John Foster Dulles: The Last Two Years

LOUIS L. GERSON

AT NOON on a brisk January day in 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower rose to take his second oath of office. Near him on a platform in front of the United States Capitol was his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. The past year had been difficult for both men. In addition to the normal burdens of leadership, physical infirmities had bound them closer than before—Eisenhower, recovering from a heart attack, had suffered from ileitis. The new year, the eve of Dulles' seventieth birthday, marked the fiftieth anniversary of his first experience in diplomacy and the beginning of his fifth year as Secretary. His hair had turned greyer; his face more drawn. He had withstood an operation for cancer and it seemed that he had weathered that dread disease. If overwork, ill health, and age had attacked his body, there was no sign of weakness or flagging determination. Dulles, James Reston would comment a year later, was "still the hardest-working man in town, and still stands above the foreign secretaries of Britain, France, Germany, Japan or the Soviet Union."[1]

Dulles was the architect of American foreign policy and its principal negotiator. He had full support of the President. No Secretary of modern times, not even Acheson, had more power. He wielded this unexampled might at a time when the United States was strongest of all nations, and yet insecure. Dulles guarded jealously his relations with the President. It was crucial to have Eisenhower's confidence. Throughout his tenure as Secretary he kept the President fully informed. Later, after retirement from the presidency, Eisenhower recalled Dulles' vast knowledge and capability and that he knew of no occasion when Dulles made important decisions without discussing them.[2] While in Washington, Dulles saw the President almost

daily, in addition to talking by telephone. After each conversation, whether across a table or by phone, he wrote out a memorandum for the files. When the Secretary was away, particularly if negotiating abroad, he cabled long dispatches to the White House detailing and analyzing the positions of foreign statesmen, giving his own opinions, often requesting guidance. Frequently Dulles' dispatches to the President were accompanied by reports from ambassadors and other members of the Department not always in agreement with his views or recommendations.

Dulles had the misfortune—some would say fortune—to represent the United States when the world was undergoing unprecedented scientific, political, economic, and social revolutions. His tenure had begun when the Stalin era ended and Republican responsibility began. It continued through an era of increased disarray within the Western alliance, the appearance of intercontinental missiles and nuclear stalemate, the emergence of Peking as a rival capital of world communism, and the stepped-up challenge from Moscow and Peking for the minds of millions of people new to freedom in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and elsewhere. In his attempts to ensure a secure and peaceful world he was both the scapegoat for all the unresolved ills and the symbol of American determination to meet the challenges of the mid-twentieth century.

The Secretary opened his second term against a background of mounting criticism at home and abroad. While sensitive to disapproval, he did not allow personal considerations to deter him from courses he believed best for the country. He wanted people to judge him not by his motives, but by results of his actions. He rejected the solutions of the realists who thought that force could disappear only through superior force, of the intellectuals who based their hopes on reason, of the sentimentalists who looked to emotion,

Judgments of religious leaders bothered him. "The church people," he wrote in 1958 to his brother-in-law, the Reverend Deane Edwards, "have been clamoring for a long time for the application of moral principles to public affairs and to foreign relations. Now when we try to do that, and explain what we are doing—and foreign policy has to be explained—we are accused of hypocrisy."[3] Attacks from ecclesiastical spokesmen came at the very time his reputation among political leaders began to improve. "Incredible as it might have seemed half-way through 1957," Richard Goold-Adams would remark, "by the end of his last year, 1958, Dulles' presence was to be a reassurance and a comfort to many of his colleagues in the Atlantic alliance."[4] When Dulles died, in May, 1959, they missed him badly.

I

DULLES AT the start of Eisenhower's Second term was resolved to mend the Western alliance, torn by the Suez Crisis of 1956, reconcile differences with the British and French, unite Western Europe, develop a world strategy to meet the economic, political, and military challenge of the two Communist colossi, and if possible find a solution to nuclear proliferation and disarmament.

Dulles was not anti-British, anti-French, pro-German; he was pro-European. The Secretary was close to Britain by inheritance. He loved France, savored its culture, relished its food, delighted in speaking its tongue, but despaired over its unstable government. He admired Adenauer, but was not so sure of the Germans. He wanted to include Germany within a federated Western European community.

Long before he became Secretary, Dulles had argued for Western European unity. He never wavered. After the Suez crisis he labored to make NATO the West's sword and shield. Despite some strengthening of organization in the last months of 1957—the power of NATO Council increased and there was a unified NATO position on disarmament—he was not satisfied. Britain was more interested in the sword than the shield; France, fearful of Germany, wanted more freedom to deal with the Russians; West Germany, suspicious of France and apprehensive about Russia, demanded ever greater support from the United States; all the continental European countries were in doubt as to their precise part in NATO strategy.

During his last years Dulles groped to resolve two dilemmas which kept the United States from developing a world strategy: the disparity between alliances and collective defense, and irreconcilability of the regional and world-wide approaches. European nations had a broad concept of alliances: members should support each other on all political issues and in all areas. Dulles took a less inclusive view, for otherwise the United States would associate itself with colonialism everywhere. He was sure that the Senate clearly understood this when it voted for the NATO treaty. Most certainly NATO could become a strong force if the United States adhered to the European idea of alliances. But this would mean that Washington would have to write off non-European areas.

Dulles despaired over the myopia of regional groups, their unwillingness to consider the interests of others and the importance of mutual relations. Following the Suez crisis there were queries, public and private: Could the allies rely on American commitments to use power? Would the United States risk general war to stop local aggression? Would the United States withdraw, go back on its pledges, and thus start a process which would spread without limit? Would Washington misuse its nuclear arsenal? Most annoying was that each geographic region felt strongly about threats to itself and showed little concern for others. NATO powers, for example, objected to American defense of Taiwan, containment of Communist China. All these problems had existed before the launching of the first Sputnik on October 4, 1957. Now the intercontinental missiles added a new and more awesome dimension.

Perhaps a single organization could resolve these dilemmas. But then the new instrument might compete with the United Nations, and alienate neutrals. Some sort of interlocking system? If so, what and how? The best place to coordinate policies was Washington—capital of the world. This might settle the problem of communication with regional centers, reduce travel, create greater unity. Latin American nations had so concluded when they set up headquarters of the Organization of American States (OAS) in Washington. Would SEATO and NATO members agree? Dulles thought not. There was imperative need to encourage and develop interdependence, the insurmountable question was how to do it. How could grand designs become realities when political instability plagued even democratic countries? The postwar record of American diplomacy showed that the United States with full support of both political parties carried out long-range policies with unfettered resolve and restraint. It was possible to find ways to increase confidence in Washington, but trust, Dulles maintained, was a mutual matter: tasks allocated, responsibility shared. Every nation wanted to be in the missile business; none wished to be mere cannon—that is, missile—fodder. But could the United States share its nuclear arsenal

and knowledge with all members of the alliance? Could Washington place its full confidence in the governments of Great Britain, France, Germany when opposition leaders expressed views contrary to the basic idea of the alliance system? And even if the United States did so, would that unite these countries in a common policy or lead them to rely more heavily on self-defense?

The Suez issue, Dulles felt, brought to the surface some basic contradictions in the Western alliance. Since the end of the second World War, Western Europe had been divided and weak. Despite some successes, American efforts for unity had encountered opposition, partly because of conviction that the United States in any event stood ready to give them economic, political, and military support. The Suez crisis had made clear that the European allies could not depend on automatic American support. Dulles reflected that there was only one way for Britain and France to solve the dilemma: Western Europe must combine, become a powerful Third Force equal to that of the United States or Soviet Russia. The Secretary went back to his favorite thesis that federation rarely occurs as a result of thought but mainly out of emotion generated by fear and weakness. Western Europe would never unite as long as it continued to rely on the United States; but once the Allies recognized they could not count on Washington, they would integrate; he expected a rise of strong anti-Americanism but was willing to pay that price for European unity; of course, he did not want anti-Americanism, neither did he want to buy pro-Americanism by leading Western Europe to believe the United States would support any course which some or all of its nations believed to be right. Such were Dulles' private thoughts.

The Secretary was aware of the great difficulty of maintaining alliances in time of peace. American historical experience demonstrated that alliances did not last beyond the emergency which brought them about. He tried to introduce into NATO features to counter divisive tendencies. He hoped that by the time his tenure was concluded political consultation would have improved. Most of all, Dulles hoped that Western Europe would become a truly united political, economic, and military third force which would relieve the United States of the great burden of world leadership.

As for SEATO, the only multilateral pact that he added to the network of American alliances, he expected progress, but he did not anticipate any spectacular developments, and he acknowledged that the pact represented the hardest task the United States had undertaken.[5] On the opening day of the SEATO conference, September 2, 1954, Dulles said that SEATO was not a replica of NATO—the United States would not commit substantial forces to it. Indeed, not wishing to tie the United States too firmly to weak nations, he shied away from use of the popular term SEATO, trying to substitute MANPAC—the Manila Pact. In Southeast Asia there was no fixed line between Communists and anti-Communists. The nations were unstable, with no local initiative and no local will to resist. The objective of the Manila Conference, Dulles told the eight-nation gathering, was to make clear that "an attack upon the treaty area would occasion a reaction so united, so strong, and so well placed that the aggressor would lose more than it could hope to gain." The United States could best serve "by developing the deterrent of mobile striking power, plus strategically placed reserves."

He wanted collaboration with Britain. He did not advertise it; he thought it important not to. But his chiefs of mission abroad and his lieutenants at the Department were aware of it. That collaboration had been sadly shaken by the Suez crisis.

II

THE SECOND decade of the cold war was one of promise and opportunity, but also danger. A new period in American-Soviet relations followed the failure of the Geneva Conference of 1955. Gone was the Stalin era with constant threats of force and a never-ending stream of vituperative anti-Western propaganda. The Stalinist regime had created fear throughout the world. American determination had convinced Stalin that he could not gain his objectives unless he was ready to resort to major war —which he did not want. After 1955 the new Soviet leadership decided to challenge the United States with economic weapons and "political warfare." Eisenhower and Dulles feared this change of tactic, although it was aimed at the area of America's greatest strength. The President believed that in economic as in military warfare, the nation on the offensive had the most flexibility. The defending power had to secure an entire area, while the aggressor concentrated on any point of his own choosing. Democracies were under a handicap: they had to be on the defensive, anticipate struggles, debate every issue, publicize actions in advance. Dictatorships could move secretly as well as selectively.

Dulles began his second term with a belief that the monolithic power of the Soviet Union and its Communist structure were deteriorating. Since Khrushchev's famous secret speech of February 25, 1956, which exposed the criminality of Stalin, Communist parties throughout the world were in disarray, leaving the satellites moving wildly through the political skies. Within the Soviet Union people were demanding intellectual freedom. A trend had established itself which might, so Dulles thought, prove irresistible. All this augured well for the world, but there were inherent dangers—confronted with difficult, hazardous, and unsatisfactory choices Khrushchev and Bulganin might take risks in foreign relations which could explode into general war.

At the NATO meeting in Paris, December 8-15, 1956, Dulles urged moral and military pressures to undermine the Soviet and Chinese systems. It was more important than ever, he said, to conform to the lofty ideals expressed in the United Nations Charter and Article One of NATO—to settle international disputes by peaceful means. Despite many imperfections the United Nations should have support. Its recent prestige and influence made it a power for good; to destroy it would be disastrous. Until recently the idea of a "just war" had been part of religion, but now it was clear to secular society as well that modern war would inflict more injustices than it could eliminate. Morality and expediency rejected resort to war as an instrument of national policy. The exercise of restraint, even under great provocation, so the Secretary told representatives of NATO, is not proof of cowardice or irresolution, but of moral strength.[6]

After Khrushchev assumed sole power on March 27, 1958, Dulles elaborated his view on how to deal with the Soviet Union. Khrushchev, he told the Western European chiefs of mission in Paris on May 9, presented a great advantage to the United States. But Khrushchev was more dangerous than Stalin—excitable, irresponsible, short-tempered, subtle, devious, impulsive. His long speech denouncing Stalin indicated his explosive nature. He had gone into details of Stalin's barbarities, thereby harming the Soviet-dominated world Com-

munist movement. Under Khrushchev there was greater danger of Russian miscalculation. (The Cuban missile crisis would prove Dulles right.) Khrushchev's words seemed reasonable, his actions more pleasant, his more liberal attitude was welcome, but the time had not yet come to relax to his lullaby.

Nothing should happen to discourage Khrushchev from the course which reminded him of La Rochefoucauld's maxim: "Hypocrisy is the homage that vice pays to virtue." The Soviet Union, Dulles said, might very well become what it pretends to be. If the West could force the Soviet Union even to appear to behave decently, that was all to the good. "I have seen lots of tough guys," Dulles recalled, "who have made their pile . . . come to New York and wanted to get into society and . . had to behave differently. They became slightly different people." Dulles did not want to make it too easy for the Soviet Union. "You cannot let them into a house if they are going to steal the silver and furniture." He wanted more proof and a longer probation, but the future looked promising: the Soviet evolution seemed headed in the right direction.

Meanwhile, Khrushchev's conciliatory actions caused concern. They might put the Western alliance in the awkward position of appearing to reject genuine moves toward improving world problems. Dulles noted Soviet efforts to establish special relations with Britain or France, such as the Russians had sought periodically with the United States. If Khrushchev was worried about the nuclear arms race, intercontinental missiles, instability within the satellites, the burden of military expenditures, and the costly competition of space exploration, he did not need to stir up trouble in the Middle East and refuse to talk seriously with Washington about controls.

Khrushchev's threat to Berlin revived the idea of disengagement. Dulles agreed with Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium that it was a naughty word which could not even be translated into a good language like French. In abstract it seemed reasonable, but in reality it meant neutralization and demilitarization of Germany, which Dulles thought neither desirable nor practical, nor a safeguard against war. The idea of a neutral Germany was dangerous. "If I had to choose between a neutralized Germany and a Germany in the Soviet bloc," Dulles said heatedly, "it might be almost better to have it in that bloc. That clearly is not acceptable. But so too is disengagement."[7]

During his last years, disarmament and proliferation of nuclear weapons weighed heavily. Until the first Sputnik launching he was skeptical of formulas which spelled out exact balances of armaments. Military power, he thought, was difficult to weigh. "Reduction of armaments," he wrote Paul Hoffman in 1952, "is more apt to be an evidence of restored confidence than by itself a means of restoring confidence."[8] He had agreed with Churchill that American superiority in atomic weapons had been the decisive deterrent to Stalin. But now all was changed. For the first time the continental United States lay exposed to devastation, American world strategy had come into question, its moral leadership challenged.

Soviet advances in nuclear weaponry and delivery systems had forced the United States to continue its traditional policy to deter all-out war. At the same time Soviet nuclear capability tended to diminish American nuclear power as a deterrent to local aggression. Washington had to maintain ready military forces for both massive and limited retaliation to prevent enemy attacks on the United States, its allies, and friends. Dulles anticipated increased Communist pressure for local gains through overt or covert military action as a result

of the Communist belief that their nuclear power would cancel American ability to fight a general war, except of course in case of a large-scale attack against the American and allied positions. The allies doubted that the United States would risk its own destruction in their behalf. The Secretary saw the need for flexible military strength which would convince an aggressor that the United States and the allies had the ability to counter local aggression and also convince the allies that such affairs would not invite all-out nuclear war. He resolved to do his best to decrease local conflicts which might escalate into general war.[9]

As for an end to nuclear testing with its poisonous effects, he feared the moral isolation of the United States. In the spring of 1958 he urged a suspension of testing, despite some objections from the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission. (President John F. Kennedy would later take credit for such a treaty with the Soviet Union.) He held back because Great Britain and France wanted to become members of the nuclear club. It was ironic that the United States had to take a propaganda beating when in fact it was its two allies that had forestalled negotiations with the Soviet Union. Privately they urged Washington to continue exploding hydrogen bombs, publicly they condemned the action. One way to overcome this problem would have been to amend the Atomic Energy Act to permit the allies to share information gained from testing. Dulles doubted that Congress would do so; it would allow Britain but not France or any other country to have access to this material. At his urging Congress did admit Britain to atomic findings, and wounded Gallic sensibilities.

III

During the first week of February, 1959, Dulles flew to Paris and Bonn, his last overseas journey, in pain again, nauseated, and finding it hard to sleep. He worried about the Berlin crisis, was concerned about Charles de Gaulle—recently inaugurated President of the Fifth French Republic for seven years. He had met de Gaulle twice in 1958; their talks had been unsatisfactory. The charismatic Frenchman, then Prime Minister, had embarked on a mission to make France feel it was a world power. His France, he said, must have a leading part in NATO and become a nuclear power. The United States had frustrated his design and he blamed Washington for undermining the French position in North Africa.

Dulles thought the charge ridiculous. The United States, he told de Gaulle, wanted France to keep its influence in Algeria, but was against its policies there. Fighting would extend into Tunisia and Morocco, encourage nationalist elements to look to the Soviet Union, and might lead to a defeat like that of Dienbienphu. (It did.) He recalled that the French government which surrendered Indochina had killed the European Defense Community. The government which surrendered Algeria would kill NATO. (It is trying to do this too.) At the December meeting in Paris, de Gaulle suggested a three-power directorate—France, Great Britain, the United States. He told Dulles that as long as the United States ran the whole show he would not cooperate, or participate in discussions on atomic stockpiles and intercontinental missiles. The Secretary's talk with de Gaulle on February 6, 1959, was surprisingly cordial, but inconclusive.[10] The bright spot was the French President's approval of the way the United States had handled the Berlin crisis.

Chancellor Adenauer was the last statesman Dulles saw in Europe before his death. When he arrived at the Schaumburg Palace the German leader knew Dulles was sick, and feared the worst. Their friendship began with the first meeting in 1953 and

had deepened after the Suez crisis. Each was religious, each thought the other the better statesman. Like Dulles, Adenauer believed in European unity. The Chancellor did not think Britain or France capable of developing or continuing a firm European policy. Churchill, while in power, was old and ill, and the French government weak and ever-changing. After Suez Adenauer was depressed by British military ineptness and wondered whether London could be relied on to fight for West Germany. Europe, Adenauer said to Dulles, was imprisoned by its past. Only the United States could bring Europe into the mid-twentieth century. He did not want to be alone on the Continent with hysterical France. To Adenauer, Dulles was an "angel from heaven."

Adenauer knew he could rely on Dulles to check the Soviet Union, and Dulles trusted the German leader to keep the Federal Republic aligned with the West, away from neutralism, away from any possible temptation of Soviet promises, and a return to militarism. Despite the Chancellor's abiding confidence in Dulles he continually demanded assurances of American support. This the Secretary found annoying, but understandable.

Their last meeting was pleasant, and reassuring to Adenauer. The Chancellor was a solicitous, perfect host. En route to the Cologne airport Dulles suddenly turned to Adenauer and said: "I know you know I've been feeling pretty badly on this trip . . . some people think this is a recurrence of cancer . . . I want to say to you that I myself don't think so . . . I must have an operation for hernia when I return to Washington. . . . I mention it to you so that you won't be shocked when you hear about the operation and so you won't think it was because of a return of cancer." Adenauer prayed that Dulles was right.[11]

The operation disclosed the spread of cancer. As soon as Dulles learned the ominous news he sent a message to Adenauer. He did not want the Chancellor to think that he had deceived him. "I recall our conversation going to the airport and the statement I made to you concerning my condition. I am sorry to have to inform you that what I have told you turned out to be wrong. But I am confident I can overcome this." A few days later he sent two photographs showing them together, one autographed and the other for Adenauer to inscribe for Dulles. To Adenauer this gesture seemed a way of saying a final good-bye.[12]

On a warm day, April 11, 1959, Allen Dulles called on the President who was then at a summer cottage in Augusta, Georgia. He brought bad news: his brother was getting weaker, pain spreading through his body and into his neck. The Secretary wanted to return to Walter Reed Hospital and resign. Eisenhower did not wish to hear about a resignation; he did not want to hurry matters, to do anything that might disturb the Secretary. "I don't want to take any action that would tend to discourage him. Please tell him this personally." But Dulles had made the decision; his brother produced his letter of resignation written in longhand on the familiar lawyer's yellow, lined paper. Dulles knew he was dying and his last official letter was his epitaph:

> . . . I was brought up in the belief that this nation of ours was not merely a self-serving society, but was founded with a mission to help build a world where liberty and justice would prevail. Today that concept faces a formidable and ruthless challenge from international Communism. This has made it manifestly difficult to adhere steadfastly to our national idealism, our national mission, and at the same time avoid the awful catastrophe of war.[13]

[1]"The Amazing Mr. Dulles," New York *Times*, Feb. 25, 1958.

[2]Interview with Dwight D. Eisenhower.

[3]Dulles to Deane Edwards, Dec. 4, 1958, Dulles MSS, deposited in Princeton University Library. Hereafter cited as Dulles MSS.

[4]Richard Goold-Adams, *The Time of Power: Appraisal of John Foster Dulles*, (London, 1962), p. 272.

[5]Dulles' draft speech to NATO meeting, Paris, Dec. 8-15, 1956, Dulles MSS. "Remarks" to Council on Foreign Relations, June 7, 1957, *ibid.*

[6]See also "Report from NATO" (May 1956), address in Washington, Dept. of State press release 246; "Outline for statement" to SEATO Council meeting, Canberra, Mar. 11-13, 1957, and "talking paper" to chiefs of mission, NATO meeting, Bonn and Paris, April 30-May 7, 1957, Dulles MSS.

[7]"Remarks of the Secretary," opening session, Western European chiefs of mission meeting, Paris, May 9, 1958, Dulles MSS. See also "The Role of Negotiation," address to National Press Club, Washington, Jan. 16, 1958, Dept. of State press release 18, 19; Dulles to Kingsley Martin, editor of the *New Statesman*, Feb. 6, 1958 (published in *New Statesman*, Feb. 8), Dulles MSS.

[8]Letter of Jan. 21, 1952, Dulles MSS.

[9]Draft outline, talk at Quantico, June 14, 1957, Dulles MSS; "Disarmament and Peace," address to the nation, July 22, 1957, Dept. of State press release 430.

[10]"Points of Conversation with General De Gaulle, June 30, 1958"; "Folder on Paris for talks with De Gaulle, July 3-6, 1958"; "Ideas Used in Talk with De Gaulle, July 3-6, 1958"; Dulles to Adenauer, July 7, 1958, Dulles MSS.

[11]Andrew H. Berding, *Dulles on Diplomacy* (Princeton, 1965), p. 42.

[12]*Ibid.*, p. 43. Also Adenauer to Dulles, Apr. 30, 1959, Dulles MSS.

[13]Letter of Apr. 15, 1959, Dulles MSS. Interview with Allen Dulles.

Love Not War In The Soviet Union

"On Maneuvers with the Red Army" by Desmond Smith. THE NATION, May 20, 1968, p. 662.

Though they support the second largest army in the world, the Soviets have a genuine horror of war . . . . It has occurred to me that the presence of this huge home army is in itself an encouraging sign. The Soviets make it work for the state's goals in a dozen diverse ways — from ceremonial parades, to its mighty economic role, to its chief duties as a Communist training school for the manpower of the nation. Also it is a powerful morale booster. As I traveled about Russia last summer I kept noticing two billboards, always side by side. The first showed a mother holding a child and was captioned: "For Their Sake We Must Have Peace." The second depicted a steel-helmeted soldier with bayonet fixed: "Ready for the Defense of the Motherland." Almost mortally damaged in 1941, the progress of the revolution Lenin began is still unfinished business inside Russia. The Soviet leadership is showing signs of accommodating itself to the human dimensions of this goal. Meantime, most Soviet citizens feel good when they pass a company of soldiers working on one of the dozen of building sites that nowadays ring Soviet cities. Why not? They strike an American visitor as an eminently sensible use of the military mind.

Are We Growing The Right Crops?

CHARLES MORROW WILSON

THESE ARE rough times for students and prophets of world food supplies. Never before in published history have departments of agriculture or similar branches of national government blown hot and cold with more inconsistency. Never before have predictions of imperiling starvation and ruinous over-supplies of food collided with such bewildering concussion. And never before were such bumper crops of *non sequiturs* and paradoxes in simultaneous publication.

The negative continues to be accentuated with generally competent background scholarship. The Food and Agriculture Organization, a United Nations component whose estimates practically all students of food supplies continue to respect, sketches the world food picture approximately as follows:

About five-eighths of the prevailing world population is already beyond or below the nutritional danger lines. In all, about 103 countries, or comparable population groups, with total census crowding 2 billion, are currently listable as "food deficit" areas. Included here are what are discreetly termed the "LDC's," Less Developed Countries; presumably less developed than the U.S.A., though in crucial areas of food production, as in numerous other mandatory progress realms we are certainly far short of being the whizz kids.

Somewhere near four-fifths of all people now living are not getting enough protein for maximal health levels. Even so, and for the world at large the most painful lacks and lapses are in the areas of malnutrition among the very young. FAO continues to estimate that up to 70 per cent, at minimum no fewer than 350 million babies and children under six are still listable as malnourished—a term now used for an inadequacy, usually chronic, of digestible protein. "Hunger" denotes persisting insufficiency of any kind of calories.