

to historical truth. As the eminent diplomatic historian Charles C. Tansill states, in his authoritative forward to Dr. Kubek's study, this is a book that must be read by "any American who wants to know why the present sawdust Caesar, Khrushchev, can insult at will the President of the United States. . . ."

Reviewed by HENRY M. ADAMS

Answering Pilate

***The City of Man*, by W. Warren Wagar.**
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963. 310 pp.
\$5.

IN THE WORDS of the author this is "a study of the search for a philosophy of world order in recent thought." Appropriately, the study briefly recounts the major expressions of the idea of a world civilization from the beginnings of recorded history to the present century. Then, in the context of the crisis of this century—a crisis described in the usual terms of alienation, spiritual sickness and civilizational breakdown—Mr. Wagar begins his study of the recent and contemporary prophets of world order. Wells, Toynbee, Julian Huxley, Teilhard de Chardin, Jaspers, Hocking, Northrop and Sorokin are all here, together with a number of lesser lights.

After presenting the ideas of these thinkers which are germane to the subject and after discussing the several facets of the problem of world integration—philosophical, cultural, religious, economic and political—the all-important question of who will integrate the integrators is raised. No longer is the real danger one of each of the several forces for world order proceeding according to its own dogma. (The Soviet sphere is noted as the only significant exception.) "Rather the danger now is that we tend to believe

nothing at all," and that ours is "rapidly becoming a world without Truth." We must therefore strive to find a middle course between fanatical and aggressive dogmatism and an indifference or apathy born of relativism. This middle course is defined by Mr. Wagar as "the responsible use of freedom to pool our finite truths in a world mind, a racial will, a policy for Man." (It is hardly necessary to note the experiences such terms recall.) We must "will to agree" and with free minds work "with passion and sincerity to reach tentative agreement on values, goals, and knowledge."

This is an admirable sentiment, but it is little more. After its expression one is immediately introduced to a periodization of history which is not only lacking in originality, but rather is an excellent example of what is perhaps the cardinal illness of our age—a refusal to accept the human condition and an eagerness to flee into a scheme of imminent salvation or redemption. There are "three great life-phases"; the childhood of the race in which man accepted or possessed an absolute truth, the period of adolescence characterized by the relativism of all values, and the period of maturity in which man lives in agreement with his fellows "beyond dogma and beyond skepticism," but in absolute awareness of his finiteness and in absolute faith in his ability "to reach a common definition of what finite truths, subject to unlimited revision, seem cogent to him in the vital present."

This study is at best a severely limited contribution. It does contain a fair statement of the predicament of modern man and it does set forth the best thought of *some* of the leading recent thinkers who have addressed themselves to the problem. The desirable is not, however, the possible, and there consequently is more than a trace of naivete in Mr. Wagar's conclusions, noble as they are. One cannot but note his omissions. The study is essentially a philosophy of history, but there is almost a total lack of appreciation of the significant literature which stands in opposition to his progressivist thesis. Löwith, for example, is noted, but the import of his study is ignored. Voegelin does not receive so much as a footnote. The examples could be multiplied, but perhaps it is sufficient to note that the author's literary hero, as the dust jacket states, is H. G. Wells.

Reviewed by FRANK GRACE

Consensus and Freedom

The Necessary Conditions for a Free Society, edited by Felix Morley. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1963. 239 pp. \$5.95.

IN HIS FOREWORD to Professor Strauss' "Natural Right and History," Jerome Kirwin told now "for many years the political philosophy of responsible government has been a neglected field in American political education." The destructive results are all about us, and nowhere more obviously than in our confusions about the meaning of the word freedom. Our prevailing intelligentsia has taught mostly that freedom is a mere thing, rootless but reified, an end in itself much like the lollipop promised the little boy if he eats his dinner without whimpering. This shallow view has now lost persuasion under rising challenge from a new order of government whose thinkers, however mistaken their philosophizing, have philosophized with diligence. Since in politics as elsewhere, you can't lick something with nothing, the adversary philosophers have sent some of our own people back to a reexamination of what Felix Morley calls "the necessary conditions of a free society." A synthesis of the views he has gathered in this book would yield three conclusions: (1) freedom is not a thing, is never absolute, but is qualified by consensus; (2) it is a means, never an end; (3) the end toward which it is a means is the doing freely those acts which make a community, while leaving a margin for individual innovation or creativity.

Not all three points are made in each of the thirteen papers of the symposium, which show the diversity in training and outlook of their very diverse authors. Several stress, and perhaps unduly, the negative rather than the assertive aspects of freedom: what it is not more than what it is. Taken together, and read in

the light of the insights and inferences of the philosopher Eliseo Vivas, who might be called the anchor man of the symposium, they make a pattern. Professor Vivas is wary of the empiricist's view that man is merely a part of nature: were that true, and the empiricist's nature being a complex of laws, man would be under the laws *determined* rather than free. But the opposite view is likewise untenable: man is not atomistic but, as Aristotle and St. Paul warned, a member of a larger entity. He is conditioned broadly by a consensus, which is the larger entity's way of shaping his character, forming his moral code, in general of house-breaking him for communal life. But the consensus, though it conditions, does not coerce: part of freedom is the free acceptance of the consensus. Nor does consensus package man altogether: loopholes remain through which he may innovate, create, as an individual. Justice Holmes used to say that the judges legislate—but only in the interstices. Vivas' man is not autonomous, but in partial and qualified ways is free.

It follows that man's access to the partial and qualified freedoms must be kept clear. Here is where government presents its dangers. Up to a point it is part of the consensus, beyond that point it threatens freedom. Herrell DeGraff, economist, sees the family as a necessary curb against government encroachment on the children. H. W. Luhnnow, merchant, Ben Moreel, naval engineer and industrialist, Arthur Kemp, economist, stress private property as the boundary government must not cross. Granted an area in which man can be free, then, what can he do with his freedom? Defend enduring values, says John Davenport, journalist. Behave responsibly, says Moreel. Govern himself by religious and moral values, says Judge Emory H. Niles. If a man must resist enticement or oppression by his own government, so much the more must he withstand enemy governments with the confidence and strategic coherence which only spiritual consensus supplies, says General Albert C. Wedemeyer.

In short, a man broadly determined by consensus, uses his partial and qualified freedom for innovations at once reflecting and extending the consensus. Consensus maintains freedom and freedom builds consensus. It is in examining the specific Western consensus that the members of the symposium reach their ultimate agreement. The late Professor Richard M. Weaver saw culture and religion as the twin