

Open opposition to the Nazi régime is now chiefly confined to the religious front, from which this article reports some pre-Saar-plebiscite developments.

# Church War *in* Germany

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‘WHOEVER cannot help us to build this church,’ Reichsbishop Müller said, in defining the aim of the National-Socialist Church, ‘whoever is not able to struggle as we do in the Third Reich, must either keep silent or draw aside. If he does not do so of his own accord, I shall have to compel him. What we want is a German church independent of Rome. Here is the goal for which we are struggling—one state, one people, one church.’

These words are already famous, and the Bishop’s ‘Gray Eminence,’ the ‘judicial administrator’ of the National-Socialist Church, Ministerial Director Jaeger, expressed himself in even more definite terms. ‘The ultimate aim is the suppression of all sects, the liquidation of religious differences among the German people. At the end of this evolution we see the National Church.’ If, moreover, we consider the ecclesiastical law passed

during the August session of the National Synod and dealing with the vows taken by the clergy and church dignitaries and if we recall that the essential points in this law, according to Dr. Jaeger, are ‘recognition of the Führer as such; recognition of the community (*Volkstum*) as such; complete sacrifice for this community and devotion of all one’s energies to this church,’ we are then able to understand the last phase of the conflict that is being waged within German Protestantism as well as its significance and possible development.

We should not underestimate the importance of this phase. At the same time we should understand that it will not be decisive. The aims of National Socialism are clear, for it is trying to control the religion of the German people and to create a church rule that fits the National-Socialist political pattern. At the same time it mixes

is being guarded in Vienna. To him it is no romantic dream that the precious stones in this noble diadem will once again shine over Germany or over part of Germany. He feels his real mission lies here. It is here that the clear aims of militant Catholicism are revealed. Here also lies the kernel of the resistance against National Socialism, for the Third Reich and the *Sacrum Imperium* are just as mutually exclusive as Franciscan Catholicism and National Socialism are mutually congenial.

Schuschnigg is chancellor, but the *Imperium Romanum* is stronger than he. Bruno Gobri's frank words in the *Gerarchia* state what we have often proclaimed in these pages, *Pecunia non olet*. The Banco d'Italia receives credits from France, and then Vienna is paid in lire. When money is not useful, honors are handed out. Not only have almost all the members of the Austrian Cabinet been overwhelmed with Italian decorations; King Victor Emmanuel has given the president of the chief industrial organization, the director of the official news bureau, the board of directors of the Austrian Aviation Company, and other gentlemen in similar positions the Cross of Commanding Officer of the Order of the Italian Crown. *Non olet*.

The military side of this question can be explained from neutral sources.

In the October issue of the *Schweizerische Monatshefte für Politik und Kultur* we find the following statements, which we reproduce word for word:—

'The serious setbacks in our military and geographic situation caused by the Treaties of Versailles and Trianon include the completely altered situation of the eastern part of our country [Switzerland]. Since 1919 we have been bordered on the east by a little rump state [Austria], a tiny affair that cannot maintain itself by its own power, that constantly needs help from abroad, and that has become a territory in which various foreign influences are at loggerheads. Recently Italy has succeeded in expelling most of the other foreign influences from Austria and attaining predominance in Vienna, thus making Austria not merely a sphere of Italian influence but almost a protectorate. The interference of the Italian Ambassador at Vienna in domestic Austrian affairs has, in the past year, taken forms that no really free and independent country would ever tolerate. This year has clearly shown that Austria has come within Italy's military sphere of influence.'

The Third Reich, the *Imperium Romanum*, the *Sacrum Imperium*—the present and future destiny of our continent will be determined by the struggle between these three forces.

tiously in the same magazine. He attempts to show that the Austrian nation is gradually rising and triumphing but that a popular vote cannot occur since he foresees what the result will be, for he writes as follows:—

‘To-day Austria has adopted a new constitution. The parties have no legal right to existence, and a popular referendum can occur only if it is carried within the framework of the Austrian corporative state. I consider a plebiscite impossible, for, if the Government placed any question involving the independence of Austria before the people, it would at once be renouncing part of its own sovereignty. A general referendum on the question of domestic and foreign governmental policy at the present transition stage would lead to a coalition between the National Socialists and the Left-wing radicals.’ Signor Morreale also admits that the Austrian Government would find itself in just as hopeless a minority after such a vote as it is to-day. But Italy has a method of quickly overcoming this obstacle, and Signor Gobbi has given us the key to its policy: ‘A great deal of money.’

As we prophesied here immediately after the attempted Putsch of last summer, the clerical and Fascist powers in Austria have already welded themselves together. This position is verified by a few sentences from the neutral *Neue Aargauer Zeitung* in the middle of October: ‘It is an open secret that at the end of July Italy and Austria were on the point of concluding a military agreement involving far-reaching collaboration in the military field and that Austria had surrendered itself completely to Italy.

The agreement was to be signed when the Austrian Chancellor visited Riccione, but the train of events of July 25 upset this plan. The new Chancellor, Dr. Schuschnigg, therefore visited the Duce in Florence when the big army manoeuvres were beginning but refrained from signing any far-reaching agreements and refused to enter into any treaty because of orders he had received from France.’

# V

If this description from a Swiss newspaper is true, and there is a great deal of reason to believe it is, we see how sharply the struggle between the *Imperium Romanum* and the *Sacrum Imperium* has divided Austria. Chancellor Schuschnigg is a clever superior spirit. Of Tyrolean origin he has little inclination to make his native country subordinate to the temporal empire of Rome. His roots are in the Catholic Action group. He considers himself the heir of Monsignor Seipel, who tried to sound out Italy but who originated the watchword, ‘No settlement without Germany.’ Schuschnigg wants to restore a situation in which Austria can play on four different groups—Italy, France, the Little Entente, and Germany. Only in this way does the Austrian Chancellor feel sure he can avoid an Anschluss with Italy or Germany or the dangers of subjecting himself to France and the Little Entente. The Chancellor knows that his time has not yet come or rather that the time of the Hapsburgs has not yet come, when another empire is to be set up in the south by the *Sacrum Imperium*.

Dr. Schuschnigg enjoys referring to the crown of Charles the Great that

he had been building with Bulgaria for a whole year. This move automatically disturbed France, since Belgrade was branching out on its own.

King Alexander was invited to Paris to answer for his conduct. And Barthou had planned to visit Italy before the beginning of November. In Sofia forty bodyguards accompanied King Alexander. The French officials let it be known that so much protection was unnecessary but that every measure for security would be taken. Alexander landed in Marseille and within a few minutes had fallen victim to the fatal bullets. With the death of this king, who was almost the last man deserving the title in Europe, a gradual shift in the balance of power began.

Who would dare to make any prophecies under these circumstances? Only one possibility remains always in the background—that all the parties may unite and turn the conflict against Germany. This would serve the interest of the *Imperium Romanum*, which wants to make Austria into the province of Noricum but does not want it to be a Roman Catholic state. This also coincides with the wishes of the French irrecconcilables, and even the *Sacrum Imperium* would not be opposed since the death of King Alexander has increased the chances of the Hapsburgs enormously.

The coefficient of uncertainty becomes very large when we attempt to analyze the European situation accurately. England, for instance, could hardly tolerate the existence of an *Imperium Romanum* because it would threaten the British imperial trade route through the Mediterranean. It must never be forgotten that the inde-

pendence of which Italy boasts so much is viewed by England in quite a different light, for Italy as an opponent would be a Power not to be underestimated by England and the Empire. For that reason the policy of Great Britain on naval problems and in respect to conflicts on continental Europe always tends toward a compromise.

#### IV

In the October issue of *Gerarchia*, which also included Eugenio Morreale's attack on Germany, we read the following passage in an article by his friend, Bruno Gobri: 'If I may express my opinion, I might say that the problem of freeing Austria from the threat of National Socialism is a question of organization and money. It would be a waste of time to try to force the Austrian generation now reaching maturity to change their opinions. Neither force nor argument would produce any results, but a new Austria must be built with the young people under fifteen years old. Remember the Austrian youth camp in Rome in this connection. Old German Austria must be replaced by this new political creation. A safe leader and a great deal of money are obviously necessary.'

'And a great deal of money.' We do not doubt that Signori Morreale and Gobri have extraordinarily large sums at their disposition, that they have had this money for years, and that they have determined to continue corrupting Austria to the limit. Yet we are amazed that *Gerarchia* speaks so openly about these matters, which up to now have remained the sole responsibility of Signor Morreale. Morreale himself speaks more cau-

come to any real solution, and the assassination of King Alexander and Barthou, which occurred only because of scandalously inadequate police protection, overthrew the National-Union Government. Although the French Right-wing parties are utterly corrupted by the armament makers, the Left-wing parties have suffered most from the collapse of parliamentarism. Thus, all the tendencies favorable to a Fascism suited to the French way of life have been strengthened, and today it is hardly possible for the Radical Socialists to set themselves up as morally superior to the Italian Fascists.

Since Fascism has gained moral stature in France, Mussolini could make clever use of it. The French will certainly not take over Fascist forms, but the state leadership will be made to resemble the Italian model in many respects. In Germany and France Italy is witnessing completely contradictory inner developments. Whereas the German National-Socialist Party took over certain forms from Fascism, National Socialism developed more and more on its own base, which must be quite different from the Fascist base, since the Third Reich and the *Imperium Romanum* are in conflict. France, on the other hand, did not take over any outer forms but is inclined to accept the inner content of Fascism, to which the French mentality is more receptive than the German. It cannot be denied that the Italian leaders possess a very fine organ to encourage these developments and to capitalize on them in their foreign policy.

Last summer, Italy shifted its position within a few weeks. In June Hitler and Mussolini met in Venice.

One of the few publicly announced results of their conversation was that both countries refused to enter any multilateral treaties. On the 13th of July, the day after the East European Pact had been submitted to Berlin, the official Italian news agency released a communiqué urging Germany to join. Thus, Italy, for the first time, openly took the French side on a paramount issue. And it is important to remember that this happened before the events in Austria on July 25th and after the Banco d'Italia had received its first credits from France, which were guaranteed in May. By shifting its ground on the question of the East European Pact, Italy gave France a tremendous advantage in the diplomatic negotiations that were under way and showed on this occasion that it took the same stand as Paris.

Albert Mousset has written in his *Paradoxes*: 'When Italy uses the word "revision," it is speaking less of its boundaries than of its position in the hierarchy of nations.' This is quite correct. Italy sees that the moment has come when it can abandon its ideas on revision in exchange for a higher position in the hierarchy of nations.

Rome reached a basic decision, but things were not so simple. A close alliance binds Italy to Hungary. France has equally close connections with Yugoslavia and the Little Entente. A Franco-Italian rapprochement would automatically affect all these countries. Hungarian-Italian relationships were severely disturbed in September. France, however, had to maintain the integrity of Yugoslavia although King Alexander visited Sofia and cemented the better relations that

entry of the Soviet Union into the League of Nations, he brought the Russian policy of France to a certain conclusion because the collaboration of the General Staffs had to wait until this step was taken. Barthou was, to a certain extent, the high point and culmination of the new French foreign policy that went into effect after Briand died. All that remained to be completed were the plans for Franco-Italian settlement.

But here the failure of the East European Pact took all the drive out of French foreign policy. Between the summer of 1932 and the summer of 1934 friendship with Russia came too much into the foreground not to have made its limitations quite clear. It would be premature to say that relations between the two countries have begun to cool, but it does not serve their interests to go any further. Relations with Italy have become much more important to France.

### III

In his valuable book, *Paradoxes sur le passé, le présent et l'avenir de l'Europe*, Albert Mousset has said: 'Franco-Italian relationships will lack any psychological basis until we know whether France saved Italy or Italy saved France during the War.'

Does the psychological basis for an agreement or an alliance exist to-day? It is doubtful, just as it has been doubtful throughout the entire post-war period, whether anything more than a metaphysical political agreement has existed between Rome and Paris. During the Franco-Italian negotiations, the French have always been in the position of surrendering something and the Italians in the

position of making demands. Whether they have been discussing the colonial question in Africa, naval problems, or the influences of the two countries in southeastern Europe and Austria, Italy has never been able to offer anything in return for accession to its desires. France always had the effective power on its side with a bigger army, a bigger navy, bigger colonies, and more money. Yet the material and psychological basis shifted to Italy during these years. Economic laws may have favored France, but the inner imponderable advantages have favored Italy to an increasing degree.

The French have regarded the new imperial idea in Germany with interest, almost with hatred, but they have nothing to offer in opposition. It was either a question of brute force or, what amounts to the same thing, the conception of the sanctity of treaties. Experience with Poland has taught the French that neither brute force nor sacred treaties offer sufficient resistance to a young idea. Thus, the paradoxical situation has arisen in which the French must base their hopes on the Fascist *Imperium Romanum*, the very possibility of which they look upon with dread.

Domestic developments in France have also produced repercussions on the country's foreign policy. The great Stavisky scandals do not incline us to assert that the power of France has been completely wrecked. Nevertheless, these symptoms of decay in the French parliamentary system of government have produced serious effects on the system as a whole.

The Doumergue Cabinet has not settled the crisis of the French system; it has merely covered up a few iniquities. The Stavisky case did not