

and particularly the supply of grain and meat, has been scarce during the past year; Italy has been forced to import considerable quantities from abroad. The shortage of grain has forced her to import 178,185 tons of grain, totalling 140 million lire, during the first five months of this year, compared with only 52,498 tons, totalling 47 million lire, for the same period in 1938. Thus these imports have more than tripled.

The Italian Government is now calling for the limitation of bread consumption. Even as long ago as July 27, the *Popolo d'Italia*, an Italian Government organ, wrote that 'The Government demands an increased sense of responsibility. The population must guard against the slightest waste of bread and wheat, which might lead to the most severe consequences for the country's economy, especially in the present situation.' The meat situation is not much different; in 1935 there was one butcher to every 957 inhabitants. Today there is only one butcher to every 1,248 inhabitants. The meager annual consumption of thirty-four kilograms of meat per head of the population in Milan, the richest and most highly developed Italian city,

shows how the meat supply has declined.

To avoid drawing the wrong conclusions, one should consider the fact that meat consumption in Italy has always been relatively small because of the climate and various other reasons. Yet at present it has declined to such an extent that it does not suffice for the most modest requirements. One may say without exaggeration, that Italy is in a critical situation in regard to her food supply, and that the policy of autarchy and close collaboration with Germany has obviously failed in one of its most important fields.

It is also obvious that one cannot start a war with an undernourished population and without a large store of food. The fundamental mistakes of this economy of self-sufficiency and the disadvantages of Italy's dependence on Germany, within the Axis policy, have become more apparent from one month to the other. In 1936, the effort to establish economic blockade of Italy by means of sanctions failed because of insufficient coördination. But today Italy is more vulnerable. Her financial and economic reverses make her the Achilles' heel of the Axis.

II. SOVIETS' SATELLITE

From the *Manchester Guardian*, Manchester Liberal Daily

THE reports of serious fighting along the remote frontier of Manchukuo and Mongolia have focused attention on the inaccessible land of the Mongolian Republic. For the past fifteen years the world has been allowed to learn little of a country that

has changed from feudalism to a strange mixture of capitalism and State Socialism.

Much of the mystery surrounding developments in Outer Mongolia has been deliberately fostered by the Russians, for it has suited Soviet polit-

ical and military quarters to be able to carry on their task of 'assisting' the backward Mongols without having to be concerned with the prying eyes of other foreign nationals. Therefore Outer Mongolia has been virtually closed to foreign visitors, at least to those from non-Chinese lands, for many years now. Soviet Russians were, of course, sent in numbers; indeed, to be sent to Mongolia became the kind of goal for adventurous Soviet spirits that the colonies were for English youths. For most of them a trip to Mongolia would be as near to going abroad as any of them could ever hope for.

A corner of the veil over Mongolia has, however, been lifted by the Soviet press of late on the eighteenth anniversary of the 'Mongolian revolution' and the fifteenth anniversary of the proclaiming of the 'Mongolian People's Republic.' A series of articles has appeared praising the efforts of the Mongolian people, which have 'changed the whole economic and cultural appearance' of the country, but not failing to give proper credit to the 'technical and other assistance' given by the Soviet Union. A picture is then presented of the innovations which are changing the lives of the descendants of the armies of Genghis Khan—Parliamentary institutions, banks and coöperatives, electric communications, air lines and motor transport, industries, agricultural mechanization, schools, and hospitals.

There is a political party—only one, apparently, as *Pravda* approvingly makes it clear that the Mongols have made such progress under Soviet tutelage that they have successfully carried out a 'purge.' It was a 'purge'

of both 'Rightists' and 'Leftists' at that.

The Soviet press is at pains to make it clear that the régime in Outer Mongolia is not to be thought Communist; it is described as a 'bourgeois democratic republic.' But it hastens to add that it is a new type of such a régime, being 'anti-feudal and anti-imperialistic,' and that the ground is being consciously prepared for a gradual transition to a non-capitalistic economy. This confirms the reports of the abandonment of the earlier Soviet missionaries' efforts to force Communistic measures on the unreceptive and unwilling Mongols. It was reported that the Soviet group tried to collectivize agriculture in Mongolia, which is mostly a matter of semi-nomadic cattle and sheep raising, but encountered such opposition that the movement was wisely abandoned. The Soviet press reports that the nomadic form of livestock breeding continues to predominate, but points out that twenty mechanized hay-cutting stations have been organized with the aim of creating State fodder reserves. The number of head of livestock had increased in 1938 to 25,000,000, as compared with 11,000,000 in 1918.

II

What industry exists in the Mongolian People's Republic has been created by the Russians, for there was no industry in pre-revolutionary days. The capital, Ulan-Bator, boasts a machinery manufacturing and repair works, two wool-washing establishments, a number of brick-making and wood-working places, and there are in the country a number of electric power stations and coal mines. The Soviet

press does not mention gold mining; but reports have reached Moscow that considerable amounts of gold are being realized from Outer Mongolia.

On the side of political organization, legislative power is nominally vested in a Parliament, called the 'Great People's Khural,' whose members are chosen in a supposedly free election. Actually, according to information current in Moscow, the Mongolian Government is a façade for the ruling party, called the 'People's Revolutionary party.' It is said to number about 9,000 members, and comprises those native elements willing to cooperate with the Soviet 'advisers.'

This party developed the same kind of schisms as the Communist party, hence the 'purge.' The 'Rightists' were accused of pushing the country backward toward a purely capitalistic economy, while the 'Leftists,' professing to be impatient for the blessings of undiluted collectivism, were accused of trying to 'leap over the laws of economic development,' which was interpreted as 'wrecking.' Both factions were conveniently exposed as 'agents of a foreign intelligence service' and were dispatched as Japanese hirelings.

In its economic and social institutions, the Mongolian People's Republic appears to have gone a long way in the direction of collectivism for a 'bourgeois' State. The land is, in theory, nationalized, although unofficial reports would indicate that the nomadic Mongolian cattle-breeders and sheep-herders have been little affected by such decrees which served to legalize the expropriation of the lands of the lamaseries. The banks are operated by the Government. Foreign trade is asserted to be a monopoly of

the State, with a major part of the internal trade turnover divided between State and coöperative organizations.

The Mongolian State exercises control over the schools, all publishing activity, and the cinema, and a system of public health is being developed. 'Doctors are replacing the Lama-sorcerers,' the Soviet press proclaims.

What the Soviet press terms the 'People's Revolutionary party's' incessant struggle against remnants of feudalism covers a bitter conflict between the new régime and the old monasteries of Lamaism. The evidence seems to be that, as is the case in Russia, the traditional religious beliefs persist stubbornly with the older generation, while their hold on the younger generation is greatly weakened.

The Soviet press has been lyrical over the development and potentialities of the Mongolian Army, for it represents the Soviet Union's prime interest in maintaining this buffer State bordering in part on Japan's puppet State of Manchukuo and in part on Japan's 'protectorate' in Inner Mongolia. The men are said to form an excellent army, for they are fearless in the face of danger and nearly every one is a marksman with a rifle from boyhood. The Russians assert that these rank-and-file soldiers have developed into skilled artillerymen, tank drivers, and pilots. The compulsory term of Army service is three years. About 30 per cent of the members of the 'People's Revolutionary party' and about half the members of the Revolutionary League of Youth (closely modeled on the Soviet Communist Youth League) are enrolled in the Army. The leading arm of the service is the cavalry, but mechanized

units are operating under Mongolian commanders.

The military organization is patterned strictly on the lines of the Red Army and its technical equipment is of Soviet manufacture. The uniforms of the Mongolian Army as seen in Moscow are almost indistinguishable from the Soviet uniforms.

The maintenance of its quasi-independence against the Japanese in just such fighting as is now going on along Outer Mongolia's rather intan-

gible frontiers is the Mongolian Republic's not disinterested way of compensating the Soviet Union for the trouble taken in training and equipping this army. An Outer Mongolia overrun by the Kwantung Army would establish Japanese bases at points only 150 miles from the vital Trans-Siberian Railway. The route from these potentially vulnerable points on the railway to Lake Boirnor, the scene of the recent fighting, is about a thousand miles.

III. 'MIKADO DOCTRINE'

By HIKOMATSU KAMIKAWA

From *Contemporary Japan*, Tokyo Political and Economic Monthly

EAST ASIA and the American continents show considerable similarities in many respects. It is strange, therefore, that there should be so few among the intelligentsia of Western countries, especially in the United States, who appreciate this fact. If thinking people on the other side of the Pacific would understand that East Asia and the American continents have similar interests and a common purpose in world politics, there is no doubt that American opinion regarding events in East Asia would undergo a radical change.

Relations between Japan and the continent of East Asia closely resemble those between the United States and the American continents. In fact the continental policy of Japan since the Manchurian Incident has been frequently called the Japanese 'Monroe Doctrine' or the East Asiatic 'Monroe Doctrine.' But not a few Western writers find fault with the Japanese 'Monroe Doctrine,' while

they justify the American doctrine, by stressing unduly the negligible differences they discover between the two. It should be pointed out, however, that these doctrines are essentially similar, the only difference being that the Japanese 'Monroe Doctrine' has East Asia for its field of operation and the original Monroe Doctrine, the American continents. The essential characteristics of the two, as far as international policies are concerned, are the same, though the processes of their development have differed.

Like its prototype in America, the Japanese 'Monroe Doctrine' is Japan's policy toward East Asia with reference to the latter's relations with the Western Powers. It has no concern with the relations between Japan and other countries of East Asia. The present condition of East Asia greatly resembles that which existed in the Western Hemisphere in the early part of the 19th century in that, with the only exception of Japan, all the