

A SYMPOSIUM

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

THE UNITED STATES occupies today the position that was Britain's in the age of the French Revolution. We Americans, whether we like it or not, have become the most powerful defenders of Western or Christian civilization against the menace of totalist ideology and armed doctrine. But greatness was thrust upon us suddenly; and certain confusions in our diplomacy, no matter what party is in power, are evident to everyone. In no field is healthy controversy, frankly undertaken, more likely to be beneficial.

Professor Bouscaren, in the first of the four essays of this symposium, argues that diplomacy may be conducted with success and honesty by a great democracy: in opposition to Mr. Walter Lippmann and certain other recent writers. Mr. Curtis Cate says that our diplomats have been endeavoring to apply the techniques of Dale Carnegie to the conduct of statecraft, with scant success; his article will rouse argument, we trust, and perhaps attract a reply from some quarter. Dr. Barnes, in a forthright review-article, examines the secret diplomacy that immediately preceded our entry into World War II. Dr. Draskovich calls for a much closer look at the case of Milovan Djilas and *The New Class*, and consequently at American policy towards "national Communism."

The editors and editorial advisors of MODERN AGE differ among themselves on the merits of these several theses; and we expect our readers, or many of them, to differ with one or another article. Without controversy, there can be no right reason.

Democracy and American Foreign Policy

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IN A WELL-KNOWN passage, Alexis de Tocqueville criticized the conduct of foreign policy in a democracy: "Foreign politics," he said, "demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient A democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the de-

tails of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience. These are the qualities which more especially belong to an individual or an aristocracy; and they are precisely the qualities by which a nation, like an in-

dividual, attains a dominant position."¹

The Economist recently indicted our foreign policy in these words: "Perhaps the greatest single obstacle to the emergence in America of a sustained and positive foreign policy is the nature of its political system. The division of power between President and Congress, the possibility of different parties controlling the one and the other, and lack of a cabinet responsible to the legislature, the working of the party system, are all weighted against the present pursuit of long-term national or international objectives The only way in which an administration in these circumstances can make its voice heard above the clamorous shouts of minorities, lobbyists . . . is by dramatizing the issue at stake to ten times life size and compelling Congress by a species of shock treatments to pass the necessary appropriation."²

Other experienced observers have criticized our system more bluntly. President Dickey of Dartmouth once said: "Our procedures for the democratic review and execution of international engagements are . . . in an unholy mess." A former careerist, writing in 1944, had this to say about the Department of State: "The Department is an unbelievably inefficient organization. It does not run. It just jerks along. Foreign policy is in the hands of whoever of two dozen higher officers is able at any moment and by any means to seize the ball. But in the Department there are queer rules: when a player seizes the ball and makes for the goal line, all the members of his team are entitled to tackle him. And as often as not the ball is seized and not carried over any goal line but hidden under the back steps."³ The famous French foreign service officer Jules Cambon once wrote: "While democracies would always have diplomacy, it was a question whether they would ever have diplomatists."⁴ James L. McCamy, in his book *The Administration of American Foreign Affairs*, complains: "The United States has not attained the competence it

needs, wants, can have and must have if it is to possess administration commensurate with its power."⁵

Among the other weaknesses attributed to democracies in the foreign affairs field are their inherently defensive natures, their alleged inability to act quickly in a nuclear age, their susceptibility to subversion, and the adverse effect of democratic ideology and public opinion on foreign policy.

Perhaps the most serious indictment of foreign policy in a democracy is that it tends to be pacifist, mostly because of public opinion, and that this pacifism plays into the hands of the aggressor. In 1936 Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin of Great Britain declared: "I have stated that a democracy is always two years behind the dictator . . . From 1933 I and my friends were all very worried about what was happening in Europe . . . at that time there was probably a stronger pacifist feeling running through this country than at any time since the War . . . My position as the leader of a great party was not altogether a comfortable one. I asked myself what chance was there—within the next year or two of that feeling being so changed that the country would give a mandate for rearmament? Supposing I had gone to the country and said that Germany was rearming and that we must rearm, does anybody think this pacifist democracy would have rallied to that cry?"⁶

The experience of the past twenty years shows how erroneous it is to base foreign policy on pacifism and an unwillingness to take risks. Recent letters to the *New York Times* by such distinguished persons as Salvador de Madariaga, Hans Morgenthau, and Reinhold Niebuhr take the United States to task on precisely these two counts, with respect to its behavior during the Hungarian uprising. Stefan Possony and Robert Strausz-Hupé put it this way in their textbook *International Relations*: ". . . to make foreign policy is to take risks . . . The United States cannot escape the terrible dilemma by avoid-

ing all risks—lest it accept defeat before the issue is joined.”⁷

But is it true that the foreign policy of the United States had been or need be enervated of our constitutional structure and the nature of democracy? Let us proceed to a consideration of public opinion, and presidential-congressional relationships, as we test various criticism of foreign policy in a democracy.

Machiavelli gives this advice on public opinion: “In politics the words shall never be in agreement with the acts. The prince must be sufficiently skillful to disguise his true plans under contrary designs. He must always give the impression that he cedes to the pressure of public opinion when in fact he carries out what he has prepared by his own hands.” Even in a democracy, the willful policy-maker seeks to lead or mold public opinion, and to make concessions only on minor details where these concessions are forced upon him by political circumstance. Only the most unprincipled will change policy day by day and week by week according to the whims and fancies of public opinion. An eminent historian states that Franklin D. Roosevelt, “when confronted by an apathetic public and a critical foreign menace, felt compelled to deceive the people into an awareness of their peril.”⁸

Lindsay Rogers admits: “Even the experts could reach no agreement on what the public is, and on what opinion is.”⁹ Yet there is such a thing as public opinion, however seldom it crystallizes and however difficult if not impossible it is to measure and identify. American public opinion must be the composite of the views of large numbers of people, some well-informed, some with vague ideas, and some almost totally ignorant. If all this wisdom and ignorance are to be embodied in a single amalgam, every variation in the proportion of knowledge to naivete will bring divergent opinions, and variations in the estimates of that proportion will cause different people to reach different conclusions about the character and the validity of

public opinion. Henry Wriston defines “the American attitude” as being “that part of public opinion which, on a given issue, becomes articulate, and which is held with enough conviction and tenacity to affect public policy. It is not determined by counting noses, or by taking polls. It is not always, therefore, the ‘will of the majority,’ numerically determined; it may be the will of a relatively small but vocal and influential minority. On successive issues this effectively dominant group will vary enormously in its size and its make-up.”¹⁰

Public opinion has influenced world events long before Mr. Gallup sought to gauge it methodically. The Papacy relied on it when it banned offenders from the Church and called upon Christendom to battle the infidel. For long years it was Napoleon’s greatest single element of power. In 1914 the German government would certainly have hesitated to plunge into war if it had encountered strong opposition among the German people. In the 1930’s British public opinion seemed paralyzed by the pacifism previously alluded to, while a growing minority clamored for sanctions against Fascism. During the Korean War there seemed to be a schizophrenic attitude of either win the war to a victory or pull out of Korea.

Only a small segment of the American public offers opinions on foreign policy, and probably the most representative element of this opinion is unorganized. Congressman Robert J. Corbett complained in 1946 that “. . . many of the pictures of public opinion on given issues which I had believed to be true were found to be very false Like many others, I tended to believe . . . that those who wrote, wired, or telephoned reflected typical public opinion. They simply did not do so. Rather they generally represented vocal minorities.”¹¹ Gabriel Almond suggest that “the function of the public in a democratic-making process is to set certain policy criteria in the form of widely-held values and expectations, leaving to those

who have a positive and informed interest the actual formation of policy.”¹² The chief function of the voter is to elect the makers of policy, but not to make policy itself. The protagonists of foreign policy come to power and stay in power only by virtue of their domestic influence, and generally speaking their policies must be in line with the desires of the citizens over whom they rule. Public opinion may exert great influence when it is overwhelmingly strong, but such a crystallization occurs only rarely. Public opinion is a difficult problem but it need not, and should not, be an obstacle to an effective and rational foreign policy. Mr. Acheson once said that the American government refused to help Chiang Kai-shek “so long as the Chinese people felt that we were supporting a government that they did not believe to be serving their interest.”¹³ Yet who could know what the Chinese themselves felt? Did the United States stop to ascertain the feelings of the U.S.S.R. before saving Stalin in 1941? The familiar excuse that public opinion would not ‘go along’ with a necessary policy is likely to be a cloak for unwillingness to act and irresolution.

Walter Lippmann is today foremost in a school of thought which deprecates Congress and public opinion, and urges unimpeded policy formulation and execution by the President and an executive elite. This view asserts that public opinion has been “disastrously wrong” in moments of great decision. It is claimed, for example, that public opinion demanded we “bring the boys back home” in 1945, thus damaging beyond repair America’s global position.

“Our God and soldier we alike adore
When at the brink of ruin, not before;
After deliverance, both alike requited,
Our God forgotten, and our soldiers
slighted.”

Thus wrote Francis Quarles in 1635 of the public’s vacillating attitude toward the military.

Yet is public opinion primarily to blame for errors of 1945? In November of 1944

President Roosevelt told Prime Minister Churchill: “I will bring American troops home as rapidly as transportation problems permit.” The public, to be sure, delighted in this announcement, but general approval was to some extent, at least, a secondary result of wartime security measures, which kept the people from knowing the deficiencies in the wartime alliance and the menace of Soviet expansionism. Censorship withheld, for war purposes, most of the evidence that tensions were so great within the alliance that one of our partners was likely to become a new, and bitter enemy. Uneasy stirrings of doubt lest that be the case were quieted when President Roosevelt declared on March 8, 1944: “I think the Russians are perfectly friendly; they aren’t trying to gobble up all the rest of Europe They haven’t got any ideas of conquest . . . these fears that have been expressed by a lot of people here—that the Russians are going to try to dominate Europe, I personally don’t think there’s anything in it.”¹⁴

It is clear that American public opinion was misled. The President had available to him explicit reports about wartime difficulties, which, however, he publicly denied existed. We cannot fairly blame public opinion for failures to face up to issues unless the basic facts are available to all the people. This instance is a powerful piece of evidence against Lippmann and similar critics who claim that democracy goes astray in foreign policy because of the separation of powers and the need to appease Congress and the public. In this instance the President was virtually unchecked. There was no deference to Congress or the electorate in this deliberate presidential action, taken despite numerous written and verbal reports, and his own first-hand contacts with Stalin at Teheran. The plain fact is that two successive presidents, despite repeated warnings from the professional advisers, allowed the Soviets to attain a dominant position in eastern Europe. The Chief Executive, unchecked by Congress or pub-

lic opinion, made the fatal decisions. These decisions, moreover, were taken at a time when military resources and diplomatic action could have made a different policy effective. During the war in Korea the public was again denied certain information about the treatment of American prisoners of war, the effect of diplomatic restrictions on military operations, and the intransigence of the Communist negotiators at Panmunjom.

The lesson to be drawn runs counter to the thesis that public opinion has been at fault and that strengthening the executive is the key to better policy formation; the true conclusion is that the public should be given the facts to the greatest extent possible, and with the greatest possible dispatch, to the benefit of foreign policy.

Foreign policy in our constitutional system has, of course, many shortcomings. Let us admit that many of our attitudes and actions have been shortsighted and mistaken. But was our nation ever involved in anything so wicked as Stalin's pact with Hitler, or Khrushchev's ruin of Hungary? Do we stand in need of emulating a strong man unimpeded by legislative bodies or public opinion? So-called "strong leadership," which is unchecked, often substitutes the irrational, even quixotic, impulses of a Duce, a Führer, a Stalin. Who would seriously propose that the checks and balances which did not exist for the modern dictatorial aggressors should be dropped from our structure of government? Experience has shown that neither constitutional liberties at home nor abroad are promoted by subjecting ourselves to the unlimited powers of personal decision.

Felix Morley has said that "our foreign policy is not democratic, was not intended to be, and cannot be."¹⁵ One of the most difficult problems of political science is the reconciliation of the necessarily arbitrary conduct of foreign policy with the equally essential maintenance of popular government. But if democracy, or more exactly, our particular form of constitutional

government, is not compatible with responsibility and leadership, then it neither will, nor deserves to, endure. Alexander Hamilton, who was more concerned with constitutionalism than with democratic rhetoric, which he left to his opponents, resolves the dilemma for us thus: "There are some who would be inclined to regard the servile pliancy of the Executive to a prevailing current . . . as its best recommendation. But such men entertain very crude notions, as well of the purposes for which governments are instituted, as of the true means by which the public happiness may be promoted. The republican principle demands that the deliberate sense of the community should govern the conduct of those to whom they intrust the management of their affairs; but it does not require an unqualified complaisance to every breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse which the people may receive from the arts of men who flatter their prejudices to betray their interests."¹⁶ One does not have to concur with Hamilton's view of the broad masses to recognize that there is some midway point between policy by public opinion poll, and policy by a dictator. Even Hamilton agreed that Congress should check and balance the control of foreign policy by the President and Secretary of State, in this passage from the *Federalist*: "There is no comparison between the intended power of the President and the actual power of the British sovereign. The one can perform alone what the other can do only with the concurrence of a branch of the legislature. . . . The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human nature which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to the sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would be a President of the United States."¹⁷

Even the most democratic of governments must desire to succeed. There is no reason why democracy should turn upon

itself and deprive its agents of its essential means of defense. Indeed the primary objective of any foreign policy, democratic or not, is security. "Democracy," writes John Kieffer, "is a doctrine for the virile and the determined; it is not a protective cloak for the weak, or a haven for the pacifist or coward. Unless we are prepared to fight for that freedom we lose it. The most insidious anti-democratic doctrine ever advanced was 'peace in our times—at any price.' One can be secure in democracy, but only if one is prepared to fight for the freedom and security that democracy offers."¹⁸

When Secretary of State Dulles returned from the Far East in April, 1955, he suggested that our choice might soon have to be between peace and liberty: "The Communist rulers think that if pacifism becomes a prevalent mood among the free peoples, the Communists can easily conquer the world. Then they can confront the free peoples with successive choices between peace and surrender; and if peace is the absolute goal, then surrender becomes inevitable."¹⁹ Several months later President Eisenhower declared: "Eagerness to avoid war—if we think no deeper than this single desire—can produce outright or implicit agreement that injustices and wrongs of the present shall be perpetuated in the future. We must not participate in any such false agreement. Thereby we would outrage our own conscience. In the eyes of those who suffer injustice, we would become partners with their oppressors. In the judgement of history, we would have sold out the freedom of men for the pottage of a false peace."²⁰

The Pope, in his Christmas message of 1956, declared: "In the present circumstances, there can be verified in a nation the situation wherein every effort to avoid war being expended in vain, war—for effective self-defense and with the hope of a favorable outcome—could not be considered unlawful."²¹

Our constitutional structure grants to the President such a degree of dominance

in foreign policy that Chief Justice Marshall once said: "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." As Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the President has at his disposal the prestige of his office, his position as party leader, his control over patronage, and the ability to appeal over the heads of Congress directly to the people. He has the power to recognize or to withhold recognition from foreign states, to enter into binding secret agreements with them, or to commit American military forces to undeclared wars; he shares the treaty-making power and the power of appointments with the Senate. But, says Edward S. Corwin, "... whatever emphasis be given the President's role as 'sole organ of foreign relations', and the initiative thereby conferred upon him in this field, the fact remains that no presidentially devised diplomatic policy can long survive without the support of Congress, the body to which belongs the power to lay and collect taxes for the common defense, to regulate foreign commerce, to create armies and maintain navies, to pledge the credit of the United States, to declare war, to define offenses against the law of nations, and to make all laws which are necessary and proper for carrying into execution not only its own powers, but all the powers of the government of the United States and of any department or officer thereof."²² Corwin also points out that the Constitution "invites a struggle for power between Congress and the President," and throughout the history of this republic both sides have had their champions.

Thomas Bailey, a strong supporter of the Presidency, urges that the President deceive the people, for their good: "... because the masses are notoriously shortsighted, and generally cannot see danger until it is at their throats, our statesmen are forced to deceive them into an awareness of their long-run interests. This is clearly what Franklin D. Roosevelt had

to do, and who shall say that posterity will not thank him for it? Deception of the people may in fact become increasingly necessary, unless we are willing to give our leaders in Washington a freer hand . . . in the days of the atomic bomb we may have to move more rapidly than a lumbering public opinion will permit . . . the yielding of some of our democratic control of foreign affairs is the price that we may have to pay for greater physical security."²³ Another advocate of a stronger President, Marshall Knappen, suggests that Congressmen must in some way be forced to overcoming what he calls their "constitutionally-induced aversion" to the executive branch and its proposals.²⁴ Clinton Rossiter expresses similar views in his recent book on the Presidency.

On the other hand Robert A. Dahl warns: "to the extent that the executive is capable of solving its problems without accepting Congressional collaboration it must inescapably become more and more the democratic shadow of that grim alternative, a frank dictatorship."²⁵ Charles Beard was outspoken in his opposition to presidential dominance of foreign policy during World War II: "At this point in its history, the American Republic has arrived under the theory that the President of the United States possesses limitless authority publicly to misrepresent and secretly to control foreign policy, foreign affairs, and the war power . . . the test is here now, with no divinity hedging our Republic against Caesar."²⁶

Complainants like Walter Lippmann who urge a stronger hand for the President in foreign affairs usually cite the example of Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations as an illustration of presidential frustration by Congress. But, as one of his critics puts it: "Wilson had a genius for making his own path difficult . . . The outstanding fact is that today the executive has the initiative in foreign policy to a degree unknown before in our history . . . No first class proposal in foreign policy has been refused since the Wilson de-

bacle."²⁷ This has been especially true since 1941, and presidential dominance was boldly proclaimed to Congress by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on March 1, 1945 when he referred to the Yalta decisions on Poland having been "agreed to by Russia, by Britain, and by me."

Short of the expenditure of money, the binding conclusion of treaties, and the declaration of war, the President can well nigh do as he pleases in formulating and executing foreign policies. By virtue of his power of recognition, executive agreements, sending troops anywhere, etc., he can narrow the freedom of choice which constitutionally lies with Congress to such an extent as to eliminate it practically altogether. Presidents of the United States have ordered the execution of well over a hundred military operations outside the borders of the United States without reference to Congress; whereas Congress was primarily responsible for involving the United States in wars in 1812 and 1898, the Presidency can claim responsibility for our involvement in the Mexican and Civil Wars, both World Wars, and the Korean War. In the field of international agreements, the ratio between executive agreements and treaties (in which Senatorial approval is required) has steadily changed to the detriment of the latter. In 1940 the United States concluded twenty executive agreements and twelve treaties; in 1942, fifty-two executive agreements and six treaties; in 1944, seventy-four executive agreements and one treaty. Although there has been a tendency in the past eight years to submit more international agreements to the Senate for its approval, the ratio between executive agreements and treaties continues to be lop-sided in favor of the former, and Harold Laski's 1949 prediction is being borne out: "More will be done by executive agreements, of which the exchange of letters between Secretary Lansing and Viscount Ishii is perhaps the classic example, than by formal treaty making. This is because the pace of events is likely to be swift."²⁸

There are also critics who demand foreign policy be taken out of politics, that "politics should stop at the water's edge." Some scholars, some commentators, and some professional diplomats resent politics either frankly or subconsciously; they prefer *expertise* of their own particular brand to the democratic hurly-burly. Yet however superficially attractive the "no politics in foreign policy" thesis may be, the record still seems to indicate that foreign policies which have not been subject to constitutional restraints, however slight, have been no more successful or efficient than their opposites. Indeed it often seems that the foreign policies of so-called democratic states have reached their lowest ebb precisely when presidents and prime ministers conducted affairs on their own, without the benefit of advice and consent of others. Certainly the secret agreements of Lansing-Ishii, Hoare-Laval, and Roosevelt-Stalin have failed to stand the scrutiny of history from the point of view of the strengthening of constitutionalism and human freedoms. The plain fact is that debate (even partisan debate) helps to mold decision and action through enlightenment as well as compromise. Advocates of *expertise* in foreign policy may as well remember that it is the constitutional way or the dictatorial way. Diplomacy is necessarily based on politics. The professional should never be supreme. The good diplomat has a sympathetic, as well as an exact, understanding of political realities.

In the past two years there has been a tendency on the part of the President to take Congress into his confidence by asking for so-called standby powers. While such powers are not required by the Constitution, they do enable the President to carry out policies which will have a much broader base of support than would otherwise be so. Diplomatic-minded presidents have discovered that they can coerce, or gain the support of Congress, through consultation in the execution of foreign policy, participation in the execution of this policy, information about the operation of pol-

icy, and the device of bipartisanship. This last is, of course, a subterfuge to take foreign affairs out of politics, and it has not succeeded for any long period of time except in extreme international emergencies. Senator Vandenberg used to complain that whereas he was always invited to take part in the diplomatic crash-landings, he was seldom invited to sit in on the take-offs.

Secret and personal diplomacy and the use of special envoys to bypass normal channels often lead to friction within the government, and inefficiency. A learned and temperate British writer held that Franklin D. Roosevelt's conduct of foreign policy was "personal and untidy, reducing the State Department to a cipher . . . during the latter part of Cordell Hull's tenure and the incumbency of Mr. Stettinius."²⁹ Early in 1940 Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles was sent to Europe in a special mission without Secretary Hull's approval, which "brought the latent antagonism between Hull and Welles into such an active state that they could no longer work together satisfactorily in the Department."³⁰ Hull complained that the utilization of private envoys "tended in many instances to create havoc with our ambassadors or ministers in the capitals they visited, even though the envoys themselves had no such intention."³¹ In June, 1944, the President approved a British-Russian spheres of influence agreement in the Balkans without informing the State Department, with the result that for three weeks State pursued a directly opposite policy.

President Truman approved a 1946 foreign policy speech by Commerce Secretary Wallace, without reading it carefully, which was in complete opposition to the foreign policy which Secretary of State Byrnes was at that time trying to carry out. In spite of the desperate, last minute efforts of Defense Secretary Forrester to block it, Henry Wallace proceeded to denounce U.S. foreign policy before a pro-Soviet gathering in New York. Byrnes then demanded that Truman fire Wallace,

which he did.³² In 1948 Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith was told to enter into negotiations with the U. S. S. R. on a number of key issues, but our ambassadors in Europe were not informed, so that world public opinion was confused about the real intentions of the United States. President Truman granted *de facto* recognition to the State of Israel so suddenly and quickly that our ambassadors overseas and at the United Nations were not informed, to their embarrassment, until well after the event. Also in 1948 the President decided to send Chief Justice Vinson to Moscow as a special envoy; this came as a surprise to Secretary of State Marshall and Under-Secretary Lovett, who protested vigorously and successfully against the plan. President Franklin Roosevelt died without informing the State Department fully about the territorial concessions made to the Soviet Union in the Far East at the Yalta conference. James Byrnes complained: "It was not until some time after I became Secretary of State that a news story from Moscow caused me to inquire and learn of the full agreement."³³

"The only practicable principle on which to base our foreign policy," writes Corwin, "is to base [it] on departmental collaboration, unless we wish to establish outright presidential dictatorship."³⁴ A number of proposals have been put forth to implement this principle, with special emphasis on improving executive-legislative relationships. These include:

- 1) Inviting the Chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee to sit in on cabinet meetings relating to foreign policy.
- 2) The creation of a Foreign Relations Council to include both foreign affairs advisers in the executive branch and Congressional leaders.
- 3) Amending the two-thirds Senate treaty rule to a simple majority in both houses (this is least likely to succeed).
- 4) Permitting the Secretary of State to

debate and defend his policies in Congress.

- 5) Electing members of the House every four years (to avoid the discordance politically which frequently exists between the executive and legislative branches in the last two years of the President's term of office).

Some of these proposals could only be realized through constitutional amendments, and even then might not appreciably improve matters. But the promotion of mutual trust and confidence between the President and Congress must constantly be uppermost in the minds of those concerned. The Hoover Commission recently urged that "Congress should appreciate that leadership in the conduct of foreign affairs can only come from the executive side of the government . . . (and) the executive branch must appreciate the role of the Congress and the propriety of its participation in foreign affairs where legislative decisions are required."³⁵

Unfortunately, not all efforts at improving executive-legislative relationships succeed. In 1951 the State Department asked Congress for an appropriation to expand a departmental staff which would maintain contact with Congress. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Ben H. Brown, was testifying on the need of continuing an appropriation for Mr. Moreland, described as "liaison official with the House of Representatives." The Deputy Assistant Secretary endured a rather acid examination, especially when it developed that his Mr. Moreland was unknown to the Congressmen. As the verbatim testimony shows, this was too much for Representative John J. Rooney, of Brooklyn:

"Mr. Rooney: 'While we are on this subject: is there any particular reason why we have been denied the privilege of meeting with Mr. Moreland?'"

"Mr. Brown. 'No, and I shall see that this is corrected.'"

"Mr. Rooney. 'Perhaps you will not

need to do so!"³⁶

For its part, Congress is not so efficient a guardian of the people's interests as it might be. It lacks sufficient staff and time to pay enough attention to foreign policy, and often it lacks objective information and even sufficient information. Congressional leaders should be kept informed commensurate with security. With respect to the Department of State and Foreign Service, it is desirable that the wholly commendable effort to understand foreign points of view not permit individuals to lose sight of Congressional and American public opinion points of view. After his years in France, Thomas Jefferson returned to discover how much out of touch he was with America, and recommended that Foreign Service officers be limited in the time they spend in posts abroad.

With about forty-five executive agencies involved in the formulation or execution of foreign policy in addition to the State Department, there have arisen jurisdictional and other disputes which leave little time for actual consideration of foreign policy matters. James L. McCamy, an administration specialist with considerable experience in government, writes: "Our failure to provide a way to settle conflicts over jurisdiction and policy within the executive has led to . . . a failure to use our full resources of government in either the formulation of foreign policy or in the conduct of programs in foreign relations."³⁷ Some of these failures might be cleared up with the adoption of certain of the Hoover Commission proposals concerning red tape and overlapping. But in any event it should be remembered that bureaucracy in other forms of government is often far worse. There the tendency of subordinates to cover up mistakes is greatly accentuated by the nature of the sanctions imposed.

We may conclude at this point that in the balance, constitutional systems such as ours, are still more efficient and successful in the long pull than totalitarian systems.

It is not true that for constitutional reasons an effective American foreign policy cannot be conducted. Furthermore, the United States Government can move just about as fast as any other, when there is decisive and determined leadership. The President has sufficient power to conduct foreign relations, and neither Congress nor public opinion need impair successful policy.

If our experiences in the Korean war and in recent months are any indication, it may well be that the United Nations, insofar as we abdicate policy formulation and execution to it, will prove to be a greater impediment to quick and efficient action in the national interest, than alleged constitutional bars. There is some evidence which indicates that in our anxiety to win over as many nations as possible to certain programs, these programs are either very much watered down, or not even acted upon at all. The demise of the hot pursuit of enemy aircraft doctrine in Korea is the most extreme case in point. But as the UN Charter itself makes crystal clear, there is no restriction on the pursuance of national interest on the part of member states, so long as they refrain from engaging in aggressive war. Reinhold Niebuhr recently wrote: "The Administration has accentuated a widely-held misconception of the United Nations as a super-government which will solve world problems. It is only a confederation of nations which originally assumed the unanimity of the great powers for its successful operation. The cold war destroyed this possibility for the organization Our devout expressions of loyalty to it therefore become but a screen for our irresponsibility; for the United Nations can do nothing without the leadership of the Western powers."³⁸

Modern critics of our foreign policy under constitutionalism have deplored the spiritual, moral, and religious elements so characteristic of, and so essential to, democracy. George Kennan, in particular, decries the tendency to inject morality into policy which, he feels, should be founded upon cold calculations of power.

"The most serious fault of our past policy formulation", he writes, "lies in something that I might call the legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems."³⁹ This criticism, like that of Lippmann, at first glance has merit, but let us consider its consequences: what policy would the balance sheet principle have suggested to Britain after the fall of France in 1940? Would it not have been surrender on the best terms available? Kennan's principle fails to take into account the human spirit. The Battle of Britain was won in large degree by heart, by courage, by faith—possibly more significant in sound policy making than all the detached calculations proposed by pessimists regarding democracy. "One person with belief", wrote John Stuart Mill, "is a social power equal to ninety-nine who have only interests." The American revolutionaries doggedly fought

on against heavy odds in 1776 because they had the will to win; the same is true of the Poles who saved Warsaw from the Russians in 1920, the Spaniards who saved the fortress of the Alcazar in 1936, the Marines who held on at Guadalcanal in 1942, our stand on the Pusan perimeter in 1950, the Guatemalans who overthrew the Arbenz dictatorship in 1955, and the Hungarian patriots who succeeded in gaining their freedom for five days, thus confounding the army of pessimists who had denied the possibility of revolt within the Soviet Empire.

Situations of strength are still essential; a reasonable estimate of the relationship of commitments to potentialities is ordinary prudence. But armaments, economic strength, and alliances are not enough. Policy must be based upon moral considerations as well as the more tangible factors.

NOTES

¹*Democracy in America*, ed. P. Bradley, I, 234-235.

²*The Economist*, May 24, 1947.

³Joseph M. Jones, *A Modern Foreign Policy for the United States*, p. 37.

⁴As quoted in Henry M. Wriston, *Diplomacy in a Democracy*, p. 8.

⁵*The Administration of American Foreign Affairs*, p. 349.

⁶*Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Ser., Vol. 317 (London, 1936), col. 1144.

⁷New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954, p. 680.

⁸Thomas A. Bailey, *The Man in the Street*, p. 11.

⁹*The Pollsters*, p. 11.

¹⁰Henry M. Wriston, *Diplomacy in a Democracy*, p. 66.

¹¹*Congressional Record*, March 15, 1946, v. 92, pt. 10, p. 1400.

¹²*The American People and Foreign Policy*, p. 5.

¹³Dean G. Acheson, *Strengthening the Forces of Freedom*, Department of State Publication 3852, p. 17.

¹⁴As quoted in Wriston, p. 91.

¹⁵*The Foreign Policy of the United States*, p. 138.

¹⁶*The Federalist Papers*, no. 71.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, nos. 69 and 75.

¹⁸*Realities of World Power*, p. 322.

¹⁹*New York Times*, April 12, 1955.

²⁰*U. S. News and World Report*, September 2, 1955.

²¹Pope Pius XII, Christmas Message, December 23, 1956, *U. S. News*, January 4, 1957, p. 110.

²²Edward S. Corwin, *The President, Office and Powers*, pp. 224-225.

²³Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

²⁴Marshall Knappen, *American Foreign Policy*, p. 195.

²⁵Robert A. Dahl, *Congress and Foreign Policy*, p. 264.

²⁶Charles A. Beard, *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War*.

²⁷Wriston, *op. cit.*, pp. 95, 104.

²⁸*Journal of Politics*, Feb., 1949, pp. 171-205.

²⁹As quoted in Wriston, pp. 42-43.

³⁰Graham Stuart, *The Department of State*, p. 344.

³¹*Memoirs* (New York: MacMillan, 1948, vol. 1), p. 200.

³²Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 206-210.

³³*Speaking Frankly*, p. 43.

³⁴Corwin, *op. cit.*, p. 270.

³⁵Report on Foreign Affairs, Recommendation 7 and 8.

³⁶House of Representatives, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Dep't. of State Appropriations Bill, *Committee Print*, pp. 7-8.

³⁷James L. McCamy, *The Administration of American Foreign Affairs*, p. 356.

³⁸"Seven Great Errors of U. S. Foreign Policy", *New Leader*, Dec., 24-31, 1956.

³⁹George Kennan, *American Diplomacy 1900-1950*, pp. 89-90.

Dale Carnegie and American Diplomacy

CURTIS CATE

ANY AMERICAN who goes to Europe these days and who is not content to be insulated from a perilous exposure to native life behind the cellophane wrapping of a guided tour is bound to be asked one question. It won't be a question about anything as spectacular as President Eisenhower's new helicopters, the elephantiasis of the American automobile, of the future of the rock n' roll. The question for Europeans is a more urgent one. As a distinguished Frenchman recently asked me in Paris: "And what about your Monsieur Dudul?" He was referring, of course, to Mr. John Foster Dulles.

Now it would have been simple to have answered this question by expressing a personal distaste for a gentleman who, despite the thick clouds of incense in which he has been enveloped by certain journalists, falls short of being the greatest Secretary of State in our history. But I couldn't help recalling Tocqueville's warning in his *Democracy in America* that seeking the explanation of events exclusively in the character, ideas, and weaknesses of those who happen to preside over the destinies of a society at a particular moment is a failing of monarchist historians. Even for those of us who are neither monarchists nor historians it is only a partial explanation to say that Mr. Dulles behaves like Mr. Dulles because he is Mr. Dulles. And so, when confronted with this recurrent question, I usually found myself answering that many

of the recent contradictions in American foreign policy may arise from our desire, amounting at times to a morbid obsession, to win new friends and influence new peoples abroad; and that they might, therefore, be attributable as much to the philosophy of Dale Carnegie as to the idiosyncracies of our Secretary of State.

Mr. Dale Carnegie's view of life is one that hardly needs an introduction. His is an optimistic, and thus a characteristically American, philosophy. In this confident vision of life, the world is basically a friendly place, where we do not have to resign ourselves fatalistically to having enemies and to being surrounded by people we cordially dislike; it is a place where, with the proper know-how, we can neutralize all ill-will and undermine all hostilities. It is a world in which every stranger is a potential friend.

The French humorist Pierre Daninos recently remarked that all over the world people will tell you, when first introduced, that they are happy to meet you. But Americans, he says, genuinely appear to mean it: "When we French say 'very happy to meet you', we might just as well be offering our condolences or saying 'So long'. We never think for a moment of being happy, for we already know enough people as it is. But in the United States it's just the opposite. People there are delighted to get to know you and they seem to have been waiting for this blessed mo-