

the latter may make terms with the Christians, they will never conclude peace with the hated dynasty at Mekka. Two years ago Ibn Saud's warriors again invaded Hussein's realm, and in a fight near Turba destroyed an army commanded by his son Emir Abdallah. The latter owed his life to the speed of his horse. Last spring they invaded Irak; a few weeks later they raided Transjordania; and now they have taken El Taif, the fairest town of the Hejaz.

To be sure, Hussein has a modern army, artillery, and even ten airplanes, while his enemies still fight in the manner of their ancestors. But

his position is more than critical. What has happened in Arabia up to the present is but a prelude. The great final onrush of the Wahhabis has only started. They are clearly intent upon seeing how far England will go in defending Hussein. Sultan Ibn Saud has far more warriors at his back than has the Caliph. Of late even Syrian officers have been flocking to his standard. Hussein will have reason to regret that he refused to sign the Anglo-Hejaz Treaty, and to recognize the Jewish rights in Palestine. For Jews in *Erez* — Israel — are far less dangerous enemies for him than are Wahhabis at the gates of Mekka.

WAR GUILT AND WAR LIES

From *Arbeiter Zeitung*, September 21
(VIENNA CONSERVATIVE-SOCIALIST DAILY)

As all the world knows, the German Government has been placed in a rather ridiculous situation. In order to secure German National votes for the Dawes Laws, it promised to deny officially the 'lies about our war guilt,' especially the declaration in the Versailles Treaty that Germany alone was responsible for bringing about the World War. Furthermore, it promised to call this protest to the attention of the Allied Powers. Now it discovers that the latter action would have a very bad effect just at present, and hesitates to carry out its promise, in spite of the insistence of the German Nationalists.

Just in the nick of time three men who, as they say, 'can honestly claim to have led the fight against the war-guilt lies,' have come to the support of the Government by very properly insisting

that official declarations can accomplish nothing in such a case. 'The best way to clear up this question is to continue an international scientific discussion of the subject.' They do not stop there, but assert that they are 'in a position to demonstrate the following statements.' Among these statements is this one: 'The Russian and the French Governments had decided upon war before Germany declared war or even mobilized.'

The three gentlemen who sign this declaration are: Count Montgelas, whom we must credit with making a serious effort to discover the truth under the diplomatic cloud that enshrouds the origin of the war; Paul Rohrbach, who was one of the most headstrong Imperialists before and during the war, and therefore does not

seem particularly well fitted to act as a judge in the present instance; and Professor Hans Delbrück, who uncontestedly ranks high as a military historian, but is not to be taken seriously in regard to the present question. He defends the thesis that it is not enough to refute the charge that Germany and Austria are the sole guilty parties. 'We must maintain that we are not only innocent of the charge of being the sole criminals, but that we are entirely innocent.' Such a formula makes a man merely ridiculous in any international scientific discussion of the theme.

Naturally there is no doubt that people existed in Russia, and likewise in France, who wanted to bring about a war, but the assertion that all the powerful and influential men advising the Tsar's Government, and in particular that Government itself, wanted a war at any cost is surely false. Its falsity can be proved without difficulty. We would not appeal for confirmation of this to what Sazonov, at that time Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, has said. All regular diplomats make profuse hypocritical professions, and falsely assert that they urged that peace must be maintained; but it goes without saying that such assertions afford not a shred of evidence that they did not all want war. Yet we can appeal with some confidence to what the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg at that time reported to be the real intentions of the Russian Government. On July 26, 1914, Count Szapary, who represented Vienna at the Tsar's court, reported the substance of a conversation which he had that day with Sazonov, and added, 'I received the impression that he was very nervous and alarmed, and thought his desire for peace genuine.'

On July 27 the Ambassador reported:—

The road that Russian policy has covered in two days, from its first blunt rejection of our proposals and disposition to sit in judgment upon our claims, to willingness to make the whole affair a European matter, and from that to a recognition of the legitimacy of our claims and a search for mediators, is indeed a long one.

On July 29 the Ambassador reported:—

Mr. Sazonov has again begged urgently for the delivery of the documents in the case, which have been promised to the Powers, and are not yet at hand [the documents relating to Serbia's conspiracies — EDITOR]. I had the impression that he still cherishes the hope of finding something among the documents that will enable him to withdraw his support from Serbia. . . . My impression leads me to believe that the Minister, in view of his general disinclination to invite a conflict with us, is clutching at straws in the hope of finding some way out of the present situation.

On July 30 the Ambassador reported:—

The evidences of a diplomatic and military nature that have accumulated render it possible to express a conjecture as to the tactics contemplated by Mr. Sazonov. The Minister, like his Imperial master, wants to avoid war, and is seeking, without finally committing himself on our Serbian campaign, to contest our title to its fruits, if possible without hostilities.

On August 1 the Ambassador describes an interview with the Minister, to whom he had come to present Berchtold's tricky suggestion of 'a direct sounding of opinion in St. Petersburg.'

Mr. Sazonov was greatly relieved by my communication, and seemed to attach an exaggerated importance to it, so that I was forced to call attention repeatedly to the changed situation, to the discrepancy between our points of departure, and the like.

This means that the Russian Minister still hoped for peace, while the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador wished to make it plain to him that this hope was

vain. Does this really show that the Russian Government was resolved upon war under any circumstances? And that is the real question. Naturally, all these passages, which are so supremely weighty, are simply omitted in the Red Book — *Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges* — which the scoundrel Berchtold published, and which is a falsification from beginning to end.

Incidentally, we propose to prove that the oft-repeated assertions that Russia's general mobilization precipitated the impending war, that hers was the first general mobilization, and that the Austro-Hungarian and the German mobilizations came later, are also lies. As everyone knows, a partial mobilization was ordered in Russia as an answer to Austria-Hungary's mobilization of eight army corps. Berchtold actually lamented, in a conversation with the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, that Russia's mobilization was only partial: 'Inasmuch as you have confined it to the military districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kasan, it assumes a hostile character toward the Monarchy.'

This was on July 30. At that time Grey's last attempt at mediation was being made, and Emperor William had just telegraphed to Franz Joseph that in compliance with 'the personal plea of the Tsar of Russia' that he try to do something to avert a world conflagration and to preserve world peace (presumably another proof that Russia was determined to have war at any costs!) he was transmitting proposals to the Austro-Hungarian Government. The substance of these proposals was, among other things, that Austria-Hungary, after occupying Belgrade or another place in Serbia, should publish her conditions to that country. And William added to this: 'I shall be sincerely grateful to you if you will let me

know your decision at the earliest possible moment.' And what did Franz Joseph answer? 'I hasten to thank you most sincerely and warmly for your kind telegram. . . . Conscious of my heavy responsibility for the future of my Empire, I have ordered the mobilization of my whole armed power.' Accordingly it is not true that the general mobilization in Austria-Hungary was in reply to the general mobilization in Russia. The truth is that the Vienna criminals took the first step here, as they did in all other cases. Every detail proves irrefutably that the men at the helm in Vienna were determined that nothing should stand in the way of war, that they were resolved upon war under any circumstances.

The conclusive facts here presented are without exception omitted, as we have just said, in Berchtold's Red Book. They first became known through the disclosures made by the Foreign Office of the Republic. We need not be surprised that the Ballhausplatz scoundrels were guilty of these falsifications, for we know that their department was a hotbed of official criminality. But we must add in all fairness that the so-called German White Book — *Vorläufige Denkschrift und Aktenstücke zum Kriegausbruch* — which was laid before the Reichstag for its information on the third of August, 1914, is likewise a falsification from beginning to end. It is an especially pernicious falsification, because it deceived the German Reichstag, and with it the whole German public, as to the origin of the war, and particularly as to whether war was avoidable or unavoidable. To be sure, the same kind of deception was repeated in the books of various colors issued by the Entente Governments. The falsifications in the Russian Orange Book have been sufficiently bared by the former Ambassador Rhomberg. But that does not palliate the fact that

the German Government presented to the Reichstag, with a full knowledge of what it was doing, an utterly misleading report; and we can even go so far as to say that the Reichstag itself, had it been truly informed of the situation when it met to approve the war laws, would have escaped most of the war hysteria to which it fell a victim.

The falsification consisted in the way the documents submitted to the Reichstag were selected, and in the omissions that were made from them. The complete collection of official documents, edited by Karl Kautsky, Walter Schücking, and Count Montgelas, shows that up to the first of August, the day the White Book ends, 609 such papers existed. How many does the White Book contain? Twenty-nine. Naturally many of the documents were of minor importance, but it is clearly impossible to give a true version of the facts with twenty-nine out of six hundred and nine. The fact is that those published in the White Book give no real information concerning the events preceding the outbreak of the war. They tell us nothing of the possibilities of preventing war and nothing of the endeavors made to preserve peace, especially by the English. This systematic suppression of all papers from which it is possible to form an opinion of the development of the war danger and of the true origins of the World War makes the book an infamous falsification. A striking example is the omission of a letter from the Tsar to William in which the Tsar proposes 'to submit the Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague Conference.' The Tsar exchanged only three letters with William, and yet there was not room for one of them! That the omission was by design is evident from the fact that other letters were revised and garbled in order to cover up the omissions in the replies.

Equally significant is the misrepres-

entation of the ultimatum to France. The telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the German Ambassador in Paris concludes: —

Please ask the French Government if it will remain neutral in a Russo-German war. We must have an answer inside eighteen hours.

Now it surely was not probable that France would give the desired answer, but the German Ambassador had still another commission to fulfill, and it is set forth in the same telegram of the Imperial Chancellor: —

If, contrary to anticipations, the French Government should promise to remain neutral, your Excellency will notify the French Government that we are compelled to demand as a pledge of neutrality possession of the fortresses of Toul and Verdun, which we will return at the end of the war with Russia. A reply must be received here by 4 P. M. to-morrow afternoon.

We can easily understand why this part of the ultimatum was not published, but was suppressed; for it shows as clearly as the light of day that the men at Berlin were determined to have a war as early as July 31, and that if France should decide to remain neutral she must be compelled to fight. In order to cover up this omission, the reply of the French Government, contained in the telegram of the German Ambassador in Paris to the Imperial Chancellor, was revised: —

(Text in the White Book) On my repeated and precise inquiry whether France would remain neutral in a Russo-German war, the Premier stated that France would act as her interests demanded.

(The true text) On my repeated and precise inquiry whether France would remain neutral in a Russo-German war, the Premier replied hesitatingly: 'France will do what her interests demand.' He explained the indefiniteness of this statement by the fact that he considered that the situation had changed since yesterday. It had been

officially reported here that the proposal of Sir Edward Grey for the cessation of military preparations by all parties had been accepted by Russia in principle and that Austria-Hungary had declared that she would not annex Serbian territory or impair Serbia's sovereignty.

The White Book ended with the first statement quoted above, and its skillful misrepresentation of what had actually

occurred makes it no wonder that the Germans allowed themselves to be persuaded that the Central Powers had been attacked by Russia and by France, and that the war was one of self-defense. This does not affect the fact that Austria-Hungary was chiefly responsible for the war; but Germany is at least guilty of being a willing accomplice in that immeasurable crime.

IN THE SHADOW OF THE THRONE

BY PROFESSOR JOHANNES HALLER

From *Berliner Tageblatt*, September 2
(LIBERAL DAILY)

[PROFESSOR HALLER, of the University of Tübingen, who is a Conservative and presumably a Monarchist, is about to publish an interesting biographical study of Prince Philipp zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld, for many years Kaiser Wilhelm's most intimate friend. The Prince's sensational memoirs were reviewed in the *Living Age* of July 14 and September 9, 1923. The article that follows is an extract from a chapter entitled 'Der Kaiser,' from the forthcoming volume.]

EULENBURG's task of protecting the monarch from himself was greatly lightened when Bülow entered the Government. But he was not relieved of it entirely. With every year it became more thankless and hopeless. Rarely was his advice accepted in such a good spirit as it was in August 1897, when Eulenburg wrote a letter to the monarch urging him, with all the powers of persuasion and emphasis he possessed, not to take a prominent part

in the agitation for a strong navy 'because people would look upon the next naval bill as something to amuse His Majesty, rather than something for the national interest.' The Kaiser answered good-naturedly on August 20:—

DEAR PHIL, —

Sincerest thanks for your valuable and important letter. . . . Your frank advice as to the way to handle the navy situation pleased me, and I am very grateful to you for it; for if you don't say exactly what you think, who will?

The Kaiser then proceeded to relate enthusiastically what Tirpitz had accomplished, and promised that he would 'after this keep his mouth shut, and use it only for eating, drinking, and smoking.'

But as the years went by such friendly counsel was less and less heeded. Eulenburg's opportunity and responsibility for making his influence felt by the Kaiser were chiefly during the latter's annual northern cruise. He was the only representative of the Cabinet