

COMING EVENTS IN THE ORIENT

BY J. O. P. BLAND

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OF all the questions which await the deliberations and decisions of the Peace Cabinet of the Empire, there is none more important and none more complex than that of the future of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Broadly speaking, public opinion in the Dominions and in India appears to favor a renewal of the Alliance, upon terms, and a similar disposition has been clearly manifested in the press and in the utterances of public men in Japan. At the same time, it appears to be generally understood that the terms of the present treaty will require modification and closer definition under certain headings if the pact is to serve as a useful and permanent instrument, adaptable to the changed and changing conditions in the Far East. So many and so great, indeed, are the changes which have taken place on both sides of the Pacific since the treaty was renewed, for the second time, on July 13, 1911; so few remain of the causes which led to the signature of the original agreement in January, 1902, that at first sight the necessity, and even the utility, of a new Treaty of Alliance may not be apparent.

Some of those who question or oppose it have invoked the Covenant of the League of Nations as a fundamental change in world-politics, to which both Great Britain and Japan have subscribed, which should, as a matter of course, render all offensive and defensive alliances superfluous, not to say inexpedient. Others point to the fact that the danger of Russian aggression against India and Eastern Asia, the first

cause of the Alliance, having ceased to exist, no good purpose, essential to the preservation of peace, will be served by its renewal. But the elimination of Russia's military activities in the Far East is only one of many dramatic changes which have taken place in that region during the past ten years. The passing of the German fleet; the rapid increase of Japan's wealth and commerce, resultant from the war in Europe; the definite adoption by the United States of a policy aiming at naval supremacy; the opening of the Panama Canal; the collapse of constituted authority in China; the movements toward independence of Mongolia and Tibet; these, and the increasing severity of economic pressure in all parts of the globe, have combined to transfer the centre of the world's immediate problems, political and economic, from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

And it is because of this transference, and of the elements of strife latent in the new situation thus created, that it is to-day more than ever desirable that Great Britain and Japan should renew their Alliance, under conditions calculated to prevent the Far East from becoming once more the arena of conflicting interests; that, pending the general sanction of the League of Nations as an effective international authority, they should unite and agree in a common policy of good-will and reciprocity, based on a community of legitimate commercial interests.

In discussing the conditions under which the Alliance should be renewed,

no good purpose will be served by shutting our eyes to accomplished facts, unpleasant though they may be. Let us not try to solve difficult questions with catchwords, or to dodge realities with formulæ. The fundamental realities which confront us to-day in the Far East, taken in the order of their importance, are: first, the military weakness, financial chaos, and political disorganization of China; second, the economic and political ascendancy of Japan in that country and her policy of 'peaceful penetration' in Manchuria and Mongolia; and third, the increasing recognition by the commercial powers, notably the United States, of the future importance of China as a market and a potential factor in world-economics.

The extent and results of the ascendancy which Japan has established in China in the course of the past ten years will be discussed in due course. For the present, I deal only with the actual situation in the eighteen provinces of China, desiring at the outset to emphasize the fact, which every impartial observer must admit, that the immediate future offers no hope of the establishment of a stable central government at Peking or of permanent financial equilibrium. And this being so, no renewal of the Alliance can serve to promote the cause of peace in the Far East, or to reconcile the respective interests of the commercial powers, unless it reasserts in all sincerity that article of the existing treaty which provides for 'the preservation of the common interests of all powers in China by insuring independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China.'

Now, the history of what has happened in Korea and the failure of the Treaty of Portsmouth to protect China's sovereign rights in Manchuria since 1905, afford sufficient proof, if

proof be needed, that Conventions of this kind can never be relied upon to serve their avowed, benevolent ends, unless inspired by permanent community of interest or by mutual recognition of restraining forces in the background. Therefore, if the renewal of the Alliance is to be of real benefit to China, and, through her, to the cause of peace and international commerce, those who negotiate it must begin by defining clearly the nature and scope of this community of interest, and thereafter proceed to reconcile it with the accomplished facts of the situation, on broad lines of policy, wherever this can be done without violation of fundamental principles of justice and right. A step toward full and frank discussion of the actual position of affairs in China has recently been taken in the negotiations of the Four-Powers Consortium, and in the conclusion of their international agreement to render financial assistance to China under conditions which, in the words of the American State Department, shall 'supplant the intense spirit of competition by a spirit of mutuality and coöperation.' But more remains to be done, and certain things to be undone, before the community of interest, or, in other words, the principle of equal opportunities, can be regarded as satisfactorily established and safeguarded for the future.

The salient and incontestable fact that emerges from the recent history of China is that the political factions that have misruled the country since the Revolution not only have proved themselves incapable of preserving its independence and integrity, but that many of their actions have tended directly to jeopardize that independence and to undermine that integrity. This aspect of the Chinese question must be faced. Public opinion in England and in America is vaguely conscious of the fact that the 'forward' policy adopted by Japan

in China, while Europe was engaged in war, cannot be reconciled with either the spirit or the letter of the Treaty of Alliance, but it is not so generally understood that the advantageous position which Japan has secured for herself since, in May, 1915, she abandoned Group V of the 'Twenty-one Demands,' in deference to the representations of the Powers, could never have been attained but for the unpatriotic venality of the officials who constitute and exploit the government of China. The Chinese themselves are under no illusions concerning this lamentable state of affairs; but public opinion abroad has been misled, and the truth concealed, as the result of the propaganda conducted by the politicians and publicists who habitually appeal to the sympathies of the civilized world, in the name of Democracy, on behalf of young China and its Republic, nobly struggling to be free. It is to be observed that, since the Revolution, most of China's diplomatic representatives abroad have been drawn from the class of young 'western-learning' officials, highly intelligent and adaptable products of European education, and that their activities at Versailles, Geneva, and elsewhere have contributed largely to the creation of a very erroneous impression as to the position and prospects of affairs in China. Thus, at the present time, when the Chinese Government is completely demoralized and faced with inevitable bankruptcy, when throughout the country the defenseless people are being mercilessly harassed and plundered by lawless soldiery and brigands, we find in several directions their influence at work, enlisting sentiment and sympathy in support of the alleged progress of liberal ideas and democratic institutions in China.

Financiers point to the recent growth of her foreign trade as proof of increasing prosperity (one might as well say

that a man who puts on weight must be healthy), while philanthropists and vocational idealists expatiate on the humanitarian and social reforms which the enlightened government of the Republic has so rapidly effected: for example, the abolition of torture in judicial proceedings, the freedom of the press, the advance of education, the emancipation of women, and the suppression of the opium traffic. The fact that these reforms have been accomplished only on paper, and that the unrelieved sufferings of the masses are greater today than they were under the Manchus, in no way detracts from the complacent satisfaction of China's diplomatic agents *in partibus*; nor does it give them pause in agitating for the abolition of extra-territorial rights and against the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as derogatory to the dignity and distasteful to the sentiments of the Chinese people. Their attitude simply ignores all the realities of the situation.

They protest loudly, and with good cause, against the injustice done to China by Japan, and condoned by the Allies at Versailles, with regard to the Shantung question, but they say nothing of the lamentable fact that, before and after the Chinese Government's representatives at Versailles had declined to sign a treaty which recorded this violation of their country's sovereign rights, the Government itself was busily engaged in conceding to Japan, in return for subsidies and loans, many rights, privileges, and concessions calculated to prejudice their future independence. If Young China were sincere in seeking the true cause of the nation's political discontents and financial embarrassments, it would find it in the incorrigible money-lust of the mandarin class, which has always paved and still paves the way for alien policies of 'peaceful penetration.'

It is useless at this juncture to dis-

guise the truth that China's weakness — more marked to-day than ever before — constitutes the pivotal fact of the Far Eastern problem. Moreover, because of the opportunities of aggression and exploitation which this weakness invites, it constitutes a constant source of dangerous rivalry. It is also evident that if this weakness is to be cured, the nation's independence preserved, and its resources developed to the general advantage of international trade, it will be necessary before long for the powers concerned to intervene, and to insist upon certain real reforms, namely, the disbandment of the Tutchuns' rabble armies, the reorganization of the administration, and the restoration of normal fiscal relations between Peking and the provinces. Great Britain and Japan, as the two countries possessing the largest vested interests and trade in China, are well within their rights in discussing these matters; to refrain from so doing for fear of hurting China's *amour propre*, would be a cruel kindness. The time has come for all concerned — America included — to face facts, to cease from proclaiming the magical virtue of political phrases, and by full and frank consultation to devise means for putting an end to a state of affairs which cannot possibly confer credit on China's rulers, and which inflicts infinite suffering on her people. If, as I hope and believe, the Japanese Government is ready to coöperate loyally to the end, the renewal of the Alliance will be an event of good augury, and welcome to every true friend of China.

There are, of course, other aspects of the Alliance besides those which arise out of the situation in China. But when all is said and done, it was China's weakness which led to the Russo-Japanese struggle for Korea, and China's weakness must inevitably precipitate new wars, unless Great Britain and Japan, with the United States approv-

ing, take such steps as may be necessary to encourage and maintain an effective Chinese Government at Peking.

Assuming the possibility of a renewal of the Alliance under such conditions as shall tend to preserve peace in the Orient, by means of a common policy of helpfulness and good-will toward China, the question naturally arises, what has Japan to offer, and what does she stand to gain, in making such an agreement? Also, wherein lies the community of interest, or the mutual recognition of restraining forces, whereby alone the Alliance can be made permanently beneficial? In suggesting answers to these questions, based on a recent study of present-day conditions and opinions in Japan, I would ask the reader to remember that international treaties are inspired not so much by sentiment as by economic necessity, and by the recognition of common dangers. The relations which are established from time to time between continents, races, and nations, their enmities and their friendships, are only changing phases in the world-wide struggle for survival, which, in this twentieth century, has become essentially a struggle for markets and for control of the supplies of raw materials required by our congested centres of industrialism. Even the dreams of a race, such visions as 'Pan-Asia' or 'Pan-Islam,' have at their rainbows' ends some goodly place in the sun, where the hungry shall be filled with good things. Idealism in world-politics belongs generally to those nations which, by foresight or by favor of the gods, enjoy more than their fair share of this world's goods; you will not find it in the homes of the hungry.

Now not only is Japan, as a nation, afflicted with increasing hunger, but her people happen also to belong to what Mill calls the active, self-helping, as distinct from the passive, non-resisting

races. In other words, they, like the Anglo-Saxon race, are of the type, which, when confronted by the pains and penalties produced by acute pressure of population upon the means of subsistence, instinctively seeks the remedy for its necessities in forceful expansion. In considering the several problems which have to be faced in connection with the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it is essential to bear these things in mind, and to remember, moreover, that the Anglo-Saxon race, on the American Continent and in the British Dominions overseas, impelled by an imperative instinct of self-preservation, is firmly united in a determination to deny to the Asiatic races all rights of expansion into the American, Australian, and African continents. Now this determination is not — as some would have us believe — a matter of racial antagonism or moral prejudice. It is founded on sheer economic necessity, and its application is, and must always be, dependent in the last resort upon the law of the stronger; in other words, upon force. When, at the Versailles Peace Conference, Japan raised the question of racial equality, thereby, in effect, asserting her claim to equal opportunities of expansion overseas, even Mr. Wilson's lofty conception of the brotherhood of man could find no practical means to recognize that claim, so that eventually he was content to compromise with it, along the line of least resistance, at China's expense.

The victorious conclusion of the war by the Allies has left the Anglo-Saxon race in a position to defend its exclusion of Asiatic immigration, and the increasing economic pressure which afflicts civilization makes it certain that this exclusion policy will be maintained. The attitude of the Japanese Government toward this question, as manifested at and since the Versailles Conference, has

been one of tacit and dignified acquiescence in measures recognized to be based upon imperative economic necessity, so long as these measures involve no arbitrary racial discrimination. At the same time, the terms of the Lansing-Ishii agreement, negotiated by Japan with the United States in November, 1917, and the recently concluded 'Consortium' negotiations concerning Japan's 'special interests' in Manchuria and Mongolia, have made it unmistakably clear that Japan is not prepared to acquiesce in any deliberate attempt to debar her from expansion into the Asiatic mainland, or from economic exploitation of China's loosely held, undeveloped, and thinly populated dependencies to the north of the Great Wall. If, in agreeing to join the Four-Powers financial Consortium, the Japanese Government waived its specific claims to the independent construction of certain railways in that region, and subscribed to the principle of coöperation, it did so upon the understanding, expressed and recorded in Lord Curzon's dispatches, that the governments behind the financiers would refuse to countenance any operations of the Consortium 'inimical to the security of the economic life and the national defense of Japan,' a reservation evidently capable of the widest application, and one which leaves the matter of Japan's 'special interests' in much the same position in which it was left by Mr. Secretary Lansing in 1917.

Here we touch a crucial point of the Far Eastern question. For it cannot be denied that, just as the 'security of the economic life' of California, Canada, or Australia, compels them to exclude the competition of Asiatic immigrants, even so the security of the economic life of Japan compels her, either to seek new outlets for her surplus population overseas, or to endeavor to secure such a position of economic advantage in com-

paratively undeveloped regions of the Asiatic mainland, as shall enable her to maintain and increase her industries, and thereby feed her people, at home. Common sense and common justice compel us to recognize this fundamental fact of the situation. Moreover, *pace* the Treaty of Portsmouth, the Japanese people regard their privileged position (not to say paramount influence) in the regions of the mainland to the north and west of Korea, as a matter of indisputable right, a right which they have won by two victorious wars, at great expense of blood and treasure. They have not forgotten that the purpose of the first Treaty of Alliance was to enable Japan to eject Russia from Korea and Manchuria while England kept the ring, and they know that, if they had not won that war, all the dependencies and territories of China to the north of the Wall would long since have passed into Russian hands. Moreover, they remember that, before and during the European war, both America and Great Britain had seen fit to recognize the existence of the 'special interests' which Japan had acquired in those regions, partly by force of arms and partly by means of 'concessions' bought from China's complaisant rulers. The development of a position of economic advantage by Japan in Manchuria became, in fact, inevitable from the day when, by the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia handed over to the conqueror the South Manchurian Railway, with all its privileges and concessions. To expect the Japanese to abandon the position thus created, with all that it means to the economic life of the nation, is to ignore the basic realities of the situation.

What now, it may be asked, does Japan expect to gain by the renewal of the Alliance? It is evident, I think, that what her rulers expect from it is the moral support of Great Britain in a rea-

sonable recognition of the necessities and difficulties of Japan's insular position; the help of England, as a friend, in the councils of nations, in reconciling what they regard as their legitimate aspirations with the interests and opinions of other nations. Everything in the actions and utterances of the rulers of Japan to-day warrants the belief that, while maintaining their right to safeguard the economic life and defenses of the nation, they are sincerely anxious to avoid, not only war, but the risk of national isolation. They believe that by coming to a good understanding with Great Britain, and, through her, with the United States, it should be possible to arrive at a solution of the Far Eastern question. They have come to regard the Alliance as an effective instrument for preventing the Red ruin of Bolshevism from overflowing into Eastern Asia; they see in it also the best means of arriving at an international agreement for the limitation of naval and other armaments. The prosperity of Japan, like that of Great Britain, depends upon a peaceful and progressive development of trade and industry, and upon a reduction of the grievous burden of taxation which now cripples enterprise at its source. If compelled to defend things essential to their national security, the Japanese will undoubtedly fight, as they have done before; but public opinion, on the whole, is convinced that, economically speaking, Japan has everything to lose and nothing to gain by war.

Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to expect that a full and frank discussion of the renewal of the Alliance, starting with reciprocal recognition of accomplished facts, should lead to a clear definition of Japan's position in Manchuria and Mongolia and to the relinquishing of such of her claims to 'special interests,' in Shantung and elsewhere, as undeniably conflict with the

maintenance of China's independent sovereignty. Discussing these matters with politicians and publicists in Japan last year, I found them generally disposed to admit that many things done, and others attempted, by the Japanese Government between 1915 and 1918 were incompatible with the terms of the treaty as renewed in 1911. Without crying over spilled milk, it is permissible to recall the fact that in 1916 and 1917, when there seemed but little prospect of a decisive victory for the Allies, the Japanese Government and its agents in China hastened to peg out a number of valuable claims, with the obvious intention of confronting the Peace Conference with accomplished facts. It was also manifestly clear, from the utterances of many Japanese statesmen, that if Germany had proved victorious, the Alliance would have come to an end with the British navy.

But Germany having been defeated, and the wisdom of the Alliance thus vindicated, a natural reaction has taken place, and most Japanese are now free to confess that during the war England received more than her fair share of kicks, and Japan most of the ha'pence. And this being so, a disposition toward graceful concessions in subsidiary matters may fairly be expected when the renewal of the Alliance comes to be discussed on broad principles of reasonable reciprocity. Among business men in Tokyo I found evidence of a general recognition of the expediency of more give and less take in the future working of the Alliance; of a more liberal spirit of reciprocity in such matters as the protection of trade-marks, coast shipping facilities, etc. The unprecedented foreign tour of the Crown Prince of Japan, and the notable break with tradition involved in his betrothal, are new portents which justify the belief that the influence of the military party at Tokyo is really waning, and that gov-

ernment by means of a responsible cabinet may before long replace the arbitrary authority of the clan system. Such a change would materially increase the power for good and promote the purposes of the Alliance, for there is no denying that the irresponsible activities of the Japanese military party in China, frequently in direct conflict with the published utterances of the Foreign Minister, must needs be checked, and their outposts withdrawn, if the Alliance is to preserve the unfettered independence of China and the open door.

Frank discussion of the existing situation should entail, *pari passu* with the reasonable recognition of Japan's position in Manchuria and Mongolia, the complete restoration of Shantung to China, and the abandonment by Japan of any claims to 'special interests' such as those created by the 'Twenty-one Demands' and by the secret military agreement of March, 1918, throughout the eighteen provinces. It should also result in a self-denying agreement by all concerned to abstain from all encroachments upon China's sovereignty and to coöperate loyally in the difficult task of restoring her stability of government. This may be regarded by many as a counsel of perfection; but the fact remains that Premier Hara, with the Seiyukai party behind him, has publicly declared that Japan would welcome an Anglo-American-Japanese understanding having as its avowed object a common reconstructive policy in China. The Japanese Prime Minister, it will be observed, recognizes the fact that such a policy will require the co-operation, or at least the good-will, of the United States. Mr. Hughes, the Australian Premier, has definitely expressed the same opinion; and it may safely be asserted that the Dominions generally would be opposed to the renewal of the Alliance under conditions calculated to antagonize America.

ON THE EVE OF THE TRAGEDY. I

BY RAYMOND RECOULY

[The following is the first of a series of articles, written by the distinguished editor of this review, describing incidents attending the outbreak of the war. The present installment is substantially an interview with Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin in 1914. The next installment will contain the account by his brother, Paul Cambon, Ambassador at London at the same time, of events in Great Britain during those critical days.]

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THE Kaiser was at Kiel, on board his yacht, which was sailing in the annual regatta. As usual, he was exceedingly busy, hurrying about hither and thither, giving orders, and trying to manage the whole affair himself. Suddenly a little steam-launch was observed, hastening at full speed toward the yacht, as if to put someone aboard. The Kaiser made a peremptory sign that she was to sheer off. Instead of obeying, however, she continued to approach. When she was but a few yards from the royal yacht, Admiral Müller, who was standing near the steersman, signaled that he had an important message to deliver. He waved a paper, placed it in his cigarette-case, and running alongside the Kaiser's yacht, skillfully threw the case aboard.

A sailor picked it up and handed it to Wilhelm. The latter opened the cigarette-case and unfolded the telegram. Turning pale, he let the paper fall from his hand, ejaculating: 'We must begin all over.' At once he gave orders to turn his boat about and abandon the race.

What had happened at Konopicht when the Kaiser and Archduke Francis Ferdinand met there? No one knows exactly. Probably the Kaiser succeeded in converting the heir of Austria to his own policy and opinions. His influence

over the Hapsburg Crown Prince was very strong, particularly through the latter's morganatic wife, whom the German court had flattered and favored from the first.

I spent the first few days of July in France, returning to Berlin shortly before the fourteenth. During the usual Embassy reception to the French colony on Bastille Day, I found sentiment somewhat agitated. A good deal of strong talk was being heard. However, big talkers are not always the best fighters. We knew absolutely nothing as to Austria's intentions, or the character of the note it was preparing to deliver to Serbia.

My colleagues, the English and the Russian ambassadors, were absent. We had not the slightest hint of the famous Council of War, supposed to have been held at Potsdam on July 5. You know that the Germans are past masters at guarding secrets. None the less, I was disturbed. I saw von Jagow, Secretary of State, almost daily; but I was unable to get an interview with the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, with whom I had been very intimate, and with whose family my wife and daughter were most friendly. Bethmann was an honest sort of man — he proved that the day he made that famous remark about 'a scrap of