

UN was not set up to do much about such an action. In any event it was necessary to go through the discussion in New York and even to make a show of military force before statesmen in Paris and London gave up their last illusions. Robertson's book has some novel material, drawn from interviews with the Canadian leader Lester B. Pearson, and letters or private accounts offered by Guy Mollet, Christian Pineau and others. The material shows Pearson's attempts to mediate between the British and the UN, and the collusion between Britain, France, and Israel. It makes even more unconvincing the asserted innocence of the British in face of the accusation that they knew of the impending Israeli attack and timed their own military moves accordingly. Still, this sort of revelation does not change much, as no one in his right mind ever believed the British innocent of collusion with the Israelis. As for Pearson's work, it is good to have this new account, but then Pearson could only be a broker in Suez diplomacy, not a principal.

A. J. Barker's *Suez: The Seven Day War* is a retired British officer's account of planning, hostilities, and retreat, and sets out everything important without making judgments of individual military reputations. Barker blames the politicians—although one cannot be sure he really blames them: he thinks they gave impossible tasks to the military. A non-British and nonmilitary reviewer might find it easier to point a finger at some of the British commanders, maybe the C. in C., General Sir Charles Keightley, a "cavalryman," who set on foot a complex military operation reminiscent of the invasion of France in 1944. This overestimate of the Egyptians, or sheer unwillingness to risk troops or military reputations, resulted in highly questionable tactics, especially the five-day softening up of Egypt by air power, deemed necessary while the lumbering convoy moved west from Malta. Poor Keightley should not get all the blame. But the reviewer finds Barker's book, despite its merits, exasperating, for surely someone could have done better at Suez, someone could have kicked this operation into high gear, so that when it had the go-ahead from the politicians its forces could have fallen on the Egyptians like a ton of bricks. The Egyptian Army's incompetence was not altogether unknown. What good were all the new administrative changes in the British Army, as set out in detail by Snyder; what good were the UN meals and plane flights and oratory; what good was the grand armada that showed up off Port Said early on November 6, a forest of masts coming over the horizon, when there was this infernal

delay? Barker relates that the weaknesses of the Suez operation are still inherent in the British military establishment. One wonders if some new Lord Haldane could not take over that establishment, institute some judicious retirements perhaps with brevet promotions, maybe giving away free swagger sticks to all retiring cavalymen, and put things in better order. But, then, it is always easy to offer advice.

Reviewed by ROBERT H. FERRELL

Two Lookout Points

Conversations with Walter Lippmann, with an introduction by Edward Weeks, Boston: Atlantic Monthly-Little Brown, 1965. 304 pp. \$5.95.

Unfinished Revolution: America and the Third World, by Cyrus L. Sulzberger, New York: Atheneum, 1965. 304 pp. \$5.95.

THE CONNECTING link between these two books is their concern with American foreign policy and world affairs in general. The backgrounds and points of observation, however, are somewhat different. Mr. Lippmann, sometimes described as a pundit, spends most of his time in Washington, with occasional trips to take soundings in European capitals. As Mr. Weeks tells us in his introduction, Lippmann "from June to September walks the beaches and the uplands of Mount Desert in Maine in reflection." Mr. Sulzberger, on the other hand, correspondent and commentator for *The New York Times*, is the very model of the restless, peripatetic reporter, logging thousands of miles every year in his search for news developments and including Asia, Africa, and Latin America in his beat as well as Europe.

So it may be that the occupational hazard of Mr. Lippmann is failure to see the trees for the wood, of Mr. Sulzberger to see the wood for the trees. The observer of world events from a distance almost inevitably succumbs at times to the lure of making facile generalizations and sweeping predictions. The down-to-earth reporter, more familiar with the details of many individual pictures, may miss the

broad outline in preoccupation with these details. However, both Mr. Lippmann and Mr. Sulzberger put forward interesting ideas for the reader to ponder and thresh out in his mind.

Apart from one conspicuous blind spot, Walter Lippmann possesses many qualities that account for his reputation as dean of the more serious commentators. He can look back on more than half a century of experience in observing the American national scene and the evolution of American foreign policy from the age of innocence before the first World War to the present era of global commitments. His style is vigorous, incisive, muscular. He is essentially pragmatic and, apart from the blind spot, is not the prisoner of any dogma. In his present conversations with CBS news correspondents over a period of years, from 1960 until early 1965, he frequently displays shrewd insights and offers hardheaded advice.

So he recognizes what every European election seems to confirm: the decline of class struggle and extremism and the trend toward middle-of-the-road policies in Western Europe. Yeats' gloomy line, "The Center does not hold," was true of the 30's, not of the 60's. And, in regard to anti-American dictators like Sukarno and Nasser, he shows more backbone and horse sense than the State Department has mustered, suggesting that, if Nasser tells us to jump in the lake with our economic aid we should address a note to him, asking him pointblank "Do you want our aid or not?" and abide by his answer.

The blind spot in Lippmann's thinking is his refusal, expressed on many occasions, to endorse strong measures necessary to deter the spread of communism. He was shocked by the policy of containment, advocated by George Kennan, not because it accomplished too little, but because he thought it attempted too much. In the testing periods of decisive confrontation with Soviet and Chinese communism, in the Berlin blockade, the Korean War, the Red Chinese grab for Quemoy and Matsu in 1958, Lippmann's trumpet gave out a very uncertain and negative sound. He is our most polished anti-anti-Communist, most fertile in ingenious arguments designed to prove that, while communism may be undesirable, there are cogent reasons why there should be no positive steps of resistance in the particular place or area where the latest Communist offensive has been launched.

This trait is not so marked in the present book, perhaps because no one of the interviews occurred in a moment of acute confrontation. But he does convey the impression of underrating the serv-

ice which Konrad Adenauer's simple, straightforward anti-communism rendered to bolstering European freedom and he seems to overpraise General de Gaulle. He never, for instance, seems to pose the question whether de Gaulle's reach does not far exceed his grasp, whether a France that was crushed in six weeks in 1940, that has been beaten in Indo-China and in Algeria can seriously pretend to the role of an independent great power.

One disadvantage about the republication of interviews given at various periods is that a statement which may have been correct at one time may now be inapplicable. So Lippman gives the respective economic growth figures for the United States and the Soviet Union in 1960 at \$15 billion and \$12 billion respectively. This was approximately accurate for 1960; but today the United States has pulled much farther ahead.

The connecting thread in Mr. Sulzberger's approach to world affairs is the explosive aftermath of Woodrow Wilson's ideal of national self-determination. At first its effects were mainly felt in Europe, in the disruption, temporary in one case, permanent in the other, of such multinational states as the old Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. One of the most striking features of the aftermath of the second World War has been the spread of the demand for self-determination to the former colonial peoples of Asia and Africa. It is a frequent German complaint that self-determination, a term very imperfectly understood by some of the Asian and African peoples to whom it has been granted, is still withheld from the Germans.

Perhaps it was not so much Wilson's theory as the collapse of European overseas rule in Indo-China and Malaya, Indonesia and Burma that set the stage for independence after the end of the war. Japan was crushed; but it was psychologically and physically impossible to reimpose the old pattern of colonial administration. At any rate, as Mr. Sulzberger points out, there is now an immense arc, delimiting a southern hemisphere, stretching from Morocco along the southern shore of the Mediterranean over the Nile, past Suez and on through Asia. South of this arc are countries held together by poverty and determination to stay aloof from cold war alignments. These non-aligned lands are often referred to as the Third World. And Mr. Sulzberger is convinced that the fate of this World is a particular responsibility of the United States. He elaborates as follows on this theme:

Economically speaking, the Pandora's box of nationalism opened by Wilson's ideas on self-determination has bequeathed to the present

generation problems as intricate as the strategic issue of controlling nuclear weapons and possibly as dangerous. We can't escape our obligation to help and we can't help enough to escape our obligation.

Two leading personalities in the Third World are Nasser in Egypt and Castro in Cuba. Mr. Sulzberger has talked with both and presents them in interesting silhouette. Nasser's attitude, he believes, is dominated by aversion to Israel; Castro does not foresee any speedy improvement in relations with Washington. As a rule-of-thumb guide to American policy the author recommends three general rules: always keep the initiative, exploit the inevitable, and stay in with the temporary political outs.

The Ugly American gives an oversimplified picture of some of America's social and psychological difficulties in dealing with peoples incredibly poorer and with differing cultural and religious backgrounds. Victor Lasky, in *The Ugly Russian*, offers concrete proof that the Russians have also failed to find all the answers in trying to win the sympathy of the uncommitted peoples and their governments, that Soviet failures in foreign aid are no less blatant than ours. One difficulty, of which Mr. Sulzberger is certainly conscious, is that just those countries which are most in need of American and other outside capital and technical knowhow are often ruled by dictators or cliques morbidly suspicious of "neo-colonialism" and inclined to nationalize everything in sight. Indonesia and Burma are outstanding examples.

Reviewed by WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

The New Leviathan

The Liberal Establishment, by M. Stanton Evans, *New York: The Devin-Adair Company. 352 pp. \$5.95.*

It is no longer necessary to argue that a Liberal Establishment exists nor that it acts with determination and an almost unchallenged unanimity. The history of the past decades allows no other interpretation. As rapidly as an issue emerges, a Liberal "line" invests it, the troops are mobilized, and the battle joined. So smoothly is this accomplished that the frustrated Conserva-

tive must fight off the temptation to feel that there is conscious coordination, that in fact a conspiracy governs the Liberal community.

This simplistic belief, however, misses the point and underrates the power of the Liberal Establishment. For the conspiratorial concept is not a logical necessity in determining the nature and structure of the ideological monolith which dominates today's political landscape. To switch the metaphor, a few drops of dye dropped into a glass of water will color it with only the most gentle kind of agitation. It would be easier for Conservatives if the Liberal Establishment were a conspiracy. Conspiracies can be broken up. What we are dealing with is a state of mind which has seized the cultural and governmental power structure.

This state of mind can be defined in analyzing the past or in attempting to deal, politically or journalistically, with the present. The individuals who make up the Liberal power structure can be named and their ideological configurations noted. It can be shown that the Liberals have established themselves in every field of endeavor and have even sent the Rossites and Vierecks to invade the Conservative phalanx. The mass media, the government, the intellectual disciplines, even part of the business community, are now the province of a group which considered itself martyred and disenfranchised less than forty years ago.

It is in this context that M. Stanton Evans's latest book, *The Liberal Establishment*, assumes its significance. For Mr. Evans is an acute analyst and a lucid writer. His wits and his reporting skills have been honed by his refusal to be one of the journalistic gang, and being in the opposition he has been compelled to work harder and to be surer of his facts than newspaper editors demand of those who, having paid their dues at the Establishment's union hall, need only coast on this association to make their mark. Beyond the descriptive and the analytic, Mr. Evans has set out to place in focus the besetting question of our times: What is happening to the American Republic and its traditions of freedom under the impact of what Vernon Parrington called the Coercive State?

In his concluding chapter, Mr. Evans sums up the price the nation has paid for its submission to the Liberal power structure. "Property rights, due process, rights of conscience, the free press—all fallen impartially before the advance of Liberal power." To these he might have added, as he does implicitly and explicitly throughout his book, the right of opposition. For like the greedy wife who says, "What's yours is mine and what's mine is mine," the Liberal Establishment works with