

dare, as with Mr. Ardrey, to deny his credentials. These petty, personal anti-Ardrey shafts have been exploited by the Liberal press, whose premises as to the nature of man are threatened by Mr. Ardrey's works, to dismiss his views as just the fulminations of another reactionary crank. However, the extensive bibliography provided by Mr. Ardrey, comprehending both standard sources and much new material of quite recent dates, may, if his potential antagonists seriously honor their professional vows, give them some pause, and considerable cause to temper their routine disparagement of Mr. Ardrey's work. Unfortunately, it would be out of character (the basic character that is mankind's, as Mr. Ardrey makes clear though so many of his detractors refuse to essay an objective evaluation of his evidence and argument) for them to make a sudden wholesale recantation and to treat Mr. Ardrey and his works with the respect that is their due. While Mr. Ardrey's more patronizing critics are catching up with what's new in their field let all who are eager to learn the latest evidence as to the real nature of man read and enjoy and profit from *The Social Contract* as constructed by Mr. Ardrey.

Reviewed by DEAN TERRILL

The Springs of Prejudice

President Nixon and the Press, by James Keogh, *New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1972. 212 pp. \$8.00.*

IN THE SUMMER of 1969 the President made a swing over the Pacific to watch the Apollo 11 splashdown, and then on into Southeast Asia with a stop in Bucharest on his way home. What Mr. Keogh considers representative East Coast commentary went

as follows: *Newsweek*: the trip was "global showboating"; James Reston in the *New York Times*: a case of "concentrating on politics and publicity," of "dramatizing the secondary questions . . . using them to avoid the primary questions . . ."; Chet Huntley, NBC News: "in spite of pressures on his legislative program and sporadic outbreaks of racial troubles, President Nixon leaves the country tomorrow. . . ." Through much of the press and TV discourse ran a particular animus against the Rumanian stop on the premise that this mild courtesy toward a mildly maverick satellite might annoy the Soviets.

But according to Keogh, who went along as a White House staffer, the President's hosts on the journey saw his coming quite differently. In Manila Keogh and Kissinger met with a group of scholars and newsmen. One of the academics, a former Kissinger student at Harvard, renewed the acquaintance with a rueful, "Well, Dr. Kissinger, I assume that you have come to say goodbye". Rumanians detected in the President's visit a new and more confident reading of Soviet reaction toward United States initiatives more affirmative than on Hungary in 1956 or on Czechoslovakia in the previous summer.

These on-the-spot assessments by foreigners, says Keogh, were the correct ones: the trip was a "significant redefinition of U. S. foreign policy and an important breakthrough to the Eastern European bloc without causing a serious breach in U.S.-Soviet relations," and in Asia Nixon's "principal purpose was to convey personally the central theme of what became known as the Nixon doctrine, particularly the highly sensitive point that from then on the United States expected its Asian allies to do more for themselves. . . ."

But why did so many East Coast commentators miss even a hint of what was so clear in Manila and Bucharest? To Keogh, very much one of their company as a Nixon recruit from among the top editors of *Time*, the explanation is that here and elsewhere "so many reporters, writers and editors in

the big league allowed their doctrinaire approach and disagreement with, as well as dislike for, Richard Nixon to lead them into error and distortion. . . .”

Now personal dislike for a man, even a President, is a subjective matter, and one in which the experienced find no blame. To many of the “beautifully groomed, handsomely tailored, supremely self-assured” newsmen, as Keogh describes them, this somewhat awkward, somewhat shy man, solitary, secretive, incapable in his introverted way of quick familiarity and easy bonhomie, short on small talk and sometimes long on the long talk of political hyperbole—this Nixon was hard to understand and so to like. But personal traits and style—or its (Camelot-type) lack—were not all that impaired Richard Nixon’s standing, as Keogh sees it. A closer clue, he suggests, to the root and real trouble was Harriet Van Horne’s cry of the heart in the New York *Post* that “in intellectual circles, [Nixon’s] Washington is increasingly regarded as a city under enemy occupation. . . .”

It is of course true that Atlantic metropolitan journalism is a branch of the intellectual community, as Grade A journalism is in any country. Nor is there any doubt of a prevailing outlook in this community. The probable truth about Richard Nixon is that his is an older and different intellectual orientation—as though he had learned his law-school law from the generalizing treatises rather than the atomism of the cases. He seems to believe in a complex of principles, a context of order. This would make him a conceptualist, one who perceives in patterns, senses causalities, coherences and continuities, thinks of a “brooding omnipresence in the skies” not as a hoot and possibly more than a hypothesis. The other, and long fashionable teaching, now come to caricature in judicial “activism,” and to catastrophe in the trashing, thrashing so-called new student left, is relativist, anti-conceptualist, scornful of principle, of logic, of history, of meaning.

These philosophic polarities collided in

American life on the question of communism. To Nixon there was an inexorable difference between communism and the free-will constitutionalism of times before Marx proclaimed amoeba man to be compressed by economics into mass and before Freud put in his later pitch for the hot coercions of sex. The frontal impact came in the trials of Alger Hiss. From the first, Nixon’s conceptualism detected Hiss’ vulnerability. From the first many of the relativist, “*ad hoc*,” “pragmatic” men saw in Hiss a class, culture and coterie hero-martyr, just as they saw in communism only another, and some thought a perfected, a “twentieth century,” version of democracy. Nixon himself traced the intellectuals’ distaste for him to the Hiss exposures.

But he hastened to stress, what must be stressed, that his jeering section was not “soft on communism” in any naïve and vulgar sense. Communism, one of the most rigid conceptualisms in the history of ideas, was as alien to the new mind-set as it was to Richard Nixon—but in the opposite direction. Men taught that all is flux, that reality is an adventitious and unsortable confusion of wayward phenomena in which it is for a man merely to take the next step, saw nothing unprincipled, no illogicality, clearly no ideational lapse in a certain affability toward, and even an agreeable excitement in, communists and communism. Not soft on communism; just zero, or thereabouts, in conceptualism.

Here may well be one reason why so many of Nixon’s critics looked so darkly on his foreign policy from the 1968 campaigning up to the present and to them utterly confounding dénouement, at the two summits. It may be why they were from the first unable to credit his plan—a broad and philosophically articulated concept—for ending the Vietnam war and bringing on a cycle of peace. And this may be why they have shrunk, wherever possible, from firm American response to Soviet expansion, on the Finlandizing ground that it would undercut their own proposals of gentle persuasion, and in the extremity, of diplomatic

mendicancy, hence would irritate Moscow and risk Armageddon. Why, they were asking in earlier years, should democrats distrust democrats? "I can personally handle Stalin," Roosevelt assured Churchill. Now they question whether a mere red-baiter, as many still at least residually think of Nixon, should invite nuclear war by arming to discourage it?

But it has to be remembered that for many years there had been a sturdy dissent from this leftward consensus on the nature of communism and its meaning in the American circumstance. Many dissenters, moreover, bore intellectual credentials as impressive as those of their colleagues who had come to think anti-communism itself a negation of learning. As early as 1951 Supreme Court Justice Jackson described communism as "a complicated system of assumptions . . . which allures our sophisticated intelligentsia more than our hard-headed working people. . . ." The premise of current United States foreign policy was clearly projected in 1950 by F. S. C. Northrop of the Yale law and philosophy faculties:

It is an essential part of [the Soviet Russians'] ideology and hence of their culture and legal principles that ideas and ideals are not merely neutral but positively evil unless they are embodied in matter. This means that the Soviet Russians will have no real respect whatever for any nation or group of people such as the [Henry] Wallacite liberals and Quaker Pacifists who act toward them as if they, the Russians, were non-materialistic idealists and pacifists. . . . This means that they will have no respect for any nation or people which does not embody its own standards and principles in all the matter and force it can muster. . . .

Declarations like these, unfortunately, were obscured in their period by the late Senator Joseph R. McCarthy's misuse of much the same themes. In their legitimate

protest against "McCarthyism," the unsophisticated found it easy to overlook, and the ultra-sophisticated to discredit, the sounder and more prophetic analyses. But Nixon, politician as well as analyst, was blending the Jacksons and Northrops with his own observation and day-to-day practice for a conceptual precipitate which took him through all his later course and on up to the summits with the communist leaders. He had managed to command their attention as an entirely unillusioned and now appropriately muscled competitor: hence a credible proponent of polite, arms' length coexistential peace.

Of course Nixon may fail. It is arguable, and is indeed argued, that the trips to Peking and Moscow themselves confessed failure. It was Nixon who went: Chou and Brezhnev did not come. To be sure, neither Peking nor Moscow was Canossa. But at Moscow the President acknowledged formally that "the tenure of the United States as the first power in the world [had indeed been] one of the briefest in history," to paraphrase Arthur Krock; on the best possible showing, it was now merely at par with the Soviet. Yet Nixon's America was what forty years of "pragmatism" had made it. In crucial ways he was almost a trustee in receivership. Just a few months before the fateful journeys he himself had cited aspects of what he called "decadence." It was Joseph Kraft, a "liberal" columnist, but one significantly not indexed in Keogh's book, who put the matter into a single somber sentence: "We have not lost anything we were prepared to fight for." Nothing in the recent history of Indochina refutes that judgment. If Nixon fails of the modified objectives now announced, the causes will surely include the philosophic disorientation among many Americans described above, with its misapprehension, in foreign policy, of the nature of the adversary, and of the means by which alone his respect is to be insured. In the future, as diligently as in the past, the adversary will doubtless cultivate and court that misapprehension, but will look for none of it

in Richard Nixon. But if Nixon succeeds—ah, if Nixon succeeds!

This review lays more stress on foreign policy than does Keogh, who surveys a broad spectrum of anti-Nixon and related comment and reporting in domestic as well as foreign affairs. The point is that foreign policy, still largely shaped by policy toward the Soviet, exposes most clearly the root of anti-Nixon attitudes which overall make the lone long-distance conceptualist an “enemy . . . occupying” the sacred places rightly in fee to “intellectuals,” *i.e.*, relativists and “pragmatists,” who play it by ear, and from day to day.

Keogh himself, here a reporter first and foremost, moderates the ideological interpretations. He even imputes to some journalists a mere “obsession with the negative,” a “veneration of rebellion” for its own sake, any rebellion, as the sufficient explanation of their behavior. He finesses the diversionary cry of McCarthyism which still rattles some of the conceptualist critics. For instance, he narrates, with no mention of communism, the famous case of Otto F. Otepka, who provided, without authority, certain State Department security data to a Senate subcommittee on subversion—to the moral outrage of newspapers which a few years later hastened to publish the Pentagon Papers.

Keogh writes throughout more in sorrow than in anger. He differentiates accurately between the leeway of editorial writers and the factual accountability of reporters. He stresses the truth that a free press and the freest government will always be at tension. His tone is simply that of a craftsman jealous of his craft, and urging those emendations in its practice which he thinks will improve its credibility and so its acceptance.

And it must be stressed that the range of his criticism is quite narrow. His title seriously overstates his case, because it is not “the Press” but a very few news organs and commentators that he rebukes. His index lists only about a dozen papers and these include the *Detroit News*: it “sharply demonstrated the difference in point of

view which separated independent journalists all across the country from the orthodoxy which was so pervasive in the major media staffs of New York and Washington”—where, he concedes, the *New York Daily News* and *Wall Street Journal*, the *Washington Evening Star* leavened the whole lump. So do such recently emerging columnists as Kirk, Buckley, Kilpatrick, Chamberlain, Hart. The *New York Times*, after criticism by Spiro Agnew, published an Agnew contribution and then (*post* if not *propter hoc*) inaugurated an opposite-editorial-page forum including diverse non-*Times* views in which a Harvard undergraduate has actually spoken up for Nixon.

Other signs are equally suggestive. The first harsh words for the Soviet Union this writer had ever heard from an intellectual friend of many years’ standing came not long ago—though provoked, to be sure, by Moscow’s “ratting” on Hanoi in its merely mild response to the Nixon mining and bombing. But another friend who has railed at Tricky Dick since the young Nixon came commie-hunting out of the West refers to him now as Resourceful Richard. As for already committed Nixonians, they will cheer for a book about the squarest of presidents which all but echoes the squarest of metrical acclaim:

If you can keep your head when all
about you
Are losing theirs and blaming it on you;
If you can trust yourself when all men
doubt you
But make allowance for their doubting,
too. . . .

Reviewed by C. P. IVES

A Patrician Patriot

Gouverneur Morris and the American Revolution, by Max M. Mintz, *Norman, Oklahoma: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1970. 284 pp. \$8.95.*

OF ALL THE MEN at the Constitutional Convention, Gouverneur Morris was by far the most conservative. In an era of enlightenment and optimism concerning the potentialities of human nature, Morris stands out as a beacon of pessimism; he implicitly rejected all forms of progressivism, and found the wide-spread belief in the perfectability of man especially distasteful. Morris preferred to confront man "as he is, without pretending to be wiser than his Maker or supposing my countrymen to be better than those of other people."

Morris also stands out as one of the few men of 1787 who refused to believe in natural rights. In his essay on liberty he declared: "He who wishes to enjoy natural Rights must establish himself where natural Rights are admitted. He must live alone." But no, said Morris, men must live together in society, and "the only 'natural' rights were those which experience has shown necessary for the preservation of society."

The philosophy, political career and personality of this flamboyant, controversial individual are all explored in Max M. Mintz's *Gouverneur Morris and the American Revolution*. Dr. Mintz writes extremely well, provides some interesting illustrations, and, above all, had had the good sense to choose the most controversial and dashing of the Founding Fathers as his subject. Throughout his career, the brilliant, self-assured, aristocratic Morris was to offend many of his colleagues with his flashing wit, near-arrogant demeanor, frequent profanity and lack of discretion, and his numerous sexual exploits. George Mason, the great Virginia libertarian and "Father of

the Bill of Rights," described Morris as a man of "known monarchical Principles . . . 'Coercion by G— —d' is his favorite Maxim in government."¹ In conversation with Jefferson, Mason described Morris as "Impudent."² Madison, less harsh than his fellow Virginian, ascribed to Morris "a fondness for saying things and advancing doctrines no one else would," but notes also "the brilliancy of his genius" and credits him with being "able, eloquent, and active."

Morris' political philosophy was similar to that of the great majority of Founding Fathers, acknowledging, as it does, the necessity of political liberty; but his natural aversion to egalitarianism and democracy strongly tempered his devotion to popular government. Gatherings of aroused patriots were often described by Morris as mobs, and he deeply feared government by "mobility." His political philosophy was based, in the words of Dr. Mintz, on two premises:

(1) that human nature is short-sightedly selfish and should be subject to restraint and (2) that the institution of private property is the foundation of society. It was his view that property fosters commerce, which gives a "mighty Spring" to the "progressive Force" of society. Government, as the protector of society, must therefore safeguard property and commerce by enforcing laws for the performance of contracts, redress of injuries, and punishment of crimes. This government, however, must rest on the rule of law, not on an erratic despotism. The rule of law depends basically upon political liberty, or the consent of the people. But complete political liberty, which he defined as "the Right of assenting to and dissenting from every Public Act by which a Man is to be bound," could endanger property. Man's selfishness would thereby be unleashed. To Morris it followed that, while a measure of political liberty is a prerequisite to the rule of law, there must also be limitations on the liberty itself.