

power even on a very small scale, could not refrain from interrupting with these words: 'How would it be possible to bring back into a temporal allegiance my brave Borghigiani, who have tasted freedom and found it so much to their liking that they are never satiated, and, were it not for me, would carry it beyond bounds?' The idea of restoring the Pontifical state, even on the smallest scale, is now more than a historical and political difficulty. As a practical matter it is out of the question. Not even the famous project elaborated by the hapless Erzberger at the instigation of the German Foreign Secretary in co-operation with the Emperor of Austria, succeeded in overcoming this difficulty; on the contrary, it managed only to conjure up a juridical and political monstrosity, as I have already demonstrated in another article.

But might not the Italian state on its

own part take the initiative? No. The Law of the Papal Guarantees has itself, in that section which concerns the internal relations between State and Church (Article 18), laid down a sound foundation and good starting-point for concessions which would be of advantage to the Church itself.

Likewise, Article 5, of this first section, which refers to the enjoyment of the Apostolic palaces, the villas and the annexed buildings, might be changed, let us say it frankly, so as to be more respectful to the Holy See than it has been up to the present time. It would be possible, moreover, to breathe into those old formulas a new and vivifying spirit such as would enable the Holy See, free from small cares as well as from sterile regrets, to move with greater freedom in that lofty atmosphere where rests the goal of its mission on earth.

WHAT IS HAPPENING IN INDIA

BY G. BUETZ

[The author of this article is a well-known writer upon Far Eastern affairs, whose articles usually betray pro-native sympathies, doubtless due in part to his hostility to Germany's recent enemies.]

From *Deutsche Politik*, September 10
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SERIOUS unrest is reported in India, and we are asking for the thousandth time whether its people have resumed their long struggle for liberty in a form which really threatens England, or whether the disturbances will prove merely transient and local.

In order to answer that question satisfactorily, we must know why revolutionary sentiment exists in India. Eco-

nomic conditions there, when reinforced by a nationalist movement, were certain to produce a revolt against the British government. First, then, let us consider India's economic grievances.

England believed it could make a permanent proletariat of the Indian nation. The measures it adopted to accomplish this were to discourage artificially popular education and to tax the

people heavily. India had more public schools before the English conquered the country than it has to-day, and after one hundred and fifty years of British rule, 90 per cent of the males and 99 per cent of the females are unable to read and write. Taxation is so burdensome that from thirty to forty million of the population are undernourished. India is forced to pay for its own government, including the salaries of its English rulers and administrators, and the staff of the India Office in London. It must also support the British Army in India and finance all military campaigns conducted in the interests of India. It must pay the pensions of all officials and officers, military or civilian, who have been employed in India. Since the revenues have been inadequate for these purposes, the country has borrowed money in England at a high rate of interest. Hitherto the country has not been able to increase its revenues. The country's income is derived from exports. For years the people have made every effort to increase the value of those exports, by shipping them in the form of manufactured goods instead of cheap raw materials. England, however, wishes to sell its manufactures in India and to buy cheap raw materials from that country. Consequently, its government artificially discourages factories there. The public revenues are raised largely by a tax on land. That tax supplies 40 per cent of the public income and reaches 50 per cent of the net product of the cultivator. Since agricultural produce is very cheap, the Indian peasant has been impoverished by this system. It has resulted in a famine whenever there is a crop failure. Such famines occur frequently.

So long as India was exclusively an agricultural country, this artificial holding down of the masses involved no dangers. But the moment India began to have an industrial proletariat, the situa-

tion changed. That condition has at length arrived. During the war, England was compelled by necessity to promote Indian manufactures in order to satisfy its own military needs. Cut off by hostilities from the merchandise of the other great industrial nations, and inadequately supplied with merchandise from England, India was forced to also manufacture for its own consumption. Since the country's population is in round numbers 300,000,000, this meant the erection of large establishments. During the latter years of the war, local factories produced half the cotton goods consumed in the country. Industrial cities sprang up to become seed-beds of revolutionary agitation. Before the war India had less than 2,000,000 factory operatives; to-day it has in the neighborhood of 10,000,000.

But the effect of this transformation is still greater than these figures would suggest. As in all countries in which manufactured industries have been recently established, the operatives spent but part of their time in the factories. They are constantly moving back and forth between these establishments and their country homes. Thus, the working people carry their revolutionary ideas to the peasantry, where they have spread like wildfire among 32,000,000 rural laborers. The latter are among the most oppressed and impoverished of all working classes. Next to them come the oppressed peasantry. The result has been to sow the seeds of discontent and revolt far and wide among the common people. These include 50,000,000 Indian peasants who live constantly near the starvation level.

The revolutionary agitation among these masses is radical to the last degree; its purpose is to expel the British rulers by an armed insurrection. A group of nationalist extremists is at its head. These leaders are drawn from the impecunious sections of the native middle

classes — students, native officials, and brain workers, whose incomes as a rule are extremely meagre. While the primary object of these men is to liberate India from English rule, they have knit up this movement with the strictly economic struggle of the proletariat, so as to utilize the discontent prevalent among the exploited and under-nourished masses as a weapon in their own propaganda of revolt.

While it is obvious, therefore, that India has amply sufficient cause for trying to expel by force its British masters, it does not necessarily follow that their enterprise has any prospect of success. Let us now take up that question.

This is a question to which a positive answer cannot be given. We can only indicate a number of facts which point in the direction of an answer. First, it is perfectly certain that England will never voluntarily grant India what it demands. That would imply the voluntary evacuation of the country. Since India is the very corner-stone of England's political power, and, we may say, her business and commercial supremacy as well, and Britain's very existence is bound up with that of India, it goes without saying that the British government will shrink from nothing to retain control of the country. From this it logically follows that a successful revolution in India will have to be an armed revolution. Such a revolution, if successful, might have either of two results: the complete expulsion of the English; or an open door to free development under English suzerainty.

An armed insurrection cannot succeed unless there is perfect unity of command; and this seems quite impossible at present. India has been divided within itself for ages by differences of religion, language, and political ideals. Several tongues of entirely different derivation are spoken within its boundaries. Since there is no such thing as a

real public-school system, English cannot be used as a common tongue, because a vast majority of the natives do not know that language. It will be an extraordinarily difficult task to create a single national consciousness among so many distinct tribes and races. Religion has now ceased to be so much of a dividing line as formerly, but this change is of very recent date. It is too soon to decide whether it is destined to be permanent. Hitherto, progress has been mainly toward bettering relations between Mohammedans and Hindus. The two confessions are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, and when the first Indian National Congress assembled, in 1885, as a result of the enthusiastic labors of the Indian Liberal, Hume, very few Mohammedans were represented. For years thereafter the National Congress was essentially a congress of Hindus. The width of the gulf between the two religions, is vividly revealed by the fact that the Mohammedan Indian leader, Saphid Ahmed, organized a rival separate congress known as the Mohammedan Educational Conference. When Bengal was partitioned in 1911, the followers of Islam, realizing that England's policy represented a peril for them, endeavored to improve the relations between the two religions. Side by side with the Hindu national movement, a Mohammedan movement sprang up, which expressed itself by the organization, in 1906, of the All India Moslem League. The war stimulated this agitation, which, as early as 1911, assumed a more radical character. Three years later, the Hindu National Congress and the Moslem League met together. In 1919, the Moslem League urged its members not to slaughter cattle, as a concession to the religious sentiments of the Hindus. In 1920 Hindus and Mohammedans together followed the coffin of the Nationalist leader, Bal Gangadhar, to

his grave, thus testifying to their complete unity in the cause of India. These concessions by the Mohammedans are a direct result of England's policy toward their Turkish brethren, and to the occupation of Constantinople.

Questionable political principles have found favor within the Nationalist Indian movement. We can classify the participants of this movement into three groups. First come the rank and file, fighting for purely economic advantages; next come the radical nationalists of the middle class; last of all are recruits from wealthier members of the middle class. Among the latter are rich Indian merchants, prosperous lawyers and physicians, and well-to-do landowners. The members of this group owe their prosperity to the civilization and the security which England has brought their country. They do not wish separation from England, but desire administrative reforms which will give the natives a limited space in the government. These men happen to be the most influential people in the movement. They mainly furnish the funds. Between them and the radicals there is no common ground. There cannot be, because the moderate, well-to-do reformers know that India's political freedom would be bought at the cost of their personal fortunes. They demand broader participation in the government in order to promote the commercial and industrial development of the country. They hope that they can thereby make India stronger economically than Great Britain itself. They do not sympathize with the material aims of the masses. They want low wages and are hostile to organized labor. They are satisfied with the reforms which England introduced late in 1919. In a word, they do not lend strength to the present agitation.

Another factor in the situation is that the employment of Indian troops

during the World War has greatly lowered the esteem in which the natives formerly held the whites. The color bar between the two races, which England has hitherto maintained, is breaking down. Then again the partitioning of Turkey has agitated the people. The radical movements in England itself constantly add fuel to the fire. Many men have been executed or otherwise severely punished for political offences without receiving a fair trial. Naturally, all this has strengthened the present agitation. The reforms which it was intended to introduce in the spring of 1921, could not be put fully into effect for this reason, and probably never will be. Last of all, in the same way that India, at an earlier period, welcomed with enthusiasm the Greek and the Italian wars of liberation, to-day they welcome Bolshevism in the form in which it has been propagated in the Mohammedan countries.

We get a clue to England's weakened authority in India in the fact that it has not dared to resist the non-coöperation movement. That is an idealist and impractical, but none the less extremely dangerous, agitation, which aims to overthrow British rule in India by a general strike. Peasants are to cease cultivating the soil, merchants to cease buying and selling wares, factory operatives are to cease production, government officials are to leave their desks. England's great administrative machine in India consists for the most part of native employees. There are some 150,000 of these civil servants. No Indian is to buy British merchandise or to ship Indian commodities to Great Britain. The apostle of this doctrine of demoralization is Gandhi, whom the English officials have not dared to touch.

However, we must bear in mind that mighty England here faces a nation which is not united by speech, religion,

or common political ideals, a land in the first steps of industrial development, an unarmed people. The censorial press grants Indian sentiment not even a voice. The government has at its call an extensive and excellent secret service. Great Britain's army regulations in India forbid training a native to serve in the artillery—a measure of prudence taught by the great mutiny of 1857.

Beyond question England's situation in India is not a rose one. We may ex-

pect the ferment which has been in progress there, without interruption since 1911, to find a vent in serious disorders. But there is little hope that the 'India for the Indians' campaign will succeed. The men best equipped to lead such a campaign have profited too much from the present government to kill the cow they milk. It will be a remarkable success for the present movement, if the reforms already promised are eventually secured.

RATHENAU AND STINNES

BY REGINALD KANN

From *L'Illustration*, September 24
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CHANCELLOR WIRTH has taken advantage of the period when Parliament is not sitting to give some exact information as to his financial proposals. The reception which the press has granted them permits us to anticipate the stirring debates which will take place when Parliament reassembles, September 27. The assassination of Erzberger can but envenom these debates. In the struggles which will very likely be implacable, two men are called to take a considerable part, less through their direct action than through the influence which they exert, the one upon the ministry, the other in the Reichstag. The first is Walter Rathenau, the most vigorous personality in the government, whose recent negotiations at Wiesbaden with M. Loucheur have just thrown him into still higher relief. The second is Hugo Stinnes, the secret chief of the party which represents the com-

mon interest of the magnates of the Ruhr. Both these celebrated business men are newcomers to politics at the moment when they are about to play a rôle that may be preponderant in the destinies of Germany and it is not without interest to glance at their past careers.

Walter Rathenau is the son of the founder of the *Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft* of Berlin, ordinarily designated by its initials, A.E.G. In spite of its comparatively recent origin, this is the most important private industry in Europe. Since it began in 1883, with a modest capital of 5,000,000 marks, it has developed by a series of prodigious bounds. In 1905 its capital reached 100,000,000 marks, and in 1914 it was 155,000,000. Both during and after the war, its progress kept on, and in 1917 its capital attained the figure of 200,000,000, the next year 300,000,000,