

part of the story it is also the weakest part of the book. The ubiquitous terror, the unprecedented injustices, are not adequately conveyed to the reader who is not already aware of them. Ratiu is evidently an outsider—however sympathetic—who never lived through the systematic slaughter of a culture, that insult to morality that is Communism. A book dealing with Romanian life after 1945 should leave the reader trembling with indignation; Ratiu's essay, informative though it is, barely stirs the passions to discomfort.

The last chapter deals with the author's personal assessment of the situation. Given the pain and sacrifice to which the great majority has been subjected in Romania, as well as the prevalent repression and hypocrisy of the new régime, the people are not likely to embrace Communism. The relatively large number of present Party members can be explained not so much by the success of philosophical persuasions as by the lure of material advantages available to card-carrying Communists. The lack of spirit in no way spells relief, however, especially since relations with the Soviet Union are stronger than ever, thanks to the Party leadership. Ratiu's optimism is thus qualified:

If change is to be brought about in Romania, it will be the doing of the ruling élite themselves when their will to govern collapses, or by the country's youth. Both are possible. Both are probable, should the international equation of forces permit it.

But at the moment the ruling élite seems quite content, a large number of young people have fled the country (whether legally or illegally), and as for the international equation . . . there are fewer and fewer unknowns, the West being less and less willing to do its own arithmetic.

Reviewed by JULIANA GERAN PILON

A Far Eastern Ambuscade

Ambush at Vladivostok, by Phyllis Schlafly and Chester Ward, Alton, Illinois: Pere Marquette Press, 1976. 157 pp. \$2.00 (paper).

GERALD FORD was ambushed at Vladivostok. This, at least, is the conclusion of Phyllis Schlafly and Chester Ward, who argue in their latest book that the 1974 SALT II accords marked yet another dismal passage in the history of American strategic emasculation. "Ambush" is indeed a reasonable choice of terms for, as the authors demonstrate, the President was taken by surprise and out-manuevered in the fast-paced talks which constituted the treaty conference. Ford arrived at Vladivostok completely unaware that he would negotiate any such treaty. He was totally unprepared, psychologically, because of a grueling 17,000 mile goodwill trip which prefaced the conference and technically, because of the virtual absence of any American military or foreign policy advisers. Only Henry Kissinger was at hand, and he, of course, was only too happy to advise and to guide the inexperienced President in terms of his own highly dubious perspective on world affairs. Brezhnev and company, with the able assistance of a coterie of military experts, were ready to capitalize on what for them was an opportune situation and, as Ford himself later put it, the "get-acquainted phase" was swiftly transcended and replaced with "very intensive negotiations on the primary issue of limitation of strategic arms."

According to Schlafly and Ward, Kissinger is to be held principally responsible for the Vladivostok debacle; he knew about the nature of the conference beforehand, and he consciously led Ford into the ambush. SALT II, the authors insist was but another manifestation of the Secretary's "sick" and "defeatist" foreign policy through which he has "deliberately brought the United States down from a position of overwhelm-

ing power to the brink of strategic surrender." As key evidence for this controversial contention, the authors cite a statement which Kissinger supposedly made to Admiral Zumwalt—"The day of the United States is past and today is the day of the Soviet Union. My job as Secretary of State is to negotiate the most acceptable second best position available"—a statement which Kissinger denies that he ever made. In their attempt to impute next to treasonous actions to the Secretary, the authors go to great lengths to prove that the statement was made and cite speculative psychological evidence to suggest its probability. Yet, as far as this reviewer can discern, their case remains unfortunately problematic, for they fail to provide specific motivations on Kissinger's part under which his policies can be construed as acts of "deliberate surrender" rather than as simple (perhaps egregious) errors in judgment. Nevertheless, it is quite easy to agree with Schlafly and Ward that Kissinger's actions, the pessimism underlying his foreign policy and his passion for "preemptive concessions," attest to qualities which make him eminently unqualified for the management of American strategic diplomacy.

The controversy over Kissinger's intentions notwithstanding, SALT II is surely a prime example of the confusion currently beclouding American foreign policy. When Kissinger and Ford returned from Vladivostok, they assured the American people that "essential equivalence" in strategic arms had been maintained, and the President confidently stated that "at Vladivostok we put a firm ceiling on the strategic arms race." According to Schlafly and Ward, Ford could make such an astonishing statement because he sincerely, albeit naïvely, believed that SALT II limited the number of MIRV warheads allowed to both sides. As the authors are quick to demur, the agreement actually limited only the number of missiles on which MIRVs could be

mounted. Under the agreement Ford thought he signed, the Soviets would have been allowed to MIRV only 165 of their missiles, whereas under the *real* agreement, they were guaranteed 1320 missiles with multiple warheads. Yet, and this is the irony of Ford's quest for "equality," even if MIRVs had been limited, the Soviet's overwhelming superiority in terms of nuclear throw weight (app. 3 megatons per Soviet SS-18 vs. app. 170 kilotons per U.S. Minuteman III) would have given them 3960 megatons of explosive power to counter a puny American assault of 222.4 megatons.

These are *prima facie* staggering figures, but what do they really mean? According to Schlafly and Ward, they imply that the U.S. is at "the brink of strategic surrender," that we would be powerless to counter any possible Soviet initiative. One wonders, however, whether American strategic capability has been as thoroughly weakened as the authors appear to believe. Wars may be fought partly in terms of throw weight and megatonnage, but not solely in those terms. There are other factors involved—weapons technology, missile accuracy and kill ratios, missile and deployment obsolescence, geographical distribution of weapons—and until these are considered in concert, it is quite difficult to determine who would win the next war, were such a confrontation to arise.

This is not to say that the central thrust of Schlafly's and Ward's account is in any way misconceived. To the contrary, their book is important and valuable because it exposes the current American policy trend—its concessionism and its unrealistic trust in Soviet good will—as courting calamity. As the authors reasonably argue, it is vital that Congress reject SALT II, and it is high time that we withdraw from the SALT I treaty. The position of the U.S. is uncertain, but it is by no means hopeless.

Reviewed by A. JAMES McADAMS

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

John P. East, professor of political science at East Carolina University, is a member of the editorial boards of *The Political Science Reviewer* and *Modern Age*. Among other works, he has published studies on Willmoore Kendall, Frank S. Meyer and Richard M. Weaver.

David Levy is a lecturer in sociology at Middlesex Polytechnic, Enfield, England. His articles have appeared in England, France, Germany and the United States. At present he is preparing a book, *Thought and Order*.

Svetozar Pejovich is chairman of the department of economics at the University of Dallas and director of the Center for Study of the American Economy. His many books include *Governmental Policies and the Free Market: the U.S. Economy in the 1970's*, *Individual Liberty: Selected Works of W. H. Hutt* (with D. Klingaman) and *The Economics of Property Rights* (with E. Furubotn).

M. E. Bradford, professor of English at the University of Dallas, has written for *Modern Age* for a decade. Recently he has been lecturing throughout the country on the prescriptive view of the American Revolution.

Edward E. Ericson, Jr. is dean of academic affairs and professor of English at Northwestern College, Orange City, Iowa. He is the author of *Radicals in the University* and co-editor of *Religion and Modern Literature*. Currently he is working on a book on Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.

George H. Douglas, professor of English at the University of Illinois in Urbana, has contributed to many scholarly and professional journals. He is presently completing a book dealing with Henry L. Mencken as a critic of American life.

Donald Marquand Dozer is professor emeritus of Latin American history and inter-American relations, University of California at Santa Barbara. He is the author of numerous books, amongst them *Latin America: Politics, Economics and Hemisphere Security*, *The Monroe Doctrine: Its Modern Significance* and *Are We Good Neighbors?*

C. Richard Cleary is professor of political science at La Salle College in Philadelphia. He has contributed chapters to many books, including *Crisis in the Great Republic* and *Medford: Pioneering Village*.

Robert Drake, professor of English at the University of Tennessee, is the author of three books of stories: *Amazing Grace*, *The Single Heart* and *The Burning Bush*.

The book reviews are contributed by: *Henry Regnery*, founder and chairman of the board of the Henry Regnery Company, Publishers; *Hugh Mercer Curtler*, chairman, department of philosophy, Southwest State University, Marshall, Minnesota; *J. Michael Bordelon*, who teaches at the University of Texas at Dallas; *David Levy*, lecturer in sociology at Middlesex Polytechnic, Enfield, England; *Haven Bradford Gow*, who teaches English at Southeastern Massachusetts University; *Francis Russell*, an author, who resides in Sandwich, Massachusetts; *R. D. Stock*, professor of English, University of Nebraska; *James W. Poultnery*, professor emeritus of classical languages, Johns Hopkins University; *Juliana Geran Pilon*, Ph.D., University of Chicago; *A. James McAdams*, graduate student in political science, University of California, Berkeley.