

doctrines are still indefinite and vague. They seem to have started out by reorganizing in accordance with their former beliefs and programmes. They do not yet comprehend the facts of the future. They have promptly turned their attention to these, but they have still to define their programme.

The Socialist party is divided by bitter domestic quarrels. In order to maintain its apparent unity, it has been obliged to limit itself to purely negative declarations, such as abstinence from coöperation with any other party and refusal to share in the government. But it is seriously divided both as to principles and to tactics, and it is not likely that this disagreement will speedily disappear. It recently declared at Strassburg that its national policies must be guided by the international policies of the Socialists of the world, which has the effect of

raising still higher the barrier between itself and other political parties, whose policies are determined solely by national interest. By adopting this principle of conduct, the Socialist party is merely aggravating its own internal discords and sacrificing its capacity for positive service. Can it maintain even its external unity? Will all of its members resign themselves to employing their energy and their ability in trying to solve a problem as incapable of solution as squaring the circle? I mean, in trying to preserve harmony when they are divided at heart? There is reason to hope that many of them will give up this thankless task, and choose to coöperate with men of other parties whose opinions approach their own, in order to persuade the proletariat to coöperate peacefully in the economic, social, and democratic development of the nation.

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HOW IT LOOKS IN SIBERIA

BY DR. PHILIPP FLEISCHER

LATE in November, 1918, I found myself in the Officers' Prison Camp at Troitskosavsk in Central Siberia on the edge of the Desert of Gobi. One morning our Russian guards surprised us with the report that a Bolshevik Soviet had been organized in the neighboring city and had seized the government. The soldiers stayed neutral. That very day the Russian officers appeared without their epaulettes, which were regarded by the Bolsheviks as indicating loyalty to the Tsar. A few days later this Soviet

proclaimed the district an independent republic.

Toward the end of the following February, we were shifted to Beresovka, the nearest railway station, where there had been a big prison camp since the beginning of the war. As the river was frozen, we had to make the journey over the endless waterless steppes, partly by carriages and partly in cars, but mostly on foot. The camp at Beresovka was in a dilapidated condition. The wooden fences had been torn down for fuel. The air

was tainted with foul odors; the place could not be cleaned up because no one would do any work and the Bolsheviks had carried off the horses of the peasants and Chinese. The barracks to which we were assigned had not been cleaned and were in a most foul condition. Practically every window-pane was broken.

In Irkutsk and the other larger towns, two kinds of Soviets were running things. One represented the soldiers, the other the civilians. Most of their numbers were young people, eighteen to twenty-two years old. New Soviets were constantly being organized at every point, through a few individuals getting together, declaring themselves a government body and barricading all roads and railway connections with neighboring districts. If they proved strong enough the Irkutsk Soviet would recognize their authority. These local bodies were constantly at swords' points with one another. They often refused to permit the passage of provisions to neighboring jurisdictions. During their fights with the bourgeoisie, they refused each other munitions. A person could not pass from one village to another without a Soviet pass, which was only granted in case the petitioner subscribed in writing to the Bolshevik programme. Upon doing so he was registered as an 'International.' The Soviets ruled by blood and terror. Contributions were periodically levied upon the cities, and in order to insure their collection, twenty or thirty of the leading residents would be arrested. If the money was not promptly paid these hostages were either shot outright or kept in prison under the constant threat of death. Every kind of paper money issued by any conceivable government passed current. Unissued war bonds and coupons, revenue stamps, and what-

ever else was found in the public treasuries were employed for the same purpose. Some Soviets, like that of Chita, printed their own currency on cigarette papers. The price of provisions and wages doubled about every two weeks. Mechanics were not allowed to practise their trade unless they registered as 'International Bolshevik Socialists.' Several of the larger business enterprises were nationalized. This meant that a commissioner and several guards would present themselves any fine morning, tell the proprietor that the business was now to be conducted on public account, and take possession of his cash box. As soon as they had sold out his stock they shut up the establishment.

During this period of practical anarchy many of our war prisoners tried to get home. Only a few succeeded, partly because the Soviet of one district would not recognize the passports of neighboring Soviets, and partly because the Bolshevik troops, which throughout the interior of Russia consisted quite largely of war prisoners, prevented these men from returning, on the principle that no one must be allowed to go home until the world revolution was an actual accomplishment. These men had to carry all sorts of passports. If the slightest suspicion was aroused as to the genuineness of such documents, the Soviet representatives would stand the possessor up by the side of the road and shoot him on the spot.

The condition of the prisoners in the prison camps kept getting worse. Regular government agencies had ceased to function, so that no provision was made for feeding them. They were not able to get fuel to cook their food. The prisoners had to organize their own commissariat and buy their own provisions.

This was supplemented by raising vegetables on the sandy plains around the camps. That was an excessively laborious task. At Beresovka, for example, and later at Nikolsk, we had first to tear up the metre-high herbage and bushes with our hands, then spade up the ground, fertilize the sterile soil to the best of our ability, and dig irrigation canals to bring water from some little rivulet or pool a mile or so distant. We had no newspapers except those published by the Bolsheviks, and of course our studies, which were making such happy progress previously, were completely interrupted.

This continued to be the situation until the Czecho-Slovaks began their victorious progress toward the sea. As early as April, 1918, they had begun to fight their way out of Russia. This was a period of terror and hardship for us prisoners. Bolshevik and anarchist bands headed westward kept invading our camp on searching expeditions. They tore off the officers' insignia and carried away any property they found. Bolshevik commissioners forced thousands of our soldiers to serve in their army. Any resistance was promptly suppressed by force. In the burying ground at Beresovka we erected a monument in memory of two Austrian soldiers who were shot because they protested in the name of their comrades against such violence.

Toward the end of June, all Siberia had been subdued by Czecho-Slovak and counter-revolutionary forces. No quarter was given by either side. The Bolsheviks used to boast of having nailed their epaulets on the shoulders of captured Cossack officers before they killed them. The counter-revolutionary troops pitilessly slaughtered every Bolshevik they caught. When the Czecho-Slovaks

took prisoners, who claimed to have been forced into the Bolshevik ranks they were brought before the Russian Investigating Committee and tortured and mistreated in the effort to extort confessions from them.

For weeks these prisoners received no rations; they lived upon what sympathetic outsiders secretly conveyed to them. The cars into which they were herded were never opened. The corpses of those who died of starvation and hardship were left with the living. Not until the Czecho-Slovak officers made vigorous protests, backed up by the Foreign Missions, were the Russians compelled to remove to hospitals the unhappy survivors, many of whom had been made insane by their sufferings.

It was while this fighting was going on that the Tsar's family was exterminated. Their death was merely mentioned officially in Chinese and Japanese newspapers. Nothing was stated regarding the manner in which it occurred. According to later accounts, an anarchist band after holding the Tsar and his daughters and one of the Grand Dukes — the Tsar's wife had already died — in strict confinement at Tomsk, threw them into the shaft of an abandoned coal mine.

After the Bolsheviks were driven out a cabinet composed of Social Revolutionaries of the Kerensky party and of moderate reactionaries under the presidency of Kolchak took over the government. Soon, however, the Socialist ministers were arrested by Cossack officers and driven into exile under the threat of death. Thereupon, Siberia entered a period of frightful Cossack domination and ensuing chaos. Kolchak's actual jurisdiction reached only as far as Lake Baikal. On the other side of the lake a Cossack hetman, Semienov, was reigning as a despot king at Chita. At

Habarovsk, a blood-thirsty Cossack hetman twenty-six years old, named Kalmukov, seized the government. General Chorwat ruled at Vladivostok. In addition, there were several smaller despots. The reign of terror they conducted belies description. No citizen's life was safe. I read in Japanese newspapers that Kalmukov's assassinations *en masse* had aroused the indignation of the American Mission, which demanded his surrender. He fled, but turned up again a few months later. This list does not complete the toll of Siberian rulers; for the railway and telegraph lines were controlled by Japanese, Americans, and Czech-Slovaks. Moreover, remnants of the Bolshevik bands were still left, which took refuge in the pathless forests and in alliance with native bandits made successful raids almost daily upon the railway trains. Added to all these were English, French, Italian, and Chinese military missions, and Roumanian, Polish, and Lett legions. The foreign missions organized a central committee at Vladivostok which served as a concurrent military government.

None of these innumerable rulers and authorities was able even by the severest measures to check a constant succession of strikes. The peasants raised only what they needed for their own consumption, as the Cossacks robbed them of everything. Nothing could be imported because there was no money. This want of currency forced Kolchak to have a new series of bills printed in America. So we had in circulation the old imperial bills, treasury notes, coupons of these notes, and Kolchak's treasury notes. An imperial ruble was worth ten rubles of the other kind, of which there were innumerable counterfeits. These counterfeits were manufactured freely. Their makers did not even take the

trouble to print the series and numbers on them. These were merely stamped with numbering machines. They passed current as readily as legitimate notes. When I left Siberia a dollar exchanged for 450 rubles.

Manufacturing was at a standstill, because there was no way of repairing worn-out and broken machinery. A person can get some conception of the range of prices from the following quotations: A Chinese coolie who used to be paid 30 or 40 kopecks a day received 400 rubles; an overcoat cost from 8000 to 10,000 rubles; a pair of American shoes, which formerly sold for 20 rubles now commanded from 2000 to 3000 rubles; a little apple was worth 25 rubles, and it took from 250 to 1200 rubles to buy lunch at a restaurant.

About 200,000 war prisoners are still left in Siberia, of whom some 5000 are in Japanese control. The condition of the latter is tolerable, for they get sufficient food and their personal safety is assured. But the condition of the remainder, who are still in the hands of the Russians, is indescribable — particularly those who remain east of Lake Baikal.

About the middle of October, 1918, I was transferred from the prison camp at Beresovka to Nikolsk-Us-sursk. Altogether there were about 2500 officers and 400 privates in our party. We arrived on the first of November. After three days' delay we were detained. A detachment of Cossacks fell upon us, beating us indiscriminately with their sabres and with whips. As usual we were quartered in double bunks. Each one was allotted a space of thirty centimetres. The barracks were in a dilapidated condition; many of the windows were out. We had no light. We were destitute of bedding, overcoats, clothes, and shoes. Many of our

number had not had a shirt for more than a year. Our garments were mere tatters. Our feet were wrapped in rags. An American Red Cross Mission busied itself in our behalf, and we received from it blankets, overcoats, shirts, and socks. Thanks to their intervention we later were allotted more room, so that each person had about four feet of bunk. In the spring of 1919 the Welfare Workers in Vladivostok succeeded in getting a change of linen and about 50 rubles to each of the prisoners. The following October a Swiss Commission brought us some linen to be made up into garments, and also woolen for clothing, enough for about one person in four. Later our comrades in the two prison camps controlled by the Japanese also took up collections in our behalf. We suffered frightfully from cold that winter. Until summer came we did not even have straw to stuff our straw beds. We covered the openings in the windows with paper. For a room containing from 80 to 100 persons we received only a few handfuls of coal. We were never able to get the temperature more than three degrees above freezing. Our suffering from hunger is beyond description; for very rarely did one of our number receive money from home with which to supplement his rations. Between February and July our daily allotment of food consisted of about 40 decigrammes (14 ounces) of black bread, and bean or buckwheat soup. Sundays we had potato noodles with an indescribable sauce. In March, we had on two occasions, and for the last time, a diminutive piece of meat. We could count upon an allowance of 50 rubles, which was supplemented irregularly by 25 rubles given us by the Danes. After October our allowance was 100 rubles, but the Danish assistance ceased.

Only a few of the prisoners could get employment. They engaged as coal miners, street cleaners, drivers, and the like. Rarely indeed did a man find employment as a clerk, waiter, musician, or teacher. Those who obtained positions had to pay from 40 to 60 per cent of their earnings to the Russian commander. A few were allotted as laborers to the Cossack troops, and others to the English or American missions. The latter always treated the men humanely and provided them with excellent food and clothing. Every war prisoner seized eagerly upon an opportunity to procure employment whether he understood the task or not. Linguists served as engineers, bank clerks as electricians, judges as physicians, and lawyers as stable boys. I know two men who worked in succession as butchers, piano tuners, language teachers, bakers, cooks, and last of all as stone masons. Many prisoners learned a trade while in camp.

An effort was made to improve the condition of the prisoners by establishing household industries among them, such as basket making, book binding, broom making, and distilling. This succeeded at several places, but in most instances the experiment failed from lack of money to buy raw materials.

Whenever the Bolsheviki threatened a district, the prisoners were speedily transferred to another point to prevent their falling into the hands of the Soviet troops. Since the railways were not at their service, the prisoners were driven on foot to some place 500 or 600 miles away in detachments of about 1000 headed by mounted Cossacks. Any man who fell exhausted by the wayside was immediately killed. Usually about one fifth of the contingent arrived at its final destination.

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WILSON AND MONROE

BY MARIANO RUBIÓ Y BELLVÉ

OUR Spanish public has followed with lively interest the debate upon the Treaty of Versailles in the Senate of the United States. It is unnecessary here to explain in detail the differences of opinion between Wilson and a majority of that legislative body. The important thing is not the details nor the reservations which may be approved or rejected. The significant aspect of this controversy is the state of sentiment it is creating. That state of sentiment discloses the profound difference between the ideals of the man who is to-day President of the great North American republic, and those of James Monroe, who was its President in the first quarter of the last century. Monroe followed a policy which has been summarized in the familiar phrase, 'America for the Americans.' During the critical years of the two terms during which he held the office, James Monroe devoted his entire attention to strictly national problems. He carried through difficult negotiations with France, England, and Spain, for the purpose of extending the territories of his country, and in these negotiations he displayed remarkable persistence, resolution, and skill. He was inspired less by a talent for utilizing chance opportunities than by an intense and vigorous patriotism, which sought first and foremost the prosperity and glory of his country. Therefore, Monroe stood for that national egoism, to which is due the grandeur and power of all peoples and all empires who have followed consistently its guidance. It is a system of statecraft lauded by men who have the qualities to pursue

it with the promise of success, and condemned by those who, lacking the ability or desire to promote the greatness of their country, are morally outraged because all the rest of the world will not adopt their own policy of quietism and inaction.

Wilson conceived the duty of the United States in a very different manner. Since the American army had decided the immediate outcome of the war, he believed that the President of the republic which had accomplished this was entitled to the honor of guiding the world's destinies. He believed that he was personally capable of forcing the nations of Europe, exhausted as they were by their tremendous struggle, into any mould he might design for them. Conceiving his personal mission of salvation in so grandiose a manner, his national egoism was relegated to the background and the Monroe Doctrine, which had hitherto confined the interests of his fellow countrymen to their own hemisphere, thereby lost in his eyes its transcendent validity. All the world, and not America alone, was to be boxed up in a League of Nations, which he himself designed. Wilson considered that the people in his own country, who opposed such a project, were little men of petty minds upon whom it was not necessary to waste much attention. When he returned to America in February, 1919, he called them narrow-minded men, egoists, and provincials, incapable of raising themselves above their low and limited horizon.

If this divergence between the national egoism represented by Monroe and still inspiring a great majority of Americans, and Wilson's ideals, which made him say with Socrates, 'The world is my Fatherland,' had been merely academic, the two might have been reconciled by some compromise.