

tional life. They concern not only the recruiting of men and the making of munitions, but every conceivable aspect of industry, of food-production and storage, of transport, of the utilization of the services of every man and woman. And if we are calling upon working men to waive trade union restrictions in the interests of national production, is it too much to ask Ministers to waive some of their customary privileges?

But we have plenty of urgent prob-

lems of peace, as well as problems of war, confronting us. I believe there is no measure that Mr. Chamberlain, with his courage and power of decision, could undertake that would more facilitate his own almost superhuman task, and make the nation feel that its problems were being faced in a really bold and big spirit, than the application, in some form or other, of that principle of Cabinet reform which Mr. Lloyd George introduced with such marked success in the War.

III. WILL TO COÖPERATE

By SIR NORMAN ANGELL

From *Reynolds News*, London Coöperative Weekly

*You know the argument:—
Because the League is no longer universal, because four of the Great Powers of the world are outside it, three of them opposing it, it is no longer powerful enough to resist aggression; Sanctions are bound to be ineffective; Any attempt to work it would mean splitting Europe into two armed camps, pitting one armed alliance against another—the Haves against the Have Nots.*

SO BE it. Let us suppose it is all true. It is not true, but assume it is. What policy do those who use this argument, particularly the supporters of Mr. Chamberlain, propose as an alternative? What policy are they following?

The League, they say, would produce two armed camps, two armed ideologies. Do they then propose to have one armed camp in Europe, that of the States outside the League? They do not, for Mr. Chamberlain's Government and Party and support-

ers clamantly demand ever more and more arms in order to oppose some other armed camp. Which camp?

When the Government demands such feverish war preparations, arming on a scale never before known in peace time; when it demands the immediate organization of elaborate Air Raid Precautions on the ground that any day we might have to face the bombing of London, by whom, do they assume, the bombs will be dropped? By the French? The Dutch? The Danes? The Swedes? The Swiss?

Mr. Chamberlain and his supporters, the whole country, the whole world knows that those bombs against which we are taking such elaborate and immensely expensive precautions will be German bombs; German or none. Unless, indeed, we envisage the sinister possibility that Mr. Chamberlain's supporters anticipate having to join the totalitarian States in the suppression of a French 'Bolshevist' Government, as they have, in fact,

joined the Italian Government in its war upon what Hitler and Mussolini have pronounced to be a 'Bolshevist' Spanish Government.

But, for the moment, we may rule that out. We are in formal alliance with France, and France with Russia and Czechoslovakia, against a menace which cannot possibly be anything but a German menace. We thus create our own armed camp, with emphasis on the arms, as against the other armed camp, which happens to be composed of the totalitarian States that have left the League.

So we do not avoid the fact or the danger of 'two armed camps,' two rival armed alliances, by renouncing the League or putting it in cold storage.

We are to deal with the danger—inherent in the fact that the three great military States outside the League, Germany, Italy and Japan, have combined—not by giving up arms, not by giving up alliances, but only by giving up the League, on the assumption, presumably, that our armed alliance will be more effective in preserving peace if it is of the pre-League, 1914 type, than if it is the nucleus of a League of Nations.

The principle of any 'League' combination is that it offers its membership, on terms of equality, freely to those against whom it defends itself; that it says: 'If you will agree to peaceful settlement of disputes and refrain from violence, we will guarantee you against unprovoked aggression as we guarantee the existing members.' There is equality of right.

The 1914 type of alliance means a combination of States designed to pursue their own interests as against the conflicting interests of another

combination, both sides basing their policy largely upon the spoliation of third parties. We 'bought' the alliance of Italy in 1914 by the bribes embodied in the secret treaties.

If we succeed once more in detaching Italy from Germany, we make an enemy of the latter, unless we can 'square' Germany by conniving at aggression against Russia, in which case we make an enemy of Russia. The only alternative to this futility is the common defense of a constitution under which all have equal rights to protection against aggression.

II

The failure of that method has been due, not to the lack of potential power, but to lack of will to uphold it. It was, for instance, argued commonly in 1935 that our force was inadequate to prevent the aggression of Mussolini.

Mussolini did not believe it. He said he wanted Colonies—for emigration, raw material. About the worst he could have chosen for such purposes was Ethiopia; some of the best were in British hands.

Why did he not take the best? Because he knew that if he touched British territory, Britain would soon show she had power to defend it. Had Italian troops landed in Kenya or Malta we should not have discussed for six months as to whether the oil sanction ought to be applied.

We know that if Ethiopia had been British territory, Mussolini would not have invaded it: existing force would have been adequate in that case to render it secure without war. Why was not force of many States then adequate? If one State could have defended Ethiopia without war, why

was the force of forty inadequate?

Put brutally, the difference is explained by the fact that we, like other Great Powers, think our territory is worth fighting for, and that the Covenant, the Law, is not. So long as that is the case, our combined power, however great, will never be adequate to secure peace.

In 1931, when the disintegration of the League began, Mr. Stimson, Hoover's Secretary of State, offered to coöperate with us in resisting—at least, diplomatically—the aggression of Japan. Sir John Simon declined the offer and defended Japan's action.

At that time the nations interested in opposing Japan included the United States, China, Russia, Australia, New Zealand and Canada; Japan did not yet have either Germany or Italy as allies (Hitlerite Germany had not yet come into being). Is it suggested that the preponderance of potential power was with the aggressor?

Is it suggested that if, in 1931, we had accepted the American proposal and given aid to China, and withheld aid from Japan, Japan would thereupon have declared war upon Britain, America, Russia and a few other States of the League as well? That if we had really made the oil embargo effective, Mussolini would have declared war upon Britain, France, and Russia? That insistence upon Spain's normal right to buy arms would have caused Italy and Germany to declare war upon Britain, France and Russia?

Then those countries would have stood upon the defensive. Which brings us to a first main consideration in estimating the relative weight of forces, and that is the immense advantage possessed in modern warfare by the defense.

Military authorities—of whom Captain Liddell Hart is one—have estimated that for the attack to succeed it must outweigh the defense in material and men by something like three to one, and that even in the air, the defense, in cases where there is equality of equipment, will have the advantage.

Figures taken by themselves do not mean much. Yet we might recall such facts as that the naval forces of the chief League Powers are considerably more than double those of the three totalitarian non-League States, and the combined populations and industrial resources of the former many times greater than those of the latter.

We commonly think of the United States as being so powerful by reason of its resources as to be invulnerable, and argue, sometimes, that her absence from the League makes it impotent. But Russia alone has a much greater population, with resources probably as great, and beginning to be industrialized on the American scale.

Imagine that you had a United States composed of Russia, China, France, the British Empire, their armies, navies, air forces, industrial and agricultural resources making a unit. Compared with the material and human resources of such a Power, how would the Fascist combination appear when we recall that it would be composed of a Japan already feeling the pinch of exhaustion in its Chinese entanglement, of an Italy already in economic straits and feeling the pinch of a still unconquered Ethiopia and an extremely unpopular Spanish war; and a Germany already short even of elementary foodstuffs?

If Russia is in a position to concentrate her whole power upon Ger-

many—is freed, that is, of serious danger from Japan—then, for the reasons indicated, Germany is placed in a militarily hazardous situation, which she will not lightly provoke.

The way, therefore, to offset the power of Germany for aggression is to aid China in her resistance to Japan (a resistance which, despite setbacks, seems certain in the long run now to be successful), which could be done by the extension of credit to China for the purchase of motor trucks, tractors, machinery, cement, an operation inci-

dentally relieving unemployment at home.

The way to defend Czechoslovakia is to see that the Spanish Government gets the materials for its defense, so that the strategic position of France is not worsened and that of the totalitarian States not improved.

The security, not alone of peace, but of democracy, is indivisible. To defend it in China, or in Spain, or in France, is to defend it here. To be indifferent to its fate there is, in the end, to betray it here.

SPELLING REFORM

Strolling one evening down Pall Mall
 I met a man who cried: 'Wall! Wall!
 Since last we met what years it semyss!
 Don't you remember Cholmondeley-Wemyss?'
 I stared at him a trifle glolmondeley.
 I could not place this Mr. Cholmondeley.
 But he, to put me at my aius,
 Added: 'We both were up at Caius.'
 Being an Oxford man, from Magdalen,
 I wished he wouldn't keep me dagdalen',
 Nor was I less disposed to chalph
 At his request to call him Ralph.
 Said he: 'My tradesmen press undeauleiu,
 Though I own vast estates near Beaulieu.'
 Alas, he followed me to Chiswick,
 Complaining that he needed phiswick,
 And how it made his poor old montefrac—
 Wife of a clergyman at Pontefract.
 He whined: 'I've hunted with the Belvoir,
 Shot pheasants over a retrelvoir.
 Have you the heart to let me deigh
 Penniless in a slum in Leigh?'
 I bade him talk to my solirencester,
 Head of a well-known firm in Cirencester,
 Who soon discovered that his kythe
 The homely surname bore of Smythe.

—*Truth*, London

France's Legion of Honor is composed mostly of deserving men; but it is large and includes many who are neither brave nor honorable.

The Legion of Honor

By GEORGES MAUREVERT

Adapted from *Crapouillot*
Paris Topical Monthly

INCONSISTENT France—the land where both the *Marseillaise* and the *Internationale* were born; where the king was guillotined in the name of the Republic, which was ten years later to be abolished by one of the most absolute dictators in all history; and where the Legion of Honor, once the reward of the brave and the brilliant, has become accessible to anyone who has the price. As André Gide has said, 'it is impossible to imagine a Frenchman reaching middle age without getting syphilis and the Cross of the Legion of Honor.' So avid have been Frenchmen for the red ribbon, that the three Republics in a space of seventy years have issued twelve times as many decorations as Royal France did in five centuries.

The Legion of Honor was established by the law of 29 Floréal, Year X, or rather, on May 19, 1802. Its founder, Napoleon, who was at that time the First Consul, intended it to

replace the ancient nobility, which had been abolished by the Revolution. The measure encountered a great deal of opposition. General Moreau declared that the Army was the Legion of Honor and forthwith sardonically decorated his *chef* for an excellent meal. Carnot wrote pointedly on the difference between *honor* and *decorations*. Madame de Stael made a great topic of it in her salon in the Hôtel de Salm, which was later to become the headquarters of the Legion.

With his usual shrewdness and knowledge of what is perhaps a baser side of human nature, Napoleon stated bluntly that although the decorations might be mere baubles, it is precisely with such baubles that men are led. It was clear that he intended to create a new nobility. For example, the ordinary members of the Legion of Honor were called Cavaliers, or Knights, and honors rose, rank by rank, in hierarchic fashion. At first