

in return for compensation elsewhere, or we might try to maintain artificially a government that would always be the source of friction between our enemies. We should also consider the possibility of creating a great East Asia empire of Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan, in which we might exercise controlling economic and political influence. Last of all, we might honestly protect Persia in its entirety, and insist upon its being kept an open field for the trade and investments of every country. But we must have one definite plan. In pointing out the necessity of this I drew the comparison between a military campaign and a diplomatic campaign. The only reply I received was that diplomacy could not look forward. It had to shape its course from day to day.

That was the very spirit of the foreign office revealed from the lips of its representative. Meantime, England had far-sighted plans. She changed her instruments but she kept inflexibly forward toward her main object, while we were easily led astray into the most impulsive undertakings. I mention only two — the expedition to Afghanistan and the Holy War.

The military leader of the expedition to Afghanistan was a Captain Niedermeyer. He and his diplomatic assistant carried out their expedition with admirable energy. But they knew perfectly well from the outset that they could not accomplish what was expected of them. I learned this personally from their own lips. How was a little group of Germans, with no military resources, cut off from their homeland by vast Russian territories, to persuade the wise old Emir of Afghanistan to attack England and support a revolution in India? Our country, that was so fond of placing its trust in the armored fist, all at once expected miracles from mere empty words.

When the Holy War was first declared, in the autumn of 1914, I had a talk about it with a captured French diplomat, who had formerly been an attaché at Vienna and a member of the Delcassé ministry. He asked me sarcastically: 'Do you expect much from that?' I said no, but expressed the hope that it might at least immobilize the colonial troops of the Entente. It did not even accomplish this. The Holy War was an absolute fiasco, just because it was not a Holy War. At a time when Christians and Mohammedans were fighting shoulder to shoulder such a war could not arouse fanaticism, and only fanaticism would have given it a 'holy' character. How could the Christians be deadly enemies of Mohammedans when other Christians were their friends and allies? The shrewd Bedouins at once saw that the thing was merely an ordinary war trick, and with their usual sharp eyes for the main chance in money matters, sold their services to the Christians who would pay them best. And although, if I am rightly informed, we spent at least one hundred million marks in coin gold in the Orient, the English overbid us.

[*The Frankfurter Zeitung* (Radical Liberal Daily), January 16]

THE STRUGGLE FOR ASIA

VIEWED under some important aspects, the stage of the Paris Conference has become a vast gambling hall and on the table just at present the stakes are Asia. Remarkably enough, only one of the players still sits in the game. It is England. The other gamblers, Russia, Japan, America, stand aside and watch. Russia with its Bolshevik government is disqualified and in any case is out of the running. Japan and America have withdrawn because they purpose set-

ting up their game at the other end of the table.

England has not succeeded in persuading America to second its efforts in Western Asia. We shall refer shortly to the advantage Great Britain would have derived from America's occupation of Constantinople. In Armenia, the task the English would have allotted their transatlantic cousins was to cover their exposed Mesopotamian flank. This plan has failed; so they now propose to found an independent Kurd state north of Mosul. The fact that the Americans refused to listen to the argument of humanitarian duty—an argument of real weight across the Atlantic—is explained by the robust and sure practical instinct of those transplanted Britons, who saw clearly that America's road to Asia was not *via* Gibraltar and Suez and Constantinople, but *via* Peking.

Japan's line of advance is even more clearly predicted. It plans a great campaign of assimilation in Eastern Siberia. This is a perilous game, however, for that country's most dangerous competitor, America, is in its rear. Japan's emigrant outposts in Central and South America are a transparent effort to mask the weakness of this strategic position. Two courses lie before Japan. Either it must penetrate deeply into Asia as a conqueror, so that it can turn about and face America on equal terms—a gigantic task for its young strength—or it can present its main front toward America at the outset, and try to win not subjects but allies on the Asiatic continent. To carry out the latter purpose it must adopt the motto, 'Asia for Asiatics,' and recognize Russia among the Asiatic Powers.

But England must sit in the original game to the end. Its participation is not a question of expediency, but

of existence; for the possession of India is at stake. Its object in this stage of the peace negotiations must be to assure its position in Western Asia, and to extend its dominion there so as to fortify itself against coming aggression from the opposite side of that Continent. The first line of assault against its position—the first place, consequently, where it must strengthen its defenses—is from Russia, that blind gambler, doubly dangerous because it disregards the rules of the game and is itself Asiatic at heart. Bolshevik Russia has long known—and indeed learned from the traditions of the Tsars—where the British Empire is most vulnerable. Its propaganda lies in the heart of Asia. There it is laying the mines for the grand explosion that is to shatter the empires of its enemies. The successive reports that reach our ears concerning the great activity of the Bolsheviks in the trans-Caspian countries and Turkestan, are being followed by the announcement of the occupation of one point after another in that region by the Red troops. England's plan of defense consists in establishing a row of Mohammedan vassal states between India and Egypt, the two buttresses of its Eastern Empire. These are to be Afghanistan, Persia, the Arabian federation, and Turkey. That would, indeed, be a rampart by no means easy to overthrow. In turn, England can offer those vassal nations no small compensation. It will develop the natural wealth of their territories, organize production, stabilize political conditions, and do all this under a sway so mild that they will be hardly conscious of the hand that rules them.

Slowly indeed is this plan maturing. It succeeded first in Persia—mainly because that country was still intimidated by the Russian spectre.

Afghanistan, however, prefers the Bolsheviki and a war ensues. England was probably honest in its plan to set up a great Arabian federation under the King of Hedja. But the bad impression made by recent events in Egypt has stayed further progress in this direction, because such an Arabian state might prove too inflammable to be risked in the neighborhood of Cairo. Meantime, Turkey, which England would have preferred to control on some such plan as that adopted for Persia, refuses the proffered hand of friendship.

Now what do these symptoms indicate? They merely show that nations, like individuals, do not live by bread alone. During the war, England has insured prosperity to her dominions, employing to this end all the advantage of her varied and inter-related commercial and industrial resources. But the Orient rejects such advantages in its fear that British rule may threaten its own peculiar culture. So, the character of the game that is being played at Paris has changed. The stakes have ceased to be mere political control, they are now the Soul of Asia. The nations of that continent reject all foreign suzerainty because they now see Islam aligned against Christianity. Therefore, the passionate interest with which the whole Mohammedan world hangs upon the fate of Constantinople is easily comprehended. To that world, this city is not only the city of the Caliphate, it is the frontier fortress of Islam culture.

The sarcastic and unfriendly words with which Lloyd George began his remarks on Turkey a few weeks ago at the opening of the peace sessions dealing with the Asiatic question, and the similar remarks which the French press now repeats as having been heard at the London deliberations, are due

to England's disappointment at the outcome of negotiations which we may feel sure it undertook with the Anatolian government of Mustafa Kemal. Had these negotiations resulted, as they hoped, in the acceptance of a disguised English Protectorate, England would have stood by Turkey heart and soul; and assuredly would have advocated its retaining Constantinople, so as to win favor from Britain's old and new Islam subjects.

In contemplation of the possibility, although it has ceased to be a likelihood, that the Turks may at the last moment despair of their own strength and come round to the English plan, the latter country is doubtless prepared to change its policy again. But if Turkey remains intractable, as now seems probable, England is mainly interested in guaranteeing Constantinople from eventual Russian occupancy. It would make no difference to England whether Russia ultimately accomplished this by allying itself with Turkey, or by force. That is why the British Government was so anxious to have America take this mandate. It would thus have unloaded upon the transatlantic power Russia's hatred. When America refused, the project of a Franco-English condominium over the Dardanelles was mooted; for England was well aware that in such an event the more powerful partner would soon monopolize all the advantages.

The Paris press has apparently changed its attitude, and is now urging vigorously that Turkey retain its rights to Stamboul. Only a short time ago, such a project, when supported by Pierre Loti, was looked upon as folly and almost treason. But now France is playing a different game. It wants Constantinople reserved as a bait for its former ally, Russia. France feels that in spite of all its securities on the Rhine, the

supports of the European Peace Temple still rest in the air. It does not have confidence in the permanent stability of the cordon of border countries on Germany's eastern frontier. Naturally, therefore, it is very anxious to renew its alliance with Russia, and as a motive, it would offer its rueful and returning partner the fulfillment of its old dream, the possession of the Straits.

So we see England and France actually at swords' points on the Golden Horn.

England, naturally, regards the problem of Constantinople as an Islam question rather than as a Turkish question. Apparently it hopes to spare the sensibilities of the followers of the Prophet by leaving the Sultan, in his capacity of Caliph, sovereignty over a small district of the city — following the precedent of the Vatican — when it ejects his government from Europe. Only experience will tell how this would succeed. For the loss of Constantinople would deprive Islamism not only of a religious, but also of a cultural capital; and it is doubtful whether a Caliph living in practical imprisonment on foreign soil would be satisfactory to the true believers.

The Turks have succeeded in asserting successfully their claims to Anatolia. Its integrity will hardly be attacked by any member of the conference. The smaller intriguers, Greece and Armenia, will be given to understand that they can have no assistance in making good their claims in this region. Italy has never sought to make acquisitions here except as compensations for annexations by the other allies. Its interests are primarily commercial, and it will be able to settle its relations with the Turks

on a basis of peace and good will.

Second only in importance to the problem of Constantinople is that of Syria. Here England and France are rivals. At first blush the prospects of the latter country would seem the more promising. Here, if anywhere, England must respect the wishes of its ally. Syria means for France not only prestige, but a return for the capital and labor it has for centuries expended in this region. So England may be expected to sacrifice, upon the altar of its friendship for France, its Arabian protégés, the King of Hedja and his son, to whom it promised five years ago all territories occupied by Arabians as far as the thirty-seven degrees of latitude. It would be induced to do this by two other considerations. First, in proclaiming an Arabian nation, England has awakened a spirit of which it would fain be free. It no longer is confident of its power to keep in check the forces that have been unloosed by the new Islam movement, and would be glad to have an ally in its task. Furthermore, England knows that French enterprises in Syria are not likely to flourish so as to become dangerous. Indeed, that country is likely soon to weary of what its own Socialists call 'The Levantine Adventure.' An army of occupation numbering thirty thousand will be necessary and France's experiences so far have not been happy. In the very midst of its sphere of occupation there have been bloody conflicts with the natives, and when General Gourand, after being received with great formality at Beirut, proposed to proceed to Damascus, he found himself opposed by Arabian forces far better organized and disciplined than he had ever encountered in Morocco.

[*L'Echo de Paris* (Jingo Clerical Daily), *Februáry* 12]

PILSUDSKI SPEAKS FOR POLAND

AN INTERVIEW WITH CHARLES BONNEFON

WARSAW, in *February*.

POLAND has placed at the head of its government the man who suffered most for its cause — a man who was a prisoner in Siberia, who was immured by the Germans in the fortress of Magdeburg, who was arrested for conspiracy in 1887, 1900, and 1917.

Joseph Pilsudski is a Socialist and a soldier. In 1894 he founded *The Workman*, which was printed secretly in Vilna. He organized the Polish Socialist party, and in 1904 started the uprising that drove the Cossacks from part of Warsaw. But this Lithuanian and son of a great landed proprietor, has devoted himself first and foremost to arousing the national sentiment of the working classes, and no one knows whether his Socialism is a means or an end.

In 1914 Pilsudski fought Russia at the head of a Polish legion, but when the Germans began to win, he changed his camp. His legion, which had already mutinied once, just before the Broussilof offensive, refused to take the oath of allegiance to Germany. On July 21, 1917, Pilsudski was arrested with his faithful companion, Sosukovski, who is now Assistant Minister of War. On November 10, 1918, after the civil population of Poland had disarmed thirty thousand German soldiers, Pilsudski reentered Warsaw in triumph.

Since that date he has held the reins of power firmly with that pliable tenacity, which is characteristic of him. He likes to character a sudden

change of tactics to defeat his opponents, and even his most intimate friends cannot read his thoughts.

Two cavalry men with drawn sabres guard the foot of the staircase leading to his apartments. When he presents himself on public occasions, or before the assembled diplomatic corps, a herald precedes him, shouting: 'Every-one uncover and stand silent before the War Lord of the Most Serene Republic!' Carefully chosen *aides-de-camp* throw into relief by their brilliant uniforms and glittering decorations the sober gray garb of the head of the government.

His enemies murmur that he imitates Bonaparte.

His friends insist that he emulates Kosciuzko. One of his boyhood companions said to me: 'I place him in the same group with Clemenceau and Foch. He will be the greatest man of reborn Poland.' Others mutter that he is an adventurer, an undetected conspirator, a demagogue supporting himself upon the mob.

But while he appears to some people a Louis XI, suspicious and cunning, always on the alert for defense and attack, and to others a charming conversationalist, a profound thinker, a brilliant genius, all agree that he is a man of the highest intellectual ability, with a will of iron.

You can well imagine that my curiosity was piqued by all these characterizations. When I saw him my preconceptions were overthrown in an instant.