

definite obligations upon Italy that to prevent her imminent entry into the war would require a coup d'état — that is, the revocation of international agreements made by the sovereign exercising the prerogatives granted him by the Statute. This irrevocable

situation does not admit any alternative. It imposes on me the duty to conceal in my inmost self my contradictory opinions, and to give my coöperation to a national war which has been virtually decided upon for about a month. . . .

A KING ON TRIAL

BY CHARLES VELLAY

FROM *Journal de Genève, February 9*
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ALONG with many another gift, M. Venizelos has that of discovering agreeable formulas. Several years ago, when he wished to stave off the onrush of republicanism that threatened to overwhelm him, he appeased the impatience of his friends by pointing out to them that King Alexander's reign was not a monarchical régime, but merely a 'crowned republic,' and since that time a good many Greeks sincerely believe that a monarchy, provided only it be a constitutional monarchy, is not a monarchy at all, but a republic.

To-day, when the same republican current is again beginning to flow and with still more force than under King Alexander, M. Venizelos has dug up another formula to prevent the inauguration of an Hellenic Republic. He has asked his supporters to give monarchy a last trial, until 1925, after which, if the experiment is successful, they will continue in the same way, or if it turns out ill they will have the republic. At the present moment, Greece is in the odd situation of having a 'king on trial.'

Such a conception, it must be said,

by no means increases the prestige of the reigning monarch, who, in his palace, is a little like a transitory guest, hardly knowing whether his position is final or provisional. But his position corresponds well enough with that disposition which most Greeks possess for coming to a compromise with men and with situations. Did not a former Minister tell me recently that he believed for his part he had found a satisfactory means of solving the difficult question of the form of government, and his compromise consisted in satisfying both Royalists and Republicans by proclaiming the republic immediately, and stating at the same time that it should not come to pass until the death of King George II, the present ruler.

But all these formulas — those of M. Venizelos like the others — do not contrive to cure the malady: that is to say, the instability of the government. Whether it is really desired or not and whatever individual sentiment may be, there is no denying that the present state of affairs is necessarily transitory. If the monarchist tendency triumphs,

it will inevitably lead to the strengthening of the King's power and position; for a King who — like the present monarch — is set apart from affairs of state without influence, without authority, and so thoroughly separated from the nation that the mourning for his father does not pass the gate of his palace, can hardly perform for his country the rôle of regulator which has naturally come to be that of a constitutional monarch.

If, on the other hand, the republican movement succeeds, every monarchical form — no matter how reduced, even if no more than a travesty of itself — will be done away with. Both sides seem to desire a consultation of the voters, who would put an end to the controversies by the supreme voice of the country itself. It is the revolutionary leaders who now oppose this, for the moment at least, because, being responsible for the work that they have undertaken and resolved to carry through to success, they do not wish to compromise their work by handing it over unfinished to the caprices of an election.

Moreover, such a régime as the 'monarchy on trial' has other dangers besides those of lessening the sovereign's prestige and lengthening a period of political uncertainty from which it is the interest of the country to emerge as soon as possible. It is not fair to let a monarchy which has no constitutional power bear the responsibility of all that may happen during its period of trial. If, during these two years of proof for which M. Venizelos asks, the country undergoes new reverses, new wars, or new territorial losses, or if public opinion at home continues to split into two camps, Royalist and Republican, and to wear itself out with internal struggles, it is the monarch who will be called to account. On the other hand, if the country goes from

one period of prosperity to another, it is the monarch who will benefit. It is a very simple way to reason, but it is unjust at bottom, unconstitutional, and in any event it is no guaranty for the future.

The truth that lurks under all this discussion of formulas corresponds far more closely to M. Venizelos's political cabinets. Those who know him best firmly believe that his mind is completely made up to come back to Greece and take charge of affairs if circumstances are favorable. Though his personal attitude is not hostile to a republic, he believes that it will be easier to govern a people who are not always tractable with a king, by using the Crown to deal with the Royalists. By talking about a crowned republic or an hereditary president to the republicans, and at all events by avoiding in this way too troublesome a parliamentary control, he hopes to gather into his hands all the resources of the state and all the forms of authority without having all their handicaps. If in the proposed interval King George has shown himself sufficiently resigned to his lot as a sovereign and sufficiently pliable, M. Venizelos will come back in 1925 as the Prime Minister of this complaisant monarch. If the opposite proves to be the case, M. Venizelos, strong in the unpopularity that the King will have drawn upon himself, will return to crush him.

However definite these calculations appear, they do include one element of the unknown which is certainly not to be neglected. In the first place, it is entirely possible that the Republicans, not all of whom are Venizelists by any means, may refuse to pay any heed to the demands of the former President of the Council and may set up a republic of their own in their own way, without waiting until M. Venizelos is disposed to lend them his aid. Then, too, it is

not at all certain that the King will long consent to the rôle of novitiate that they presume to impose on him. All the old supporters of Constantine, their numbers increased by other and more moderate groups, are actively at work to set up again the régime of yesterday to the profit of King George, and whether by force or by the ballot,

it is not wholly outside the realm of the probable that they may succeed in it. This is so true that if M. Venizelos, whose authority has at best diminished, lets the suitable hour slip by, he runs the risk of finding himself to-morrow confronted with a wholly new situation, such as he by no means anticipates.

HELMUTH VON MOLTKE

THE VANQUISHED OF THE MARNE

BY ZUBERKLOSS

[An extract from the memoirs of the first Chief of Staff of the German armies in the World War was printed in the Living Age of January 20. Since then the official version of the memoirs has been published by General von Moltke's widow. The following article, from the picturesque pen of the military editor of Count Bernstorff's weekly, sheds much light on the character and tragic fate of the man who lost the battle of the Marne, and thereby the war.]

FROM *Das Demokratische Deutschland*, March 3
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NOT the uncle who celebrated at Königrätz and Sedan, but the nephew who lost the battle of the Marne. William II liked the Moltke family. He appointed two Moltkes as his personal adjutants — Count Kuno, who was later subjected to the same nasty charges as Philipp Eulenburg, and Helmuth, whom the Kaiser was accustomed to address in conversation and in letters as his 'dearest Julius.' The first got as far as being appointed Commandant of Berlin, the second became Chief of the General Staff.

When Helmuth von Moltke was named by the Kaiser as Count Schlieffen's successor, it was rumored that he at first refused the position, saying that he did not feel that he measured up to

it; but the Kaiser reassured him, remarking that he would do well enough in time of peace, and in war he would run things himself anyhow. In those days the General Staff building was mockingly called the 'Molkerei (Milkshop) Limited,' a play on the General's name. Conrad von Hötzendorff records that Moltke himself told him that, at the time of his appointment, he asked the Kaiser whether His Majesty 'expected to win the big prize twice in the same lottery.' The Archduke Francis Ferdinand assured Hötzendorff that Moltke had been appointed on his recommendation, but, as Hötzendorff remarks, this was not in conformity with Moltke's letter to him. Now that Moltke's *Memories, Letters, and Docu-*