

Freud and Jung: The Social Implications of Psychological Theory

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The purpose of this paper is to identify the philosophical difference between the two most influential psychological systems of the modern age, those of Freud and Jung, in order that we may better appreciate their differing social implications. This is significant in so far as the Freudian psychoanalytical movement is essentially rooted in ancient beliefs capable of being traced back through the Cabala even to distant Babylonian traditions,¹ whereas Jungian thought is rooted in a more distinctly Western tradition.²

It may be stated at the outset that, as has been well recognized, Freud's psychological concepts were deeply rooted in ancient Middle Eastern traditions through his deep understanding of the great wealth of the Jewish cultural heritage. Yet we may also perceive in some of his writing a deliberate attempt to find alternatives to the major philosophical principles of the European civilization which surrounded him, yet regarded him as alien. In *The Interpretation of Dreams*, for instance, Freud admitted that he saw himself as a modern Hannibal who would take vengeance on Rome, which symbolized European culture in general and the Catholic Church in particular.³ That he should have succeeded to a great extent in his undertaking is part of the dilemma of the modern West.

¹ See *Sigmund Freud and the Jewish Mystical Tradition*, David Bakan, Beacon Press, Boston, 1975.

² I must stress that my intention is not to evaluate the scientific achievements of Freud and Jung in their entirety but only to highlight those aspects of their systems which have a significant bearing on questions of social philosophy.

³ *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), in *The Standard Edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud* (henceforth referred to as SE), IV, p.196f.

Marthe Robert, in her book on Freud's sense of his own identity, *From Oedipus to Moses*,⁴ has revealed the conflict between the ethnic roots of the psychologist and the classical foundations of the European society in which he lived. We may recall here that the Jews were emancipated only in 1867 in Austria and two years later in the North German Confederation, and Freud must therefore have been very conscious of being an "outsider" in gentile Viennese society. The acceptance of the Jewish people into Central European society was slow and marked by suspicion and strife between the two communities. Thus, as Jacques Maritain has pointed out: "at the bottom of Freudian metaphysics there is – the resentment, Freud himself has explained, of a soul insulted and humiliated since childhood, a resentment, as it seems, against human nature itself."⁵ In many ways Jewish scholars were more free to see gentile European clearly, free from the sense of involvement that might cloud the minds of gentile scholars. On the other hand, they must also have had problems in comprehending just how the Europeans themselves felt about the social behavior they observed. In a sense they were in the same position as Europeans studying African and Asian societies. From the outside some things seemed familiar, but those same things could not be understood easily when one was not brought up with them from childhood. It is not surprising, therefore, that Freud told his fellow members in a talk before the B'nai B'rith that: "Because I was a Jew I found myself free from many prejudices which restricted others in the use of their intellect; and as a Jew I was prepared to join the Opposition and to do without agreement with the 'compact majority'".⁶ Freud's persistent representation of civilized society to man's sexual instincts may therefore have been more than simply a product of a purely materialistic psychology, it may indeed have been, as Robert called it, a conscious attempt to turn "the world upside down by revealing the impure source of all the creations of the spirit".⁷

⁴ Marthe Robert, *From Oedipus to Moses*, Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1976.

⁵ Jacques Maritain, "Freudianism and Psychoanalysis: a Thomist view", *Freud and the 20th Century*, ed. B. Nelson, Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1963, p.253.

⁶ Marthe Robert, *op.cit.*, p.4.

⁷ p.55.

The chief assumption of Freudian psychology is that all the effects of so-called culture and civilization are social manifestations of infantile instincts which, first and last, retain their primitive character as sexual and aggressive. This limited view of human nature and its spiritual products is due to Freud's inadequate scheme of the psyche as being constituted of three main elements, the id, the ego, and the super-ego. There is no clear demarcation between the id (or libido), and the ego, or rational intellect, since the unconscious, instinctual drives of the id are present with the ego throughout its development and characterize it strongly even in its highest, "civilized" state. As for the so-called super-ego, this is not really an integral part of the self, but a product of the interaction between the individual self and the societal psyche which serves as an admonitory agent, or "conscience", to the ego. Indeed, Freud maintains that conscience is derived from the earliest childhood experiences of a person, so that the superego is the parental image internalized. Conscience is actually a form of aggressiveness which, strangely enough, "does not so much – represent the severity which one has experienced from [the parent] or which one attributes to [him]; it represents rather one's own aggressiveness towards it".⁸ It is true that Freud admitted "archaic vestiges" in the superego, and so he came close to admitting that the unconscious cannot really be entirely dependent on its conscious interaction with external reality, as Jung was later to establish.⁹ But the general attribution of the moral faculty to familial circumstance and society in Freud's system, rather than to the individual psyche itself is a distortion of idealistic philosophy which is typical of a rational-materialistic philosophical trend which embraced both Spinoza and Marx. We shall see later how Jung corrected this inadequate view of conscience through his system of archetypes. Indeed, the major defect of the Freudian psychology, as Reinhold Niebuhr has admirably shown, is that "[S]ince Freud's system is a consistently naturalistic one, it can not, despite the

⁸ *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930), in *SE*, XXI, p.129..

⁹ See C.G. Jung, "A psychological view of conscience" in *Collected Works*, Vol.X, p.440: "first, the unconscious is, ontogenetically and phylogenetically, older than consciousness, and secondly, it is a well-known fact that it can hardly be influenced, if at all, by the conscious will."

subtleties of its analyses of the intricacies of human selfhood, do full justice to the transcendent freedom of spirit of which the self is capable and it cannot survey the creative and destructive possibilities of that freedom".¹⁰ Niebuhr insists that the self is always more than mere reason: "No doubt the self uses all of its rational faculties as instruments of this freedom. The freedom is however more than the capacity for discursive reason and the creative capacities of this freedom do not prevent it from being used destructively or egoistically".¹¹

Freud's view of the development of human civilization is akin to Hobbes's since it repeats the Hobbesian thesis of the state of nature as being one of strenuous efforts to satisfy physiological hunger and appease the mutual physical strife between individuals. However, unlike Hobbes, Freud does not envisage a Leviathan as a political solution to the problem of human nature,¹² but, more like Spinoza, believes that rational understanding will usher in a well-balanced society of men who will reconcile their ego with their id and be freed of the adult illusions of civilization derived from their diverse infantile complexes.¹³ It is true that Freud also concedes love (i.e. the life-instinct), or Eros, a role in the gregarious formation of early societies,¹⁴ but in an ambiguous way that it is strongly allied to envy. Thus the root of gregariousness itself is located in the envious feelings that a child feels with regard to his parent's attentions to his brothers and sisters.¹⁵ According to Freud, this envy is satisfied vicariously through the identification of the desires of each individual in a group with the desires of others in it.

Indeed, in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud even proposes a mythic model of the formation of early society borrowed from the Oedipus story according to which the fate of all civilization derives from an Oedipal envy of a primal father figure and an incestuous

¹⁰ R. Niebuhr, "Human creativity and self-concern in Freud's thought", in *Freud and the 20th century*, p.269.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Cf. p.30 below.

¹³ See *The Future of an Illusion* (1927), in *SE*, XXI.

¹⁴ See *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921) Ch.IV, in *SE*, XVIII, p.92, and *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, in *SE*, XVIII, p.50.

¹⁵ *Group Psychology*, Ch.IX, 'The Herd Instinct', in *SE*, XVIII, p.120f.

desire for a primal mother figure. But anyone who is not deceived by the charm of novel mythological theories can see that the Oedipal complex is by no means a universal phenomenon and, even if it were, it clearly could not have been the chief impetus to the lofty creations of the spirit which are the hallmark of high civilization. Certainly, there is no indication in Sophocles's plays themselves that any of the events relating to one specific royal family of Thebes are supposed to represent the birth of either Greek or human civilization, as, for instance, the overtly mythic story of Prometheus is supposed to do.¹⁶ Indeed, it has been argued that Freud's conception of the drama of early society could probably be a projection onto humanity of his own psychological complexes. In maintaining that all early societies were formed when the sons of a certain patriarch collectively killed and devoured their father since he represented an obstacle to their craving for power,¹⁷ Freud was partly rationalizing and universalizing his own unhappy experiences with his Chasidic father, Jakob Freud, who represented the Jewishness from which the psychologist sought unconsciously to free himself. This hypothesis is reinforced in his essay on 'Moses and Monotheism' (1939), in which he describes the killing of Moses¹⁸ by the Jews who followed him: Moses is the father of the Jewish religious ethos from which the Jews attempted in vain to free themselves, since the Yahwist religion which succeeded the Mosaic system gradually acquired the characteristics of the latter.

¹⁶Freud points to the passage in *Oedipus Rex* where Jocasta comforts the tragic hero by reminding him that his crime is perhaps not so unnatural as he must think since it often occurs in the dreams of men (*The Interpretation of Dreams* in SE, IV, p.264). But the very fact that Sophocles is aware of this dream-wish and yet does not make it the moral basis of his drama reveals that for him the fear of the gods represented by the chorus is much more significant for the health of the nation than the unconscious indulgence of repressed desires. The emphasis on the latter that Freud provides in his system is totally un-European and typically modern.

¹⁷ *Totem and Taboo* (1913), in SE, XIII, p.141f.

¹⁸ Moses is depicted by Freud as an Egyptian prince, when the biblical story of Moses makes complete psychological sense only if the central figure were a Jew expelled from Egypt for his revolutionary religious invention, just as Abraham earlier was expelled from Chaldea for his inability to adapt to the philosophical constitution of the Chaldeans (see Josephus the Jew, *Jewish Antiquities*, I, 157; cf. Philo the Jew, *De mutatione nominum*, 72-76, and *De migratione Abrahami*, 184).

However we see this, according to Freudian theory all civilization was rooted in unpleasant origins and developed over time into a system which imposed an ever greater control on the primal instincts, aided by super-egoistic activity. Thus, in this view, religion, philosophy, and art, the columns of higher human civilization, are all equally "illusions" of instinctual life that have been sublimated. Religion is but a product of the child's need of a protecting father:

Religion is an attempt to master the sensory world in which we are situated by means of the wishful world which we have developed within us as a result of biological and psychological necessities. But religion cannot achieve this. Its doctrines bear the imprint of the times in which they arose, the ignorant times of the childhood of humanity. Its consolations deserve no trust ... If we attempt to assign the place of religion in the evolution of mankind, it appears as a permanent acquisition but as a counterpart to the neurosis which individual civilized men have to go through in their passage from childhood to maturity.¹⁹

Religious teachings are, as it were, "neurotic relics" and Freud suggests that "the time has probably come for replacing the effects of repression by the results of the rational operation of the intellect".²⁰ Art and philosophy, too, are akin to neuroses. In fact:

It might be maintained that a case of hysteria is a caricature of a work of art, that an obsessional neurosis is a caricature of a religion, and that a paranoiac delusion is a caricature of a philosophical system.²¹

That is, they differ from one another only in degrees of intensity and not in kind. The illusory character of philosophy is highlighted by Freud in the following manner:

¹⁹ *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* (1933), Lecture XXXV in SE, XXII:168.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Totem and Taboo*, II, in SE, XIII, p. 73; cf. 'Preface to Reik's *Ritual: Psycho-analytic studies*' (1919) in SE, XVII:261.

Philosophy is not opposed to science, it behaves like a science and works in part by the same methods; it departs from it, however, by clinging to the illusion of being able to present a picture of the universe which is without gaps and is coherent, though one which is bound to collapse with every fresh advance in our knowledge. It goes astray in its method by over-estimating the epistemological value of our logical operations and by accepting other sources of knowledge such as intuition.²²

Art is a more harmless product of the transference of instinctual activity to the imagination since it does not pretend to be anything but an illusion.²³

According to Freud, the unfortunate aspect of the repression of the instincts which constitutes human culture is that it causes the individual to suffer an increasing malaise within the confines of civilized life and produces the various psychic disorders which Freud himself and his followers took it upon themselves to cure. One of the obvious results of civilization, according to Freud, is that "The sexual life of civilized man is ... severely impaired; it sometimes gives the impression of being in the process of involution as a function, just as our teeth and our hair seem to be as organs".²⁴ As for the instinct of aggression, Freud maintains that civilized men seek outlets for this instinct through the forcible creation of nations and wars between these nations. Moreover, by the time Freud wrote *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), the experience of the Great War had prompted him to identify, in addition to instinct of self-preservation or 'life-instinct' (related to the libido), a 'death-instinct' characteristic of the human ego and inbuilt in the entire social system which the ego creates.²⁵ This death-instinct is indeed capable of bringing about the ultimate extinction of all mankind.²⁶

²² *New Introductory Lectures* in *SE*, XXII:160f; see Jung's crucial evaluation of intuition in the Germanic peoples.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Civilization and its Discontents*, in *SE*, XXI, p.105.

²⁵ See *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), in *SE*, XVIII.

²⁶ See 'Why War' (1933) in *SE*, XXII, p.211.

In this dark theory of the state, Freud shows himself to be a strict psychological determinist with little understanding of the full scope of the human spirit which is characterized by a creative force of will and independent of both the Eros and Ananke identified by Freud as the motive powers of civilization. The alarming defect of Freud's psychological system therefore is that it is, as Maritain puts it, "pervaded and overwhelmed on every side ... by a pseudometaphysics of the most vulgar character ... because it combines all the prejudices of deterministic, mechanistic scientism with all the prejudices of irrationalism".²⁷ Indeed, in this narrowly deterministic mode of thought, Freud's theories parallel the limited economic conception of man postulated by that other major nineteenth century Jewish thinker, Karl Marx, and for such reasons as these some have maintained that there is a tendency in the Jewish psyche to limit itself to empirical-rationalistic materialism.²⁸ According to Freud's psychological innovations, man is a

²⁷ Maritain, in *op.cit.*, p.249.

²⁸ It has been suggested that the philosophical outlook of the Semitic peoples is closely related to their "imperfectly" inflected speech and their lack of mythological imagination. The importance of a fully developed language for philosophical speculation was argued by nineteenth century linguists such as Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835) and Ernest Renan (1823-1892). Humboldt, for instance, in the published introduction (*Einleitung über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluß auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts*) to his projected work *Über die Kawisprache auf der Insel Java*, declared that

It is self-evident that a language whose structure is most extensively suited to the intellect and which most intensively stimulates its activity must also possess the most enduring power to produce from its reservoir of linguistic materials new conformations, brought forth by the lapse of time and the destinies of peoples ... if the Sanskritic tongues have for at least three millennia given proof of their productive capacity, this is simply an effect of the intensity of the creative linguistic action in the peoples to which they belonged" (Wilhelm von Humboldt, *Linguistic Variability and Intellectual Development*, tr. George C. Buck and Frithjof A. Raven, Coral Gables, Florida: Univ. of Miami Press, 1971, p.162)

Humboldt actually argued that the Semitic languages were "deficient":

In contrast, it seems more certain to me than what has been discussed to this point, and more important for determination of the relationship of the Semitic languages to intellectual development, that the intimate linguistic sense in the case of these peoples was still lacking the necessary acuteness and clarity with respect to the material meaning and to the relationship of words ... Inflected words in the Semitic languages do not contain inflectional modifications of original tones; rather they contain complementations that produce the true phonetic form. Now, since the original root morpheme cannot become, in addition to the inflected one, perceptible to the ear in connected speech, the animate distinction between semantic and relational expression suffers.

prisoner of his lower unconscious and therefore deprived of a capacity for ethical behavior. As Gérard Bonnot puts it:

On a confondu le diable et le bon Dieu, le bien et le mal, l'humain et l'inhumain dans le même déterminisme psychologique ... Libérateur equivoque, Freud nous interdit d'élaborer de nouvelles valeurs morales en nous privant du seul attribut qui puisse les fonder: notre liberté. Il nous livre à la dictature d'une nécessité qui, pour être inconsciente, n'apparaît pas moins implacable que les lois de la physique.²⁹

What is worse is that the "cure" that Freud and his followers propose to this pathetic state of affairs is, explicitly or implicitly, a rational liberation of the libido. For, if civilization is a cause of psychic disorders, then the only way to remedy these personal defects is to undo the repressions of the societal super-ego. Such an aim is clearly more congenial to animals than to men, since it is easier for the former to live in agreement with their instincts than it is for us. Indeed, the logical result of Freud's doctrine is that man as a natural being must be considered a "freak", as he, not surprisingly, is in the left-Freudian Erich Fromm:

Self-awareness, reason and imagination disrupt the

Renan, a Semitic scholar, also saw the difference between the Indo-European and the Semitic languages as being one between organic and inorganic forms. Thus he declared,

On peut dire que les langues ariennes, comparées aux langues sémitiques, sont les langues de l'abstraction et de la métaphysique, comparées à celles du réalisme et de la sensualité. Avec leur souplesse merveilleuse, leurs flexions variées, leurs particules délicates, leurs mots composés, et surtout grâce à l'admirable secret de l'inversion, qui permet de conserver l'ordre naturel des idées sans nuire à la détermination des rapports grammaticaux, les langues ariennes nous transportent tout d'abord en plein idéalisme, et nous feraient envisager la création de la parole comme un fait essentiellement transcendantal. Si l'on ne considérait, au contraire, que les langues sémitiques, on pourrait croire que la sensation présida seule aux premiers actes de la pensée humaine et que le langage ne fut d'abord qu'une sorte de reflet du monde extérieur (*Histoire générale et système comparé des langues sémitiques*, Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1878, Bk.I, Ch.I, p.22).

Thus, the Semitic consciousness was perceived by these writers as being rigid and narrowly focussed: "L'abstraction leur est inconnue; la métaphysique impossible" (*Ibid.*).

²⁹ G. Bonnot, *Ils ont tué Descartes: Einstein, Freud, Pavlov*, Paris: Editions Denoël, 1969.

"harmony" which characterizes animal existence. Their emergence has made man into an anomaly, into the freak of the universe.³⁰

The link between the Freudian view of man and the chaos of modernism, marked by what A.H. Williamson calls its "anti-historical orientation, its insistence upon discontinuities, its focus upon the fragmented, its moral ambiguities" and its attempt "to discount national experience, delegitimize patriotism, dissolve social ties, reject dominant philosophic and religious truths"³¹ is as obvious as it is, in the highest degree, deplorable.³² The pervasive influence of Freudian thought on the western, especially American, mind cannot be doubted.³³ As H.M. Ruitenbeck put it, "In the structure of the American unconscious, psychoanalysis has, for some people, replaced earlier ideologies, and even certain religious consolations".³⁴ The penetration of the social fabric by the Freudian psychology is readily evident in the widespread use of psychoanalytic terminology in daily parlance, especially terms such as "guilt feelings, personal insecurity, unstructured personality, instability, "internalization" ... frustration, aggressive tendencies, trauma, and the all-inclusive ... 'tensions'", with a concomitant absence of such positive terms as "personal integrity, self-reliance, responsibility, or ... 'moral courage'", as Richard LaPiere has

³⁰ E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1955, p.23.

³¹ A.H. Williamson, "The cultural foundations of racial religion and anti-semitism", in *Lingering Shadows: Jungians, Freudians, and Anti-Semitism*, ed. A. Maidenbaum, S.A. Martin, Boston: Shambala Press, 1991, p.151.

³² See also Jung, 'In Memory of Sigmund Freud' (1939) in *CW*, XV:47: Freud's psychological method is and always was a cauterizing agent for diseased and degenerate material, such as if found chiefly in neurotic patients --- Later when the new ideas met with ample recognition, this grew into an aesthetic defect, and finally, like every fanatacism, evoked the suspicion of an inner uncertainty".

³³ For the development of Freudian psychology in Europe, see H. Ellenberger, *The Discovery of the Unconscious: The history and evolution of dynamic psychiatry*, London: Penguin Press, 1970; for its influence in America, see H.M. Ruitenbeck, *Freud and America*, N.Y.: Macmillan Co., 1966.

³⁴ H.M. Ruitenbeck, *op.cit.*, p.24.

pointed out.³⁵ The encouragement of self-expression on the psychoanalyst's couch is linked in no uncertain way to the vulgar, and often violent, freedom of expression - physical as well as vocal - which characterizes modern society in general and is the glaring opposite of the restraint typical of social conduct in a genuine civilization. As for the various revolts, primarily in America, in the sixties, against the so-called "establishment", and the increasing racial and sexual permissiveness that they have led to, these may indeed be considered the final triumph of a man who revealed his scientific intentions in the Virgilian epigraph to his most famous work, *The Interpretation of Dreams*: 'Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo'.³⁶

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The defects of Freud's psychology are best highlighted by juxtaposing it to a study of the discussions of the psyche and its role in society contained in the writings of the German-Swiss psychologist Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961). Jung clearly realized that psychoanalysis is:

... the psychology of neurotic states of mind, definitely one-sided, and its validity is confined to those states ... it is not a psychology of the healthy mind, and ... this is a symptom of its morbidity ... it is based on an uncriticized, even an unconscious, view of the world which is apt to narrow the horizon of experience and limit one's

³⁵Richard LaPiere, *The Freudian Ethic*, N.Y.: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1959, p.64; see also H.J. Eysenck, *The Decline and Fall of the Freudian Empire*, Scott Townsend Publishers, Washington D.C. 1991, 202ff: "Psychonalysis is at best a premature crystallization of spurious orthodoxies; at worst, a pseudo-scientific doctrine that has done untold harm to psychology and psychiatry alike --- The time has come to treat it as a historical curiosity, and to turn to the great task of building up a truly scientific psychology" (p.208).

³⁶ This line from the *Aeneid*, VII, 312, "If I cannot bend the higher powers, I will move the infernal regions", used to represent the operation of repressed instinctual impulses, may well serve as the motto of Freud's entire intellectual production.

vision.³⁷

Unlike the limited, rational materialistic conception of the ego and the id propounded by Freud, which is rather a physiological unconscious or subconscious,³⁸ Jung's Psyche or the objective Unconscious is a metaphysical sphere of universal life or energy that ranges between spirit and matter:

Just as, in the lower reaches, the psyche loses itself in the organic material substrate, so in its upper reaches it resolves itself into a "spiritual" form about which we know as little as we do about the functional basis of instincts. What I would call the psyche proper extends to all functions which can be brought under the influence of a will.³⁹

Indeed, Jung, rather like the philosopher Schopenhauer, considers matter and soul, or Will, as two aspects of a single primal reality.⁴⁰

³⁷ 'Freud and Jung: Contrasts' (1929), in *Collected Works*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957-21, (henceforth referred to as *CW*) IV:335.

³⁸ A transcendental realm of the spirit was alien to the thought of Freud. As L. Frey-Rohn puts it: "[Freud] erkannte ein An-Sich, es war aber --- ausschließlich ein *An-Sich des Triebes, ja des Stoffes* (Leblosen!). Ein geistiges An-Sich ein transzendentaler Sinn war ihm fremd. Hinter der psychischen Wirklichkeit stand in letzter Linie der *Körper mit seinen Anforderungen* --- Wann immer der Ausdruck "Geist" vorkam, war es in der Bedeutung von Seele, von geistigen Interessen oder auch von "*ruach*" (Windhauch). In jedem Fall wies der Geist auf einen Gegenpol zur Sinnlichkeit bzw. auf etwas "mit dem Gesicht Wahrgenommenes hin", Liliane Frey-Rohn, *Von Freud zu Jung*, Zürich: Rascher, 1969, pp.391,393.

³⁹ 'On the Nature of the Psyche' ("Theoretische Überlegungen über das Wesen des Psychischen", 1954) in *CW*, VIII: 183. cf., also, 'The Psychology of the Child Archetype' ('Zur Psychologie des Kind-Archetypus', 1940), iii, 2, in *CW*, IX, i:173: "The deeper 'layers' of the Psyche lose their individual uniqueness as they retreat farther and farther into darkness. Lower down, that is to say, as they approach the autonomous functional systems, they become increasingly collective, until they are universalized and extinguished in the body's materiality, i.e., in chemical substances. The body's carbon is simply carbon. Hence 'at bottom' the psyche is simply 'world'."

⁴⁰ We may remember that matter is characterized in the system of Schopenhauer as the visibility of the Will, while Soul or Psyche itself is the Will as ideal Nature, that is, the Will with a tendency to manifest itself through matter. But above the Will as ideal Nature is the Will as the ineffable Self. See below p.17, and A. Jacob, "From the World-

Since psyche and matter are contained in one and the same world, and moreover are in continuous contrast with one another and ultimately rest on irrepresentable, transcendental factors, it is not only possible but fairly probable, even, that psyche and matter are two different aspects of one and the same thing.⁴¹

The ultimate nature of both matter and spirit is "transcendental, that is, irrepresentable". And "the only reality which is given to us *without a medium*" is the psyche and its contents. The psyche is a kind of non-physical space in which energy operates, and energy is cosmic as well as human. The human psyche, according to Jung, has three layers, consciousness, the personal unconscious, and the objective or collective unconscious. It is the last that constitutes one radical difference between Jung's psychology and that of Freud. For the collective unconscious is that level of the psyche that is prior to and larger than the individual personal experience. It is not merely psychic but, first, spiritual and transcendental. The nature of this transcendental reality cannot be determined with our limited reason:

That the world inside and outside ourselves rests on a transcendental background is as certain as our own existence, but it is equally certain that the direct perception of the archetypal world inside us is just as doubtfully correct as that of the physical world outside us.⁴²

The reason why it eludes objective definition is that it is intimately connected to the observing subject:

Soul to the Will: The natural philosophy of Schelling, Eschenmayer, and Schopenhauer", *Schopenhauer Jahrbuch*, 1992, 19-36, rpt. in A. Jacob, *De Naturae Natura*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1992, Chs. IX and X.

⁴¹ 'On the Nature of the Psyche' in *CW*, VIII:215.

⁴² Jung, *Mysterium Coniunctionis* (1955-56), VI, Art. 10 in *CW*, XIV:551. See also 'On the Nature of the Psyche' in *CW*, VIII:228: "We are fully aware that we have no more knowledge of the various states and processes of the Unconscious as such than the physicist has of the processes underlying physical phenomena. Of what lies beyond the phenomenal world we can have absolutely no idea, for there is no idea that could have any other source than the phenomenal world."

Hence the reality underlying the unconscious effects includes the observing subject and is therefore constituted in a way that we cannot conceive. It is, at one and the same time, absolute subjectivity and universal truth, for in principle it can be shown to be present everywhere, which certainly cannot be said of conscious contents of a personalistic nature.⁴³

It is, therefore, not merely unconscious as psychic energy, but originally the higher consciousness, or "absolute Wissen", of the Self:

If we are to do justice to the essence of the thing we call spirit, we should really speak of a "higher" consciousness rather than of the unconscious, because the concept of spirit is such that we are bound to connect it with the idea of superiority over the ego-consciousness.⁴⁴

This spirit is "above" the intellect:

Spirit is something higher than intellect since it embraces the latter and includes the feelings as well. It is a guiding principle of life that strives towards the superhuman, shining heights.⁴⁵

This distinction between ego consciousness and higher consciousness is completely absent in the psychological system of Freud.

The Psyche, which alone is immediately accessible to us, thus encompasses not only the lower 'id' of Freud, but also the collective

⁴³ "On the Nature of the Psyche' in *CW*, VIII:230; cf. A. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, Art.2: "That which knows all things and is known by none is the subject. It is accordingly the supporter of the world, the universal condition of all that appears, of all objects ... We never know it, but it precisely that which knows wherever there is knowledge" (tr. E.F.J. Payne, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 1966, I:5). See also, in this connection, A. Jacob, *op.cit.* (note 39 above).

⁴⁴ 'Spirit and Life' ('Geist und Leben', 1926) in *CW*, VIII:335.

⁴⁵ *Commentary on the Secret of the Golden Flower* (*Das Geheimnis der goldenen Blüte*, 1957) in *CW*, XIII:9.

unconscious which is both "the repository of man's experience and, at the same time, the prior condition of this experience".⁴⁶ The collective unconscious consequently consists of both instincts and archetypes.⁴⁷ The latter are, as it were, the "self-portrait" of the instinct, or the "instinct's perception of itself". And again, in his essay on "Die Schizophrenie", Jung describes Archetypes as "inherited, instinctive impulses and forms that can be observed in all living creatures".⁴⁸ The difference between instinct and the archetypes is that the former is the energetic aspect of the archetypes manifest in matter:

To the extent that the archetypes intervene in the shaping of conscious contents by regulating, modifying, and motivating them, they act like the instincts,⁴⁹

while the archetype itself is the "Sinn des Triebs", or its specific significance. Jung is thus careful to distinguish the archetypal representations from the archetype itself, which is ultimately transcendent:

The archetypal representations (images and ideas) mediated to us by the unconscious should not be confused with the archetypes as such. They are varied structures which all point back to one essentially "irrepresentable" basic form. The latter is characterized by certain fundamental meanings, although these can be grasped only approximately ... it seems to me probable that the real nature of the archetype is not capable of being made conscious, that it is transcendent.⁵⁰

This transcendent, irrepresentable quality of the Archetype

⁴⁶ *On the Psychology of the Unconscious* (*Über die Psychologie des Unbewußten*, 1943), 'The Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious', in *CW*, VII:95.

⁴⁷ "The instinct and the archetypes together form the 'collective unconscious', 'Instinct and the unconscious' ('Instinkt und Unbewußtes', 1928), in *CW*, VIII:133.

⁴⁸ 'Schizophrenia' ('Die Schizophrenie', 1958) in *CW*, III:262.

⁴⁹ 'On the Nature of the Psyche' in *CW*, VIII:205.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, VIII:213.

is the same as the transcendent reality of Schopenhauer's Will, namely the Self.⁵¹

The archetypal images of the Psyche are generally a vital formative activity, akin to the productive imagination:

It is difficult to see why unconscious psychic activities should not have the same faculty of producing images as those that are represented in consciousness --- the psyche consists essentially of images. It is a series of images in the truest sense, not an accidental juxtaposition or sequence, but a structure that is throughout full of meaning and purpose; it is a "picturing" of vital activities.⁵²

Significantly, Jung also emphasizes the fact that the archetypes are "typical modes of apprehension",⁵³ thus confirming Schopenhauer's insight that the Ideas are, from the point of view of the objectivised Will or the manifest universe, indeed levels of awareness of the reality of the Will as the Self. The spirit is apt to be manifested in symbolical ways in the phenomenal realm. In *Die Psychologie der Übertragung* Jung declares that the self is:

both ego and non-ego, subjective and objective, individual and collective. It is the "uniting symbol" which epitomizes the total union of opposites. As such and in accordance with its paradoxical nature, it can only be expressed by means of symbols. These appear in dreams and spontaneous fantasies.⁵⁴

These empirical manifestations of the self bear the numinous quality of their original, and are thus unbounded by space or time. In *Psychologie und Alchemie*, Jung suggests that the self is apt to manifest itself in dreams "since night after night our dreams

⁵¹ See above p.17.

⁵² 'Spirit and Life' in *CW*, VIII:325f.

⁵³ 'Instinct and the Unconscious' in *CW*, VIII:137.

⁵⁴ *The Psychology of the Transference (Die Psychologie der Übertragung, 1946)*, in *CW*, XVI:264.

practice philosophy on their own account".⁵⁵ This account of the larger archetypal significance of dreams is in stark contrast to the empirical interpretation of dreams as wish-fulfillment in Freud.

The symbolization of the Archetype of the Self or of the Absolute Unconscious is witnessed not just in individual egos but also, in its most basic and universal psychological form, in mythology. The collective Unconscious thus typically represents itself through mythological motifs. The mythological archetypes are underlying patterns of symbol formation which, according to racial and cultural inheritance, change their particular manifestations at any time or place.⁵⁶ The collective unconscious thus not only binds individuals among themselves to the race, but also unites them backwards with the peoples of the past and their psychology.⁵⁷ Although the collective unconscious as a whole is so far from human consciousness that the latter cannot really comprehend it, a basic understanding of the collective psyche behind the individual is vital for a healthy social and historical life. The importance of the unconscious as a "determining influence of history" is indeed evident throughout European history. For example,

Only in the age of enlightenment did people discover that the gods did not really exist, but were simply projections. Thus the gods were disposed of. But the corresponding psychological function was by no means disposed of; it lapsed into the unconscious, and men were thereupon poisoned by the surplus of libido that had once been laid up in the cult of divine images ... The unconscious is prodigiously strengthened by this reflux of libido, and, through its archaic collective contents, begins to exercise a powerful influence on the conscious mind. The period of the Enlightenment closed, as we know, with the horrors of the French Revolution. And at the present time, too, we are once more experiencing this uprising of the

⁵⁵ *Psychology and Alchemy* (*Psychologie und Alchemie*, 1952) Part II, Ch.3, in *CW*, XII:182.

⁵⁶ Jung, "Synchronizität als ein Prinzip akausaler Zusammenhänge" (1952), in *Naturerklärung und Psyche*, p.104, (*Gesammelte Werke*, VIII, p.575f).

⁵⁷ See *On the Psychology of the Unconscious* in *CW*, VII:77.

unconscious destructive forces of the collective psyche.⁵⁸

Since Jung is careful to differentiate the archetype of the Self⁵⁹ from the individual archetypes related to the rational ego, he can logically maintain that it is the archetypes of the ego alone which need to differentiate themselves through psychic evolution, from the primitive identification of an individual self with the world around him to the rise of self-consciousness and its consequent separation from the life of nature which is the domain of the ego. Jung disagrees with Freud's view of civilization as a result of the sublimation of instincts, which can only mean a subtle form of repression. Jung maintains, instead, that "sublimation is not the "transmutation" of instincts but the spontaneous "transfer" of energy from one instinctual form to another, from a physical instinct, for example, to its corresponding archetypal form".⁶⁰ As he put it:

Freud's sexual theory of neurosis is grounded on a true and factual principle. But it makes the mistake of being one-sided and exclusive; also it commits the imprudence of trying to lay hold of unconfinable Eros with the crude terminology of sex. In this respect Freud is a typical representative of the materialistic epoch, whose hope it was to solve the world riddle in a test-tube.⁶¹

As for the so-called "Oedipus complex", Jung suggested that that may be more than a mere paternally oriented sexual complex

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, in *CW*, VII:92.

⁵⁹ The former is the absolute Self itself and equally the Form of God:

Strictly speaking, the God-image does not coincide with the unconscious as such, but with a special content of it, namely the archetype of the self. It is this archetype from which we can no longer distinguish the God-image empirically ('Answer to Job' in *CW*, XI:469).

⁶⁰ W. Odajnyk, *Jung and Politics*, N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1976, p.179.

⁶¹ *On the Psychology of the Unconscious*, in *CW*, VII:27. Jung himself describes Eros as belonging "on the one side to man's primordial animal nature which will endure as long as man has an animal body. On the other side he is related to the highest forms of the spirit. But he only thrives when spirit and instinct are in right harmony".

and, in fact, "evidence of a notable release from the fatalities of the family situation".⁶² Jung expressly denounced the Freudian concept of the super-ego, and insisted that the super-ego be properly considered as 'conscience', which is not a late result of the interaction between individual and society whereby the latter appears in the form of a patriarchal God of injunctions, but rather an autonomous archetypal constituent of the psyche. Jung argued that:

The Freudian superego is not ... a natural and inherited part of the psyche's structure; it is rather the consciously acquired stock of traditional customs, the 'moral code' as incorporated, for instance, in the Ten Commandments. The superego is a patriarchal legacy which as such is a conscious acquisition and an equally conscious possession. If it appears to be an almost unconscious factor in Freud's writings, this is due to his practical experience, which taught him that, in a surprising number of cases, the act of conscience takes place unconsciously.

The Freudian superego, in short, is, according to Jung, "a furtive attempt to smuggle the time-honored image of Jehovah in the dress of psychological theory". Conscience is, indeed, not the same as moral precept since the former may often be in opposition to the latter. In such conflicts the proper solution is delivered by a creative instinct which springs from an active connection between the rational consciousness and the nonrational unconscious. Unlike Freud's opposition between the collective demands of society and the rebellious instincts of the individual, the judgement of the creative instinct of man in fact possesses "that compelling authority not unjustly characterized as the voice of God".⁶³

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ 'A psychological view of conscience' ('Das Gewissen in psychologischer Sicht' (1958), *CW*, X:455. Jung's explanation of conscience differs from Hitler's, as cited by Hermann Rauschning, "Conscience is a Jewish invention. It is a blemish, like circumcision" (H. Rauschning, *Hitler Speaks*, London, 1939, p.220). Yet Hitler was expressing the view that in pre-Judaeo-Christian Germanic society morality sprang from the desire to be loyal to the values of the group instead of from any individually internalized "conscience" that could turn the individual *against* the mores of the group.

It should not be surprising that, with the theory of the collective unconscious, Jung points not only to the relation between the Self and the ego in the unfolding of human civilization but also to the basic psychological differences between races and to the psychological influences that occur between them. An example of the exclusivity of racial archetypes is in fact offered by the modern history of Europe. Jung considers one of the chief causes of the wars, schisms, and strife of modern Europe as being due to the anomalous position of Christianity amongst the European peoples. As he sees it, "German Christians' are a contradiction in terms".⁶⁴ In 'Wotan' Jung explains the catastrophes of wartime Germany as due to the emergence, under stress, of the native spirit of Wotan, the ancient Germanic god of war and thunder, among the German people. The lesson to be learnt from this example is that the nationalistic awareness of a people is as essential as the self-awareness of its individual constituents: "Nationalism – disagreeable as it is – is therefore a *sine qua non*, but the individual must not remain stuck in it. On the other hand, in so far as he is a particle in the mass he must not raise himself above it either".⁶⁵

Jung clearly insists on the need to apply different psychological categories in considering different racial groups. Thus in *The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious*, he declared that

it is a quite unpardonable mistake to accept the conclusions of a Jewish psychology as generally valid. ... No doubt, on an earlier and deeper level of psychic development, where it is still impossible to distinguish between an Aryan, Semitic, Hamitic, or Mongolian mentality, all human races have a common collective psyche. But with the beginning of racial differentiation essential differences are developed in the collective psyche as well".⁶⁶

⁶⁴ "Wotan" (1936) in *CW*, X:190.

⁶⁵ Jung to Dr. James Kirsch, May 26, 1934 in C.G. Jung, *Letters*, ed. G. Adler, A. Jaffé, R.F.C. Hull, Princeton: PUP, 1975, Vol.I, p.162. That Jung's political views were always intimately related to his psychological ones, despite his public repudiation of the Nazi regime in 1946, is demonstrated by S. Grossman in his article "C.G. Jung and National Socialism", *Journal of European Studies*, 9 (1979), 231-59.

⁶⁶ *The Relation between the Ego and the Unconscious* (*Die Beziehungen zwischen dem Ich und dem Unbewussten*), 1928), Part I, Ch.2, in *CW*, VII:149n.

Jung criticizes Freud's mistaken application of Jewish categories "indiscriminately to Germanic and Slavic Christendom" for "Because of this the most precious secret of the Germanic peoples - their creative and intuitive depth of soul - has been explained as a morass of banal infantilism". He continues:

[Freud] did not understand the Germanic psyche any more than did his Germanic followers. Has the formidable phenomenon of National Socialism, on which the whole world gazes with astonished eyes, taught them better? Where was that unparalleled tension and energy while as yet no National Socialism existed? Deep in the Germanic psyche, in a pit that is anything but a garbage-bin of unrealizable infantile wishes and unresolved family resentments. A movement that grips a whole nation must have matured in every individual as well ... And that is why [the] scope [of medical psychology] must be widened to reveal to the physician's gaze not just the pathological aberrations of a disturbed psychic development, but the creative powers of the psyche laboring at the future; not just a dreary fragment but the meaningful whole".⁶⁷

Pointing out that neither Freud nor Adler is "a universally valid representative of European man," Jung suggests that the Jewish psychology is a representation of "the shadow that accompanies us all" for, he charges:

The Jews have this peculiarity in common with women; being physically weaker, they have to aim at the chinks in the armour of their adversary, and thanks to this technique which has been forced on them through the centuries, the Jews themselves are best protected where others are more vulnerable. Because, again, of their civilization, more than twice as ancient as ours, they are vastly more conscious than we of human weaknesses, of the

⁶⁷ 'The state of psychotherapy today' ('Zur gegenwärtigen Lage der Psychotherapie', 1934), in *CW*, X:165.

shadow-side of things, and hence in this respect much less vulnerable than we are.⁶⁸

The psyche of the Germanic peoples contrasts with the predominantly rational ego-consciousness of the Jews, Jung argues, and that this accounts for the greater creativity of the former:

The "Aryan" unconscious ... contains explosive forces and seeds of a future yet to be born, and these may not be devalued as nursery romanticism without psychic danger. The still youthful Germanic peoples are fully capable of creating new cultural forms that still lie dormant in the darkness of the unconscious of every individual ... The Jew, who is something of a nomad, has never yet created a cultural form of his own and as far as we can see never will, since all his instincts and talents require a more or less civilized nation to act as host for their development.⁶⁹

While the archetypes of the collective unconscious are generally race-bound, according to Jung, they can be distorted by chthonic influences on the lower soul, or the subconscious. Thus Jung points to the influence that the mind and manners of a conquered people have on their conquerors. In America, for example, the Europeans have inevitably developed Indian morphological characteristics as well as psychological symbolisms. Some of their culture, on the other hand, is derived from the Negro:

American music draws its main inspiration from the Negro; and so does the dance. The expression of religious feeling, the revival meetings, the Holy Rollers and other abnormalities are strongly influenced by the Ne-

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

gro.⁷⁰

Though Jung does not declare this mingling of racial characteristics to be entirely harmful, he extols the virtue of retaining one's links with one's native soil for "he who is rooted in the soil endures".⁷¹ If we gloss this section of Jung's writings with the description of the Archetypes as constituted both of *a priori* forms and residues of empirical experience, as well as the Schopenhauerian elucidation of archetypes or Ideas as levels of Self-knowledge, we will see that these interactions of racial archetypes indeed entail alterations of the capacity of the individual egos to apprehend the inner reality of life or Psyche.

However, despite the racial and nationalistic dimensions of the Collective Unconscious, the aim of historical evolution, according to Jung, is indeed "individuation". Individuation is the fullest development of personality, and is a "Passion des Ich,":

a conscious and deliberate self-surrender which proves that you have full control of yourself, that is, of your ego. The ego thus becomes the object of a moral act, for "I" am making a decision on behalf of an authority which is supraordinate to my ego nature. I am, as it were, deciding against my ego and renouncing my claim ... Hence it is quite possible for the ego to be made into an object, that is to say, for a more compendious personality to emerge in the course of development and take ego into its service. Since this growth of personality comes out of the unconscious, which is by definition unlimited, the extent of the personality now gradually realizing itself cannot in practice be limited either. But unlike the Freudian super-

⁷⁰ 'Mind and Earth' ('Seele und Erde', 1931) in *CW*, X:46. cf. also 'The Complications of the American Psychology' (1930) in *CW*, X:508: "The inferior man has a tremendous pull because he fascinates the inferior layers of our psyche, which has lived through untold ages of similar conditions - "on revient toujours à ses premiers amours" - -- The barbarian in us is still wonderfully strong and he yields easily to the lure of his youthful memories. Therefore he needs very definite defenses --- the defenses of the Germanic man reach only as far as consciousness reaches. Below the threshold of consciousness the contagion meets with little resistance".

⁷¹ 'Mind and Earth' in *Collected Works*, X:49.

ego, it is still individual. It is in fact individuality in the highest sense.⁷²

It is not the continued assertion of the individual ego against the external world but rather the subsumption of this ego in the higher consciousness of the Absolute Self:

But again and again I note that the individuation process is confused with the coming of the ego into consciousness and that the ego is in consequence identified with the self, which naturally produces a hopeless muddle. Individuation is then nothing but ego-centeredness and autoeroticism. But the Self comprises infinitely more than a mere ego ... It is as much one's self, and all other selves, as the ego. Individuation does not shut one out from the world, but gathers the world to oneself.⁷³

The aim of individuation is the renewed participation of the individual self in the transcendent Self. For, the individual ego extends beyond consciousness to the realm of the spirit, or the Godhead. This Jung tries to illustrate by the example of the divinity of Christ:

In the world of Christian ideas, Christ undoubtedly represents the self. As the apotheosis of individuality, the self has the attributes of uniqueness and of occurring once only in time. But the psychological self is a transcendent concept, expressing the totality of conscious and unconscious contents, it can only be described in antinomial terms (Just as the transcendent nature of light can only be expressed through the image of waves and particles) ... As an historical personage Christ is unitemporal and unique;

⁷² Jung, 'Transformation Symbolism in the Mass' ('Das Wandlungssymbol in der Messe', 1954), IV, ii, in *CW*, XI:258. As Aniela Jaffe puts it, "Individuation muß, in religiöser Sprache, als Verwirklichung eines "Göttlichen" im Menschen verstanden werden", Aniela Jaffe, *Der Mythos vom Sinn*, Zürich: Rascher, 1967, p.89.

⁷³ 'On the Nature of the Psyche' in *CW*, VIII:226. cf. Jung's letter, dated 23 August 1953: "Becoming conscious means continual renunciation because it is an ever-deepening concentration" (*Letters*, tr. R.F.C. Hull, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1973-75, II:120); cf. also 'Spirit and Life' ('Geist und Leben' 1926), in *CW*, VIII:325.

as God, universal and eternal. Likewise the self: as an individual thing it is unitemporal and unique; as an archetypal symbol it is a God-image and therefore universal and eternal.⁷⁴

Jung's answer to the problem of loss of religion consequent on Freud's theories of civilization was thus not the traditional Judaeo-Christian one of a God in Heaven but a more philosophical interpretation of the symbolic significance of Christ using the ideal archetype of the self as an image of divinity. Jung also uses as an illustration of his ethical goal the Hindu doctrine of the immersion of the Atman in the Brahman, terms which served as sources of his conception of the Ich and the Selbst.⁷⁵ Jung insists that the ultimate consciousness of the Self is not the same as the ego, but rather a higher transcendent entity that is consequent on psychic evolution or the union of the individual ego with the unconscious anima. This higher reality is also the domain of real freedom, since the individual self is now integrated into the subject of the Psyche which is the absolutely free and creative Self. As Dieter Spies puts it:

Im Selbst ist das Ich integriert in das größere Subjekt der Psyche, es ist sozusagen ... identisch mit dem "Anordner" der Psyche. Und in diesem Sinn ist der individuierte Mensch frei von jedem psychischen Zwang, denn Unterordnung unter die psychische Anordnung bedeutet nicht mehr Unfreiheit; es handelt sich jetzt gewissermaßen um die *eigene* Anordnung! Es ist Freiheit im transzendentalen Sinn. Alles Reden von und alle Sehnsucht nach Freiheit sind nur Antizipationen dieser Freiheit des Selbst-Seins.⁷⁶

This freedom that comes with the realization of the individual as the Absolute Self is, also, not a selfish rejection of the

⁷⁴ *Aion* (1951), V, in *Collected Works*, IX,ii:62f.

⁷⁵ See *The Psychology of the Transference*, in *CW*, XVI:264.

⁷⁶ Dieter Spies, *Das Weltbild der Psychologie C.G.Jungs*, Fellbach-Oeffingen: Bonz, 1984, p.192.

world, according to Jung, but rather a realization of the identity of the individual self with that of other beings:

the self is our life's goal, for it is the completest expression of that fateful combination we call individuality, the full flowering not only of the single individual, but of the group in which each adds his portion of the whole.⁷⁷

This liberation of the ego is made possible by the fact that, in Jung's idealistic metaphysic, as we have noted earlier,⁷⁸ the external world of nature too is not matter alone but ultimately spiritual:

Nature is not matter only, she is also spirit. Were that not so, the only source of spirit would be human reason. It is the great achievement of Paracelsus to have elevated the "light of nature" to a principle ... The *lumen naturae* is the natural spirit, whose strange and significant workings we can observe in the manifestations of the unconscious now that psychological research has come to realize that the unconscious is not just a "subconscious" appendage or the dustbin of consciousness, but is a largely autonomous psychic system for compensating the biases and aberrations of the conscious attitude, for the most part functionally, though it sometimes corrects them by force ... The unconscious is not limited only to the instinctual and reflex processes of the cortical centres; it also extends beyond consciousness and, with its symbols, anticipates future conscious processes. It is therefore quite as much a "supraconsciousness".⁷⁹

By contrast, the Freudian discovery of the subconscious is

⁷⁷ 'The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious' in *CW*, VII:240.

⁷⁸ See above p.

⁷⁹ 'Paracelsus as a spiritual phenomenon' ('Paracelsus als geistige Erscheinung', 1942) in *CW*, XIII:184f; cf. 'The phenomenology of the spirit in fairy-tales' ('Zur Phänomenologie des Geistes im Märchen', 1948), in *CW* IX,i:239, and *Symbols of Transformation* (*Symbole der Wandlung*, 1952), II, in *CW* V:430..

only of the "mirror-image" of the consciousness which contains only "distorted reflections of conscious contents".⁸⁰

Given this metaphysical basis of his psychology, it is not surprising that Jung, unlike the materialist philosophers or psychologists, does not consider the realization of the ideal society to be dependent on modifications of social relationships. On the contrary, according to Jung, individual changes are the necessary condition of social changes. Jung's ideal of a spiritually regenerated mankind was completely opposed to the mass mentality of modern times parading in the guise of democracy, fascism, or communism. For, only the enlightened individual is capable of a truly impersonal social life in that he alone has realized the metaphysical identity of his individual self with that of the others. In fact, there are specific dangers in the communal models posited by both communism and fascism, since the communal ideal "puts a premium on the lowest common denominator, on mediocrity, and 'on everything that settles down to vegetate in an easy, irresponsible way'".⁸¹ This leads to a gradual lowering of culture by restricting the possibilities of individual development, so that "the one source of moral spiritual progress for society is choked up".⁸² Whereas Freud pointed to the dangers of the repression of instinct in civilized life, Jung points to the greater dangers of the suppression of the individual psyche in a heavily communalized society, for the repressed elements of the psyche fall into the unconscious and are "transformed into something essentially baleful, destructive, and anarchical".⁸³ We have here an explanation of the negative social results of the Freudian ethic discussed above.⁸⁴ The resulting "inexorable moral degeneration of society" can be checked only by the enlightened individual who has comprehended and assimilated the full range of his unconscious.

It may be mentioned that Freud, in his epistolary essay "Why War?" (1933), proclaimed that society would be best organized when the masses were subordinated to an elite who have

⁸⁰*The Relations between the ego and the unconscious*, II in *CW VII*:185.

⁸¹ Odajnyk, *Jung and Politics*, p.58.

⁸² *The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious*, in *CW VII*:150.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ See above p.14.

subjected their instincts to "the dictatorship of reason".⁸⁵ Jung, on the other hand, saw the fascist state as resulting precisely from the rationalistic system of Hegel:

The victory of Hegel over Kant dealt the gravest blow to reason and to the further development of the German and, ultimately, of the European mind, all the more dangerous as Hegel was a psychologist in disguise who projected great truths out of the subjective sphere into a cosmos he himself had created. We know how far Hegel's influence extends today ... [In Hegel we find] the practical equation of philosophical reason with Spirit, thus making possible that intellectual juggling with the object which achieved such a horrid brilliance in his philosophy of the State.⁸⁶

Freud, who is Hegelian insofar as his repudiation of the instinctual life of man for being productive of the "illusions" of religion and civilization is directed by his admiration of reason, deserves the same rebuke that Jung aimed at Hegel. It is indeed significant that, in spite of his apparent "elitism", Freud considered the two principal upper castes, the church and the army, as two "artificial groups" bound, as all groups are, by libidinal ties to the leader, either Christ or the Commander-in-Chief, as well as to the other members in it. These ties, like all other ideal relationships, are considered to be based on the "illusion" that the leader loves all the members equally. Jung's idea of a national leader, on the other hand, was of one totally conscious of his self and his racial/archetypal identity:

the true leader is always one who has the courage to be himself, and can look not only others in the eye but above all himself – It is perfectly natural that a leader should stand at the head of an elite, which in earlier centuries was formed by the nobility. The nobility believe

⁸⁵ 'Why War', in *SE*, XXII, 213.

⁸⁶ 'On the Nature of the Psyche' in *Collected Works*, VIII:169-70.

by the law of nature in the blood and exclusiveness of the race.⁸⁷

Jung, therefore, had a quite different understanding of the racial-psychological ideal which governs an idealistic nobility than Freud proposed in terms of his narrowly limited psychological categories.

Indeed, Jung was opposed to the deracinated individualism which calls itself "modernism." While commending democracy since it "takes account of human nature as it is and makes allowance for the necessity of conflict within its own national boundaries",⁸⁸ he definitely repudiates the "modern man" who is unhistorical and denies the past to live wholly in the present. Jung also deplores the projection of the personal desires and fears of the individual psyche onto society at large either in the form of patriotism, where the nation is considered a father or mother that is to be depended on or obeyed with complete obedience, or in the form of anarchic rebellion against this collective parent. For, as he put it, "resistance to the organized mass can be effected only by the man who is as well organized in his individuality as the mass itself".⁸⁹ Until the individual attains a considerable degree of self-recognition, he will remain vulnerable to mass movements and leaders who may use him as a pawn to further their personal ambitions. The truly modern man will be one who considers the present as a creative transition point between the past and the future, while the pseudo-modern men "appear by the side of the truly modern man [as] uprooted wraiths, blood-sucking ghosts whose emptiness casts discredit upon him in his unenviable loneliness".⁹⁰ The truly modern man is indeed proficient and creative in mastering the traditions of his culture and contributing his own spiritual creations to them.

Unfortunately, the years following the second world war have

⁸⁷ *C.G. Jung speaking*, ed. W. McGuire and R.F.C. Hull, Princeton: PUP, 1977, pp.59-66.

⁸⁸ 'The Fight with the Shadow' (1946), in *CW*, X:225.

⁸⁹ 'The Undiscovered Self' ('Gegenwart und Zukunft', 1957) in *CW*, X:278.

⁹⁰ 'The spiritual problem of modern man' ('Das Seelenproblem des modernen Menschen', 1928), in *CW*, X:76.

witnessed the triumph of the Freudian ethic over the Jungian. The widespread influence of the limited rational-materialistic psychology of Freud with its restricted understanding of the constitution and powers of the human mind can be said to have contributed to the inexorable vulgarization of the pseudo-modern man.⁹¹ The corrective to this fragmented view of the world, wherein all civilization is reduced to its lowest psychological and social sources rather than traced to archetypal ideas which prefigure the spiritual possibilities of man, is perhaps to be found in the integrative psychology of Jung with its crucial dimension of spirit as the ultimate reality of the psyche, both individual and collective.

⁹¹ While this is especially true of American society, the increasing influence of America on the mind of Europe should not be ignored either.

The Humor Phenomenon: a Theoretical Perspective

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The topic of humor has an ancient history in the annals of mankind, although the "humor movement" only began in the 1960's. This article outlines some pertaining ideas on the origins of humor, and cites a number of the earliest references. A summary of the major humor theories is presented, subsumed under the headings of social, psychoanalytic and cognitive perceptual. A theoretical perspective for the humor phenomenon is offered, which incorporates original research findings as well as selected aspects of current thinking on this topic.

It is no exaggeration to say that humor, a distinctive characteristic of humankind, has been the subject of debate for two or three millennia at least. Among biblical references is the following verse from one of the earliest books in the Old Testament:

"A cheerful heart is good medicine, but a crushed spirit dries up the bones." (Proverbs, 17:22. New International Version)

The earliest recorded direct reference to an aspect subsumed within the broad definition of humor, is generally accredited to Aristotle (384 - 322 B.C.). Commenting in *Poetics* that comedy had already acquired its (then) present features, Aristotle went on to say:

...we do not know who decided on masks, prologues, the number of actors, and so forth ... the making of plots came originally from Sicily... Homer ... was the first to outline the forms of comedy, by making a story not out of invective but out of the laughable" (Bambrough, 1963, p.415).