrow of Bolshevism is not its sole purpose. Since the pound sterling has lost so large a fraction of its value in comparison with the dollar, England has been paying heavy tribute to the United States. It wishes to liberate itself from this tribute. It is seeking another source for grain and raw materials. It hopes to find its supplies in Russia, where the pound sterling has

an enormous value compared with the ruble. We shall totally misinterpret present events, from Lithuania to Korea, unless we bear constantly in mind that the United States and Great Britain are henceforth to be the two greatest naval and commercial powers of the globe.

It remains to be determined whether Mr. Lloyd George's theories are likely to be confirmed by facts. We cannot criticize their purely hypothetical bases, for hypotheses are as necessary to political progress as to scientific progress. Nevertheless, we must examine the foundation for these hypotheses.

Is Russia in a position to export commodities enough to influence appreciably the cost of living in Western Europe? The problem presents three aspects — production, purchasing power, and transportation.

If private consumption of bread tends to increase in Russia — which is what we would naturally expect — it is very doubtful whether there will be an excess of grain sufficiently large to affect supplies and prices in Western Europe. Are there considerable sources available for export? If so, we shall have to prevail upon the holders to deliver their supplies. That is a task which the Soviet Government has apparently failed to accomplish. Recently, the Food Commissioner at Moscow estimated the visible store of wheat in Russia at only about 550,000 tons. This is required primarily for home consumption. Then, assuming without further discussion that we could arrange to pay for what we buy in Russia without difficulty, there still remains the problem of transportation. That difficulty presents itself not only in case of grain, but in case of every other product, whether brought from Russia or shipped to that country. What is the situation here?

Radiograms received from the Bolsheviks speak of the great efforts being made to restore locomotives, to unload cars, and to clear railway terminals. So far as we can judge, these labors are rather impulsive and decorative — they do not produce the impression of being methodical and constant. But we need not deal with this question of form. When Peter the Great requisitioned from each village a certain number of shoemakers, and gave them the choice of going to Moscow and learning the new methods of the Englishman, Humphrey, or serving a term in the galleys, he adopted a very dramatic procedure. None the less, history tells us that he succeeded in improving the Russian method of making shoes. To-day, when the Bolsheviks order a 'week of transportation service,' or even a 'Communist Saturday,' they are not drilling their administrators in English methods. Rather, they are adopting a German way of doing things. These 'weeks' and these 'Saturdays' suggest surprisingly the proceedings that the German authorities used during the war to get additional results from the public. However, allowing for this superficial difference, Lenin's methods are very similar to those of Peter the Great, and we have no reason to suppose that they will be less successful. However, what will the practical result amount to even then? The reforms of Peter the Great certainly did not weaken the power of the Tsar. If Lenin manages to reform the railway service, what reason have we to conclude that this will weaken the Bolsheviks? The day that the Russian railways begin to give as good service under the combined efforts of Communist propaganda and the Red terror that Russia formerly had, undoubtedly that country will control the indispensable machinery for for-

eign commerce. But at the same moment, the Soviet rulers will have acquired an equally indispensable instrument for inspiring respect for their authority throughout all the realm, and for dispatching troops whenever they desire against their neighbors. This would not be the overthrow of Bolshevism proposed by Mr. Lloyd George. It would, rather, result in establishing a great power, autocratic and imperialist in organization and purposes.

Some may object that the Bolsheviks are incapable of erecting such an efficient system. Many fancy that their government is destined to end in anarchy. All this is possible, but in that case how are you going to increase

production, organize exports, rehabilitate transportation? In brief, how are you going to reestablish that commerce which we count upon to 'save Russia'?

So we conclude that Mr. Lloyd George's hypotheses are not as self-evident as they seem. We are not prepared to discuss the relations between the Coöperatives and the Soviets. Little illumination is thrown upon them by the radiogram correspondence between Moscow and Great Britain.

The English and French should have the courage to face these facts: Russia continues an unsolved problem, and one possibly full of menace. This is an additional reason for us to remain united. Stick to the alliance!

THREE EMPERORS AND A 'TRAITOR'

[*The Neue Freie Presse* (National Liberal Daily), January 6]

1. *Tsar Nicholas II*

BY GOTTFRIED, PRINCE OF
HOHENLOHE-SCHILLINGSFURST

UPON my first audience the Tsar received me at his writing desk. He was in a colonel's uniform of the Zarskoye Guards, his favorite dress. It was very characteristic of him that he never wore any other uniform than that of a colonel, a rank he held on the death of his father. He used to say that he had been promoted to colonel, but since there was no one left to promote him higher, his military career stopped at that point. This was frequently repeated as indicating his touching modesty and without doubt something of this sort was involved in his action.

But, after all, he was the head of the army, and naturally outranked his officers.

It is hardly necessary to say that in my introductory interview nothing of importance was mentioned. The Tsar welcomed me to Russia with great friendliness, asked me the usual questions as to the period I had been in service, where I had been stationed last, and then referred to a visit which he had made a few days previously to one of our cruisers anchored at Kronstadt. He stated that he was very much pleased with the incident.

In the course of the years that followed I saw the Tsar quite frequently at manœuvres and on hunting excursions, so that I believe I came to know him well enough to form opinions of some value as to his character.

Nicholas II became heir to the